THE SAIVAPARIBHĀṢĀ

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the Śaivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin

English Translation

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

Editors

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

V. K. S. N. RAGHAVAN

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Dr. R. BALASUBRAMAN

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PREFACE

Conversant with both Tamil and Sanskrit traditions of Śaiva Siddhānta, Śivāgrayogin has written a number of books on Śaiva Siddhānta in the form of commentaries and independent treatises. According to tradition, he is one of the illustrious preceptors of the Suryanārkoil Ādhīnam in Tamil Nadu. He had the good fortune of receiving *dīkṣā* and *śaivasannyāsa* from his *guru*, Śrī Śivakkoḷundu Śivācārya, and succeeded him as the spiritual head of the Ādhīnam. As a preceptor of the Siddhānta philosophy and practice, he occupies an important place in the school of Śaiva Siddhānta.

Śivāgrayogin's Tamil commentary (written in the *maṇipravāla* style) on Aruḷnandi's *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* is well-known. He has also written commentaries in Tamil on the *Sarvajñānottara*, *Devīkālottara*, and *Śrutisūktimālā*. His *Śivaneṛiprakāśam* (in Tamil) is an idependent exposition of the basic doctrines of Śaiva Siddhānta. He wrote in Sanskrit two commentaries on the *Śivajñānabodha* — a short one called *Śivajñāna-bodha-saṅgraha-vyākhyāna* and an elaborate one popularly referred to as *Śivāgra-bhāṣya*. In addition to these, he wrote in Sanskrit *Śaiva-sannyāsa-paddhati*, *Kriyā-dīpikā*, and *Śaiva-paribhāṣā*.

The *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* which is a valuable manual on Śaiva Siddhānta is comparable to Dharmarāja's *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of the Advaita school and Śrīnivāsa's *Yatīndramata-dīpikā* of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school. It consists of five chapters. Chapter I deals with logic and epistemology of the Siddhānta school. Chapters II and III deal with *Pati* and *Paśu* respectively. Problems connected with *Pāśa* are dealt with in Chapter IV. The concluding chapter expounds the Siddhānta conception of *mokṣa* and the means thereto. Śivāgrayogin follows the

conventional method of *pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta* dialectics in expounding the Siddhānta views on epistemology and metaphysics, ethical discipline and the goal, and justifies the Siddhānta position in all aspects by citing the authority of the *Pauṣkara* and other *Āgamas*.

Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri who was the first Head of the Department of Philosophy brought out during the fifteen years of his service (1927-1942) in the Department several editions of texts with English translation, besides independent monographs. He chose for translation texts belonging to different schools — *Bhāmatī* (*catussūtrī*), *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*, *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* and *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* from the Advaita school, *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa from the Sāṅkhya school, *Mānameyodaya* from the Mīmāṁsā school, and *Śivādvaita-nirṇaya* of the Śaiva school. He was able to complete all these translations during this period, in addition to the scholarly monographs and learned articles which he published from time to time. The work turned out by Professor Sastri is, indeed, impressive. He not only formulated the ideal to be followed by the Department, but also gave practical expression to it. The ideal, as he conceived it, was "to consolidate our own intellectual heritage with a view to understand and regulate better the lives which have been guided by it all these centuries," without any need for justifying our ways to the outsider or making them appeal to him. Not only did he give the Department a "content", but also a "direction".

Professor Suryanarayana Sastri's English translation, hitherto unpublished, of Śivāgrayogin's *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* was available in the Department. On scrutiny it was found to be incomplete as it contained the English translation for only the first four chapters. Dr V. K. S. N. Raghavan and I prepared the translation for the fifth chapter of the text. Professor Sastri must have followed the text of the *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* in *grantha* script available in the Adyar Library, Madras; and this manuscript copy contains only four chapters. There is an excellent printed copy of this text in *devanāgarī* script, which contains all the five chapters, published by the Oriental Research Institute (Sanskrit Series No. 90), University of Mysore, in 1950. The text of the *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* published by the Oriental Research Institute of the University of Mysore has been helpful in the preparation of this edition of the text with English translation.

I am thankful to Dr N. Veezhinathan, Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras, for his timely help and guidance in the preparation of this volume.

The Radhakrishnan Institute is grateful to the Vice-Chancellor and other authorities of the University of Madras for providing funds for the publication of this monograph.

Madras
March 18, 1982

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN
Director

I am thankful to Dr. N. Venkatarama, Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras, for his timely help and guidance in the preparation of the volume.

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Madras
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R. RAJASUBRAMANIAN
Director

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॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

शैवपरिभाषा

प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

वन्दे तं परमेशानं सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणम् ।
सृष्ट्यादिपञ्चकृत्येशं पशूनां पतिमव्ययम् ॥

गणेशं षण्मुखं साम्बं चित्सभेशं गुरुं नमन् ।
शिवभक्तानुमोदाय शैवभाषां वदाम्यहम् ॥

ŚAIVAPARIBHĀṢĀ

First Chapter

Obeisance to Śrī Sāmbaśiva
Here begins the *Śaivabhāṣā*

Salutations to that supreme Lord (Īśvara), who is of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss, who is the lord of the fivefold activities beginning with creation, and who is the indestructible lord of the bound creatures.

Recording obeisance to Gaṇeśa, to Ṣaṇmukha, to Sāmba, to the Lord of the dance-hall that is intelligence (*Citsabheśa*) and to the preceptor, I set forth the *Śaivabhāṣā* for the satisfaction of the devotees of Śiva.

१. इह खलु धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाख्यचतुर्विधपुरुषार्थानां मध्ये मोक्षस्य परमपुरुषार्थत्वात् तस्य च दीक्षादिना पाशापगमे पशौ शिवत्वाभिव्यक्तिरूपस्य पत्यनन्यतासाक्षात्कारेणैव प्राप्यत्वात् तादृशसाक्षात्कारस्यापि पति-पशु-पाशाख्यपदार्थत्रयपरिज्ञानसाध्यत्वात् तत्परिज्ञानस्य च प्रमाणाधीनत्वात्, प्रथममुद्देश-लक्षण-परीक्षाभिः प्रमाणं निरूप्यते ॥

1. Here, of the four kinds of human goals, *viz.*, religious merit, wealth, (wordly) desires and final release, since final release is the supreme human goal, since that which is of the form of the manifestation of Śiva's nature in the creature, when the bonds are removed by *dīkṣā* etc., is attained only by the intuition of non-otherness from the Lord (*pati*), since that kind of intuition too has to be accomplished by the definite knowledge of the categories called the Lord (*pati*), the creature (*paśu*) and the bonds (*pāśa*), and since that definite knowledge is dependent on *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇa* is first explained through statement (*uddeśa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and examination (*parīkṣā*).

२. तत्र नाम्ना पदार्थानां स्वरूपमात्रकीर्तनमुद्देशः, लक्षणमसाधारणो धर्मः, लक्षितस्य लक्षणमुपपद्यते न वेति विचारः परीक्षा। तत्र प्रमाणानामुद्देशः—'प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दा इति त्रीणि प्रमाणानि' इति। तदुक्तं-"प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च सह शब्देन शाङ्करे" इति ॥

2. Of these, the mention of the thing that is the word-sense, is the statement. The definition is the distinctive attribute. The inquiry as to whether the definition is adequate to the defined is examination. Of these the statement of *pramāṇas* is (thus): '*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* are the three *pramāṇas*.' "In the Śaiva system (in Śāṅkara) *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* as well as *śabda* constitute the *pramāṇas*."

३. तत्र प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणं तु संशयविपर्ययस्मृतिव्यतिरिक्ता प्रमापरपर्याया आत्मचिच्छक्तिरिति। तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

संशयादिविनिर्मुक्ता चिच्छक्तिर्मानमुच्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ४)

3. As for the definition of the general nature of *pramāṇa*, it is the soul's intelligence-energy which is different from doubt, error and remembrance and is otherwise called valid knowledge (*pramā*). That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Intelligence-energy free from doubt etc., is said to be *pramāṇa*." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pramāṇapaṭala, v. 4)

४. तत्र संशयो नाम साधारणधर्मदर्शनात्कोटिद्वयावलम्बिनी बुद्धिः, यथा — स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेत्यादि। विपर्ययस्तु अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिः, यथा — शुक्तिकायां रजतमित्यादि। पूर्वानुभवजनितसंस्कारजन्या बुद्धिः स्मृतिः, यथा — कामुकस्य कामिनीसाक्षात्कारादि। एतत्त्रितयव्यतिरिक्ता चिच्छक्तिरेव प्रमाणम् ॥

तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

द्व्यालम्बा संशयो बुद्धिः समानाकारदर्शनात् ।
विपर्ययोऽन्यथाज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठितम् ॥
अनुभूतार्थविषया मतिः स्मृतिरिहोच्यते ।
एभिर्विहीना चिच्छक्तिः प्रमाणत्वेन संमता ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ५ - ६)

4. Of these what is called doubt is that cognition which rests on two alternatives, because of an attribute (to both) being seen; *e.g.*, "(Is this) a post or a man?" and so on. Error, however, is the cognition of that in what is not that; *e.g.*, 'silver in nacre' and so on. Remembrance is the cognition generated by the impression of

prior expereience; *e.g.*, "the lover's vision of the beloved" and so on. Only that intelligence-energy (*i.e.*, consciousness) which is different from these three is a *pramāṇa*. That has been said even there (in the *Pauṣkara*): "The cognition that rests on two, because of a common nature being seen, is doubt; error is cognition otherwise, resting on what is not of that form (cognised); the cognition whose content is an object (formerly) experienced is here said to be remembrance; intelligence-energy free from these is admitted to be a *pramāṇa*." (Pramāṇapaṭala, vv. 5-6).

५. इयं च चिच्छक्तिः पदार्थविषयको बोध एव। तस्याश्च फलं स्वविषये हानोपादानादि। उक्तं च पौष्करे —

परं प्रमेयं हानादिव्यापारः फलमिष्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ८)

तत्रातिव्याप्त्यादिदोषा न सन्तीति तत्रैव प्रतिपादितम्।

अत्राव्याप्त्यादिदोषाणां न कदाचन संभवः।
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेषु व्याप्त्या नाव्याप्तिदूषणम् ॥
नातिव्याप्तिश्च मेयेषु नानाभावेष्ववर्तनात्।
नान्यथाव्याप्तिरप्यस्ति प्रमाणं चेत्तादीदृशम् ॥
प्रमाणकथनं तेन समीचीनमुदाहृतम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ९—११)

5. And this intelligence-energy is but the consciousness relating to things. And the fruit of that is the avoidance, acceptance etc., relating to its own content. And it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "In respect of the external content, the relation of being an object of knowledge, this (itself) is acknowledged to be active and the fruit of

consciousness." (Pramāṇapaṭala, v. 8). Even there (in the *Pauṣkara*) it has been declared that defects like over-pervasion do not exist here. "Here, there is no possibility whatsoever of defects like under-pervasion. Because of pervasion of *pramāṇas* like perception, there is no defect of under-pervasion. Nor is there over-pervasion since it does not apply to the different kinds of objects of knowledge, nor is there non-pervasion otherwise (non-appreciability of the definition); if (anything is) a *pramāṇa* it is of this nature." (*Ibid*, vv. 9-11)

६. तथागतास्तु प्रमाणमित्थं लक्षयन्ति —

"प्रमाणमविसंवादिज्ञानमर्थक्रियास्थितिः ।
अविसंवादनं" ... ... ॥ इति ॥

तदसत्; भूतभविष्यद्विषयेष्वनुमानेष्वव्याप्तेः । न ह्यसतोर्भूत-भविष्यतोः काचिदर्थक्रियास्ति । स्मृतिज्ञानसविकल्पकज्ञानयोश्चातिव्याप्तेः । न हि ततः प्रवृत्तो विसंवाद्यते कश्चित् । न चेष्टापत्तिः । तेषां मते शुद्ध-वस्तुविषयकत्वेन निर्विकल्पस्यैव प्रमाणत्वात् ॥

6. Bauddhas, however, define *pramāṇa* thus: *pramāṇa* is cognition that does not fail to accord; it is the awareness of practical efficiency that constitutes non-failure to accord. That is not sound, since there is under-pervasion in respect of inferences whose contents (objects) are past and future. Indeed, in the case of the past and the future which are non-existent (now), there is at no time the awareness of practical efficiency; and there is over-pervasion in respect of memory-cognition and determinate cognition; for one who is active because of these cognitions) does not fail to accord (with experience).

७. प्राभाकरास्तु —

अनुभूतिः प्रमाणं सा स्मृतेरन्या स्मृतिः पुनः।
पूर्वविज्ञानसंस्कारमात्रजं ज्ञानमुच्यते ॥

इति वर्णयन्ति। तदपि न; तत्र पूर्वं पदार्थस्मरणपूर्वकस्य वेदवाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं प्रसाध्येदानीं स्मृतिव्यवच्छेदेनानुभूतेः प्रमाणत्वं वदतस्तव पूर्वापरविरोधात्। किं च स्मृतिज्ञानानामात्मस्वात्मांशयोरभिमतं प्रामाण्यं न सिध्येत् स्मृतिज्ञानस्य स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तत्वासम्भवेनानुभूतित्वाभावात्॥

7. The Prābhākaras, however, say thus: "Experience is *pramāṇa*; that is different from remembrance; remembrance, again, is said to be that cognition which is generated solely by the impressions of prior cognition." That too is not (sound). There, there is contradiction between earlier and later; for you who, having established earlier the intrinsic validity of the cognition of the sense of Vedic texts, which (cognition) is preceded (caused) by the remembrance of the word-senses, now declare validity for such experience (alone) as excludes remembrance. Further for memory-cognition there would not result what is here considered validity, (even) in respect of their own existence, for, the memory-cognition, there being no exclusion (of the nature) of remembrance, there is not the nature of experience.

८. अनधिगततथाभूतार्थनिश्चायकं प्रमाणमिति भाट्टाः। यदाहुः —

तस्माद्दृढं यदुत्पन्नं न च संवादमृच्छति।
ज्ञानान्तरेण विज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं प्रतीयताम् ॥ इति ॥

(श्लो. वा. चो. सू. श्लो. ४०)

तदपि न चारुतरम्; यादृच्छिकसंवादिनां दुष्टेन्द्रियाणां बाष्पादिविषयधूमादिलिङ्गविभ्रमाणां भ्रान्तविप्रलम्भकवाक्यानां च प्रामाण्यापत्तेः,

सकलवेदाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गाच्च। यत्र क्वचन जन्मनि वेदार्थस्य सर्वैरधिगतत्वेनानधिगतपूर्वत्वाभावात्। किंचास्मिन्पक्षे धारावाहिकद्वितीयादिज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं न स्यात्॥

8. The Bhāṭṭas hold that it is the *pramāṇa* that ascertains an unknown thing in the manner in which it is, does not apply to that whose object is memory; (but it may be said:) the validity of one cognition (that of memory) may be known through another cognition. That is not very intelligent. Further, there is the contingence of validity for defective sense cognitions that accord by chance for delusive cognitions of smoke etc., as probans where the contents is mist etc., and for deceitful statements, there is also the contingence of non-validity for the entire *Veda*, for in respect of the sense of the *Veda*, there is not the (condition of) not having been previously apprehended by all in some birth or other. Further on this view there would be no validity for the second and subsequent cognitions in a continuous stream (of cognitions).

९. नैयायिकास्तु — साधनाश्रययोरन्यतरत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्तं प्रमाणमिति कथयन्ति। यथाहुः —

तत्र प्रमाणं प्रमया व्याप्तं प्रमितिसाधनम्।
प्रमाश्रयो वा तद्व्याप्तो यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा॥ इति॥

तदपि न; करणानां प्रमेयत्वेन प्रमाणत्वाभावात्, प्रामाण्ये वा दीपादीनामपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात्। तदुक्तं श्रीपौष्करे —

ननु न स्यात्कुतो मानं यत्तत्प्रमितिसाधनम्।
तन्न दीपदृगादीनां प्रमाणत्वप्रसङ्गतः।
यत्प्रमाणं न तन्मेयं मेयाभावः पुनः स्थितः॥

मत्यानुमीयते तत्र शब्दादिर्विषयत्वतः ।
यन्मेयं न हि तन्मानं यतो मानेन मीयते ॥
पश्यामीति दृशा लोके प्रसिद्धिरुपकारतः ।
न कस्यापि पदार्थस्य यद्विना भवति प्रमा ॥
तदेव मानमेष्टव्यं चक्षुरादि न तादृशम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ११-१४)

9. The Naiyāyikas, however, say that, that is a *pramāṇa* which while being either an instrument or a locus (of valid knowledge) is pervaded by valid knowledge. As they say: *Pramāṇa* here is either the instrument of valid knowledge pervaded by valid knowledge or the locus of valid knowledge, pervaded by that; valid knowledge is experience of the thing as it is." That too is not (sound) for the causes being objects of valid knowledge, there is not the character of *pramāṇa* (for them). If these were the characteristics of being *pramāṇa* (for them), there is the contingence of that nature even for the disputants (who are knowers, *pramātṛ-s*; not *pramāṇa*). That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Now it would not be (a *pramāṇa*). Why? Since if that which is the instrument of valid knowledge (were a *pramāṇa*) there is the contingence of the nature of *pramāṇa* for the intellect, the lamp, the sense of sight etc. That which is a *pramāṇa* is not object of knowledge. That it is not an object of knowledge is settled. Sound etc., being objects are inferred through valid knowledge. What is an object of knowledge is not a *pramāṇa*, since it is known by a *pramāṇa*. The usage in the world 'I see with the sense of sight' is because of (the sense-organ) being an auxiliary. That in the absence of which there is no valid

knowledge of anything, that alone should be admitted to be a *pramāṇa*; the sense of sight etc., are not such." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pramāṇapaṭala, vv. 11-14)

१०. चक्षुरादीन्द्रियाणां स्वस्वविषयव्यतिरिक्तविषयग्राहकत्वायोगात् सर्वग्राहकं किञ्चित्प्रमाणमेष्टव्यम्। तच्च चिच्छक्तिरेव। तदुक्तम —

न चक्षुः शब्दसंवित्तौ न श्रोत्रं रूपवेदने।
सर्वत्र ग्राहिका संवित्सैव मानमतो मतम्॥ इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. १५)

10. Since for senses like that of sight, there is no capacity to apprehend objects other than their respective objects, there should be recognised some *pramāṇa* capable of apprehending everything. And that is but intelligence-energy. That has been said: "There is no sense of sight in the cognition of sound, there is no sense of hearing in the cognition of colour; consciousness is that which apprehends in every case; therefore that alone is considered to be *pramāṇa*." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pramāṇapaṭala, v. 15)

११. ननु तर्हि सर्वेषां पदार्थानां सिद्ध्यसिद्ध्योर्बुद्ध्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात्, तस्याश्च सर्वविषयग्राहकत्वात् बुद्धिरेवात्र प्रमाणमिति चेत्, नः तस्याश्चक्षरादिवत्प्राकृतत्वाविशेषेण चिद्रूपत्वाभावात्, सुखदुःखादिरूपहेतुना तस्या वेद्यत्वाच्च। तस्माद्बुद्धेर्नियमेन प्रमाणत्वं नास्ति। उक्तञ्च —

यत्सिद्धौ च इयं सिद्धा यदसिद्धौ न किंचन।
बुद्धिः सर्वान्तिमत्वेन कस्मान्मानं न चेष्यते॥
प्राकृतत्वाविशेषेण दृगादेरविशेषतः।
असंविदात्मकत्वेन न हि बुद्धेः प्रमाणता॥

बुद्धिश्च वेद्यते किंच सुखदुःखादिरूपतः ।
प्रमाणैकान्तता तेन बुद्धेरपि न संमता ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. १६ - १८)

11. As for the statement that since the establishment of things follows the presence or absence of the intellect and since that (intellect) apprehends all objects, the intellect alone is the *pramāṇa*, that is not (so), for being like the sense of sight etc., undistinguished (from them) in respect of being material (*prākṛta*) there is not for it the nature of intelligence; further, because of the forms of happiness, misery etc., it is an object of knowledge. Therefore, the character of *pramāṇa* does not invariably belong to the intellect. And it has been said: "The intellect, on the establishment of which there is the establishment of this (object of knowledge) and on the non-establishment of which there is nothing (known), that being at the *end* (root) of all, why is it not recognised as a *pramāṇa*? Being non-distinct in respect of being material, it is not distinguished from the senses etc.; hence not being of the nature of intelligence, the character of *pramāṇa* does not belong to the intellect; further the intellect is known (as an object) because of its forms of happiness, misery etc. Hence being invariably a *pramāṇa* is not admitted even in the case of the intellect." (*Ibid.* vv. 16 - 18).

१२. ननु प्रमात्रादिप्रमेयान्तसामग्र्यां सत्यामेव प्रमोत्पत्तेः असत्यां च तदनुत्पत्तेः प्रमासामग्र्येव प्रमाणमिति चेत्, न; तथात्वे प्रमातृप्रमेयादिव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्, प्रमात्रादिव्यतिरेकेण सामग्र्यभावात्, यद्यतो व्यतिरिक्तं तत्ततो भिन्नमिति व्याप्तिव्याकोपाच्च। तस्मात् संशयादिविनिर्मुक्ता चिच्छक्तिरेव प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम्। तथा चोक्तम् —

ननु प्रमेयसंसिद्धौ सामग्री केन नेष्यते ।
प्रमात्रादिघटान्तेषु सत्स्वेव घटनिश्चयात् ॥

तन्न प्रमातृमेयादिव्यवहारविलोपतः ।
मातृमेयप्रमाणानां तदन्तर्भावतः स्थितेः ॥

तेषां तु व्यतिरेकेण सामग्री न च दृश्यते ।
यद्यतो व्यतिरिक्तं तत्ततो भिन्नं स्वरूपतः ॥
संशयादिविभिन्ना तु चिच्छक्तिर्मानमिष्यताम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. १९ - २२)

12. Now, since valid knowledge arises only when there is the causal aggregate beginning with the knower and ending with the known, and since when the latter does not exist, the former does not arise, the causal aggregate of valid knowledge in itself is *pramāṇa*; if this be said, no; for, if that were so, there would be the loss of the empirical usage of knower, known etc., (treating them as distinct); for, there is no causal aggregate other than the knower etc.; further, there is conflict with the concomitance that when something is not distinct from another, it is non-different from that other. Therefore it is established that only intelligence-energy free from doubt etc., is a *pramāṇa*. And thus it has been said: "Now, why is not the causal aggregate in respect of the establishment of the object of knowledge, recognised (as a *pramāṇa*), since (an object like) 'pot' is ascertained only when there exist all these causes beginning with the knower and ending with pot? That is not so, because of the loss of empirical usage of the knower, the object of knowledge etc., (as distinct), since it is established of the knower, the means of knowledge and the

object of knowledge that they are included in that (causal aggregate). And as distinct from these there is not seen any causal aggregate. That which is not distinct from another, like one's own nature, is non-different from that other. Let us (therefore) recognise as *pramāṇa* that intelligence-energy which is free from doubt etc." (*Ibid.* vv. 19-22)

१३. नन्वात्मचिच्छक्तिः प्रमाणं चेत्त्वन्मतेऽपि चैकस्यैव प्रमाणत्व-प्रमातृत्वप्रसङ्गरूपदोषोऽस्तीति चेत्, न; अविद्यारागादिना कलुषिता विषयाभिमुखी चिच्छक्तिः प्रमाणमेव, न प्रमाता। अकलुषिता आत्माभिमुखी चिच्छक्तिः प्रमातैव, न प्रमाणम्। तदुक्तं तत्रैव—

चिच्छक्तिश्च परापेक्षो बोध एव न चापरः।
न तस्याभिमुखं ज्ञानं माता मानं परोन्मुखम्॥ इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ७)

13. Now if the self's intelligence-energy be *pramāṇa*, there is in your view the defect of one and the same being both *pramāṇa* and knower (object of valid knowledge ?). If this be said, no; intelligence-energy which is defiled by *vidyā* and *rāga* (*tattvas*) and is directed towards objects is but *pramāṇa*, not the knower. The undefiled intelligence-energy of the self (and is not turned towards objects) is but knower not *pramāṇa*. That has been said even there (in the *Pauṣkara*): "And intelligence-energy is but consciousness directed to what is other than itself (*i.e.*, objects); it is not anything else; the knower is of the nature of consciousness; (but) for that there is no turning towards (objects); *pramāṇa* (however) is turned towards the other (*i.e.*, objects)." (*Ibid.* v. 7)

१४. तत्र प्रथमं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमुच्यते। साक्षात्कारिप्रमा प्रत्यक्षम्। तच्च द्विविधम्, निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदात्। निर्विकल्पकं नामजात्यादि-

योजनाहीनं वस्तुमात्रावगाहि ज्ञानम्। सविकल्पकं तु नामजात्यादियोजनात्मकं विशिष्टज्ञानम्। उक्तं च तत्रैव —

विकल्पयोगात्सा शक्तिरेकापि द्विविधोच्यते।
वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रस्य ग्रहणं निर्विकल्पकम्॥
नामजात्यादिसंबन्धसहितं सविकल्पकम्। इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. २७ - २८)

14. First there is stated the definition of perception. Perception is direct immediate knowledge. And that is twofold, being differentiated into indeterminate and determinate. What is called indeterminate in cognition which being devoid of the relation of generality etc., apprehends the bare thing; the determinate, however, is the cognition of the qualified and is of the nature of the relation of name, class etc. And it has been said even there (in the *Pauṣkara*) : "That energy, because of uniting with distinctions, is said to be twofold, though (really) one. The apprehension of the bare existence of a thing is indeterminate; that which is associated with the relation of name, class etc., is determinate." (*Ibid.* vv. 27-28)

१५. तच्च प्रत्यक्षं प्रकारान्तरेण त्रिविधम्, इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं, मानसप्रत्यक्षं इन्द्रियान्तःकरणनिरपेक्षचित्प्रत्यक्षं चेति। तदुक्तम् —

प्रत्यक्षं त्रिविधं प्रोक्तमक्षमानसचिद्वशात्॥ इति॥

पौष्करे च,

एतच्चेन्द्रियसापेक्षं निरपेक्षं तथैव च।
अन्तःकरणसापेक्षमिति त्रिविधमिष्यते॥ इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. २८)

15. Such perception is three-fold in a different manner as perception derived from senses, perception

derived from the internal organ and perception of intelligence not dependent upon the sense and the internal organ. So it has been said, "Perception is threefold dependent on the sense, the internal organ and intelligence." In the *Pauṣkara* too (it is said): "And this (perception) is admitted to be threefold: dependent on the sense, not dependent (on the sense), and dependent on the internal organ." (*Ibid.* v. 28)

१६. तत्रेन्द्रियान्तःकरणनिरपेक्षं निरस्तबन्धया चिच्छक्तया आत्मनो नित्यसंबन्धाज्जायमानं स्वात्मापरोक्षज्ञानम्। तदुक्तम् —

तत्रेन्द्रियानपेक्षं च सर्वथा त्यक्तबन्धया।
चिच्छक्त्यानन्त्ययोगाच्च योगः स्वाभाविको मतः॥ इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. २९)

अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं तु मनसा बाह्येन्द्रियोपनीतार्थानुभवः। तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं बाह्येन्द्रियचयेन तु।
अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं चिच्छक्तेर्ध्येयसङ्गतिः॥ इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ३१)

इन्द्रियसापेक्षमपि आच्छादकमलनिवृत्तये इन्द्रियापेक्षया चिच्छक्तयेन्द्रियद्वारार्थवीक्षणम्। तदपि तत्रैव —

अन्यच्चेन्द्रियसापेक्षं स्याच्छादननिवृत्तये।
इन्द्रियापेक्षया शक्त्या तद्द्वारेणार्थवीक्षणम्॥ इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ३०)

16. Of these, that which is not dependent on the sense and the internal organ is the immediate cognition of oneself that arises from the constant relation to the self of intelligence-energy that is free from all relations.

That has been said: "Of these, that which is not dependent on the sense is due to the constant and indissoluble union (with the self) of intelligence-energy free from all relations; that is considered to be natural." (*Ibid.* v. 29) But what is dependent on the internal organ is the experience by the mind of the objects brought in by the external senses.*

That has been said even there: "What is dependent on the internal organ (exists), however with the help of the external senses; what is dependent on the internal organ is the relation of the intelligence-energy with what is to be contemplated (*dhyeya*)." (*Ibid.* v. 31) What is dependent on the sense organ is the looking at objects, for the removal of the obscuring impurity by intelligence-energy dependent on the senses, through the channel of the senses. That too is said (even thus): "Different would be what is dependent on the senses; it is the looking at objects, for the removal of obscuration, by the energy dependent on the senses through the channel of the senses." (*Ibid.* v. 30)

* (This is different from the explanation given in the *Pauṣkara-bhāṣya,* where we are told that in this variety of perception, the mind alone is active, the other senses being quiescent. The *Āgama* reads 'jayena,' not 'cayena'; the former means conquest and indirectly cessation or quiescence; the latter means increase or heap.)

१७. ननु चिच्छक्तेरिन्द्रियद्वारार्थसंबन्धः प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तम्, तस्याः स्वनिष्ठाया विषयाभिमुख्याभावात् किंचित्करणं विना तस्या अर्थसंबन्धः कथमिति चेत्, सत्यम्; मलावरणवशात्स्वनिष्ठापि सा कलया व्यञ्जिता अविद्यया विषयाभिमुखीकृता रागेण रञ्जिता च सती अन्तःकरणबाह्येन्द्रियद्वारा आत्मभोगाय बाह्यार्थे प्रवर्तते ।

17. But it is not the (direct) looking at objects by intelligence-energy. Now, it has been said that the relation of intelligence-energy to objects through the channel of the senses is perception. Since for that (energy) which, abides in itself, turning towards object is impossible, how can there be relation to objects without some instrument? If this be asked, true! because of obscuration by *mala*, that (energy), though abiding in itself, manifested (to a small extent) by *kalā*, turned towards objects by *avidyā*, and affected by *rāga*, sets out towards external objects for enjoyment, through the channels of the internal organ and the external senses.

१८. न तु परोक्तरीत्या इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षमात्रजन्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्; चिच्छक्तिसंयोगविहीनस्य तस्याकिंचित्करत्वात्। तदुक्तम् —

चिच्छक्तेरर्थसंयोगोऽध्यक्षमिन्द्रियमार्गतः ।
स्वयमेव हि चिच्छक्तिः पदार्थाभिमुखी न तु ॥
कथं पदार्थसंबन्धस्तस्याः करणमन्तरा ।
सत्यं मलावृतत्वेन स्वनिष्ठैव प्रतिष्ठिता ॥
कलादिकरणैर्युक्ता युज्यतेऽर्थैर्यदा क्वचित् ।
तदा प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तमक्षमर्थे प्रवर्तते ॥
न चेन्द्रियार्थमात्रस्य संयोगोऽध्यक्षमिष्यते ।
चित्संयोगविहीनानामकिंचित्करता यतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. २३ - २६)

स्वायंभुवे च —

कलोद्वलितचैतन्योऽविद्यादर्शितगोचरः ।
रागेण रञ्जितश्चापि बुद्ध्यादिकरणैर्युतः ॥ इति ॥

18. But not in the manner stated by others, is perception that cognition which is generated solely by the contact of sense with object, since that (contact) devoid of intelligence-energy can effect nothing. And thus it has been said: "The conjunction of intelligence-energy with an object through the channel of sense is perception; for intelligence-energy of itself is not turned towards objects; how can there be the relation of it to things without an instrument? True; being enveloped by *mala*, it stands abiding in itself alone; when sometimes it unites with an object, when (itself) associated with instruments like *kalā* (*tattva*), then that is said to be perception; the sense is active in respect of the object; and the conjunction of sense and object alone is not admitted to be perception, since for those which are devoid of conjunction with intelligence, there is not the capacity to effect anything." (*Ibid.* vv. 23-26). And in the *Svāyambhuva* (it is said): "Intelligence, reinforced by *kalā*, having its object revealed by *avidyā*, coloured (i.e., affected) by *rāga*, associated with instruments like the intellect (perceives objects)."

१९. तत्राक्षसंबन्धः षड्विधः, संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः, विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति। तदुक्तं पौष्करे —

अक्षमात्रेण संबन्धः षड्विधोऽध्यक्षसंज्ञितः ॥
घटादिद्रव्यविज्ञानं चक्षुस्संयोगमात्रतः ।
संयुक्तसमवायात्तद्गुणसामान्ययोर्मतिः ॥
संयुक्तसमवेतार्थसमवायाद्गुणत्वधीः ।
शब्दस्य ग्रहणं श्रोत्रसमवेततया स्थितम् ॥
शब्दत्वं समवेतार्थसमवायात्प्रतीयते ।
विशेषणतयाभावसमवायाविति स्थितिः ॥

विशेष्यत्वेन वाभावसमवायमतिः स्थिता । इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ३२-३६)

अन्यत्रापि —

घटतन्नीलनीलत्वशब्दशब्दत्वजातयः ।
अभावसमवायौ च ग्राह्याः संबन्धषट्कतः ॥ इति ॥

इति प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् ॥

19. The relation of sense (to object) is of six kinds: conjunction, inherence in the conjoined, inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined, inherence, inherence in what is inherent, and the relation of qualification and the qualified. That has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "The contact with the sense, which is named perception, is of six kinds: the cognition of substance, as of pot etc., is from mere contact with the sense of sight; but from inherence in the conjoined, there is the cognition of the generality and its quality (blue); from inherence in what is inherent in the qualified, there is the cognition of quality-ness (blueness of the pot); it is settled that the apprehension of sound is through inherence in the sense of hearing; the soundness (of sound) is cognised from inherence in what is inherent; the cognition of non-existence as inherent (in the perceived) is either as a qualification (of the perceived) or as the substrate (or the perceived)." (*Ibid.* vv. 32-36). Even elsewhere: "The pot, its blue colour, blueness, sound, the class soundness and, the inherence and non-existence are apprehended through the six kinds of conjunction." Thus Pratyakṣapramāṇa (Perception).

२०. अथानुमानं निरूप्यते। व्याप्तिनिश्चयेन परोक्षार्थप्रमितिरनुमानम्। शब्दज्ञानव्यावर्त्तये व्याप्तिनिश्चयेनेति पदम्। संशयोत्तर-

प्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय परोक्षग्रहणम्। अत्रानुमितिरनुमानमिति भावव्युत्पत्त्या व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानजन्यपरोक्षार्थविषयकबुद्धिवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचिच्छक्तेरेवानुमानत्वम्। तत्करणस्य लिङ्गपरामर्शस्य तु मेयत्वेन नानुमानत्वम्। उक्तं च —

अनुमानं दृढव्याप्त्या परोक्षार्थावबोधकम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ३७)

20. Then, inference is set forth. The cognition of a mediate object through the ascertainment of concomitance is inference. The words "through the ascertainment of concomitance" are for the purpose of excluding knowledge from verbal testimony. The use of "mediate" is to avoid over-pervasion in respect of perception subsequent on doubt (reinforced by inference). Here, inference, understood as what is existent, is inferential knowledge; hence, the character of *anumāna* (inferential knowledge) belongs only to intelligence-energy which is generated by the cognition of a probans residing in the subject, as qualified by concomitance (with the probandum) and which relates to a mediate object; but, in the case of reflection on the probans, which is instrumental to that (inference), there is not the character of *anumāna*, since it is an object of knowledge. And it has been said: "Inference is that which gives knowledge of remote objects through well-established concomitance." (*Ibid.* v. 37)

२१. तत्र व्याप्तिर्नाम साध्यसाधनयोरनौपाधिकः सम्बन्धः। तथा चोक्तम् —

साधनस्य स्वतः साध्येनान्वयो व्याप्तिरुच्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ४१)

21. Here, what is called concomitance is the relation free from external adjuncts, between the probandum and the probans. And thus it has been said: "The co-existence of the probans with the probandum is called concomitance." (*Ibid.* v. 41)

२२. उपाधिश्च साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यव्यापकत्वम्। यथा वह्निना धूमे साध्ये आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगादिः। स हि साध्यस्यधूमस्य व्यापकः, धूमवति सर्वत्र वृत्तेः साधनस्य वह्नेरव्यापकः, वह्निमत्ययोगोलकादाववृत्तेः। अयं च निश्चितोपाधिः। शङ्कितोपाधिस्तु मित्रातनयत्वेन श्यामत्वे साध्येऽदृष्टोपाधिः। इयं च व्याप्तिर्द्विविधा, अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात्। सामान्यतः साध्यसाधनयोः संबन्धोऽन्वयव्याप्तिः, यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इति। तयोर्व्यतिरेकमुखेन संबन्धो व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः, यथा - यत्राग्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाह्रद इति। तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

सा च व्याप्तिर्द्विधा ज्ञेया व्यतिरेकान्वयात्मिका ॥
सामान्यमुखतो ज्ञेया सान्वयव्याप्तिरुच्यते।
साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिरभावमुखतोऽपरा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ४१ - ४२)

अन्यत्र च —

व्याप्यव्यापकभावो हि भावयोर्यादृगिष्यते।
तयोरभावयोस्तस्माद्विपरीतः प्रतीयते ॥ इति ॥

22. And being an external adjunct consists in pervading the probandum while not being pervasive of the probans; *e.g.*, when smoke is to be proved through fire, (the conjunction with) wet fuel etc., (is the *upādhi*); that indeed is pervasive of the probandum, the smoke, since it exists everywhere where there is smoke; it is not pervasive of the *probans*, fire, since it does not exist in an iron

ball etc., which are fiery; and this is an ascertained external adjunct. (An example of) the suspected external adjunct, however, is unseen potency *(adṛṣṭa)* as the external adjunct, when darkness is to be proved (of a person) through being the son of Mitrā. And this concomitance is of two kinds, being differentiated into co-presence and co-absence. The ordinary relation of probandum and probans is the concomitance of co-presence: where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the fire-place. Their negative relation is the concomitance of co-absence: where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a big lake. That has been said even there: "That concomitance should be known to be of two kinds, as of the nature of co-absence and co-presence; relation in the ordinary (affirmative) form is said to be concomitance by co-presence; the other is the concomitance of probandum and probans through non-existence (of both)." (*Ibid.* vv. 41-42). And elsewhere (it is said): "Just as the kind of relation of pervader and pervaded is admitted between existents, the reverse of that is cognised as between their non-existences."

२३. इदं चानुमानं द्विविधम्, स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति। स्वार्थं स्वप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः। तच्च महानसादौ वह्निधूमयोः व्याप्तिग्रहणानन्तरं पर्वतादौ व्याप्यलिङ्गदर्शनाद्वन्ह्याद्यनुमानम्। यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितु पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम्। ते चावयवाः प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात्पञ्च। तत्र पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा, धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः। यो यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम्। तथा धूमवांश्चायमित्युपनयः। तस्माद्वह्निमानेवेति निगमनम्। एवं पञ्चरूपोपपन्नाद्वाक्यात्परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते। तत्परार्थानुमानम्। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

तच्चेह पञ्चावयवं प्रतिज्ञा हेतुरेव च ॥

दृष्टान्तोपनयावेतौ निगमश्चाथ पञ्चमः ।
इष्टार्थोक्तिः प्रतिज्ञा तु हेतुस्तद्व्याप्तिमद्वचः ॥

दृष्टान्तो द्विविधोद्युक्तो हेतुस्तद्वत्परीक्ष्यते ।
दृष्टान्तपक्षयोर्व्याप्तिप्रस्तार उपनयो भवेत् ॥

पुनः प्रतिज्ञानियमो निगमः स्यात्सहेतुकः । इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ३७ - ४०)

23. And this inference is of two kinds: for oneself and for another. That for oneself is the cause of one's own cognition; and that is the inference of fire, which occurs immediately after the apprehension of the concomitance from the observation of the pervaded probans on the hill etc. When, however, he who having inferred for himself fire from smoke, uses the statement with five members in order to convey the knowledge to another, that (statement) is inference for another. And these members are five, divided into *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. Of these "The hill has fire" is the *pratijñā*; "because it has smoke" is the *hetu*; "whatever has smoke has fire, like the fire-place" is the *udāharaṇa*; "and similarly has this smoke" is the *upanaya*; and "therefore this (hill) certainly has fire" is the *nigamana*. Thus, from the statement containing five members, even the other person cognises fire. That is inference for another. And thus it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "And that has five members — *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*, the fifth. The statement of the sense desired (to be proved) is *pratijñā*; the *hetu* is the statement of the ground of inference which is invariably concomitant with the thing that is sought to be proved; the *udāharaṇa* is the statement wherein the *hetu* is proved

to be concomitant with the illustrative example in both the affirmative and the negative manner; the *upanaya* is the mention of the concomitance between the *dṛṣṭānta* and the subject (*pakṣa*); the restatement of what is premised together with the probans is the *nigamana.*" (*Ibid.* vv. 37-40)

२४. स च हेतुर्द्विविधः, दृष्टसाधनसामान्यतोदृष्टसाधनभेदात्। तत्र आद्यस्त्वक्षयोग्यपदार्थानुमापकः। यथा - कुलालं घटक्रियां च कुत्रचित् दृष्ट्वा अन्यत्रापि घटदर्शनात् कुलालेन निर्मितो घट इति। द्वितीयस्तु प्रत्यक्षायोग्यार्थानुमापकः। यथा - परकीयज्ञानानुमापकं परवाक्यम्। तत्र हि साध्यं परकीयज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षयोग्यम्। किन्तु साध्यतावच्छेदक-ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नम्। तज्जातीयमात्मीयज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षयोग्यम्। अतः सामान्य-तोदृष्टमेव। तथा प्रपञ्चकृत्यं तत्कर्तारं चैकत्र अदृष्ट्वा कार्यत्वसामान्यात् पशुपाशज्ञानागोचरजगत्कर्त्रनुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टसाधनम्। एवं पशुपाश-मायाकर्मादीनामप्यूह्यम्। तदुक्तम् —

दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति तत्साधनं द्विधा।
तत्राद्यमक्षयोग्यस्य पदार्थस्यानुमापकम्॥
अन्यत्सतोऽप्यदृष्टस्य पदार्थस्यानुमापकम्। इति॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ४३ - ४४)

24. And this probans is twofold, being divided into what is instrumental as seen (in experience) and what is instrumental as seen in its generic nature. Of these, the first is what causes inference of a thing capable of being perceived. This is how: having seen in some (one) place a potter and the pot-making, the inference elsewhere too, because of having seen a pot there, that, that pot was made by a potter. The second one is what causes inference

of a thing not capable of being perceived. This is how: The statement of another person is the cause of inference of the knowledge present in him. Therein the knowledge of other man, which is sought to be established is indeed not capable of being perceived. It however is conditioned by the property of — the state of being knowledge — the property which determines knowledge as the thing that is sought to be established. The knowledge present in oneself which belongs to the category of the knowledge of other man is capable of being perceived. Therefore it is known from its generic nature. Not having seen in any one place the activity of world-making and the agent, the inference of a world creator, who is not the object of knowledge for the bare creature or (for that creature through) the bonds, is through the instrumentality of what is seen in its generic nature, since the inference is from similarity in respect of being an effect. Thus is it to be understood in the case (of the inference) of *paśutva* (the bond called *āṇava*), *pāśa*, *māyā*, *karma* etc. That has been said: "The probans is twofold, as what is seen (in ordinary experience) and what is seen in its generic nature; of these, the first is what causes inference of a thing capable of being perceived; the other causes inference of a thing which though existent is unseen." (*Ibid.* vv. 43-44)

२५. यत्र साध्यं वा साध्यजातीयं वा न प्रत्यक्षयोग्यं स शब्दमात्रज्ञातसाध्यकः परोऽपि हेतुः। यथा पूर्वपुण्यानुमापक इदानींतनो भोगविशेषः। स च साध्यः पुण्यादिः शब्दादृते न ज्ञायत इति शब्दमात्रज्ञातः। स च हेतुः पुनस्त्रिविधः, अन्वयव्यतिरेकि-केवलान्वयि-केवलव्यतिरेकिभेदात्।

25. Where the probandum or what is of the same class as the probandum is not capable of being perceived, that is known through verbal testimony alone, though the

probans be perceptible; *e. g.*, the present particular enjoyment which causes the inference of prior merit. Since that probandum, merit etc., is not possible in the absence of verbal testimony, it is known through verbal testimony alone. And the probans is (again) threefold: the co-present and co-absent, the barely co-present, and the barely co-absent.

२६. तत्र अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः पञ्चरूपोपपन्नः, तानि च रूपाणि पक्षधर्मत्वं, सपक्षे सत्त्वं, विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः, अबाधितविषयत्वं, असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति। तत्र सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्मा पक्षः। निश्चितसाध्यवान् सपक्षः। निश्चितसाध्यधर्माभाववान्विपक्षः। तत्र पक्षधर्मत्वं हेतोः पक्षे पर्वतादौ वर्तनम्। सपक्षे सत्वं तु सपक्षे महानसादौ वर्तनम्। विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः विपक्षे महाह्रदादौ हेतोरवर्तनम्। अबाधितविषयत्वं पक्षे पर्वतादौ वन्ह्यादेः साध्यस्य प्रमाणान्तरेण बाधविरहः। असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं तु साध्यविपरीत-साध्यसाधकहेत्वन्तरविरहः। एवं पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एवान्वयव्यतिरेकी साध्य-साधकः॥

26. The co-present and co-absent probans is endowed with five attributes. These attributes are: being resident in the subject, existence in what is of the same class as the probandum, non-existence in what is not of the same class as the probandum, not having its content sublated and not having a counter-probans. Here, that in which the presence of the probandum is in question is the subject (*pakṣa*), that in which the probandum has been ascertained is *sapakṣa*, and that wherein the non-existence of the probandum has been ascertained is the *vipakṣa*. 'Being resident in the subject' is the existence of the probans in the subject, *i.e.*, hill etc. 'Existence in the *sapakṣa*' is existence in the fire-place etc., which are *sapakṣas*. "Non-existence in the *vipakṣa*" is non-existence in the big lake etc., which are *vipakaṣas*. 'Not having its

content sublated' means the non-sublation of the probandum, fire, etc., in the subject, hill etc., through some other *pramāṇa*. 'Not having a counter-probans' is the absence of another probans that can establish a probandum contrary to the (present) probandum. The co-present and co-absent probans can establish the probandum only when endowed with these five attributes.

२७. विपक्षशून्यः केवलान्वयी। सपक्षशून्यः केवलव्यतिरेकी। तावुभौ चतूरूपोपपन्नावेव स्वसाध्यं साधयतः। क्रमेणैषामुदाहरणम् - पर्वतो वह्निमान्, धूमवत्वात्, यथा महानसः। विश्वं कार्यं कर्तृसापेक्षं, कार्यत्वात्, कुलालसापेक्षमृद्वत्। सर्वं कार्यं सदेव, क्रियमाणत्वात्, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा शशशृङ्गमिति॥

27. That which is devoid of *vipakṣa* is the barely co-present. That which is devoid of *sapakṣa* is the barely co-absent. These two establish their respective probanda, while possessing four attributes alone. The illustrations of these (three kinds of probans) respectively are: The hill is fiery, since it has smoke, like the fire-place. The entire effected universe is dependent on a creator, since it is an effect, like the clay dependent on the potter. Every effect is certainly real, since it is effected; what is not thus (real) is not that (effected) like the horn of a hare.

२८. तथा चोक्तम् —

अन्वयव्यतिरेकीति केवलव्यतिरेकि च।
केवलान्वयिरूपेण क्रमेण परिलक्ष्यते॥

पक्षधर्मः सपक्षे सन् व्यावृत्तश्च विपक्षतः।
अबाधोऽसत्प्रतीपक्षो व्यतिरेकान्वयात्मकः॥

साध्यधर्मयुतः पक्षः सपक्षस्तत्सधर्मयुक् ।
तद्विधर्मा विपक्षः स्याद्बाधो मानान्तरोद्भवः ॥

साध्ये द्वयोस्त्रिरूपत्वं तेन ज्ञानाद्विपक्षता ।
निर्विपक्षोऽन्वयी हेतुर्निस्सपक्षस्तथापरः ॥

साग्निर्देशः सधूमत्वादन्यो रसवती यथा ।
केनाप्यध्यासितं विश्वं कार्यं स्याद्वस्तुभावतः ॥

यथा कुलालसापेक्षा मृदित्येषोऽन्वयी पुनः ।
सदेवोत्पद्यते कार्यं क्रियमाणत्वहेतुतः ॥

असन्न पूर्वं क्रियते धर्मांशः शशशृङ्गवत् । इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ४४ - ५०)

28. And that has thus been said: "The co-present and co-absent, the barely co-absent and the barely co-present are defined respectively. What is co-absent and co-present is existent in the subject, existent in the *sapakṣa*, absent from the *vipakṣa*, non-sublated and without counter-probans. The *pakṣa* is that wherein the probandum has to be established. The *sapakṣa* is that which is associated with an attribute similar to the probandum. The *vipakṣa* is that wherein the non-existence of that (probandum) has been ascertained. The sublation is the origination of another (contrary) cognition. The *satpratipakṣa* is the obstruction (to inference) caused by the cognition of two probans each having only three attributes in respect of two contrary probandums (*asatpratipakṣatva* and *abādhitaviṣayatva* being excluded). That which has no *vipakṣa* is barely co-present probans; the other is that which has no *sapakṣa*. The other place (hill etc.,) has fire, since it has smoke, like the fire-place; the entire (material cause

of the) world becomes an effect, because of its being controlled by someone, since it is (an effected) thing, like the clay dependent on the potter — this is the barely co-present. Every effect is real, as it is effected; what is not real is not effected like the horn of a hare." (*Ibid.* vv. 44-50)

२९. उक्तानां पक्षधर्मत्वादिरूपाणां मध्ये एकेनापि रूपेण हीना अहेतवः कतिपयरूपयोगाद्धेतुवदवभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः। ते चासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकानध्यवसितकालात्ययापदिष्टभेदात्पञ्च। तत्रासिद्धलक्षणम्—

व्याप्यस्य पक्षधर्मत्वप्रतीतिः सिद्धिरुच्यते।
असिद्धिस्तदभावः स्याद्धेतुस्तद्धाननेकधा॥ इति॥

29. (Of the co-present and co-absent probans) a probans which is devoid of any one of the five attributes above-mentioned is not really a probans but because of the presence of some attributes it appears as a probans; such are called apparent probans (or fallacies). They are five being divided into *asiddha*, *viruddha*, *anaikāntika*, *anadhyavasita*, and *kālātyaya*. Here is the definition of *asiddha*. "The cognition of the pervaded (the probans) as existing in the subject is called *siddhi*. *Asiddhi* is the absence thereof. There are many kinds of such (a defective) probans."

३०. स च स्वरूपासिद्धो भागासिद्ध आश्रयासिद्धो विशेषणासिद्धो विशेष्यासिद्ध उभयासिद्धो हेत्वज्ञानासिद्धोऽधिकरणाज्ञानासिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध इति दशविधः। व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽपि द्विविधः। एको व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात्, अपरस्तूपाधिसद्भावात्। अत आहत्यैकादशासिद्धाः। तत्र स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा - घटादयः परमाणुरूपा भवितुमर्हन्ति, नित्यत्वात्, पाञ्चरात्रमते आत्मवदिति। अत्र उभयवादिसंमते अनित्यघटे नित्यत्वहेतुः स्वरूपेणासिद्धः। यथा वा - नित्यः शब्दः, चाक्षुषत्वादिति।

अत्र चाक्षषत्वं शब्दे पक्षेऽसिद्धम् ॥ भागासिद्धो यथा - अनित्यौ जीवदेहौ, कार्यत्वात् घटवदिति । अत्र कार्यत्वं पक्षीकृतयोर्जीवदेहयोर्मध्ये जीवेऽसिद्धम् । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा - गगनारविन्दं सुरभि, अरविन्दत्वात्, सरोजारविन्दवदिति । अत्र गगनारविन्दाश्रयो न संभवति । विशेषणासिद्धो यथा - शब्दो नित्यश्चाक्षषत्वे सति गुणत्वात्, रूपवदिति । अत्र हेतौ चाक्षुषत्वविशेषणमसिद्धम् ॥ विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा - शब्दो नित्यः, प्रमेयत्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात्, घटवदिति । अत्र हेतौ विशेष्यभूतस्य द्रव्यत्वस्यासिद्धिः । उभयासिद्धो यथा - नित्यो घटः, गुणत्वे सत्यतीन्द्रियत्वादिति । अत्र हेतौ विशेषणभूतं गुणत्वं विशेष्यभूतमतीन्द्रियत्वमप्यसिद्धम् । हेत्वज्ञानासिद्धो यथा - देवदत्तो बहुधनः, तद्धेतुभूतादृष्टाश्रयत्वात्, यज्ञदत्तवदिति । अत्रादृष्टाश्रयत्वहेतुरस्माभिरदृष्ट इत्यज्ञानाद्धेतुरज्ञानासिद्धः । अधिकरणाज्ञानासिद्धो यथा - इदानीमिहाकाशे परमाणुः कदाचित् द्रव्यारम्भकः, परमाणुत्वात्, घटारम्भकपरमाणुवदिति । अत्राश्रयस्य आकाशाधिकरणकपरमाणोरज्ञानादाश्रयाज्ञानासिद्धो हेतुः । अन्यतरासिद्धो यथा - अनित्यः शब्दः, कृतकत्वात्, घटवदिति । अत्रान्यतरस्मिन्मीमांसकमते कृतकत्वस्य हेतोरसिद्धत्वादयमन्यतरासिद्धो हेतुः । व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो यथा - सर्वं क्षणिकं, सत्वात्, जलबुद्बुदवदिति । अत्र सत्वक्षणिकत्वयोर्व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावादयमाद्यो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो हेतुः । औपाधिकव्याप्यत्वासिद्धो यथा - गर्भस्थः श्यामः, मित्रातनयत्वात्, प्राचीनमित्रातनयवदिति । अत्र श्यामत्वे साध्ये शाकाद्याहारपरिणतिभेदस्यैवोपाधेर्विद्यमानत्वादौपाधिकव्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽयं हेतुः ॥

30. That *asiddha* is of ten kinds as: (1) *svarūpāsiddha,* (2) *bhāgāsiddha,* (3) *āśrayāsiddha,* (4) *viśeṣaṇāsiddha,* (5) *viśeṣyāsiddha,* (6) *ubhayāsiddha,* (7) *hetvajñānāsiddha,* (8) *adhikaraṇājñānāsiddha,* (9) *anyatarāsiddha,* (10) *vyāpyatvāsiddha.* The last is two-fold, one due to the lack of any *pramāṇa* to apprehend the concomitance, the other due to having an external adjunct. Altogether thus there are eleven kinds of *asiddha.* (1) *Svarūpāsiddha*: Pot etc., should be of the form of primal atoms, since they are eternal, like the soul in the Pāñcarātra system; here

the probans of eternality in respect of the pot, which is admitted by both disputants to be non-eternal, is *svarūpāsiddha*; or else, in 'sound is non-etenal since it is visible,' visibility is non-existent in the subject, sound. (2) *Bhāgāsiddha*: The *jīva* and the body are eternal, since they are effects, like the pot; here 'being one effect' is non-existent in the *jīva*, of the *jīva* and body which have been made the subject. (3) *Āśrayāsiddha*: The sky-lotus is fragrant, since it is a lotus; here there does not exist the locus (of attribution), *viz.*, the sky-lotus. (4) *Viśeṣaṇāsiddha:* Sound is eternal, since while being visible it is a quality like colour; here, in the probans, the qualification of being visible is non-existent. (5) *Viśeṣyāsiddha*: Sound is eternal, since while being an object of knowledge it is a substance, like a pot; here in the probans, substantiality, which is the substrate (of the qualification), is non-existent. (6) *Ubhayāsiddha*: Pot is eternal, since while being a quality, it is beyond the cognition of senses; here in the *hetu*, the adjective quality-ness and the substrate being beyond sense-perception are non-existent. (7) *Hetvajñānāsiddha*: Devadatta is endowed with much wealth, since there resides in him the *adṛṣṭa* which is the cause of that; here since the probans, 'being the abode of *adṛṣṭa*' is imperceptible by those like us, the probans is unknown and non-established. (8) *Adhikaraṇājñānāsiddha*: Now in respect of this ether, primal atom is sometimes the cause of substance, since it is a primal atom, like the primal atom that causes a pot; here, since there is not known the substrate *viz.*, primal atom having ether for its locus, the probans is *āśrayājñānāsiddha*. (9) *Anyatarāsiddha*: Sound is non-eternal, since it is a product, like a pot; here, since in the view of one of the disputants, the Mīmāṁsakas, the probans of being a product is not known the probans is *anyatarāsiddha*. (10) *Pramāṇābhāvavyāpyatvāsiddha*:

Everything is momentary, because of being real, like water-bubbles; here since there is no *pramāṇa* that apprehends the concomitance of momentariness and reality, this probans is *vyāpyatvāsiddha*. (11) *Aupādhikavyāpyatvāsiddha*: The child in the womb is dark because of being the child of Mitrā like the earlier children of Mitrā; here since, in respect of the probandum, darkness, there is the external adjunct of *adṛṣṭa*, this probans is *aupādhikavyāpyatvāsiddha*.

३१. अथ विरुद्धः। तल्लक्षणं तु साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तत्वम्, साधनविपर्ययव्याप्तसाध्यकत्वं वा। यथा - नित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वात्, व्योमवदिति। अत्र कार्यत्वहेतुः स्वसाध्यविरुद्धेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तः। साधनविपर्ययव्याप्तसाध्यकस्तु यथा - अनित्यं मनः, चेतनत्वात्, आत्मवदिति। अत्रानित्यत्वरूपं साध्यं स्वसाधनविपर्ययेणाचेतनत्वेन व्याप्तम्॥

31. *Viruddha*: The definition is either being pervaded by the contrary of the probandum or (the probandum) being pervaded by the contrary of the probans. e.g., Sound is eternal, since it is a product, like the ether. Here the probans, 'being a product' is pervaded by non-eternality, the contradictory of the probandum. "Being pervaded by the contrary of the probans" is thus: Mind is non-eternal, since it is intelligent, like the self. Here non-eternality is pervaded by the contrary of the probans.

३२. अनैकान्तिकः सव्यभिचारो हेतुः। स च द्विविधः। साधारणानैकान्तिकोऽसाधारणानैकान्तिकश्चेति। तत्र प्रथमो यथा - आत्मा नित्यः, प्रमेयत्वादिति। अत्र प्रमेयत्वहेतुः पक्ष आत्मनि सपक्षे मायायां विपक्षे घटादौ च वर्तते। द्वितीयो यथा - भूर्नित्या, गन्धवत्त्वादिति। अत्र गन्धवत्त्वहेतुः सपक्षादात्मनः विपक्षाज्जलादेश्च व्यावृत्तः पक्षमात्रे वर्तते॥

32. *Anaikāntika* which is irregular probans is twofold as (1) *sādhāraṇa* and (2) *asādhāraṇa*. (1) The self is eternal

because it is an object of knowledge; the probans or "being an object of knowledge" is *anaikāntika*, since it is inconsistant; for it exists in the subject, the self, in the *sapakṣa*, *māyā*, and in the *vipakṣa*, pot etc. (2) Earth is eternal, since it has odour; here the probans, 'possessing odour' is absent from *sapakṣa*, the self, and the *vipakṣa*, water etc., and exists in the subject alone.

३३. साध्यानिश्चायको हेतुरनध्यवसितः। यथा - विश्वं सन्ततं वर्तते, वस्तुत्वादिति। अत्र वस्तुत्वहेतुः स्वसाध्यनित्यवर्तनं न निश्चिनोतीत्यनध्यवसितः। बलवत्प्रमाणान्तरबाधितो हेतुः कालातीतः। स एव बाधितविषय इत्युच्यते। स प्रमाणानां भेदात्पञ्चधा भवति। तत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधो यथा - अग्निरनुष्णः, पदार्थत्वादिति। अनुमानबाधो यथा - विश्वं कार्यं निरुपादानकं, आगन्तुकत्वादिति। आगमबाधो यथा - यागादयः स्वर्गसाधका न भवन्ति, क्रियात्वात्, व्यर्थक्रियावदिति। अर्थापत्तिबाधो यथा - शतवर्षजीवी देवदत्तो गृहेऽसन् बहिरपि नास्ति, प्रत्यक्षेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वादिति। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

हेतूनां दूषणान्यत्र पञ्चोक्तानि शिवागमे ।
असिद्धिः प्रथमो हेतोः पक्षवृत्तेरनिश्चये ॥

नित्यत्वादणवो हेतुरित्यसिद्धिः स्वरूपतः ।
विशेषणविशेष्यादेरसिद्ध्या तत्तदात्मिका ॥

वर्तमानो विरुद्धः स्याद्धेतुः पक्षविपक्षयोः ।
व्यापकोऽव्यापको देशानवच्छिन्नत्वहेतुतः ॥

पक्षादित्रितये वर्तमानोऽनैकान्तिको भवेत् ।
आत्मा नित्यः प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्रोदाहृतो द्विजाः ॥

साध्याप्रयोजकः पक्ष एवानध्यवसायिकः ।
सन्तत्या वर्तते विश्वं वस्तुत्वादित्युदाहृतः ॥

कालातीतस्तु साध्यस्य पक्षे मानविरोधतः ।
निरुपादानकं विश्वं कार्यमागन्तुकत्वतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ५१ - ५६)

33. *Anadhyavasita* is the probans that cannot lead to the certitude of the probandum; *e.g.*, in 'the world exists constantly, because it is a thing', the probans "being a thing" does not cause the certitude of constant existence which is to be proved by itself; hence it is *anadhyavasita*. The probans sublated by some other stronger *pramāṇa* is *kālātīta* (lapsed in time); that is itself what is said to have its content sublated (*bādhita-viṣaya*). And that becomes fivefold because of the division of *pramāṇas* (into five). Perceptually sublated is thus: fire is not hot, since it is a thing; inferentially sublated is thus: the world-effect has no material cause, since it is adventitious; scripturally sublated is thus: sacrifice, etc., are not instrumental to heaven, since they are activities, like the activities of play, etc.; sublated by presumption is thus: Devadatta who has a hundred years of life, while not being at home, does not exist outside either, since he is not cognised by perception. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara* : "Fallacies of the probans have been stated to be five in the *Śivāgama*. The first is *asiddhi* where the existence of the probans in the subject is uncertain. "Atoms are the cause, because of their eternality" — is *svarūpāsiddhi*. By the non-establishment of the qualification (of the probans) or of the substrate (*i.e.*, the locus of the probans) or of anything similar (*e.g.*, the cognition apprehending the pervasion or existence of probans in the subject), there is *asiddhi* of the respective nature in each case, *i.e.*, *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, *āśrayāsiddhi* and *jñānāsiddhi*. The probans that exists in both *sapakṣa* and

vipakṣa is *viruddha*; *e.g.*, the pervasive (self, etc.) is not pervasive, since it is not defined in space. [The *Pauṣkara-bhāṣya* says that existence in *vipakṣa* alone is what is required though this kind of probans sometimes exists in the *sapakṣa* too.] That which exists in the three, beginning with *pakṣa* (*i.e.*, *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*) is *anaikāntika*; the example cited here, oh, the twice-born, is that the self is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. That which exists in the subject alone without pervasion by the probandum is *anadhyavasita*; the example cited is that the world exists constantly, since it is a thing. The *kālātita* or lapsed in time is due to conflict of the subject (having the probandum) with some other *pramāṇa*, *e.g.*, the world effect has no material cause, since it is adventitious." (*Ibid.* vv. 51-56).

३४. ये त्वनध्यवसितमनैकान्तिकेऽन्तर्भावयन्ति ते प्रकरणसमं पञ्चमं मन्यन्ते। तल्लक्षणं तु यस्य साध्याभावसाधकः समानबलो हेतुरस्ति स सत्प्रतिपक्षः प्रकरणसम इति चोच्यते, यथा - शब्दो नित्यः, बाधकप्रमाणरहितत्वात्। स चानित्यः, साधकप्रमाणरहितत्वादिति। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे - "अबाधोऽसत्प्रतिपक्षः" इति। असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं हेतोर्गुणं ब्रुवता सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य हेत्वाभासत्वं शिवेनैव सूचितम्। पक्षाभासश्चतुर्विधः, कुत्रचित्पक्षाभावात्, कुत्रचित्पक्षधर्मत्वाभावात्, कुत्रचित्पक्षपक्षधर्मत्वयोरुभयोरभावात्, कुत्रचिदुभयोः सत्त्वेऽपि व्याप्त्यभावादिति॥

34. Those who include *anadhyavasita* within *anaikāntika* consider the fifth as the *prakaraṇasama*. The definition of this (latter) is: that for which there is an equally strong probans proving the non-existence of the probandum; this is called *satpratipakṣa* and also *prakaraṇasama*; *e.g.*, 'sound is eternal, since there is no *pramāṇa* to the contrary,' and 'it is not-eternal since there is no *pramāṇa* in favour (of eternality).' And thus it has been said in the

sacred *Pauṣkara* : "Non-sublation is not having a counter-probans." In declaring *asatpratipakṣa* as a merit of the probans it is indicated by Śiva himself that *satpratipakṣa* is a fallacy of the probans. Fallacies of the subject are of four kinds: (1) non-existence of the subject, (2) non-existence of being the attribute of the subject, (3) non-existence of both, (4) non-existence of pervasion even where both the above exist.

३५. अत्र क्रमेणोदाहरणानि - खपुष्पं सुरभि, पुष्पत्वादिति। अत्र पक्ष एव नास्ति। अनित्य आत्मा, अणुरूपत्वादिति। अत्राणुरूपत्वे पक्षधर्मता नास्ति। शशशृङ्गं सुगन्धि, पार्थिवत्वादिति। अत्र पक्षः पक्षधर्मता चोभावपि न स्तः। पृथ्वी नित्या, चाक्षुषत्वादिति। अत्र पक्षपक्षधर्मत्वयोः सत्त्वेऽपि साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिर्नास्ति।

35. The examples respectively are: (1) the sky-flower is fragrant, since it is a flower; here the subject itself is non-existent; (2) the soul is non-eternal, since it is atomic in nature; here for atomicity of nature there is non-existence in the subject; (3) the hare's horn is sweet-smelling, since it is earthly; here both the subject and being the attribute of the subject are non-existent; (4) earth is eternal, since it is visible; here, though the subject exists as also the (probans) being the attribute of the subject, there is no pervasion as between probandum and probans.

३६. एते च पक्षाभासा आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धव्याप्यत्वासिद्धेष्वन्तर्भवन्तीति नेह पृथग्लक्षिताः। दृष्टान्ताभासास्तु - अर्थदोषादुक्तिदोषाच्च द्विविधाः। तत्रार्थदोषः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तस्य साध्यवैकल्यं साधनवैकल्यमुभयवैकल्यं स्वरूपवैकल्यं चेति चतुर्विधः। वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तस्य तु साध्याभाववैकल्यं साधनाभाववैकल्यं स्वरूपवैकल्यं चेति चतुर्विधः॥

36. Because these fallacies of the subject come within the purview of *āśrayāsiddha*, *svarūpāsiddha* and *vyāpyatvāsiddha*, they are not mentioned separately. Fallacies of the example are of two kinds — defects of the thing (real defects) and defects of statement (verbal defects). Real defects in the case of the positive example are four: failure of probandum, failure of probans, failure of both, and failure of *svarūpa*. In the case of the negative example there are the four: failure of the absence of the probandum, failure of the absence of the probans, failure of the absence of both and failure of *svarūpa*.

३७. यथा - विश्वं कार्यं, प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, अन्वयेन आत्मवदिति, तत्रैव अदृष्टवदिति मायावदिति खपुष्पवदिति च । यथा वा - विमतं कार्यं, अप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, व्यतिरेकेणात्मवत् इति । तत्रैवादृष्टवदिति मायावदिति खपुष्पवदिति च । उक्तिदोषोऽप्यन्वयदृष्टान्तस्य च व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तस्य च व्यत्ययेनोक्तिः, अन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्त्योर्व्यत्ययेनोक्तिः, तत्रैव साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यत्ययेनोक्तिः, साध्यस्य साधनतयोक्तिः, साध्यतया साधनस्योक्तिश्चेत्यन्वयानुमाने पञ्चविधः । एवं व्यतिरेकानुमाने चेति दशविधः । यथा - पर्वतो वह्निमान्, धूमादित्यन्वयप्रयोगे अन्वयव्याप्तिमुक्त्वा यथा महाह्रद इति, तत्रैव व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनानन्तरं यथा महानस इति, तत्रैवान्वयव्याप्तौ यत्र यत्र वह्निस्तत्र तत्र धूमो यथा महानस इति, तत्रैव पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वादिति साध्यविपर्ययस्य साधनविपर्ययस्य च दृष्टान्तः । एवं शब्दार्थदोषवशादन्वयव्यतिरेकवशाच्चाष्टादश दृष्टान्ताभासाः । एते दृष्टान्ताभासाः तर्कशास्त्रेऽनिरूपितत्वादत्र कथं निरूप्यन्त इति चेत्, यथायथमसिध्यादिषु हेत्वाभासेष्वन्तर्भावयितुं शक्या इति तत्र पृथङ्न निर्दिष्टाः । अत्र तु शैवागमे पृथङ्निर्दिष्टत्वाद्भेदेन कीर्तिताः । तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

अनुष्णो वह्निरित्यादिप्रतिज्ञाते सहेतकम् ।
पञ्चानामनुमानस्यावयवानां तु पूर्वयोः ॥

वैपरीत्यं समुद्दिष्टं दृष्टान्तस्याधुनोच्यते ।
नित्य आत्मा विभुत्वेन यथाकाशमितीरिते ॥
दृष्टान्तः साध्यविकलः साधने च तथा भवेत् । इत्यादि ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ५८ - ६०)

37. For instance world is a product, since it is perceptible, like the soul (*sādhyavaikalya*), or like *adṛṣṭa* (*sādhanavaikalya*), like *māyā* (*sādhanavaikalya*), or like the sky-flower (failure of *svarūpa*, *i.e.*, existence). Or, *e.g.*, the subject in dispute is a product, as it is imperceptible, negatively like the soul (*sādhyābhāvavaikalya*), or like *adṛṣṭa* (*sādhanābhavavāikalya*), or like *māyā* (*ubhayābhāva-vaikalya)*, or like sky-flower (failure of *svarūpa*). Verbal defect consists in the reversed statements of the positive examples (as negative) and the negative examples (as positive), or the reversed statement (of co-presence and co-absence) in a concomitance of co-presence and co-absence. Thus in positive inference, there are five kinds (of defects); similarly in negative inference too; then, there are three kinds in all; *e.g.*, in the affirmative syllogism 'the hill is fiery', having stated the concomitance of co-presence, there is the example 'as in a big lake'; having stated the concomitance of co-absence, there is the example 'as in the fire-place'; in that same concomitance, the statement is made in the form 'where-ever there is fire, there is smoke, as in the fire-place'; in that same syllogism, there is transformation of probandum and probans in the form 'the hill has smoke, since it has fire'. Thus because of verbal, and real defects and because of (transpositions of) co-presence and co-absence, the fallacies of the example are eighteen. These fallacies of the example are not discussed in the science of

logic; why then are they discussed here? They are not mentioned at first since they can be included in the fallacies of the probans, like *asiddha*. But since they are mentioned in the *Śivāgama*, they are treated here separately. That is thus said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "When the subject (*pakṣa*) is mentioned as possessing the *sādhya* (probandum) in the form 'Fire is not hot' along with the probans, etc., then, for the first two (namely, *pratijñā* and *hetu*) of the five members (of the syllogistic argument), fallaciousness has been pointed out. The fallaciousness of the *dṛṣṭānta* is now stated. When it is said that the soul is eternal, since it is pervasive, like ether, the example is devoid of the probandum; similarly there could be failure of the example with regard to the probans" and so on. (*Ibid.* vv. 58-60)

३८. एतत्प्रसङ्गाच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानि निरूप्यन्ते। तत्र च्छल-लक्षणम् —

कंचिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य प्रयुक्ते वचने पुनः ।
अनिष्टमर्थ मारोप्य तन्निषेधश्छलं मतम् ॥ इति ॥

तच्च त्रिविधम्। वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं चेति। तत्र वाक्च्छललक्षणम् —

अभिधावैपरीत्येन कल्पितार्थस्य बाधनम् ॥ इति ॥

तद्यथा - आढ्योऽयं, नवकम्बळत्वादिति प्रयोगे नूतनार्थतया प्रयुक्तस्य नवशब्दस्य संख्यापरत्वमारोप्य निषेधः। कुतोऽस्य नव कम्बळाः, एक एव कम्बलः प्रत्यक्षसिद्ध इति ॥

सामान्यच्छललक्षणम् —

सामान्यच्छलमेतत्स्यादिति सामान्ययोगतः ।
तात्पर्यवैपरीत्येन कल्पितार्थस्य बाधनम् ॥ इति ॥

अयमहो ब्राह्मणोऽनूचान इति वाक्यं ब्राह्मणस्यानूचानत्वसंभावनामात्रेण कश्चित्प्रयुङ्क्ते। ब्राह्मणत्वस्यानूचानत्वहेतुत्वं तात्पर्यविषयमारोप्य च्छलवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते। न ब्राह्मणत्वमनूचानत्वहेतुः, ब्राह्मणब्रुवेष्वनैकान्त्यादिति॥

उपचारच्छलस्य लक्षणम् —

उपचारप्रयोगेषु गौणलाक्षणिकेषु यः।
मुख्यार्थासंभवाद्बाध उपचारच्छलं तु तत्॥ इति॥

यथा गङ्गायां घोषः, सिंहो माणवक इति प्रयोगे कथं गङ्गायां घोषवासः, कथं वा सिंहो माणवक इति प्रत्यवस्थानम्॥

अस्य प्रतिवाद्यनुसन्धानापेक्षया वादिना प्रयुक्तस्य च्छलवाक्यस्य प्रतिवादिना अपरिज्ञाने सदस्यैर्वानुद्घाटने प्रतिवादिनो दोषः, तैरुद्घाटने वा वादिनो दोष इति॥

38. As incidental to this, *chala, jāti* and *nigraha-sthāna* are discussed. The definition of *chala* is thus: "When a statement is made in view of a particular sense, to impose another sense thereon and deny it, it is considered to be *chala*." And that is of three kinds : *vāk-chala, sāmānya-chala,* and *upacāra-chala*. *Vāk-chala* is defined thus: "Sublation of a sense assumed in opposition to the expressed sense (of the words used)." *E.g.*, in the syllogism, "He is rich, since he has *nava-kambala,*" the word *nava* used in the sense of 'new' is taken to mean a number (nine) and the statement is refuted in the form, "Where are his nine blankets? He is perceived to have only one blanket." *Sāmānya-chala* is defined thus: "When by association with some similar quality a sense opposed to the purport is assumed, the denial of that is *sāmānya-chala.*" When someone makes the statement "This learned one is indeed a brahmin" merely to refute the possibility of a non-brahmin being learned, the user of *chala* imposes

a sense not intended that brahminhood is the cause of being learned, and rises to say, "Brahminhood is not the cause of being learned, since that probans is inconclusive in the case of those who are merely called brahmins." *Upacāra-chala* is defined thus: "When words are used figuratively, in a secondary or *gauṇa* sense, refutation on the ground of the impossibility of the primary sense is *upacāra-chala.*" *E.g.*, in the statements, 'A cow-station on the Ganges', 'The pupil is a lion', the questions 'How can there be a cow-station on the Ganges?' 'How can the pupil be a lion?' (are *chalas* based on the primary sense of the terms used). When this statement of *chala* used by the disputant to test the knowledge of the opponent, is not recognised to be such by the opponent or revealed to be such by the audience, the defect (of failure) is on the opponent; when revealed by them (the opponent or the audience) the defect (of failure) is on the disputant (who used the *chala*).

३९. अथ जातिः। सा च "साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्य-विकल्पसाध्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषो-पपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमा" इति। अत्र द्वन्द्वान्ते श्रूयमाणः समशब्दः प्रत्येकमभिसंबध्यते। आसां सामान्यलक्षणम् —

प्रयुक्ते स्थापनाहेतौ दूषणाशक्तमुत्तरम्।
जातिमाहुरथान्ये तु स्वव्याघातकमुत्तरम्॥ इति॥

तत्र साधर्म्यसमाया वैधर्म्यसमायाश्च जातेर्लक्षणम् —

हेतोर्वादिप्रयुक्तस्य स्वमतस्थापनाकृते।
साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं तु तत्समे॥ इति॥

तत्र साधर्म्यसमा जातिर्यथा - अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादित्युपसंहारे नैतदेवं, अस्ति ह्याकाशेनापि साधर्म्यममूर्तत्वम्, तद्वन्नित्यः किं न स्यात्, अविशेषादिति॥

वैधर्म्यसमा जातिर्यथा - पूर्वस्मिन्नेवोपसंहारे घटवैधर्म्यात् श्रावणत्वान्नित्यः किं न स्यादिति। एवमन्येऽपि जातिभेदा ऊह्याः॥

39. Then *jāti* is defined. *Jāti* (futile rejoinder) is of twentyfour kinds as parity per (i) similarity, (ii) dissimilarity, (iii) augmentation, (iv) subtraction, (v) uncertainty, (vi) certainty, (vii) shuffling, (viii) probandum, (ix) convergence, (x) non-convergence (xi) continued question, (xii) counter-instance, (xiii) non-generation, (xiv) doubt, (xv) vacillation, (xvi) non-probativeness, (xvii) presumption, (xviii) difference, (xix) evidence, (xx) apprehension, (xxi) non-apprehension, (xxii) non-eternality, (xxiii) eternality, (xxiv) character of effect. Here the word *sama* (parity) occuring at the end of the *dvandva* compound has been applied to every case. The definition of the general nature of all these is thus: "When the probans for proving is stated, the incapacity to point out a defect in reply is called *jāti*. Others, however, say that it is a self-contradictory reply." The *sādharmyasamā jāti* and the *vaidharmyasamā jāti* are defined respectively as "the opponent's refutations through *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* of the probans given by the disputant for establishing his view." This is an example of *sādharmya-samā jāti*: When it is concluded that sound is non-eternal since it is produced, the reply "It is not so; there is similarity even to ether in not having a concrete form (*amūrtatva*); why should it not be eternal like that (ether), since there is no distinction?" (would be a case of *jāti*, since there is a distinction between sound and ether, in that the former is a quality, while the latter is a substance and all qualities are *amūrta*, while only some substances are). The following is an example of

vaidharmyasamā jāti: in the above conclusion itself, the reply "since because of being heard, it is dissimilar to the (non-eternal) pot, why should it (sound) not be eternal?" is a *jāti*. Thus are to be understood the other varieties of *jāti*.

४०. निग्रहस्थानलक्षणम् —

अखण्डिताहंकृतिना पराहंकारखण्डनम् ।
निग्रहस्तन्निमित्तस्य निग्रहस्थानतोच्यते ॥ इति ॥

तानि च प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, प्रतिज्ञान्तरं, प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः, हेत्वन्तरं, अर्थान्तरं, निरर्थकं, विज्ञातार्थं, अपार्थं, अप्राप्तकालं, न्यूनं, अधिकं, पुनरुक्तं, अननुभाषणं, अज्ञानं, अप्रतिभा, विक्षेपः, मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं, निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः, अपसिद्धान्तः, हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानीति द्वाविंशतिः ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहानिलक्षणम् —

कथायां यच्च पक्षादि येन निर्दिष्टमादितः ।
तस्य तेन पुनस्त्यागः प्रतिज्ञाहानिरुच्यते ॥

सा च साध्यसाधनधर्मिणां तद्विशेषाणां च त्यागात् षड्विधा । तत्र साध्यप्रतिज्ञाहानिर्यथा - अनित्यः शब्दः, ऐन्द्रियिकत्वादित्युक्ते सामान्यमैन्द्रियिकं नित्यं दृष्टमिति अनैकान्तिकत्वेन प्रत्युक्ते तर्हि शब्दोऽपि नित्यः स्यादिति । एवमन्यान्यपि निग्रहस्थानलक्षणान्यूह्यानि ॥

40. *Nigrahasthāna* is defined thus: "*Nigraha* is the censure of another person's conceit by one whose own conceit is uncensured and the cause of that censure is said to be *nigrahasthāna*." There are twenty-two *nigrahasthānas* as: (1) *pratijñāhāniḥ*, (2) *prātijñāntaram*, (3) *pratijñāvirodhaḥ*, (4) *pratijñā-saṁnyāsaḥ*, (5) *hetvantaram*, (6) *arthāntaram*, (7) *nirarthakam*, (8) *vijñātārtham*, (9) *apārtham*, (10) *aprāptakālam*, (11) *nyūnam*, (12) *adhikam*, (13) *punaruktam*, (14) *ananubhāṣaṇam*, (15) *ajñānam*, (16) *apratibhā*, (17) *vikṣepaḥ*,

(18) *matānujñā,* (19) *paryanujyopekṣaṇam,* (20) *niranuyojyānuyogaḥ,* (21) *apasiddhāntaḥ,* and (22) *hetvābhāsas. Pratijñāhāniḥ* is defined thus: "When in the course of an argument, a certain proposition, etc., are laid down first by a disputant, the abandonment of these later by him is called *pratijñāhāniḥ.*" That is of six kinds, through the abandonment of the (general) attributes of the probans, probandum and subject, and of the particular (attributes) of the three. This is an example of *sādhya-pratijñāhāniḥ*: When it is said that sound is non-eternal because of being sense-cognised, and because of inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatva,* of the probans) in that generality which is sense-cognised, is perceived to be eternal, this (argument) is refuted, (the statement) "Then, let sound too be eternal" (is *pratijñā-hāniḥ*). The definitions of other *nigrahasthānas* are also to be understood similarly.

४१. अथ शब्दप्रमाणं निरूप्यते। आप्तवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं शब्दप्रमाणम्। आप्तो नाम यथार्थदर्शी यथार्थोपदेष्टा पुरुषः। तद्वाक्यं तु आकाङ्क्षा-योग्यतासन्निधिमतां पदानां समूहः। तेन 'घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिः' इत्य-नाकाङ्क्षं, "अग्निना सिञ्चेत्" इत्ययोग्यं, व्यवहितोच्चरितं च "गाम् ... आनय" इत्यादि न वाक्यम्। आकाङ्क्षा नाम प्रतिपत्तुर्जिज्ञासा। अनन्वय-निश्चयाभावो योग्यता। अव्यवधानेनोपस्थितिः सन्निधिः। तेनाकाङ्क्षा-योग्यतासन्निधिमत्पदकदम्बकं वाक्यम्। तच्च द्विविधम्, लौकिकं तु नद्यास्तीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्तीत्यादिकम्। वैदिकं तु परमाप्तश्रीमत्सदाशिववाक्यम्। तच्च द्विविधम्। वेदः शैवागमश्चेति। वेदवाक्यं तु प्रसिद्धम्। शैवागमवाक्यं तु "मुक्त्यै प्राप्य सतस्तेषां भजेद्वेषं शिवालयम्" इत्यादि। अतो वेदशिवा-गमयोः परमाप्तसदाशिवप्रणीतत्वात्तावेव यथार्थावबोधकौ। तज्जन्यज्ञानमेव प्रमाणम्॥

Śabda

41. Next, the *pramāṇa* of verbal testimony is discussed. The cognition produced by the statement of a trustworthy

person is verbal testimony. He who is called a trustworthy person is one who sees things as they are and teaches things as they are. His statement is a group of words possesssing expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition. Hence, words without (reciprocal) expectancy as in "pot, accusative, bringing, act (instead of 'bring the pot')", words without compatibility as in "Moisten with fire" and words without juxtaposition as in "Bring" and "The cow" pronounced after a considerable interval of time, do not constitute a sentence. What is called expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) is the desire on the part of the listener to understand. The compatibility is only the absence of certitude that there is no syntactical relation (between the meanings of two words). Juxtaposition consists in the auditory perception of words without lapse of time. Hence, a sentence is a group of words possessing expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition. And that is of two kinds: worldly and scriptural. Worldly sentences are like "There are fruits on the bank of the river." Scriptural sentences are the statements of the supremely trustworthy Sadāśiva. And that is twofold - *Veda* and *Śaivāgama*. The Vedic sentences are well-known. The sentences of the *Śaivāgama* are such as, "For the sake of release, consort with good ones and, adopt their modes of life and adore the temples of Śiva," etc. Therefore, since *Vedas* and *Śaivāgamas* are the work of the supremely trustworthy Sadāśiva, they alone give knowledge of the truth (of things as they are); the knowledge generated by them alone is valid.

४२. न तु वेदानामनिर्दिष्टप्रवर्तकत्वादपौरुषेयत्वादत एव नित्यत्वान्महाजनपरिगृहीतत्वाच्च प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते। आगमानां तु तद्विपरीतत्वात् "श्रुतिपथगलितानां तन्त्रमार्गे निवेशः" इत्यादिना तन्त्रानुष्ठाने दोषश्रवणाच्च

कथं प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्, सत्यम्; निर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकाणामार्षाणां मन्वादिस्मृतीनां प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगच्छतां तदुपास्येश्वरप्रणीतागमेषु कथमप्रामाण्यशङ्कावकाशः। अथ यद्यपौरुषेयनित्यवेदमूलकतया तासां प्रामाण्यमिति मन्यसे, तदनुपपन्नम्; तथा हि-वेदस्य स्वरूपतो वा नित्यत्वं प्रवाहतो वा? नाद्यः; स्वरूपस्य शब्दात्मकतया उच्चरितप्रध्वस्तत्वेन प्रत्यक्षत एवानित्यत्वदर्शनात्, 'स एवायं गकार' इत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानानां सामान्यविषयत्वेन शब्दस्वरूपनित्यतायां प्रमाणत्वाभावाच्च। न द्वितीयः; प्रवाहरूपनित्यताया अध्यापकाध्येतृसम्प्रदायाविच्छेदात्मकत्वात् प्रपञ्चस्याप्युत्पत्तिविनाशवत्वेन वेदस्यापि तदन्तर्भूतत्वेनानित्यत्वमेव। तस्मान्नित्यनिर्मलसर्वज्ञपक्षपातरहितयथार्थग्राहकाव्ययपरिपूर्णस्वतन्त्रपशुपाशहन्तृपरमाप्तपरमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वेनैव वेदानामागमानां च प्रामाण्यम्। वेदस्य स्वयंभूत्वनित्यत्वश्रवणात्कथमुत्पत्तिविनाशवत्त्वमिति चेत्तत्तथा न भवति। स्वयंभुपरमाप्तपरमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वेन कार्ये कारणत्वोपचारात् स्वयंभूत्वस्याऽऽप्रलयस्थायित्वेन नित्यत्वस्य च तत्र तत्र श्रवणात्। आगमानां परमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वेन प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमे वामादीनामपि प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्सत्यम्; ईश्वरेणैव "वैदिककर्माधिकारिणां वेदोपबृंहितानि, षण्मुनिशापग्रस्तद्विजादीनां स्वतन्त्रागमकर्मानुष्ठानद्वारा जन्मान्तरे वैदिकशैवकर्मस्वधिकारसिद्ध्यर्थं असुरादिव्यामोहार्थं चान्यानि वामादीनि मयैव कथितानिः तस्मान्मद्भक्तैः शिष्टैर्वेदविरुद्धानि स्वतन्त्रागमानि न सेव्यानि" इत्युक्तत्वात्तत्तदधिकारिणः प्रत्येव तस्य तस्य प्रामाण्यम्। न सर्वान्प्रति। तदुक्तं कामिके—

शैवागमोऽपि द्विविधः श्रौतोऽश्रौतश्च स स्मृतः।
श्रुतिसारमयः श्रौतः स्वतन्त्र इतरो मतः॥
अन्यानि चैव शास्त्राणि लोकेस्मिन्मोहनाय वै।
वेदवादविरुद्धानि मयैव कथितानि तु॥
वामं पाशुपतं चैव वातुलं चैव भैरवम्।
न सेव्यमेतत्कथितं वेदबाह्यं तथेतरत्॥ इति॥

42. Now since for the *Vedas* no author is mentioned, since they are not of human origin and for that very reason

are eternal, and since they are accepted by the majority of men, validity is intelligible (in their case). In the case of the *Āgamas*, however, because of their being the opposite of the *Vedas* (in these respects), and because of the declaration of defect in the pursuit of *tantras*, in such words, as "the entry on the path of *tantra* is for those who have been expelled from the path of *śruti*", how is there validity? If this be asked, true; but by those who admit the validity of the works of sages, like the traditional codes of Manu and others, where authorship is mentioned, how is there room to suspect invalidity in the case of the *Āgamas* which are the works of the Lord worshipped by these (same sages)? If then you admit the validity of the former, as being based on the eternal *Veda* of non-human origin, that is not intelligible. It is thus. The eternality of the *Veda* is either of its very nature or is comparable to that of a stream. Not the first; for its nature being that of sound, is seen to be non-eternal even by perception, as pronounced and then destroyed. Recognitions like "This is that same letter *g*" relate to the generality (of the letter) and hence have no validity in respect of the eternality of sound by its very nature. Not the second; for eternality comparable to that of a stream consists in the non-interruption of the succession of teacher and pupil. Since even for the world there is creation and destruction, the *Veda* too as included therein is but non-eternal. Therefore there is validity for both *Vedas* and *Āgamas*, only as being the work of Parameśvara, who is eternal, flawless, omniscient, impartial, cogniser of things as they are, imperishable, independent, perfect, the destroyer of the bonds of the creature and the supremely trustworthy person. Since self-origination and eternality are declared of the *Veda*, how can there be origination and destruction? If

this be asked, it is not (really) so (self-originated) since the (self-origination of the) cause is figuratively predicated of the effect, which is the work of the self-originated supremely trustworthy Parameśvara. And production by the self-originated having been established, eternality too is declared (of the *Veda*) here and there. If it be said that if validity be admitted for the *Āgamas*, as the work of Parameśvara, there is contingence of validity - even for the *Vāmas* (the *Āgamas* of the left path) and so on, true; for it has been said by Īśvara himself: "These have been declared by myself in order that the twice-born ones who are eligible for Vaidic rites, but are afflicted by the curse of Ṣaṇmuni, may, through the channel of performing the rites laid down in these independent *Āgamas*, attain in another life eligibility for *Śaiva* rites sanctioned by the *Vedas*, and in order that demons and others may be deluded; therefore, the independent *Āgamas*, opposed to the *Vedas* are not to be resorted to by worthy devotees of mine." The validity of each is only in respect of those eligible for each, not in respect of all. That has been said in the *Kāmika*: "*Śaivāgama*, too, is of two kinds; it is said to be *śrauta* and and *aśrauta*. *Śrauta* is that which is full of the essence of *Śruti* (*Veda*); the other is considered to be independent (of the *Veda*). Other (so-called) sacred teachings too, which exist in this world, in conflict with the teaching of the *Veda*, have been declared by me alone, for the sake of deluding; (these are) *Vāma*, *Pāśupata*, *Vātula*, and *Bhairava*. These, it has been said, should not be resorted to as also what else is outside the *Veda*."

४३. तस्मात्तन्त्रानुष्ठाननिषेधस्यापि वेदविरुद्धतन्त्रविषयत्वमेव। आगमादन्येष्वार्षेषु दैवतेषु च ज्ञानमोक्षयोः संभवात् तैरेव शास्त्रैः पर्याप्तमिति चेन्न; तेषु प्रकृत्यधोगतानां चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वानामेव निरूपणात् षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वातीतपरम-

मोक्षानिरूपणाच्च परस्परविरुद्धत्वाच्च। तस्मात्सार्वज्ञ्यादिविशिष्टपरमेश्वर-प्रणीतागमैरेव ज्ञानमोक्षयोः सिद्धिरिति सर्वमवदातम्। तदुक्तं पौष्करे —

अथवा सद्भिरप्राप्ता श्रद्धया शिवगोचराः।
अन्ये तु सज्जनायाताः प्रकृत्याद्यवगोचराः॥

न चार्षं पौरुषैर्वाक्यैः ऋषिभिर्दैविकं तथा।
न देवैर्ब्रह्मणो वाक्यं वैष्णवं पद्मजन्मना॥

तथा रौद्रं न हरिणा न रौद्रेण शिवोक्तकम्।
बाध्यमूर्ध्वोर्ध्ववैशिष्ट्यादधोऽधो बाध्यमूर्ध्वतः॥

शिवागमाविरोधेन शास्त्रं सर्वं व्यवस्थितम्।
नान्यशास्त्रविरोधेन तत्संवादितया तथा॥

शिवशास्त्रं व्यवस्थाप्यं तद्व्यवस्थापकं यतः।
यस्य यस्य हि शास्त्रस्य यावती व्याप्तिरिष्यते॥

तावत्येव भवेद्विप्राः प्रामाण्यं तस्य तस्य च।
आप्तोक्तिरागमः सोऽपि परोक्षार्थैकसाधनम्॥

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन यदि वार्थं सुनिश्चितम्।
यो वक्ति सोऽयमाप्तः स्यात्तस्मादाप्ततरः शिवः॥

सुप्रसन्नेद्रियग्रामः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगोचरः।
पक्षपातविनिर्मुक्तो यथार्थग्राहकः सदा॥

अव्ययः परिपूर्णश्च स्वतन्त्रः पशुपाशहा।
प्रमाणमेकं तद्वाक्यं तथ्यं श्रेयोनिधिः सदा॥

सृष्ट्यनन्तरमेवेशः शुद्धाध्वविषयानणून्।
स्वांशुसंस्पर्शनादेव कृत्वा दृक्क्रिययोत्कटान्॥

सदाशिवोऽपि भगवान्नादरूपतया गतम् ।
षट्पदार्थमयं ज्ञानमनेकच्छन्द एव च ॥
पूर्वतो दशसङ्ख्यातं शिवभेदं तथापरम् ।
रौद्रमष्टादशविधं तेभ्योऽवादीत् कृपानिधिः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ७४-७९, ६१-६७)

43. Therefore even the prohibition of those observances relates only to those *Tantras* that are opposed to the *Veda*. Since knowledge and release are possible even from the books of ṛṣis and deities, which are not *āgamas*, there may be satisfaction even with those sacred teachings; if this be said; no, since in those three are discussed only the twenty-four *tattvas* from *prakṛti* downwards, since supreme release which is above the thirty-six *tattvas* is not demonstrated, and since there is mutual conflict (among those *śāstras*). Therefore knowledge and release result only from the *āgamas* produced by Parameśvara qualified by omniscience; for, thus everything is clear. That has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "And among these, those which relate to Śiva have not been showed with devotion by the good ones (who are the authors of other *darśanas*); (therefore) these others, coming from (those) good people relate only to *prakṛti* and what is below it. The statement of ṛṣis cannot be sublated by the statement of human beings; nor that of deities by that of ṛṣis; nor the statement of Brahmā by that (of other) deities; nor that of Viṣṇu by that of Brahmā; nor that of Rudra by that of Hari; nor that of Śiva by that of Rudra; since each higher one is superior, each lower one is sublated by each higher. Every (other) sacred teaching stands established (only) in so far as it does not conflict with *Śivāgama*. But the sacred teaching of Śiva does not have to be established,

without conflict with other *śāstras* or because of its conformity with them, since these are the pervaded and that is the pervader. O holy ones! the validity of each *śāstra* is only the proportion to the pervasion (extensiveness) admitted for each." (*Ibid.* vv. 74-79) "The statement of a trustworthy person is *āgama*; that too establishes only a thing that is mediate; he who states (as it is) a thing which is well-ascertained by perception or by inference, he is a trustworthy person; therefore, Śiva is the most trustworthy; he is the possessor of a host of absolutely perfect organs (of sense), the possessor of complete wisdom embracing all things, free from partiality, constantly apprehending things as they are, imperishable, perfect, independent and the destroyer of the bonds of the creature. His statement is the sole *pramāṇa*, unfailing, the constant storehouse of beatitude. Immediately after creation (of the *śāstra*), Śiva remaining in the form of Sadāśiva, having illumined, by mere association with His energy, (roused the conative and cognitive energies of) the souls who are residing in the *śuddha adhvā*, gave forth that knowledge which came through the form of *Nāda* (*tattva*), deals with the six categories from *pati*, and is composed in different metres; first there came ten in number called Śiva-bheda; then there came the Raudram of eighteen kinds; and the Lord, the store-house of grace, imparted the knowledge of the above to them." (*Ibid.* vv. 61-67)

४४. अत्र प्रमाणशब्देन करणव्युत्पत्त्या शब्दार्थयोरभेदोपचाराद्वा शब्द उच्यते। सर्वत्र चिच्छक्तेरेव प्रामाण्यसमर्थनात्। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

शब्दस्तु पारम्पर्येण शिवज्ञानानुमापकः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प्र. प. श्लो. ७४)

44. Here, by the word *pramāṇa,* understood as an instrument or because of figurative usage of non-difference between verbal testimony and its sense, the word *śabda* (verbal testimony) has been used; for it has been shown that the character of *pramāṇa* belongs in every case only to *citśakti.* And thus it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Verbal testimony is indirectly the ground for infering Śiva's knowledge." (*Ibid.* v. 74).

४५. पदं नाम वर्णसमूहः। वर्णानां क्षणभङ्गुरत्वात् अर्थप्रत्यायकत्वाभावात् अर्थप्रत्ययनार्थं वर्णेषु स्फोटो नाम कश्चित्पदार्थो नित्योऽङ्गीकरणीयः। इत्थं प्रमाणानां त्रित्वं व्यवस्थितम्। एतेष्वेव त्रिषु प्रमाणेषूपमानादीनां सर्वेषां यथायथमन्तर्भावः। तथा हि - अर्थापत्तिस्तावदनुमानेऽन्तर्भवति। कथम्? अनुपपद्यमानार्थदर्शनादुपपादकार्थान्तरकल्पनमर्थापत्तिः। यथा जीवतो देवदत्तस्य गृहेऽभावमुपलभ्य बहिर्भावकल्पनम्। तदिदमनुपपत्तेरविनाभावरूपतया तज्ज्ञानजन्यमित्यनुमानमेव। अनुपपत्तिर्हि बहिर्भावं विना जीवतो गृहेऽभावस्यासत्त्वम्। सोऽयमविनाभाव एव। गृहे असन् देवदत्तो बहिः सन्, शतवर्षजीवित्वे सति गृहनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वात्। यन्नैवं तन्नैवम्। यथा अजीवन्यज्ञदत्त इति॥

45. What is called a word is a group of letters. Since letters perish momentarily, since (thus) they cannot cause cognition of the sense, there should be recognised, among letters, an eternal thing called *sphoṭa* for the source of causing cognition of the sense. Thus has been established the threefoldness of *pramāṇas.* In these same three *pramāṇas* there is inclusion of all others such as *upamāna.* It is thus: presumption (*arthāpatti*) is included in inference. Because of the perception of something which is unintelligible, the presumption of something else which will make it intelligible is presumption; *e.g.*, having cognised the non-existence at home of the living Devadatta, (there is) the assumption of his being outside. Since

this unintelligibility is of the form of an invariable connection and is generated by the knowledge of that (connection), the presumption from unintelligibility is but inference; the unreality of non-existence at home of a living person in the absence of his being outside, is certainly an invariable connection; Devadatta, who is not at home, is outside, since he is the counter-correlate of non-existence at home while being one who is destined to live for a hundred years; what is not there is not that, like Yajñadatta who is not alive.

४६. उपमानमप्यनुमानमेव। न पृथक्प्रमाणम्। तथा हि - यदि तावत्सादृश्यज्ञानमुपमानं तदा प्रत्यक्षमेव तत्, अयं तत्सदृश इति प्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहसंभवात्। यदि त्वेतत्सदृशः स इति ज्ञानमुपमानं तदा स एतत्सदृशः, एतद्गतसादृश्यप्रतियोगित्वात्, यो यत्सादृश्यप्रतियोगी स तत्सदृशः, यथा सम्मत इत्यनुमानमेव। अथ त्वतिदेशवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं तदर्थप्रत्यभिज्ञया तस्य वाच्यत्वपरिच्छेदः तदापि पिण्डगतवाच्यतापरिच्छेदो वाक्यात्। पिण्डगतजातिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्ततापरिच्छेदो लाघवलिङ्गादिति न मानान्तरमुपमानम् ॥

46. Even *upamāna* is but inference, not an independent *pramāṇa*. It is thus: if cognition of similarity be *upamāna*, then it is perception since its apprehension is possible by the perception, "This is similar to that." If, however, *upamāna* be the cognition "That is similar to to this," then it is but the inference, "That is similar to this, since it is the counter-correlate of similarity present in this, that which is the counter-correlate of similarity present in something is something similar to that, like what is admitted (by both of us)." If, then, it be the ascertainment of a thing being denoted by a word, because of the recognition of that thing immediately after hearing the words of instruction (about it), there, the

ascertainment of denotedness in respect of a particular is the ascertainment from the sentence, of the generality present in the particular as the connotation (cause of application) (of the word), because of the capacity of parsimony; hence *upamāna* (being thus included in *śabda*) is not another *pramāṇa*.

४७. संभवोऽप्यनुमानान्नातिरिच्यते। सहस्रेषु शतं संभवतीति शतसद्भावनिश्चयो हि संभवः। स च सहस्रस्य शताविनाभावग्रहेण जनित इत्यनुमानमेव। ऐतिह्यमपि यथार्थं चेत् शब्द एवेति सिद्धम्॥

47. *Sambhava*, too, is not other than inference. *Sambhava* is indeed the certitude of the existence of a hundred, since a hundred is included in a thousand. And since that is generated by the inseparable connection between a thousand and a hundred, it is but inference. *Aitihya* too, if true, is established to be but verbal testimony (*śabda*).

४८. अभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षान्नातिरिच्यते। तथा हि - घटाद्यभाव इन्द्रियेण गृह्यते, तत्प्रतीतेस्तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात्। न च वह्न्यादिप्रतीताविवाधिकरणग्रहणतदुपक्षयादन्यथासिद्धं तदनुविधानमिति युक्तम्। निमीलिताक्षस्य त्वगुपनीते घटादौ नीलाद्यभावग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियजन्यमधिकरणज्ञानं हेतुरिति चेन्न; वायोश्चक्षुषा ग्रहणाभावेन तत्र रूपाभावग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। इन्द्रियदोषादिना अभावप्रतीतौ दोषदर्शनादपि तस्या इन्द्रियजन्यत्वमभ्युपेयम्। न चाभावेन संयोगादिसंनिकर्षो नास्तीति कथं तस्यैन्द्रियिकत्वमिति वाच्यम्; ऐन्द्रियिकत्वानुरोधेन विशेषणतासन्निकर्षकल्पनोपपत्तेः। न चैन्द्रियिकत्वसंनिकर्षकल्पनयोः परस्पराश्रयत्वम्। ऐन्द्रियिकत्वकल्पनायां सन्निकर्षकल्पनाया अनपेक्षितत्वात्। सन्निकर्षो ह्यैन्द्रियिकत्वेऽपेक्षितः। न तु तत्कल्पनापि तत्कल्पनायाम्॥

48. *Abhāva*, too, is not other than perception. It is thus: the non-existence of pot, etc., is apprehended by the

sense-organ, since it is concomitant with the presence or absence of that (sense-organ). Nor does it stand to reason that this concomitance is otherwise explained since that (function of the sense-organ) is exhausted with the apprehension of the substrate (of non-existence), just as (in inference, it is exhausted) with the apprehension of fire, etc; for then there is the contingence of the apprehension of the non-existence of blueness, etc., of the pot by him who has closed his eyes, and who has the tactual perception of the pot. If it be said that the cause (of the cognition of non-existence) is such cognition of the substrate as is generated by the same sense-organ as that which apprehends (non-existence), no; for, since there is no apprehension of air by the sense of sight, there is the contingence of the non-apprehension of the absence of colour there-from. Where non-existence is cognised through a defect in the sense organ and so on, then, even because of the cognition of defect, there should be admitted the generation of that (cognition of non-existence) by the senses. Nor may it be asked "Since there is no contact like *saṁyoga* (conjunction) with non-existence, how can it be sensed?"; for, in conformity with (the fact of) its being sensed, a mode of contact called *viśeṣaṇatā* is intelligible. Nor is there reciprocal dependence between its being sensed and the assumption of a mode of contact, since in the assumption of its being sensed, the assumption of a mode of contact is not needed. It is the contact, indeed, that requires it to be sense-apprehended; but the assumption of this does not depend on the assumption of that (former).

४९. परिशेषोऽप्यनुमानमेव। अयं च दशस्वेतेषु चोरोऽस्ति, एते नव अचोरा इत्युक्ते अयं चोर इति निश्चयः। चोरत्वं अमुकवर्ति,

पुरोवर्तिष्वन्यतमवर्तित्वे सति अमुकान्यैतदन्यतमावर्तित्वात्, अमुकत्ववदित्यनुमानमेव। अमुकत्वादौ पूर्वं व्याप्तिग्रहाभावेऽपि सामान्यतो व्याप्तिग्रहसंभवात्। इति सिद्धं प्रमाणत्रैविध्यम्॥

49. *Pariśeṣa* (elimination), too, is but inference. "The thief is among those ten; these nine are not thieves;" when this is said there is the ascertainment, "This (other) is the thief." "This being-a-thief, exists in him, since while existing in one of those (ten) confronting us, it does not exist in others except him, like the character of (his) being himself", is but inference; for, though in respect of the character of his being himself and so on, there is not earlier the apprehension of pervasion, yet apprehension of pervasion in a general way is possible. Thus is established the threefoldness of *pramāṇas*.

५०. एतेषां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एव गृह्यते उत्पद्यते च। तत्र स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं नाम बाधानवतारकालीनयावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राह्यत्वम्। अत्र च प्रमाणं सामग्र्येव। ज्ञानग्राहकेण हि ज्ञानं विषयावच्छिन्नं गृह्यते। विषयश्च विशेषणविशेष्यवत्तत्संबन्धोऽपि। अत एव घटमेव घटतया जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायो दृश्यते। न चैवं प्रामाण्ये संशयो न स्यात्; निश्चिते तदयोगादिति वाच्यम्। निश्चितेऽप्यर्थे ज्ञानस्य दोषजन्यत्वसंशयेन संशयोपपत्तेः। अन्यथा परतस्त्ववादिनोऽपि प्रामाण्यसंशयोऽपि न स्यात्। अर्थतथात्वस्यानुव्यवसायेनानिश्चयेपि व्यवसायेन निश्चयात्। प्रामाण्यसंशयस्य च तत्संशयपर्यवसन्नत्वात्। अन्यथा सुनिश्चितेऽप्यर्थे प्रामाण्यसंशयापत्तेः। उत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वं च यावत्स्वाश्रयज्ञानजनकसामग्रीजन्यत्वम्। ज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तहेत्वजन्यत्वं प्रमायाः स्वतस्त्वमिति। अस्ति चात्रानुमानम्। विमतप्रमा ज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तजन्या न भवति, अप्रमात्वानधिकरणत्वात्, घटवदिति। न च विमतप्रमा, ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीना, कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वात्, अप्रमावदित्यौदयनमनुमानं बाधकमिति शङ्कनीयम्। प्रमा दोषव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तजन्या न भवति, ज्ञानत्वात्,

अप्रमावदिति प्रतिसाधनग्रहग्रस्तत्वात्, ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रादेव प्रमोत्पत्तिसंभवे तदतिरिक्तस्य गुणस्य दोषाभावस्य वा कारणत्वकल्पनायां कल्पनागौरव-प्रसङ्गाच्च ॥

50. The validity of these is apprehended and originated only intrinsically. Of these what is called apprehension intrinsically consists in being apprehended by whatever apprehends its own substrates before sublation appears. And the *pramāṇa* here is but the causal aggregate, by that which apprehends cognition the cognition is apprehended as defined by its object. And the object is a substrate possessing a qualification, as also the relation (between the two). Hence, it is that there is the reflective cognition, "I cognise the pot as pot." Nor may it be said, "Thus there can be no doubt in respect of validity, since that is impossible in respect of what is ascertained, for even in respect of ascertained things, doubt is intelligible because of the suspicion of the cognition having been originated defectively; otherwise, for those who maintain the extrinsic nature (of validity), there would not be seen the suspicion of validity. For, the thing being so (as cognised) is ascertained by the original (*vyavasāya*) (cognition) though not ascertained by the reflective (cognition), and the doubt as to validity (in respect of cognition) culminates in doubt as to that (thing); otherwise even in respect of a well-ascertained thing suspicion of its validity would be intelligible. Intrinsicality in respect of origination consists in being generated by the causal aggregate that originates the cognition that is its substrate; the intrinsicality of validity consists in this that while being originated by the causal aggregate of cognition it is not originated by any additional cause. And there is inference here. The validity in dispute, while being originated

by the causal aggregate of the cognition, is not originated by anything over and above that, since it is not the locus of invalidity like the pot. Nor may it be doubted that there is a sublator in the inference of the school of Udayana as: "The validity in dispute is dependent on a cause over and above the cause of cognition, since while being a product, it is a particular variety thereof, like invalidity." For, that is affected by the counter-inference, "Validity is not originated by anything over and above the cause of cognition free from defects, since it is cognition, like invalidity." When the origination of validity is possible even from the causal aggregate of cognition alone, there is no merit in (what is) over and above that and in assuming causality for this, there is the defect of prolixity of assumption.

५१. ननु दोषस्याप्रमाहेतुत्वेन प्रमायास्तदभावहेतुत्वं दुर्निवारमिति चेत्, दोषाभावस्याप्रमाप्रतिबन्धकत्वेनान्यथासिद्धत्वात्। अप्रमा तु परत एवोत्पद्यते ज्ञायते च। तस्याः ज्ञानसामग्रीव्यतिरिक्तस्य दोषस्योत्पत्तौ हेतुवात्। ज्ञप्तौ च ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्र्यतिरिक्तस्य मानान्तरस्य ग्राहकत्वसंभवात्। लक्षणं तु विशेष्यवत्त्यप्रकारकज्ञानत्वं, अतद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं वा। एतादृशं च भ्रान्तिज्ञानं प्राभाकरोक्तरीत्या ग्रहणस्मरणात्मकज्ञानद्वयं न भवति; इदं रजतमिति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतिभासविरोधात्। न च इदं रजतमित्यत्र ज्ञानं रजतं च शुक्तिकायामनिर्वचनीयमुत्पद्यत इति वाच्यम्, तदुत्पत्तौ सामग्र्या अभावात्। न चासदेव रजतमुत्पद्यत इति वक्तुं शक्यम्; तस्य तुच्छस्य उत्पत्तिप्रतिपत्त्योरयोगात्। न चात्मन्येव रजतं भासत इति वाच्यम्, तथात्वे अहं रजतमिति प्रत्ययप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मादितरासां ख्यातीनां अप्रामणिकत्वादप्रमा अन्यथाख्यातिरेवेति सिद्धम्॥

इति श्रीमदतिवर्णाश्रमाचार्यशैवपरिपालकशिवाग्रयोगीन्द्रज्ञानशिवाचार्य-
विरचितायां शैवपरिभाषायां प्रमाणनिरूपणं नाम
प्रथमः परिच्छेदः॥

51. Now, some say that since defect is the cause of invalidity, it is impossible to avoid causality for the absence of that (defect) in the case of validity; for the absence of defect is otherwise accounted for as the adversary of invalidity. Invalidity, however, arises and is cognised only extrinsically; for in its case, in its origination there is the possibility of defect, over and above the causal aggregate of cognition; and in the cognition of itself, there is the possibility of some other means of knowledge different from the causal aggregate of that which apprehends the cognition. Its definition is "being the cognition of a mode that does not exist in the substrate" or "being the cognition of a particular mode in the form that 'it possesses that' in what does not possess that." And delusive cognition in this form is not, as the Prābhākaras say, a twofold cognition of the nature of apprehension and memory because of conflict with the presentation of apposition in "This is silver". Nor may it be said that in "This is silver", both the cognition and the silver as indeterminable are originated in the nacre; for in respect of their origination there is no causal aggregate (present). Nor is it possible to say that there is originated silver which is only unreal, since in the case of that which is a void (*tuccha*), origination and cognition are impossible. Nor may it be said that silver appears in the self alone (which alone is real), since if that were so, there would be the cognition, "I am silver". Therefore because of the invalidity of other views of error it is established of invalidity that it is but apprehension otherwise.

Here ends the First Chapter called
Discussion of the Pramāṇas in the Śaivaparibhāṣā
written by Śivāgrayogin, the Ativarṇāśramācārya and Protector of Śaiva.

द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

१. अथ प्रमेयं निरूप्यते। तच्च त्रिविधम्; पतिः पशुः पाशश्चेति। तदुक्तम्—

पतिः पशुः पाश इति पदार्थास्त्रय ईरिताः ॥ इति ॥

तत्र पशूनामस्वातन्त्र्यात् पाशानामचेतनत्वात् पत्युः प्रथममुद्देशः। अनन्तरं चेतनत्वसाधर्म्यात् पशूनाम्। तदनु पाशस्यावशिष्टस्य। ननु—

सप्त स्वायंभुवे प्रोक्ताः षट् पौष्करमतङ्गयोः।
श्रीमत्पराख्ये पञ्चोक्ताः पदार्थाः रौरवे त्रयः ॥

इति पदार्थस्य नानाविधसङ्ख्यात्वदर्शनात् कथं पदार्थास्त्रय एवेति चेत्, सत्यम्; तेषां पतिपशुव्यतिरिक्तानां पाशपदार्थ एवान्तर्भावात्, अस्मत्सन्तानादिमुनेर्वामदेवस्य रौरवागमप्रधानत्वाच्च तदनुसारेण त्रयः पदार्था इत्युक्तमित्यविरोधः। तत्र पतिशब्देन इन्द्र इत्युक्ते देवेन्द्र इतिवत् भामेत्युक्ते सत्यभामेतिवच्च नामैकदेशे नामग्रहणात्पशुपतिरिति हर उच्यते। ननु सृष्टिस्थितिसंहाररूपकृत्यत्रयस्य ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रकर्तृकत्वेन वेदागमपुराणेषु बहुशः श्रुतत्वादत्र हर एक एव पतिरिति कथं निरूप्यत इति चेत्, प्राकृतसृष्ट्यादिकर्तॄणां गुणत्रयाधिष्ठितत्रिमूर्तीनां मध्ये रूद्र एव कर्तेत्युक्तं चेत् शङ्कावकाशः। अत्र मयोक्तं गुणत्रयातीतं त्रिमूर्तीनां कारणात्मकं स्थूलसूक्ष्मशून्यरूपरहितं चिदानन्दैकरूपम्। तच्च गुणनामक्रियारहितमपि योगवृत्त्या ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रादिसर्वशब्दवाच्यं परतत्त्वमिति नात्र शङ्कावकाशः।

Second Chapter

1. Now, the object of knowledge is discussed. And that is of three kinds: *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*. It has been

said: "Three categories are declared as *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*." Of these, since *paśus* are not independent and *pāśas* are non-intelligent, there is mention of *pati* first; next, because of similarity in the possession of intelligence, (there is mention) of *paśus*, and after that of what is left over, *viz.*, the *pāśas*. Now, since the categories seem to be differently enumerated in different works as, "Seven categories are delcared in the *Svāyambhuva*, six in the *Pauṣkara* and *Mataṅga*, five in the sacred *Parākhya*, and three in the *Raurava*," how can it be said that there are three categories alone? If this be asked, true; but since those (others) which are different from *pati* and *paśu* are included even in *pāśa*, and since for Vāmadeva, the first sage in our succession (of teachers), the *Raurava* was the principal *Āgama*, the categories are said to be three; and there is no contradiction. Here, by the word *pati* is denoted Hara, who is Paśupati (the Lord of *paśus*), the whole name being apprehended through a part of the name, just as Devendra is understood when one says Indra, and Satyabhāmā when one says Bhāmā. Now, since it is extensively declared in the *Vedas*, *Āgamas* and *Purāṇas* that of the three activities of creation, sustentation and destruction, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra are the agents, how is it shown here that the one Hara alone is *pati*? If this be asked, we reply that there would be room for doubt if it had been said that among the three *mūrtis*, who are agents in material creation, etc., and who are controlled by the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), Rudra alone is the (real) agent. (But) there is declared by me here, the supreme reality who is above the three *guṇas* is of the nature of the cause of the three *mūrtis*, is free from the states, gross, subtle and void (*i.e.*, above the five *avasthās*), and is of the one form of

intelligent bliss. And, the supreme reality, though outside the appreciability of the *guṇas* in their principal senses, is not secondarily denoted by words like Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra; hence there is no room for that doubt.

२. तदुक्तं देवीकालोत्तरे —

न स्थूलसूक्ष्मो न च शून्यरूपो ज्ञानैकरूपो जगदेकबन्धुः ॥ इति ॥

पराख्ये —

एको हि नामगैर्भेदः स्थितः स परमेश्वरः ।
बृहत्वाद्बृंहणत्वाच्च ब्रह्मैव शिवयोगतः ॥

विष्णुः प्रभवशीलत्वात्प्रभवो जगतां प्रभुः ।
रुजं द्रावयते यस्मात्तेन रुद्रो रुजः क्षयात् ॥ इति ॥

स्कान्दपुराणे सूतसंहितायाम् —

विकल्परहितं तत्त्वं ज्ञानमानन्दमव्ययम् ।
न च नामानि रूपाणि शिवस्य परमात्मनः ॥

तथापि मायया तस्य नामरूपे प्रकल्पिते ।
शिवो रुद्रो महादेवः शंकरो ब्रह्म सत्परम् ॥

विष्णुनारायणादीनि नामानि परमेश्वरे ।
कथंचिद्योगवृत्त्या तु वर्तन्ते न तु मुख्यया ॥ इति ॥

2. That has been said, (i) in the *Devīkālottara*: "Neither gross nor subtle, nor void in form, of the nature of knowledge alone, and the only friend of the world;" (ii) in the *Parākhya* : "That Parameśvara, being one, exists as different through differences of names; because of being great, or causing to grow, He is but Brahmā, according to *Śaiva* teaching; He is Viṣṇu because of His capacity to

protect; the Lord of the world is the protector; since he drives away the sorrows (of *saṁsāra*) He is Rudra; He is therefore Rudra because of the destruction of sorrow;" in the *Skāndapurāṇa*, in the *Sūtasaṁhitā*: "The reality is free from differentiation; It is knowledge, bliss, and non-dual; for Śiva, the supreme self, there are neither names nor forms; yet through *māyā* there are posited names and forms for Him; Śiva, Rudra, Mahādeva, Śaṅkara, Brahmā, Sat, Param, Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, etc., are names for the supreme Lord; these apply somehow by secondary (etymological) use, not through the principal (conventional) use."

३. तस्य परतत्त्वस्य स्वरूपलक्षणं पशुपाशप्रमाणागम्यं निर्मलनिरतिशयस्वप्रकाशज्ञानानन्दात्मकं विभु नित्यं स्वतन्त्रं शिवमिति। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्स्वायंभुवे —

अप्रमेयमनिर्देश्यमनौपम्यमनामयम् ।
सूक्ष्मं सर्वगतं नित्यं ध्रुवमव्ययमीश्वरम् ॥ इति ॥

एतच्च लक्षणमतद्व्यावृत्त्यैवोक्तमित्येतत्तत्रैवोक्तम् —

अप्रमेयमनन्तत्वादनिर्देश्यमलक्ष्यतः ।
अनौपम्यमसादृश्याद्विमलत्वादनामयम् ॥
सूक्ष्मं चानुपलभ्यत्वाद्व्यापकत्वाच्च सर्वगम् ।
नित्यं कारणशून्यत्वादचलत्वाच्च तद्ध्रुवम् ।
अव्ययं परिपूर्णत्वात् स्वामिभावात्तथेश्वरम् ॥ इति ॥

श्रीमत्पराख्ये च —

तत्स्वरूपं भवेदस्य शिवस्य परमात्मनः ।
चिद्रूपमात्मनो रूपं दृक्क्रियाशक्तिलक्षणम् ॥ इति ॥

देवीकालोत्तरे —

आकाशमिव सर्वं तु सबाह्याभ्यन्तरं प्रिये ।
परानन्दमरूपं तु पश्यन्नानन्दभाग्भवेत् ॥ इति ॥

श्रीमदचिन्त्ये —

नाध्यक्षं नापि तल्लैङ्गं न शाब्दमपि शाङ्करम् ।
यत्सुखं परमं ज्ञेयं ..... । इति ।
स्वसंवेद्यं परं ज्योतिः ..... ॥ इति च ।

3. Of this supreme reality, the definition through its own nature is thus: it is that which is not known by cognition belonging to *paśu* and *pāsa*, which is of the nature of stainless, unsurpassable, self-luminous knowledge and bliss, which is pervasive, eternal, independent and auspicious. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Svāyambhuva*: "Unknowable, indescribable, incomparable, stainless, subtle, omnipresent, eternal, firm, indestructible, lordly." It has been said even there that this definition has the purpose of excluding what is not that (not of fixing what it is): "Unknowable because of infinitude, indescribable because of not being a definable object, incomparable because of having no similarity, stainless because of having no impurity, subtle because of not being cognised, omnipresent because of pervasiveness, eternal because of there being no cause (for Him), firm because of immovability, indestructible because of perfection, and lordly because of the status of owner (of the world)." And in the sacred *Parākhya*: "Of this Śiva, the supreme self, the (essential) nature is the nature of intelligence." In the *Devīkālottra*: "Dear one, like the ether, He is all, both without and within, supreme

bliss and formless; seeing Him, one becomes the experience of bliss." In the sacred *Acintya*: "It is not known by perception, nor is it known by inference; nor is Śaṅkara's nature the object of verbal testimony; His supreme nature which is to be known, is the supreme light which can be known by Himself alone."

४. तस्य पञ्चविधकृत्यकारित्वं तटस्थलक्षणम्। न चानन्तेशादिष्वतिव्याप्तिः। तेषामपि तदभिव्यक्तत्या पञ्चविधकृत्यकारित्वेन लक्ष्यत्वात्। तानि पञ्चविधकृत्यानि सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारतिरोधानानुग्रहाः। तदुक्तं श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे —

जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसतिरोभावविमुक्तयः
कृत्यं सकारकफलं ज्ञेयमस्यैतदेव हि ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. २. श्लो. ३)

4. His agency in the five kinds of activity is the *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. Nor is this over-pervasive of *Ananteśa*, etc., since they too are defined as agents in the fivefold activity, through the manifestation (of that Supreme reality) in them. Those fivefold activities are: creation, sustentation, destruction, concealment and grace. That has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The activities of Him should be known to be the creation, sustentation, and destruction of the world, concealment and release together with their causal correlates and fruit." (II. 3)

५. अस्य च पत्युः सद्भावे वेदागमावनुमानं च प्रमाणम्। वेदागमौ प्रसिद्धौ। अनुमानं तु - स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकादिभावेन नानाविधं तनुकरणादिकं जगत् सकर्तृकम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत् इति। यथा वा विवादाध्यासितं जगत् स्वोपादानवित्कर्तृपूर्वकम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवदिति। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमच्छिवज्ञानबोधे —

स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकादित्वाज्जगतः कार्यदर्शनात् ।
अस्ति कर्ता स हत्वैतत्सृजत्यस्मान् प्रभुर्हरः ॥ इति ॥

(शिव. सू. १)

श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

विवादाध्यासितं विश्वं विश्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकम् ।
कार्यत्वादावयोः सिद्धं कार्यं कुम्भादिकं यथा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पति. प.श्लो. ९२)

श्रीमृगेन्द्रे —

अथोपलभ्य देहादि वस्तु कार्यत्वधर्मकम् ।
कर्तारमस्य जानीमो विशिष्टमनुमानतः ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. ३ श्लो. १)

श्रीमत्पराख्ये च —

कर्म चिद्रहितं तस्माद्योजकं तदपेक्षते ।
योजकः स महेशानः स्वेच्छया बलवान्यतः ॥ इति ॥

अन्यत्राप्युक्तम् —

अचेतनस्य मायादेः प्रवर्तकतया पतिः ।
सिद्धः सर्वार्थवित्कर्ता व्यापकः सततोदितः ॥ इति ॥

श्रीमन्मतङ्गे —

धर्मेण साध्यते धर्मी चत्कार्येण कारणम् ।
कारणेन क्वचित्कार्यं क्वचिदाम्नायदर्शनात् ॥

घटादिधर्मात्कर्तृत्वं कुलाले धर्मिणि स्थितम् ॥ इति ॥

घटादिगोचरक्रियाशक्तिरूपाद्धर्मादित्यर्थः ।

5. In the existence of this *pati*, *Vedas* and *Āgamas* as also inference are *pramāṇas*. The *Vedas* and *Āgamas* (in this regard) are well known. Inference, however, is thus: the world of bodies, instruments, etc., denoted by words in the masculine, feminine and neuter genders has a creator, since it is a product, like the pot; or (the inference may be thus): the world which is the subject of dispute, has for its cause a creator who knows the whole world, since it is a product, like a pot. And thus, it has been said in the sacred *Śivajñānabodha*: "Since the world is seen to be a product because of being of the nature of He, She and It, there is a Creator; He is the Lord Hara (Śiva). Taking all these, He creates us." (aphorism 1). In the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "The world which is the subject of dispute has for its cause a creator who knows the (whole) world, since it is a product, like the products, pot, etc., which are established for both of us (to have a creator)." (Patipaṭala, v. 92). And in the *Mṛgendra*: "Then, cognising that things like bodies to possess the attribute of being products, we know through inference there is a special creator of these." (III. 1). And in the sacred *Parākhya*: "*Karma* is devoid of intelligence, therefore it requires someone to unite it (to the souls); He who unites (it) is, Maheśāna, since He is independently mighty." Elsewhere too, it is said: "*Pati* is established as He who causes the activity of non-intelligent *māyā*, etc.; He thus appears to be the omniscient and pervasive creator." In the sacred *Mataṅga*: "Sometimes the substrate is established through the attribute; the cause, through the effect; sometimes the effect is established through the cause; sometimes (the cause is established) through the revelation of scriptures; because of the attribute, pot, etc., creatorship is established in the substrate, the

potter." That is to say, from the attribute consisting the conative energy whose object is pot, etc.

६. न चोक्तेष्वनुमानेषु पक्षतावच्छेदकाननुगमः। क्षित्यादित्वस्यैव पक्षतावच्छेदकत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात्। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्; एतादृशकर्त्रभावे कार्यानुपलब्धेरेव बाधकत्वात्। न च कार्यत्वं स्वरूपतोऽसिद्धम्; सावयवत्वेन कार्यत्वस्य सिद्धेः। नापि शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिः; लाघवेन जन्यत्वस्यैव सकर्तृताप्रयोजकत्वात्। उपाधिनिरासादेव तन्निबन्धना व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपि न। न चायं हेतुर्विरुद्धः; साध्यविपरीतेनाव्याप्यत्वात्। नाप्यनैकान्तिकः; अकर्तृकतया निश्चिते आत्मादौ कार्यत्वाभावात्। न च कार्यत्ववत्यङ्कुरादावकर्तृकत्वसन्देहेन सन्दिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वमस्त्विति वाच्यम्; साध्याभावसन्देहे सन्दिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वाभावात्। अन्यथा पर्वतादौ वह्न्यभावसन्देहेन धूमादेरपि सन्दिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च विमतमकर्तृकम्, शरीराजन्यत्वादित्यनेन सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्; तस्याप्युपाधिनिरासोक्तिरीत्यैव निरासात्॥

6. Nor is it that in the said illustrations there is no constant determinant of subjectness; for being of the nature of earth, etc., is itself intended to be the determinant of subjectness. Nor is there inutility (of the probans), since the non-cognition of the effect in the absence of such a creator, is itself the sublater (of the change of inutility). Nor is the nature of being a product non-established, since being a product is established because of having parts. Nor is there an external adjunct, *viz.*, being one originated by a body, since, because of parsimony, origination as such is itself determinant of the possession of a creator. Since the (presence of an) external adjunct has been refuted, there is not the non-establishment of pervasiveness either, as caused by that (adjunct). Nor is this a contradictory probans, since it is not pervaded by the contradictory of the probandum.

Nor is it inconclusive since 'being a product' is absent from the self etc., ascertained not to have a creator. Nor may it be said that there is suspected inconclusiveness, since in respect of sprouts, etc., there is a doubt of their not having a creator; for there is no suspected inconclusiveness where the doubt is as to the non-existence of the probandum (in the subject); else, because of the doubt of the non-existence of fire etc., on the hill, etc., there is the contingence of suspected inconclusiveness even for smoke, etc. Nor is there a counter-probans in this way: "What is in dispute has no creator since it is not originated by a body."; for that too has been refuted by the same argument as the refutation of the external adjunct.

७. अयं च कर्ता अवस्थाभेदेन त्रिविधः। शक्त उद्युक्तः प्रवृत्तश्चेति। यदा सर्वं कार्यमुपादाने लीनं तदा तज्जननशक्तिमात्रयुक्तत्वाच्छक्तः। यदा तु तदीयशक्तिः कार्यजननाभिमुखी तदोद्युक्तः। यदा तु सा जनितकार्या तदा प्रवृत्तशक्तियुक्तत्वात्प्रवृत्तः। तदुक्तं श्रीमृगेन्द्रे —

शक्तोद्युक्तः प्रवृत्तश्च कर्ता त्रिविध इष्यते।
शक्तेः प्रवृत्तिभेदेन भेदस्तस्योपचारतः॥ इति॥

श्रीमत्पौष्करे च —

लयादिकोऽप्ययं भेदः शक्तितस्तु ततः स्थितः।
बिन्दुक्षोभो यतः शंभोः शक्तेरेव प्रवर्तते॥

ज्ञानक्रियात्मिका सापि नित्या नित्योदितप्रभा।
सा पराभिमुखी सर्वबन्धलेशविवर्जिता॥

अनन्यान्या शिवात्मैव वस्तुतो मूर्तिरीश्वरी।
लयावस्थां यदा प्राप्ता तदोदासीनरूपिणी॥

कार्याभावादुदासीना साम्यावस्था तदैव हि ।
विज्ञानक्रिययोः साम्यं यस्मादुद्युक्तकर्तृषु ॥

तदा ह्येतत्करोमीति व्यापारे साम्यमेतयोः ।
अधिकारे क्रियोद्युक्ता कार्येष्वधिकृता यतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पति. प. श्लो. ३८ - ४२)

7. And this creator is of three kinds, because of differences in adjuncts: *śaktaḥ*, *udyuktaḥ* and *pravṛttaḥ*. When all products are resolved in the material cause, then He is *śaktaḥ* since He is associated only with the capacity to generate them. When, however, His energy is actually turned to the origination of products, He is *udyuktaḥ*. When, however, that generation is actually effected, then because of association with active energy, *pravṛttaśakti*, He is *pravṛttaḥ*. That has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The creator is recognised to be of three kinds — *śaktaḥ*, *udyuktaḥ* and *pravṛttaḥ*. Through the difference in the functioning of *śakti*, the difference predicated of Him is figurative." And in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "This difference into *laya*, etc., is understood through (differences in) the *śakti*, since the agitation of *bindu* proceeds only from the *śakti* of Śambhu. That (*śakti*) too which is of the nature of cognition and conation is real, eternally luminous. It is turned towards the Supreme and devoid of all trace of bondage. It is non-different and yet different from Śiva. That alone is the real form of the Lord. When it is in the state of dissolution (of the universe) then it is of indifferent nature (*i.e.*, there is no *kriyā*-aspect); because of the absence of *kārya* (*i.e.*, activity) it is indifferent. That alone is the *sāmya* state when there is equality of cognition and conation in those agents intent on activity; then

indeed there is equality of those two (energies) in the activity as, "I do this"; in *adhikāra*, the conative energy is predominant since there is interest in activity." (Patipaṭala, vv. 38-42).

८. ननु शिवसमवेतायां शक्तौ किं मानम्? विमतं करणजन्यम्, कार्यत्वादित्यनुमानमिति चेन्न; ज्ञानेच्छादीनां करणत्वसम्भवेन अर्थान्तरतया अनेन शक्तिसिध्ययोगादिति, मैवम्; ज्ञानेच्छादीनामेव शक्तित्वेन तैरर्थान्तरस्याभावात्। तर्हि तेषां भेदेन शक्तिरपि नानात्वं स्यादिति ऐकत्यसिद्धान्तो व्याहन्येतेति चेन्न; ज्ञानेच्छादीनामपि स्वतो भेदाभावात्। एकस्या एव शक्तेर्यदा कार्यानुकूलादृष्टादिपरामर्शित्वं तदा ज्ञानत्वम्, यदा त्वेवं भवत्वित्याकारता तदा इच्छात्वम्, यदा तत्तत्कार्यजनकत्वं तदा कृतित्वमिति ज्ञानादिभेदोपपत्तेः। एवमेक एवायं कर्ता नवधा भिद्यते। तत्र शिवशक्तिनादबिन्द्वाख्याश्चत्वारो निष्कळभेदाः। सदाशिवाख्यः सकळनिष्कळ एकः। महेश्वररुद्रविष्णुब्रह्माख्याश्चत्वारः सकळभेदाः। तत्र द्वौ शक्तिभेदौ। अपरे सप्त शिवभेदाः। एवमेकैव तच्छक्तिः बिन्दुशक्तिमनोन्मनीमहेश्वर्युमालक्ष्मीवाणीभेदेन सप्तधा भिद्यते।

8. Now what is the proof of a *śakti* inherent in Śiva? "The subject in dispute is generated by a cause since it is a product."— if it be said to be this inference, no; for the inference leads to a different conclusion since cognition, conation, etc., are possible causes and there is no possibility of establishing *śakti* as that (cause). Not so; for cognition, conation, etc., being themselves energy (*śakti*) it is not the case that they constitute a different conclusion (to the inference). "Then, because of their difference, there would be diversity for *śakti* too and the conclusion of its oneness would be contradicted." —if this be said, no; for, as between cognition, conation, etc., there is no difference in their own nature. In the case of one and the same *śakti*, when there is a consideration of the *adṛṣṭa*, etc., favourable to what is to be done then there is cognitive

nature; when, however, there is the form "Let it be thus" then there is the nature of desire; when there is generation of the respective products, then there is the nature of volition; thus is intelligible the difference of cognition, etc. Thus this (*śakti*) which is but one is divided into nine. Of these the *niṣkala* varieties are those called Śiva, Śakti, Nāda and Bindu; what is called Sadāśiva is *sakala-niṣkala*; the four called Maheśvara, Rudra, Viṣṇu and Brahmā are *sakala* varieties. Of these, (the first) two are varieties of Śakti; the other seven are varieties of Śiva. Thus that *śakti* which is but one is divided into seven as Bindu, Śakti, Manonmanī, Maheśvarī, Umā, Lakṣmī and Vāṇī.

९. ननु बिन्दोरवस्थाभेदेन कर्तुः शिवस्य भेद उक्तः, तन्न सङ्गच्छेत; अचेतनस्य बिन्दोः स्वतः प्रवृत्त्ययोगात्। अथ चेदीश्वर एव तत्प्रवृत्तिं कारयति तदा तस्य विकारित्वं स्यादिति चेत्, उच्यते — तत्र कर्तृत्वं द्विविधम्, सङ्कल्पमात्रेण करणेन चेति। तत्र करणापेक्षकर्तृत्वं कुलालादीनाम्। सङ्कल्पोऽपि द्विविधः, मनोव्यापाररूपः सन्निधिरूपश्चेति। तत्र मनोव्यापारेण कर्तृत्व ब्रह्मादीनाम्। शिवस्य तु सन्निधिमात्रेण; न तु विकृतिहेतुबाह्यकरणापेक्षया; निर्मलतया तस्य करणादिरूपोपाधिरहितत्वात्। लोके चोपाधिमतामेव विकारित्वं दृष्टम्। तस्मात्कर्तृत्वेनाविकारित्वं न विरुद्धम्। न च यदि तस्य देहाद्युपाधिमत एव कुलालादेः कर्तृत्वदर्शनादिति वाच्यम्; स्वदेहप्रेरणादावुपाध्यभावेऽपि कर्तृत्वदर्शनात्। तत्राप्युपाध्यन्तरस्वीकारेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात्प्रथमसृष्टौ समस्तोपाधिवर्जितः प्रवृत्ताशेषशक्तिकः शिव एव कर्ताभ्युपेयः। तस्य च पञ्चविधकृत्येषु सूर्यस्य कमलोत्पलनवनीतपङ्कसम्बन्धिषु विकासमुकुळीभावद्रवीकरणशोषणरूपकार्येष्विव सन्निधिमात्रेण कर्तृत्वम्।

9. Now through differences of states in the Bindu, there were declared differences in the agent, Śiva; that is not consistent, since in the case of the non-intelligent Bindu, its being active by itself is impossible. If then it be said that Īśvara alone is He who causes its activity,

then there would be mutability for Him. The reply is: mutability is of two kinds — by mere resolve and through instruments. Agency dependent on instruments belongs to the potter, etc. Resolve, too, is of two kinds — that which consists in a mental operation and that which consists in proximity. Of these, agency consisting in a mental operation belongs to Brahmā, etc. That of Śiva, however, is by mere proximity, but not dependent on external instruments that cause change; for, being stainless, to Him do not belong instruments like the conditioned intellect. And in the world, mutability is seen only in the case of those which are limited by adjuncts. Therefore, immutability does not conflict with agency. Nor may it be said, "If for Him there be no adjuncts like the body, thence there is no agency either for Him since in the world agency is seen only for the potter, etc., who possess adjuncts like the body."; for in the activation of one's own body, etc., agency is seen, though there is no adjunct; if another adjunct be admitted even there, there is the contingence of infinite regress. Therefore, in the primal creation, Śiva alone, devoid of all adjuncts, the creator of everything without exception, should be admitted as the agent. And His agency in the five forms of activity is by mere proximity, like the sun's activity of causing to bloom, causing to close, liquifying and drying in the proximity of the lotus, the lily, butter and mire.

१०. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

बिन्द्ववस्थाविशेषेण शिवभेदस्त्वयोदितः ।
बिन्दोरचेतनत्वेन प्रवृत्तिः स्वत एव न ॥

कर्ता चेत्तत्प्रवृत्त्यर्थं विकारी स्यात्तदा शिवः ।
एवं विरोध आपन्ने परिहारं वदेश्वर ॥

ईश्वरः —

कर्तृत्वं द्विविधं विप्राः ! सङ्कल्पात्करणादपि ।
न हि सङ्कल्पमात्रेण कुलालैः क्रियते घटः ॥

शिवः सङ्कल्पमात्रेण बिन्दुक्षोभकरः सदा ।
न व्यापारविशेषेण येनायं विकृतो भवेत् ॥

समस्तोपाधिशून्यत्वान्निर्मलत्वाच्च हे द्विजाः ।
य एवोपाधिमन्तस्ते विकृताः कार्यजन्मनि ॥

ततश्च नाविकारित्वं कर्तृत्वेन विरुध्यते ।
समस्तोपाधिशून्यत्वात्कर्तृत्वं नेष्यते कथम् ॥

कर्तृत्वप्रतिबन्धत्वादुपाधेस्तद्वियोगतः ।
भवेत्प्रत्युत कर्तृत्वं प्राचुर्याय मुनीश्वराः ॥

अदेहस्यापि कर्तृत्वं स्वदेहप्रेरणे यथा ।
सदेहस्यापि कर्तृत्वं सर्वत्रापि यदीष्यते ॥

तद्देहस्यापि कार्यत्वाद्व्याप्तं कर्त्रन्तरेण तत् ।
तस्य देहादयोऽप्येवमित्यवस्था न कुत्रचित् ॥

ततः प्रथमसृष्टेस्तु समस्तोपाधिवर्जितः ।
कर्ता महेश एवेष्टः प्रवृत्ताशेषशक्तिकः ॥

यथार्को दिनचेष्टानां सन्निधेरुपकारकः ।
तथा सन्निधिमात्रेण विदधात्यखिलं शिवः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. प. प. श्लो. २७ - ३७)

10. And thus it is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Sages: 'By Thee has been declared differences in Śiva through differences to the states of Bindu; since Bindu is non-intelligent there is no activity for it of itself; if Śiva is to be the agent for the sake of its activity then He would be mutable; since such a conflict results, tell us the solution, O Īśvara.' God: Agency, Oh, wise ones! is of two kinds — by resolve and by instruments; a pot is not indeed created by the potter by mere resolves; Śiva always agitates the Bindu by mere resolves. not by a particular operation in which case He would be mutable. O twice-born ones! He is free from all adjuncts and all impurities (He is immutable); they alone who have adjuncts are subject to change to the production of the effect; and therefore immutability does not conflict with agency. How can it be that because of being devoid of all adjuncts agency is not recognised (for Śiva)? On the contrary, since the adjunct is the obstacle to (unfettered) agency, from the disjunction of that (adjunct) there would be (unfettered) agency, through abundance (of perfection), O Sages! just as there is agency even for the bodiless in respect of the activation, of one's own body. If agency everywhere be recognised for the embodied one (alone), since that body too is a product, it is pervaded by another agent; his body, etc., are in a similar predicament; hence there would be no stopping anywhere (for this regress). Therefore, for the first creation, Maheśa, free from all adjuncts should alone be recognised to be the agent as active in association with all kinds of energies. Just as the sun is by mere proximity the helper in the various activities by day, even so by mere proximity, Śiva creates the whole universe." (Patipaṭala, vv. 27-37)

११. ननु "तद्वपुः पञ्चभिर्मन्त्रैः पञ्चकृत्योपयोगिभिः" इत्यादिना शिवस्य मन्त्रशरीरत्वश्रवणात्कथमशरीरत्वमिति चेत्, सत्यम्; अत्र शास्त्रे मननत्राणयोगितया शक्तेरेव मन्त्रशब्देनाभिधानात् तद्वपुः शाक्तम्। ननु शाक्तत्वं शक्त्यारब्धत्वं शक्तिपरिणामत्वं वा? तथात्वे तस्य निर्विकारत्वनित्यत्वादिप्रतिपादकागमादिविरोधः। तथा च शक्तेरेव कार्यभेदभिन्नाया मूर्धादिभावकल्पनयोपचारेण शरीरत्वाभ्युपगमः। तस्याश्च तदभिन्नत्वान्न वास्तवमस्य शरीरत्वम्। तथा चोक्तं श्रीमृगेन्द्रे —

लोके वपुष्मतो दृष्टं कृत्यं सोऽप्यस्मदादिवत्।
मलाद्यसम्भवाच्छाक्तं वपुर्नैतादृशं प्रभोः॥
तद्वपुः पञ्चभिर्मन्त्रैः पञ्चकृत्योपयोगिभिः।
ईशतत्पुरुषाघोरवामाजैर्मस्तकादिकम्॥
ईष्टे येन जगत्सर्वं गुणेनोपरिवर्तिना।
स मूर्धा समदेशत्वान्मूर्धा नावयवस्तनोः॥
तस्य तस्य तनुर्या पूस्तस्या मुषति येन सः।
तत्त्राणाद्व्यञ्जनाच्चापि स तत्पुरुषवक्त्रकः॥
हृदयं बोधपर्यायः सोऽस्याघोरः शिवो यतः।
परिग्रहस्य घोरत्वाद्घोरोक्तिरुपचारतः॥
वामस्त्रिवर्गो वामत्वाद्रहस्यश्च स्वभावतः।
वामं धाम परं गुह्यं यस्यासौ देवगुह्यकः॥
सद्योऽणूनां मूर्तयः सम्भवन्ति यस्येच्छातस्तेन सद्योऽभिधानः।
सद्योमूर्तिर्योगिनां वा विधत्ते सद्योमूर्तिः कृत्यशैघ्र्याच्च मूर्तेः॥
इत्थं शक्तिः कुर्वती देहकृत्यं देहाभावादुच्यते देहशब्दैः।
तस्या भेदा येऽपि वामादयः स्युस्तेऽपि प्रोक्ताः कृत्यभेदेन सद्भिः॥

(मृ. प्र. ३ श्लो. ७ - १४)

स इत्थं विग्रहोऽनेन कारणेनाहतौजसा ।
करोति सर्वदा कृत्यं यदा यदुपचर्यते ॥ इति ।

(मृ. प्र. ४ श्लो. १)

11. Now since by statements like "His form constituted by the five *mantras*, so as to be of service in the five activities", a body formed of *mantras* is declared of Śiva, how then can it be said that He has no body? True, (but) in that sacred teaching, *śakti* itself is denoted by the word '*mantra*' as being worthy of contemplation (*manana*) and as capable of protecting (*trāṇa*). The body composed of that (*mantra*) is that which is constituted of *śakti*. Now does 'being constituted of *śakti*' mean being originated by *śakti* or being a transformation of *śakti*? If it be either, there is conflict with the *Āgamas* declaring His (Śiva's) immutability, eternality, etc. And thus through the different products of *śakti* itself, and through imagining different parts like the head, etc., embodiment has to be admitted figuratively (for Śiva), since that *śakti* is non-different from Him; but His possessing a body is not real. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "In this world is seen, the body of an embodied being, just as ourselves, to be a product; but the Lord's body is not as this; His is constituted of *śakti*, as it is not originated from *mala*, etc. His bodily form, *viz.*, the head, etc., is constituted of five *mantras* Īśa, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāma and Aja, which are of service in the five activities; that auxillary with which He rules the whole world, while remaining above it, that is the head, because of occupying the same place (among *mantras*) as the head (in the body), not (because it is) a member of a physical body. That whereby He lives in the cities, *i.e.*, the respective bodies (of gods and

men) that is the *tatpuruṣa* face, since it protects (the creatures from the fear of rebirth, etc.) and manifests (cognitive and conative energies). *Hṛdaya* is a synonym of wisdom. Since *aghora* or Śiva is wisdom, He has *aghora* for his heart. The predication of *ghoratva* is figurative, (*ghoratva* not being itself of the nature of beatitude), because of the *ghoratva* of the *parigraha* (*i.e.*, of the host of persons eligible for the impure - *aśudda* - path, whose capacities have been quietened by His own *śakti*). He is *vāma*, because He is the bestower of the three human goals (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*). He is secret (mysterious, *guhya*) in His own nature. Since that light of His which spreads in the lower paths (*adhvās*) is mysterious (non-manifest), He is *vāma-deva-guhya*. He is named *sadyaḥ* since from His desire there arise immediately physical forms (for the souls); or because He instantly takes on the forms in which He is contemplated by *yogins*, He is *sadyomūrtiḥ* (He creates forms like His own *mantra* form), but not because of quickness in creating a physical body for Himself. Thus *śakti* which carries on the functions of the body, since there is no body, is denoted by the word 'body' (applied to Śiva). The varieties such as *vāma* etc., are said by wise ones to be (figuratively) differences of that (*śakti*), through differences of function (just as the capacity of fire though really one is spoken of as differentiated into burning, illumining, etc.)." (III. 7-14). "He who has this kind of form with His instrument of unhindered capacity always performs His functions at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner." (IV. 1).

१२. न चानन्तेश्वरश्रीकण्ठादीनां शिवभेदानां शरीरित्वेन शिवस्यापि शरीरित्वं स्यादिति वाच्यम्; तत्रापि तेषां शिवभेदत्वस्य तदभिव्यक्त-

तदधिष्ठातृशिवशक्त्यायत्तत्वात्। अत एवैतेषां मन्त्रेश्वराणुसदाशिवानामपि पतिपदार्थेऽन्तर्भावः। कारकपदार्थस्यापि दीक्षात्मकशिवशक्तिरूपतया तत्रैवान्तर्भावः।

12. Nor may it be said that since for the different forms of Śiva, like Ananta, Īśvara, Śrīkaṇṭha, etc., that (*śakti*) is the body, it maybe the body for Śiva too. For there (in the example) their being varieties of Śiva, is dependent on their manifestation of that and on Śivaśakti which controls them; hence it is that even of *mantra, Īśvara, aṇu* and *Sadāśiva* there is inclusion in the category of *pati*; even of the things which are causal correlates (*kārakas*), as being of the form of Śivaśakti, of the form of *dīkṣā,* there is inclusion in that (*śakti*) itself.

१३. अयमेव च जगतो निमित्तम्। तत्समवायिचिच्छक्तेर्मायोपहितत्वेनोपादानत्वमपि। न तु परमाणवो नापि प्रकृतिः नापि केवलमायाद्वयम्। तथा हि — न तावत्परमाणवो जगदुपादानम्; प्रमाणाभावेन तेषामेवासिद्धेः। ननु अनुमानं मानम्। तथा हि — जालसूर्यमरीचिसंस्थं सूक्ष्मं रजः स्वन्यूनपरिमाणद्रव्यारब्धं, कार्यद्रव्यत्वात्, घटवदिति परिदृश्यमानस्य सूक्ष्मरजसः कारणेऽनुमिते तस्य महदारम्भकत्वेन कार्यत्वे चानुमिते तेनैव हेतुना तस्यापि तथाविधद्रव्यारब्धत्वमनुमीयते। तथा च दृश्यमानस्य सूक्ष्मद्रव्यस्य यत् परम्परयारम्भकं स एव परमाणुः। तथाणुपरिमाणतारतम्यं क्वचिद्विश्रान्तं, परिमाणानां तारतम्यत्वात्, महत्परिमाणतारतम्यवदित्यनुमानेनापि परमाणुसिद्धिरिति, मैवम्; समानपरिमाणदुग्धारब्धैर्दध्यादिभिरधिकपरिमाणसर्पिराद्यारब्धैर्घृतादिभिश्चाद्यस्य हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वात्। तत्र तदवयवारब्धत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। द्वितीयस्य च परिदृश्यमाने परिमाण एव विश्रान्तिसम्भवेन अभिमतार्थासाधकत्वात्। तस्मात्परमाणूनामेवाभावान्न तेषामुपादानत्वम्। नापि प्रकृतिः; तस्या महदाद्यपेक्षया उपादानत्वस्यास्माभिरभ्युपगमात् परमोपादानत्वं तु नास्ति; तस्याः कार्यत्वस्य समर्थयिष्यमाणतया उपादेयत्वात्। नापि माया; किं तु तस्या उपादानकोटिनिवेशमात्राभ्युपगमे इष्टापत्तेः।

तस्या एवोपादानत्वमित्युपगमस्तु मायाविशिष्टशिवस्योपादानत्वसाधक-प्रमाणेन बाधितः। तच्च प्रमाणं पञ्चमीश्रुत्यादिकम्।

13 He Himself is the efficient cause of the world; through the *citśakti* inherent in Him being conditioned by *māyā*, He is also the material cause. (The material cause) is not the primal atoms, nor *prakṛti*, nor the two *māyās* by themselves. It is thus. Primal atoms are not the material cause of the world; for in the absence of evidence they are not established. Now there is inference; it is thus: the minute particle of dust present in the ray of sunlight passing through the window is caused by a substance of a smaller size, since it is a product, like a pot. When a cause is inferred for the seen, but minute particle of dust, and when that is inferred to be a product because of being the cause of what has gross dimension, it is inferred by that same probans that that cause too is produced by a substance of a like nature (*i.e.*, of smaller dimensions than the effect). And thus, that which is indirectly the cause of the seen minute substance, that itself is the primal atom. Similarly, the primal atom is established even by this inference: The gradations of size in atoms should stop somewhere, since there are gradations of size, like the gradations of gross dimension. Not so, for the first probans is inconclusive in the case of curds, etc., produced by milk, etc., of the same dimension and ghee, etc., produced by butter, etc., of greater dimension; there is no evidence of (the effect) being produced by a part of that (cause). And the second probans does not establish what is desired since it is possible to stop even with the seen gradations of dimension. Therefore, since there are no primal atoms at all, material causality cannot belong to them. Nor is *prakṛti* (the material

cause); its material causality in respect of *mahat*, etc., is admitted by us too. Absolute material causality does not belong to it since it is a product in the manner to be shown. Nor is *māyā* (the material cause); it is a contingence of the acceptable, since it is admitted to enter into what constitutes the material cause; as for the admission of that alone as the material cause, that is sublated by the *pramāṇa* establishing material causality to belong to Śiva as qualified by *māyā*. And that *pramāṇa* consists in the scriptural use of the ablative case, etc.

१४. तथा हि स्कान्दे —

शिवात्सत्यपरानन्दप्रकाशैकस्वलक्षणात् ।
आविर्भूतमिदं सर्वं चेतनाचेतनात्मकम् ॥

इत्यपादानपञ्चमी श्रुता । सा च "जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः" (पा. सू. १-४-३०) इत्यपादानसंज्ञया उपादानवाचिनो विहिता । अतः सैव पञ्चमी तत्र प्रमाणम् । तथा तत्रैव —

सृष्ट्यर्थमैक्षत प्राज्ञो बहुस्यामिति शक्तिमान् ॥

इति बहुभवनसङ्कल्पःश्रूयते । स चोपादानत्व एव घटते । न हि निमित्तमात्रस्य कुलालस्य घटः स्यामिति सङ्कल्पोऽस्ति । एवं देवीकालोत्तरे —

भूतानि चाहं स्थिरजङ्गमानि
यावन्ति चान्यान्यहमेव तानि ॥

इति सामानाधिकरण्येन निर्देशो वर्तते । स च मृद्घट इत्यादावुपादानोपादेययोरेव दृष्टः, न त्वत्यन्तभिन्नयोर्दण्डघटयोरिति सोऽपि प्रमाणम् । तदुक्तं शिवज्ञानबोधे —

अन्यः सन्व्याप्तितो नान्यः ... ... ।
... ... ॥ इति ॥
(शिव. सू. २.)

14. It is thus: in the *Skānda* passage, "From Śiva, who is of the sole nature of truth, supreme bliss and light, all this has been manifested, both sentient and non-sentient.", the fifth case in the sense of the ground of ablation has been used; and that is laid down for what denotes the material cause, since the ground of ablation signifies "the material cause of the agent in production (*i. e.*, the product)." (Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, I. iv. 30). Therefore, that fifth case is itself the *pramāṇa* in this matter. Similarly in that (*Skānda*) itself in the words, "For the sake of creation, the wise One endowed with *śakti*, desired 'May I become many' ", there is declared the resolve to become many; and that is reconcilable only with material causality. Indeed for a mere efficient cause, the potter, there is not the resolve "May I become the pot". Similarly in the *Devīkālottara*, there is the appositional mention in the words "I am the elements; whatever else there is, movable or immovable, I alone am all these." And that (appositional designation) is seen only where there is the relation of material cause and effect, as between clay and pot but not as between what are wholly different, like the staff and the pot; hence this (designation) too is a *pramāṇa*. Thus it has been said in the *Śivajñānabodha*, "Being different, yet, because of pervasion, non-different." (aphorism 2).

१५. नन्वेवं निर्विकारत्वप्रतिपादकानि वचनानि व्याहन्येरन्निति चेत्, न; "शिवाच्छक्तिमतः प्रभोः" इत्यादिवचनानुसारेण मायाद्वयाख्यपरिग्रह-शक्तिविशिष्टस्य शिवस्योपादानत्वेऽपि विशेषणीभूतमायाया एव विकारित्वात्। विकारित्वेऽपि केवलस्य निर्विकारत्वाविरोधात्। ननु शिवो नोपादानम्, चेतनत्वात्, पशुवदित्यनुमानेन बाधः प्रतिरोधो वा शिवोपादनत्वबोधकाग-मस्येति चेन्न; आगमस्यानुमानापेक्षया प्रबलत्वेन तस्यैवानुमानबाधकत्वात्। अन्यथा यागादिक्रिया न स्वर्गसाधनम्, क्रियात्वात्, वृथाचेष्टावदित्यनुमानेन

यागादिस्वर्गसाधनतावोधकस्याप्यागमस्य बाधप्रतिरोधाद्यापत्तेः। ननु समवायिकारणस्य नानात्व एव तत्संयोगात्मकमसमवायिकारणं लभ्यते। शिवस्य तूपादानत्वे असमवायिकारणं न लभ्यत इति न तस्योपादानत्वं युज्यत इति चेन्न; भावकार्यस्यासमवायिकारणजन्यत्वनियमे मानाभावात्। प्रत्युत तदभावस्यैवोपादानत्वबोधकागमेन निश्चयात्, शब्दादिकार्येऽसमवायिकारणस्याभावेन व्यभिचाराच्च। न च तत्रापि भेर्याकाशसंयोगादिरसमवायिकारणम्; तद्व्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तस्य कार्यव्यतिरेकस्यादर्शनेन तस्य कारणत्वे मानाभावात्। अन्यथा तत्राकाशपरिमाणस्याप्यसमवायिकारणत्वकल्पनापत्तेः; एकतन्त्वारब्धे सूत्रे व्यभिचाराच्च। न च तत्रापि तन्त्ववयवानामेवारम्भकत्वम्, तेषां च संयोगः सम्भवतीति युक्तम्; मूर्तानां समानदेशताविरोधे तु तन्तुसमानदेशस्य सूत्रस्य निष्पत्ययोगात्। तन्तोरपि सद्भावप्रतीत्या तन्तुविनाशकल्पनाया बाधितत्वात्। एवं च शिवो नोपादानम्, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवदित्यनुमानं निरस्तम्। आगमबाधेन तस्याप्यनुत्थानात्। नन्वागमेनापि साक्षादुपादानत्वं न बोध्यते, किं तु तद्व्याप्यत्वम्, कार्येणाभिन्नत्वम्, तल्लयाद्यधिकरणत्वं च। तथा चानयोः सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वमेव स्यादिति नोपादानत्वनिश्चयो युक्तः। न च लयाद्यधिकरणत्वमागमेन बोधितमिति प्रबलमिति युक्तम्; कर्तृत्वस्यापि तेनैव बोधितत्वात्। यदि चागमबोधितस्य कर्तृत्वसम्बन्धिनः पक्षधर्मत्वस्य बोधेन तदीया व्याप्तिर्बोध्यते तदा लयाद्यधिकरणत्वस्य वा कर्तृत्वस्य वा सा बाध्यताम्, विशेषाभावात्। तस्मात्सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वमेव॥

15. Now thus the texts predicating immutability would be contradicted; if this be said, no; for though in conformity with texts like "*śakti* is considered to be from Śiva", there be material causality for Śiva as qualified by the *parigraha śakti* called the two *māyās*, mutability is only for the *māyā* mentioned as the qualification; and though there be mutability for (Śiva as) the qualified, there is no conflict with the immutability of the bare (unqualified substrate, Śiva). Now there is sublation or counter-action of the text teaching material

causality by the inference "Śiva is not the material cause, since He is intelligent, like the soul."; if this be said, no; for, revelation being stronger than inference, the former alone is the sublater of the latter. Otherwise even of the revealed text teaching instrumentality to heaven in the case of sacrifice, there would be sublation or counter-action by the inference: "Acts like sacrifice are not instrumental to heaven, since they are acts, like futile movements." Now, only when there is plurality of material cause, does there result the non-intimate cause consisting in their combination; but when Śiva is the material cause there results no non-intimate cause; hence the material causality of that (Śiva) is not possible — if this be said, no; since there is no evidence for the world as effect being invariably produced by a non-intimate cause (as well); on the contrary, it is the absence of that (non-intimate cause) which is ascertained by the revelation teaching (Siva's) material causality; further the alleged probans is inconsistant since the non-intimate cause is absent from such effects as sound. Nor is there a non-intimate cause there too, such as the conjunction between the drum and the ether; for there is no evidence of this being a cause, since there is not seen the absence of the effect as determined by the absence of that (suggested cause); else, there is the contingence of non-intimate causality being assumed even in the case of the size of ether. Further (the suggested need for a non-intimate cause) is inconsistant in the case of a cord produced by a single thread. Nor is it that there too, causality belongs only to the parts of the thread (the cotton filaments) and that conjunction of these is possible; for there being conflict in two conjoint (products) occupying the same place, the production of the cord which occupies the same space

as the thread would be impossible. Because of the cognition of the thread too as existing, the assumption that the thread is destroyed is sublated. Thus is refuted the inference, "Śiva is not the material cause, since He is an agent, like the potter, etc." For, being sublated by revelation this (inference) does not arise at all. Now, even by revelation, material causality is not expressly taught, but only pervasion of that (world) non-different from the effect and being the locus of the dissolution of that (world). And thus, there would be but counter-action (*satpratipakṣatva*) between these (the inference here offered and any inference based on the *Āgamas*); hence the certitude of material causality does not stand to reason. Nor does it stand to reason that because *Āgama* teaches, "being the locus of the dissolution, etc., of the world," this is stronger; for agency too is taught by that (*āgama*) itself. If it be said that the concomitance of that (being the locus of dissolution, etc.) is taught without sublating the agency, then we may say that agency is taught without sublating its being the locus of dissolution, etc.; for there is no distinction between the two. Therefore there is but counter-action, not the certitude of material causality. Not so; for, by the fifth case in the sense of ablation which teaches material causality in the form of *prakṛti*, material causality is expressly taught by the *Āgama* (not merely inferred from its express teaching).

१६. अत एव नोपादानत्वनिश्चय इति, मैवम्; पञ्चम्याः प्रकृते प्रकृतित्वरूपोपादानत्वबोधकतया साक्षादेवागमेनोपादनत्वबोधनात्। नन्वेवं शिवो निमित्तं न भवेत्, उपादानासमवायिव्यतिरिक्तकारणस्यैव निमित्तशब्दार्थत्वादिति चेन्न; प्रकृतिभावेनोपादानत्ववदनुकूलचिकीर्षादियोगेन निमित्तत्वस्योपपत्तेः। निमित्तलक्षणमपि प्रकृतिभावादन्यादृशोपयोगवत्त्वम्। तच्च चिकीर्षादिनोपयोगवति शिवेऽप्यक्षतमिति शिव एवोपादानं निमित्तं चेति सिद्धम्॥

16. Now thus Śiva cannot be the efficient cause; for what is meant by the word "efficient" is only that cause which is other than the material and the non-intimate. If this be said, no; for, just like material causality though being the root-cause (*prakṛti*), efficient causality too is intelligible through His possession of the desire to do what is favourable (to the production of the world). And the definition of efficiency is only this - serviceability in some way other than that of being the root-cause; and that is unaffected even in respect of Śiva who is of service through His desire to do (what is helpful); hence it is established that Śiva alone is both material and efficient cause.

१७. नन्वेवम् —

निमित्तमीश्वरस्तेषामुपादानं स बिन्दुराट् ॥

(पौ. तन्त्र. प. श्लो. २८)

शिवो निमित्तं प्रकृतिः परापरा
कार्यात्मतामस्य समाप्नुते जडा ॥

इत्यादिवचनविरोध इति चेत्, न, एतादृशवचनानां मायावद्विकारितयोपादानत्वं नास्तीत्येवम्परत्वात्। यदपि "बहु स्यामिति शक्तिमान्, यावन्ति चान्यान्यहमेव तानि" इत्यादिवचनजातं केवलोपादानत्वमात्रपरं, तदपि "अन्यः सन्व्याप्ततोऽनन्य" इति कार्ये व्याप्तिसत्तालक्षणानुस्यूतिस्फूर्तिपरमिति न कश्चिद्विरोधः ॥

17. Now, thus, there is conflict with such texts, as "Īśvara is the efficient cause; the material cause is the *bindurāṭ*", (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Tantrapaṭala, v. 28); "Śiva is the efficient cause, the material cause is the *parāśakti*; the lower (*aparā*), the inert occupies the position of a product thereof." If this be said, no; for such texts have only the

purport that (for Śiva) there is not as for *māyā* material causality consisting in being transformed. As for texts, like "May I become many", "The possessor of *śakti* resolved to become many", "Whatever else there is, that is myself alone", which (seem to) have for their purport material causality alone, these too, like "Being different yet non-different" (*Śivajñānabodha*), have for their purport His pervasion (of the effect), and His reality consisting in the experience and manifestation (of Him) in the effect; hence there is no conflict.

१८. एवं च पतिपदार्थशिवस्य तदधिष्ठितमायायाश्च कार्यभूतप्रपञ्चस्य स्वधर्मसत्तास्फूर्तिप्रियादिरूपतया जडविकारादिरूपतया चोभयोरुपादानत्वम्। शिवस्य तु मायाया अधिष्ठातृतया निमित्तत्वमधिकमिति विशेषः। यथा धूमलक्षणे कार्ये आर्द्रेन्धनवह्न्योरुभयोरुपादानत्वेऽपि धूमकार्ये काष्ठधर्मकृष्णरूपमेव; न तु वह्निधर्मभास्वररूपम्; तथा प्रपञ्चस्य शिवमायोभयोपादानत्वेऽपि न चिदानन्दरूपत्वम्। किं तु जडमायाधर्मप्रकाश्यत्वविकारित्वरूपमिति। तत्र च वह्नेरिव शिवस्य निमित्तत्वमिति न तदुत्कृष्टधर्मवत्त्वम्। न च वह्निरपि धूमे निमित्तमात्रम्, न तूपादानमिति वाच्यम्; अन्यस्योपादानस्याभावेन परमाणुप्रक्रियायाश्च पराकरिष्यमाणत्वेन वह्नीन्धनयोरेवोपादानत्वात्। न च काष्ठमेवोपादानं वह्निस्तु निमित्तमात्रमिति वक्तुं शक्यम्। वह्निधर्मभूतौष्ण्यादेरप्युपलभ्यमानत्वेन ग्राहकतौल्यात्। तस्मान्मायाविशिष्टेश्वरस्य निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं च सिद्धम्।

18. And thus, since for the world which is the product of Śiva — the category called *pati* — and of *māyā* controlled by Him, there is His nature of reality, manifestation, desirability, etc., as also the nature of inertness, mutability, etc., there is material causality for both (Śiva and *māyā*). In the case of Śiva, however, as the controller of *māyā*, there is the additional attribute of efficient causality; this is the distinction. Just as in respect of the effect consisting of smoke, though material causality

belongs to both wet fuel and fire, in the product, smoke, there is only the black colour which is an attribute of the fuel, not the brightness, the attribute of fire; similarly though in respect of the world, material causality belongs to both Śiva and *māyā*, there is not for it, the nature of intelligence and bliss, but rather the attribute of inert *māyā*, *viz.*, non-luminosity and mutability; since for Śiva as for fire, there is efficient causality, there is not (for the world) the possession of His superior attributes. Nor may it be said that fire too, then have efficient cause in respect of smoke not the material cause. Since there is no other material cause and since the teaching of primal atoms (as the material cause) has been refuted, material causality belongs only to both fire and fuel. Nor is it possible to say that the fuel alone is the material cause, while fire is but the efficient cause; for, since there is cognised even heat, etc., which are attributes of fire, there is parity of the means of apprehension in respect of both. Therefore, in the case of Īśvara qualified by *māyā*, there is established causality both efficient and material.

१९. तदुपपादकवचनानि वातुळे —

लिङ्गे सर्वं समुत्पन्नं लयस्तत्रैव चोच्यते ।
लिङ्गं शंभुरिति ज्ञेयं पीठं शक्तिरुदाहृतम् ॥
योनिलिङ्गप्रकारेण जगत्सृष्ट्यर्थकारणम् ।
सदा संयोगभावत्वात्कामरूपमुदाहृतम् ॥
लिङ्गे तु जायते तत्र जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।
तस्माल्लिङ्गं विशेषेण कर्मरूपमुदाहृतम् ॥
कर्मोदये तु सृष्टिः स्यात् कर्मान्ते संहृतिर्भवेत् ।

एतत्कर्मेशरूपं तु सृष्टिस्थितिलयावहम् ।
दक्षिणाङ्गभवो ब्रह्मा हरिः पूर्वाङ्गसम्भवः ।
हृदयान्नीलरुद्रस्तु शिरसश्शिवसंज्ञकः ॥
महेशस्य सहस्रांशाद्रुद्रदेवसमुद्भवः ।
एतन्महेशकोटयंशाद्ब्रह्मविष्णुसमुद्भवः ।
नेत्रे तु सव्यवामोर्ध्वे सूर्यसोमाग्निसम्भवः ।
प्राणे वायुः समुत्पन्नः श्रोत्रे कीलादिसम्भवः ॥
आस्ये ज्ञानं समुत्पन्नं गणेशस्तद्गळोद्भवः ।
षण्मुखो हृदये जातो नाभौ देवाः समुद्भवाः ॥
पञ्चाशत्कोटिदेवाश्च महेशांशसमुद्भवाः ।
ऋषयश्च तथा कोटयो रोमकूपसमुद्भवाः ॥ इति ॥

ज्ञानं नाम वेदादिविद्या ।

19. The texts which justify this are found in the *Vātula* as: "From the *liṅga* everything is originated; and dissolution is declared even therein. The *liṅga* is known as *Śambhu*; the *pīṭha* (seat) is called *śakti*. Since the causes of the creation of the world, in the form of the *yoni* (*śakti*) and *liṅga* (*śambhu*) are always in conjunction, they are said to be of the form of love. From the *liṅga* is born the world — immovable and movable. Therefore the *liṅga* is specially said to be active (*karma*) by nature. When *karma* originates there will be creation; at the end of *karma* there will be destruction. This form of the Lord as *karma* is that which carries on creation, sustentation and destruction. From the right side arose Brahmā; from the front arose Hari; from the heart arose Nīlarudra; from

the head, He who is called Śiva; from a thousandth part of Maheśa arose Rudradeva; from a hundred-hundred-thousandth part of this Maheśa arose Brahmā and Viṣṇu; from the eyes — right, left and the one above, arose the sun, the moon and fire; from (His) *prāṇa* arose the wind; from (His) hearing arose *Kīla* (minute particle), etc.; from His face arose wisdom. Gaṇeśa arose from His neck. Ṣaṇmukha arose from His heart; from His navel, arose the various deities; fifty crores of deities arose from a part of Maheśa; similarly a crore of sages (*ṛṣis*) arose from the hair follicles." What is called "wisdom" is such knowledge as the *Veda*.

२०. नन्वेवमपि शिवस्यैव जगत्कर्तृत्वमिति कथम्? त्वयैवानन्तेश्वरादीनामपि कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमात्।

कदाचित्सृष्टय शार्वाः कदाचित्पद्मजोद्भवाः।
कदाचिदपि वैष्णव्यः कदाचिन्मुनिनिर्मिताः॥

इति जगतोऽनियतकर्तृत्वश्रवणादिति चेन्मैवम्; प्रकृतिमायायां सृष्टौ ब्रह्माणमधिष्ठाय तस्यामेव मायायां सृष्टौ पालने च विष्णुमधिष्ठाय पुनश्च तस्यामेव सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारेषु रुद्रमधिष्ठाय अशुद्धमायायां सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारतिरोभावेष्वीश्वरमधिष्ठाय कारणत्वेऽपि शुद्धमायायां सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारतिरोभावानुग्रहेषु साक्षात्सदाशिवस्यैव कर्तृत्वम्॥

20. Now even thus, how can it be said that the creatorship of the universe belongs to Śiva alone, since even by you creatorship is admitted for Anantesa, and others as well? For, in "Sometimes, the creation is that of Śarva (Śiva), sometimes that of the lotus-born (Brahmā), sometimes that of Viṣṇu, too, sometimes it is ordered by sages", the creatorship of the world, is declared not to be invariable. If this be said, no; for, controlling Brahmā in the creation of *prakṛti-māyā*, controlling Viṣṇu in the creation and

sustentation of that same *māyā*, again controlling Rudra in the creation, sustentation and destruction of that very *māyā*, controlling Īśvara in the creation, sustentation, destruction and concealment of *aśuddha-māyā*, Śiva is the cause (indirectly); but agency belongs directly to Śadāśiva alone in the creation, sustentation, destruction, concealment and grace in respect of *śuddha-māyā*.

२१. नन्वन्यत्र सृष्ट्यादिकार्यत्रयस्यैव ब्रह्मादित्रयस्य कारणत्वमुक्तम्; न तु पञ्चसु कार्येषु पञ्चेश्वराणामिति चेत्, पञ्चकार्याणां पञ्चेश्वरकर्तृत्व-प्रतिपादकानि कामिकाद्यागमवचनानि बहूनि सन्त्येव वेदोपबृंहितपुराण-वचनानि चोच्यन्ते। काशीखण्डे —

पञ्चानामपि देवानां ब्रह्मादीनां समाश्रयम्।
ओङ्कारबोधितं लिङ्गं पञ्चायतनमुत्तमम्॥ इति॥

नृसिंहपुराणे च —

आनाभेर्ब्रह्मणो रूपमागळाद्वैष्णवं वपुः।
आशीर्षाद्रुद्रमीशानं तदग्रे सर्वतःशिवम्॥ इति॥

श्रीशंकराचार्यैः सौन्दर्यलहर्यां च —

जगत्सूते धाता हरिरवति रुद्रः क्षपयते
तिरस्कुर्वन्नेतत्स्वमपि वपुरीशस्तिरयति।
सदापूर्वः सर्वं तदिदमनुगृह्णाति च शिवः
तवाज्ञामालम्ब्य क्षणचलितयोर्भ्रूलतिकयोः॥
(श्लो. २४).

इत्युक्तत्वात् सिद्धं पञ्चेश्वराणां पञ्चकार्यकर्तृत्वम्।

21. Now, elsewhere for the three beginning with Brahmā, causality is declared in respect of only the three functions, beginning with creation, not (causality) of the

five lords in respect of five functions; if this be said, there are certainly numerous texts of *Āgamas* like the *Kāmika* which predicate of the five lords, agency in respect of the five functions; there are also statements of the *Purāṇas* which (supplement, and) have the support of the *Vedas*. In the *Kāśīkhaṇḍa* (it is said): "The *liṅga* is the abode of all the five divinities beginning with Brahmā; it is taught by the syllable '*Om*' and is the supreme five-fold *āyatana* (abode);" and in the *Nṛsiṁhapurāṇa*: "Upto the navel, it is of the form of Brahmā, upto the neck that of Viṣṇu, upto the head the form of Rudra, Īśāna is above that; Śiva is thus all Gods." By Śaṅkarācārya, it has been said in the *Saundaryalaharī*, "In the creation of the world Brahmā (functions); Hari protects; Rudra is the destroyer; Īśa concealing this as well as his own form stabilises it; Sadāśiva bestows grace on all this; all of these function in dependence on Thy command, (as shown by) the slightest inflection of your eyebrows." (verse 24). Therefore, the causality for the five lords in respect of the (five) functions is established.

२२. एवं च स्रष्टुः परमेश्वरस्य चिच्छक्तेः सूक्ष्मशरीरतया परिग्रहबिन्दुशक्तेः स्थूलशरीरतया स्वदेहप्रवर्तकत्ववत् सृष्ट्यादिप्रवर्तकत्वमवगन्तव्यम्। तदेवं व्यवधानेनाव्यवधानेन वा शिवस्यैव सर्वप्रपञ्चकार्यकर्तृत्वम्। तच्च कार्यं परिणामारम्भसमूहविवर्तवृत्तिभेदेन पञ्चविधम्। तत्र वृत्तिरेव जगत्, न परिणामादिः। तथा हि — न तावज्जगत् परिणामः, पूर्वावस्थापरित्यागेनावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिर्हि परिणामः। यथा पयसः पयस्त्वावस्थापरित्यागेन दध्यादिरूपप्राप्तिः। न चेह पूर्वावस्थापरित्यागोऽस्ति। नाप्यारम्भः, यत्र हि नानाकरणैः परस्परसंयोगेनैकं कार्यमारभ्यते तदेवारम्भः, यथा घटादिः। अत्र त्वेकस्या एव मायायाः कारणत्वान्नारम्भपक्षः क्षोदसहः। न च मायाशिवयोः संयोगेनेहाप्यारम्भोऽस्त्विति युक्तम्; तयोस्तुल्यवदुपयोगाभावात्। माया हि विकारितयोपयुज्यते। तदधिष्ठातृतया तु शिव इति।

संयोगस्य चरमकारणत्वेन सर्वदा कार्यापत्तेश्च। अत एव न समूहोऽपि; अनेकेषामेव लोह्नां चामरादिरूपसमूहदर्शनात्। प्रकृते च तदसम्भवात्। नापि विवर्तः; तस्य अतत्त्वतोऽन्यथाभावात्मकत्वेन जगतोऽत्यन्तासत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद्यथा पटस्य कुट्यवस्था अहेश्च कुण्डलावस्था अप्रच्युतपूर्वरूपस्यैवावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिरूपत्वाद्वृत्तिः तथा जगदपि शिवाधिष्ठितशुद्धाशुद्धमाययोर्वृत्तिरेव॥

22. And thus since the Lord is the controller of His own body, *citśakti* being His subtle body and the assumptive *bindu-śakti* being His gross body, there is to be understood His agency in creation, etc. Thus whether with intermediaries or without, agency in the creation of the entire world belongs to Śiva alone. And this product may be of five kinds - transformation, creation, aggregation, illusory manifestation and *vṛtti*. Of these, the world is only a *vṛtti*, not a transformation, etc. It is thus: the world is not a transformation; transformation is the abandonment of the earlier states and the attainment of a different state, *e.g.*, the abandoment of the state of milk by milk and the attainment of the state of curd; and here (in the case of the world) there is not the abandonment of the earlier state. Nor is it a creation; where indeed by the reciprocal conjunction of several causes a single effect is produced, that alone is creation, *e.g.*, pot, etc. Here, however since the one, *māyā* alone, is the cause, the view of creation cannot be supported. Nor does it stand to reason that through the conjunction of *māyā* and Śiva, there may be createdness even here, since they are not both of service in the same way. *Māyā*, indeed, is of service as undergoing transformation, and Śiva as the controller thereof; further, since conjunction is the last of the causes, (when that has taken place) there is the contingence of the product being everlasting. For the same reason

it is not even an aggregation, for only in the case of many (causes like) hairs is there seen aggregation in the form of a fly-whisk and so on; and in the present case that is not possible. Nor is it an illusory manifestation; for that is the becoming something else in an unreal way and there is the contingence of absolute unreality for the world. Therefore, just as in the original state of the cloth (as folded) and of the snake as coiled there is even without detriment to the original nature (of the thing) the attainment of another state constituting *vṛtti*, similarly, the world too, is but a *vṛtti* of the *śuddha*- and *aśuddhamāyās* controlled by Śiva.

२३. अयं च स्वरूपज्ञप्तिविषयः। नात्यन्तमनवभास्यः। नापि प्रमाणभास्यः; तथात्वे तुच्छत्वजडत्वयोः प्रसङ्गात्। न च मनोरूपप्रमाणजन्यज्ञानविषये जीवात्मनि जडत्वाभावेन व्यभिचारः। तस्य प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वे तदभावे प्रकाशासम्भवेन कदाचिदहं वा नाहं वेति संशयस्य नाहमिति विपर्ययस्य च प्रसङ्गेन स्वप्रकाशत्वस्यैवोपेयत्वेन प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वायोगात्। न च प्रमाणागम्यत्वे शिवस्य प्रागुक्तमनुमानागमवेद्यत्वं व्याहन्येतेति युक्तम्; धर्मिणः स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽपि तद्धर्माणां कर्तृत्वोपादानत्वादीनां तद्गम्यत्वेन प्रागुक्तस्यानुमानादिप्रमाणगम्यत्वस्योपपत्तेः। इति सिद्धं शिवस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वम्॥

23. And ours is the view that He is by His nature, knowledge; it is neither wholly non-manifest, nor manifested by *pramāṇas*, since in that case there is the contingence of unreality or inertness. Nor is there inconsistancy (of the probans in this inference) in the case of the *jīva* (self) which is the object of cognition generated by *manas* as *pramāṇa* and yet is not inert. For, if it were the object of cognition generated by a *pramāṇa*, then, because of the occurrence of non-manifestation in the absence of that (*pramāṇa*) sometimes there is the contingence of the

doubt "I" or "not-I" and of the error "not-I"; hence self-manifestation alone has to be accepted and hence its being the object of *pramāṇa*-generated cognition is impossible. Nor does it stand to reason that if not known by a *pramāṇa*, then what was said before about Śiva being known by inference and revelation would be contradicted; for though the substrate (*dharmin*) is self-manifest, since its attributes such as agency and material causality have to be understood by those (*pramāṇas*), there is intelligibility of what was said before about being known by *pramāṇas* like inference; thus is established Śiva's self-luminosity.

इति श्रीमदतिवर्णाश्रमाचार्यवर्यशैवपरिपालकशिवाग्रयोगीन्द्रज्ञानशिवाचार्य-
विरचितायां शैवपरिभाषायां पतिपदार्थनिरूपणं नाम
द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

Here ends the Second Chapter called Discussion of the Category 'PATI' in the Śaivaparibhāṣā written by Śivāgrayogin, the Ativarṇāśramācārya, and Protector of Śaiva.

तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

१. अथ चिद्रूपतया पत्यनन्यः पशुपदार्थो निरूप्यते। तत्र पशुर्नाम देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तो नित्यश्चिदात्मकोऽनेको विभुरनादिमलावृतोऽस्वतन्त्र-कर्ता च। अत्र देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्त इत्यनेन देहेन्द्रियप्राणबुद्ध्यात्मवादानां निरासः। नित्य इत्यनेन क्षणिकात्मवादस्य चिदात्मक इत्यनेन जडात्मवादस्य अनेक इत्यनेन एकात्मवादस्य विभुरित्यनेनाणुपरिमाणमध्यमपरिमाणात्म वादयोः अनादिमलावृतोऽस्वतन्त्र इत्याभ्यां आत्मेश्वरवादस्य च व्यावृत्तिः। कर्तेत्यनेन साङ्ख्यात्मवादनिरासः। तथा चोक्तम् —

अत सातत्यगमने व्युत्पन्ना ज्ञस्वभावतः।
परामर्शात्मकाद्धेतोर्गतेर्ज्ञानार्थता यतः॥

आत्मानो व्यापिनोऽनन्ताश्चिद्रूपाः पशवस्त्रिधा॥ इति॥

श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे च —

नाव्यापको न क्षणिको नैको नापि जडात्मकः।
नाकर्ताभिन्नचिद्योगी पाशान्ते शिवताश्रुतेः॥ इति॥

(मृ. प्र. ६. श्लो. ७)

श्रीमत्पराख्ये च —

देहान्योऽनश्वरो व्यापी विभिन्नः समलोऽजडः।
स्वकर्मफलभुक्कर्ता किञ्चिज्ज्ञः सेश्वरः पशुः॥ इति॥

(पराख्यं. पशु. प. श्लो. १५)

Third Chapter

1. Next is discussed, the category '*paśu*' which, as of the nature of intelligence, is non-different from the Lord (*pati*). Here, what is called '*paśu*', is different from the body, organs, etc.; '*paśu*' is eternal, of the nature of intelligence, manifold, pervasive, beginninglessly enveloped in *mala*, unfree and agent. Here, by the words "different from the body, organs, etc.," there is refutation of the contentions that the soul is the body, the organs, the vital air, or the intellect; by "eternal", (there is refutation) of the contention that the soul is momentary; "of the nature of intelligence" (refutes) the contention that the soul is inert; "manifold" (refutes) the contention that the soul is one; "pervasive" (refutes) the contention that the soul is atomic or of intermediate size; "beginninglessly enveloped in *mala*" and "unfree" distinguish (the soul) from Īśvara; by "agent", there is refutation of the soul as conceived by the Sāṅkhyas. And thus it has been said: "(The root) '*ata*' is understood in the sense of constant *gamana*, since (the *ātman*) is of the nature of the knower, for '*gati*' has the sense of knowledge. The souls are pervasive, innumerable, of the nature of intelligence, and belong to the three classes of *paśus*." And in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "Not non-pervasive, nor momentary, nor one, nor inert by nature, nor non-agent, associated with the intelligence non-different (from itself), since on the destruction of (association with) the bonds, there is declared *Śivatva* (for them)." (VI. 7.) In the sacred *Parākhya* also: "Different from the body, non-mementary, pervasive, diverse, associated with *mala*, non-inert, experiencer of the fruit of his own *karma*, agent, parviscient, possessing a Lord, such is *paśu*." (Paśupaṭala, v. 15).

२. ननु कथमात्मनो देहव्यतिरिक्तत्वम्? देहस्यैवात्मत्वात्। तथा हि — यद्यस्मिन् सत्येव दृश्यते तत्तस्य कारणं दृष्टम्। तथा च चतुर्विधभूतपरिणामाद्देहाच्चैतन्यं स्वत एवोत्पद्यते किण्वाद्यणुशक्त्या मदरूपविचित्रकार्यवत्। तस्माद्भूतात्मकाद्देहादेव चैतन्यसम्भवः। तच्चैतन्यमधिष्ठातुमात्मा ईश्वरश्च नापेक्षणीयः, अत एव स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादिसामानाधिकरण्यप्रत्ययोपपत्तिः। मम देहोऽयमित्यादिप्रत्ययस्तु राहोः शिर इत्यादिवदौपचारिकः; तस्माद्देहातिरिक्त आत्मा नास्तीति चेन्मैवम्। न वयं कारणशक्तिभिः कार्याणां वैचित्र्यं नेति ब्रूमः; किं तु विरुद्धात्कारणाद्विरुद्धं कार्यं नोत्पद्यत इति। तथा च जडाद्देहात् कथं प्रकाशरूपचैतन्यसम्भवः। किं च गुणस्य नाशो गुणिनाशाद्विरोधिप्रादुर्भावाद्वा भवति। इह तु मृते देह उभयाभावेऽपि कथं तद्गुणभूतचैतन्यनाशः; देहारम्भकभूतैकदेशप्राणवायुनिर्गमादिति चेन्न; सुप्तौ तत्सद्भावेऽपि ज्ञानानुपलब्धेः। न च करणोपरमात्तदानीं चैतन्यानुपलब्धिरिति वाच्यम्, त्वन्मते करणोपरतिहेतुकर्माभावेन सुप्तावपि चैतन्योदयप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद्यत्सद्भावे देहस्य चेष्टा, यदभावे तदभावः तच्चैतन्यं देहव्यतिरिक्तं आत्मत्वेनेष्टव्यम्। किं च बाल्ययौवनवार्धकेषु शरीरस्य भेदेन बाल्ये कृतस्य कथं वार्धके प्रतिसन्धानम्। तस्माद्देहात्मवादः प्रत्यक्षेणैव निराकृतः। अत एव मम देहोऽयमित्यादिप्रत्ययदर्शनम्। स्थूलोऽहमित्यादिप्रत्ययस्त्वौपचारिकः। किं च निर्दोषेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेऽप्यर्थग्रहो न दृश्यते। तत्कस्य हेतोः? व्यासक्तत्वादिति चेत्, हन्त! तर्हि चित्तव्यासङ्गप्रयोजकः सूक्ष्म आत्मा अभ्युपेयः।

2. How is the soul different from the body, since the body alone is the soul? It is thus: If something is seen only where there is something else, the latter is sure to be the cause of the former. And thus, from the body which is a product of the four kinds of elements, consciousness rises of itself, like the peculiar effect of intoxication produced by the (aggregated) capacities of the *kiṇva*, etc. Therefore, the occurrence of consciousness is only from the body constituted of the elements; neither soul nor *Īśvara* is needed to control this consciousness. Hence it is that there

is intelligibility of the appositional cognition in the form "I am fat", "I am lean", etc. As for the cognitions like "This is my body," they are figurative like "the head of Rāhu." Therefore there is no soul other than the body. — If this be said, not so. We do not say that there is no peculiarity in the product because of the (peculiar) capacities of the cause, but (we say) that from a cause of a particular nature an effect of a contrary nature cannot arise. And thus, from the inert body how can there result consciousnsss which is of the nature of luminosity? Further, the destruction of the quality results from the destruction of the possessor of the quality or from the rise of an opposite. But though neither of these (causes) is present in the dead body, how is there the destruction of consciousness which is a quality of that (body)? If it be said to be due to the departure of the vital air, which is a part of the elements originating the body, no; for even when that *(prāṇa)* exists, in sleep, cognition is not seen. Nor may it be said that because of the quiescence of the organ at that time, there is non-cognition of consciousness; for in your view there is no *karma* as the cause of the quiescence of the organs. Hence in sleep too there is the contingence of the rise of consciousness. Therefore, that which is non-existent when that (body) is inactive and that which is existent, when that (body) is active, that consciousness should be recognised as the soul different from the body. Further, since there is difference of body in infancy, youth, and old age, how is there recollection in old age, of what was done in infancy? Therefore, the contention that the body is the soul is refuted even by perception. Hence it is that there are seen cognitions like "This is my body." As for cognitions like "I am fat", they are figurative. Further, even when there

is contact of the object with a faultless sense-organ, apprehension of the object is not seen. Why is it like that? If it be said to be due to a distracted mind (*citta*), then, alas! there should be admitted the subtle soul who brings about distraction of the mind.

३. एतच्च प्रतिपादितं श्रीमत्पौष्करपराख्ययोः —

चैतन्यदर्शनाद्देहे नात्मा चैतन्यको भवेत् ।
यद्यस्मिन् सति सन्दृष्टं तदिष्टं तस्य कारणम् ॥

कारणत्वाविशिष्टोऽत्र देहश्चैतन्यसाधकः ।
शरीरघटयोर्योगात् सुरापूपाख्यकार्ययोः ॥

कारणं गुडपिष्टादिरविशिष्टोऽपि दृश्यते ।
अपूपादसती पूर्वं मदशक्तिस्तदात्मनि ॥

तस्माद्भूतात्मकादेव देहाच्चैतन्यसम्भवः ।
तच्चैतन्यमधिष्ठातुं किमन्येनात्मनेश्वर ॥

ईश्वरः —

केनोक्तं भिन्नकार्याणां वैचित्र्यं नेति शक्तिभिः ।
विरुद्धात्कारणात्कार्यं विरुद्धं नोपजायते ॥

विरुद्धमपि चैतन्यं जडाद्देहात्कथं भवेत् ।
किं च यस्य तु यो धर्मस्तन्नाशाद्धर्मनाशनम् ॥

विरोधिगुणसद्भावादथ स्यादन्यथा द्विजाः ।
देहे सत्यपि चैतन्यं मृते किमिति नेष्यते ॥

यद्भावयदभावाभ्यां चेष्टाचेष्टे भजेत्तनुः ।
तच्चैतन्यमिति प्रोक्तं व्यतिरिक्तं तु देहतः ॥

किं च बाल्ये च वार्धक्ये यौवने च विभेदतः ।
शरीरस्यानुसन्धानं कथं बाल्ये कृतस्य च ॥
स तावदनुसन्धत्ते प्राग्भुक्ता सेयमङ्गना ।
इति तस्माच्छरीरात्मवादोऽध्यक्षनिराकृतः ॥
तस्मात्स्थूलोऽहमित्यादिर्ज्ञेयो राहोः शिरो यथा ।
किं च देहो ममेत्यादिप्रत्ययोऽस्त्येव पुष्कलः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ६१ - ७१)

भूतानां समुदायेऽपि देहस्याध्यवसायतः ।
वस्तुग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य संशुद्धे लोचनेऽपि च ॥
न यतोऽर्थग्रहो ह्यस्य योऽभिप्रेतोऽन्यचेतसः ।
अतोऽप्यन्यः पुमानस्ति यो जातः शून्यमानसः ॥
दृष्टा बाल्यादिकावस्था तावद्देहे चतुर्विधा ।
परिणामविशेषेण या विभिन्ना पृथक् पृथक् ॥
अन्यां यां योऽनुसन्धत्ते तामवस्थां गतामपि ।
सोऽस्मिन्स्मर्ता स्मृतिर्ज्ञानं भिन्नं भूताक्षनिर्गतम् ॥ इति ॥

(पराख्यं. पशु. प. श्लो. १९-२० ; २२ ; २४)

3. And this has been taught in the sacred *Pauṣkara* and *Parākhya* — "Sages: Since consciousness is seen in the body there is no possibility of (assuming) the soul as (the substratum of) consciousness. That in the presence of which is seen something else is recognised to be the cause of this latter. Though of the two, the body and a pot, there is no distinction in respect of causality (*i.e.*, antecedence to the effect), yet the body (alone) is the cause of consciousness; though jaggery, flour, etc., are seen without distinc-

tion to be causes of both liquor and the sweet cake, yet they are seen to be the cause of intoxicating properties not seen in the sweet cake; therefore, consciousness results for the soul only from the body constituted out of the elements; what is the need, Oh, Īs'vara, for another soul to control that consciousness? Īs'vara: Who said that through different capacities (in the cause) there could not be diversity of effects? (But) from a cause of a particular nature, a contrary effect does not arise. Consciousness which is contrary (to the cause) how can it arise from the inert body? Further, when there is some attribute of another, it is destroyed by the destruction of the latter; or else, O, twice born ones! because of the existence of an opposed quality; (then) though the body exists (at death), why is not consciousness admitted to exist in the corpse? That in whose presence or absence the body is active or non-active, that is said to be consciousness; it is different from the body. Further, since there is difference of the body in infancy, youth and old age, how can there be remembrance of what was done in infancy? But he does recollect in the form, "This is that girl, who was formerly enjoyed by me." Therefore the contention that the body is the soul is perceptually refuted. Therefore usages like 'I am fat' should be understood to be like 'the head of Rāhu'. Further, there certainly exists extensively cognitions like 'This is my body' " (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pas'upaṭala, vv. 61-71). "Even when there exists the aggregate of the elements, for the body that sets out to apprehend things determinately there is not (such apprehension) even though the sense of sight is pure, since apprehension of an intended object is not possible because his mind is directed elsewhere. On this ground, there is a self apart from body, with an empty mind (or a mind directed elsewhere). There are seen four kinds of states, such as infancy, in

the body, which are each different because of difference in transformation. He who recollects these different ones belonging to the past, he is the one who remembers and the remembrance is cognition which is different from what arises from the elements and the (elemental) senses." (*Parākhya*, Paśupaṭala vv. 19-20; 22; 24).

४. नन्विन्द्रियाणि ज्ञानहेतव इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धम्। अतो ज्ञातृत्वमपि तेषामेवास्तु। ज्ञात्रन्तरकल्पनायां गौरवात्। न चेन्द्रियाणां नानात्वेन गुणप्रधानभावाभावेन च युगपद्विरुद्धव्यापाराः प्रसज्येरन्निति वाच्यम्। स्वतो गुणप्रधानभावाभावेऽप्येकस्मिन् देहे विद्यमानानां तेषामेकग्रामवासिनामिव कार्यानुरोधेन गुणप्रधानभावोपपत्तेः। मास्तु वा गुणप्रधानभाव इन्द्रियाणाम्। तथापि युगपद्विरुद्धव्यापाराभाव उपपद्यते। मनोरूपसहकारिसाहित्येन प्रबलस्य व्यापारोपपत्तेः। न च तेषां करणत्वान्न कर्तृत्वमिति वाच्यम्। करणत्वस्यास्माभिरनभ्युपगतत्वेनान्यतरासिद्धत्वात्। न च रूपाद्यपलब्धिकरणत्वेनैव तेषां सिद्धेर्नासिद्धिरिति युक्तम्; सहेतुकत्वानुमानेन तेषां सिद्ध्युपपत्तेः। तस्मान्मूकोऽहं बधिरोऽहमित्याद्यनुभवानुसारेणेन्द्रियाण्येवात्मेति, मैवम्। इन्द्रियाभावेऽपि स्वप्नादौ ज्ञानोपलम्भेन तेषां ज्ञातृत्वायोगात्। किं च श्रोत्रादीनीन्द्रियाणि प्रतिनियतविषयाणि, आत्मा तु सर्वग्राहक इत्यनुभवसिद्धम्। अतस्तैः शब्दादिसर्वविषयग्राहक आत्मा अन्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। किं चेन्द्रियाण्यपि प्रेर्याण्यनुभूयन्ते। न च स्वतन्त्रस्यात्मनः प्रेर्यत्वमस्ति, अतो न तेषामात्मत्वं सम्भवति। अपि च श्रोत्रादीनि न स्वरूपं जानन्ति। आत्मा तु श्रोत्रादिस्वरूपं जानाति। अतो विरुद्धधर्मयोगित्वान्न श्रोत्रादिरात्मा। किं च योऽहं चक्षुषा घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीमान्ध्यदशायां तमेव त्वचा स्पृशामीति प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुपलभ्यते। तदिन्द्रियाणामात्मभावे न युज्यते। अन्येनोपलब्धेऽन्यस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभावात्। किं चेन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वे युगपद्विरुद्धव्यापारयोगप्रसङ्गः। न चैकग्रामवासिनामिव कार्यानुरोधेन तेषां गुणप्रधानभावादीति पूर्वोक्तं युक्तम्। असाधारणकार्ये तेषामपि गुणप्रधानभावाभावात्। न च वरगोष्ठीन्यायेन गुणप्रधानभावः। युगपत्स्वस्वभोग्यप्रत्यासत्तिरहितेष्वेव तन्न्यायप्रवृत्तेः। वरेषु ह्येकस्य स्वभोग्यसन्निधाने तद्रहितानामितरेषां गुणभावाभ्युपगमो युज्यते। इन्द्रियेषु युगपत्स्वस्व-

विषयसन्निकृष्टेषु नैकस्यापि गुणप्रधानभावाभ्युपगमः सम्भवति। तस्मान्न वरगोष्ठीन्यायेनापि गुणप्रधानभावः। नापि मनस्साहित्यप्राबल्यात्कृतो व्यापारयोगः। एकत्र मनस्साहित्यमित्यस्यैव त्वन्मतेऽयुक्तत्वात्। मन्मते हि स्वतन्त्र आत्मा स्वाभिमतग्राहिणीन्द्रिये मनो निवेशयतीति युक्तमेकस्यैव साहित्यम्। त्वन्मते तु इन्द्रियाण्येव स्वतन्त्राणि। तत्परतन्त्रं मनः। न च प्रधानानां तेषां वैमत्ये गुणभूतस्यैकत्रागमनं युक्तम्। न चेन्द्रियमेव मनः समाकर्षति। विनिगमकाभावात्। तस्मादिन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वे युगपद्विरुद्ध-व्यापारप्रसङ्ग एव। तस्मान्नेन्द्रियाण्यात्मा॥

4. Now it is established by co-presence and co-absence that senses are the causes of cognition; therefore, cognisership too may belong to them alone, since there is prolixity in assuming another cognisor. Nor may it be said that since the senses are diverse and since there is no relationship of principal and subordinate they would come to conflict in function; for though of themselves not in the relation of principal and subordinate, yet for these which exist in one body, a relation of principal and subordinate is intelligible in conformity with their purpose, just as for those who live in the same village. Or let there be no relation of principal and subordinate among the senses; yet the non-existence of simultaneous contradictory functioning is intelligible, since through association with the mind as auxiliary, it is intelligible that that which is (thus) stronger alone functions. Nor may it be said that because of these being (thus) agents, they cannot be instruments; for since their being instruments is not admitted by us, what is alleged is not admitted by one party, nor does it stand to reason that there is no non-establishment since they (the senses) are established only as instruments of the cognition of colour, etc., for they (the senses) may intelligibly be established even because of (the cognitions) having a cause (not because of having the

senses as instruments). Therefore, in conformity with such experiences as 'I am dumb,' 'I am deaf', the senses alone are the soul. Not so, since even when the senses are absent, cognition is seen in dreams, etc., the cognisership of the senses is impossible. Further, senses like hearing have each appropriate objects, while the soul is the apprehender of all; this is established in experience. Therefore, there should be admitted a soul which is different from those (senses) and apprehends all objects like sound. Further, the senses, too, are experienced as subject to direction; and in the case of the soul which is independent, there is no subjection to direction; therefore it is not possible for them to be the soul. Further, the sense of hearing, etc., do not know their own nature; the soul, however knows the nature of hearing, etc. Therefore because of the possession of conflicting attributes, the sense of hearing and the like, are not the soul. Further, there is seen the recognition, "Myself who saw the pot with my sense of sight, now in the state of blindness, touch that same (pot)"; that does not fit in with the senses being the soul, since in respect of what is cognised by one, there is no recognition for another. Further, if the senses be the soul, there is the contingence of simultaneous conflicting activities. Nor does what was said before stand to reason, that as in the case of those who live in the same village the relation of principal and subordinate among them is intelligible, in conformity with what is to be done (the purpose). For even in the case of those (persons) there is no relationship of principal and subordinate in respect of what is to be done by each distinctively. Nor is there the relationship of principal and subordinate on the analogy of the bridegroom and the (rest of his) party, since that analogy applies only where there is not the simultaneous

attainment of his object of enjoyment by each; when the one bridegroom is in the proximity of his object of enjoyment, for others who are devoid of that (proximity), it is intelligible to admit the relationship of subordinates. In the case of the senses which are simultaneously in contact with their respective objects it is not possible to admit the subordinateness of even one. Therefore, not even on the analogy of the bridegroom and party is there the relation of principal and subordinate. Nor is the functioning (of one in preference to the others) due to superiority (from the conjunction with the mind), for, on your view, it does not stand that there is conjunction of the mind with one (sense); on my view, indeed, the independent soul directs the mind to the sense that apprehends what that (soul) desires, and thus the conjunction (of mind) with one (sense) alone stands to reason; on your view, however, the senses alone are free, the mind is dependent on them; and when these principals are at variance, it does not stand to reason that this subordinate goes with one of them alone. Nor does (one) sense itself attract the mind, since there is no determining consideration (as to which sense attracts). Therefore there is certainly the contingence of simultaneous conflicting activities if the senses be the soul. Therefore the senses are not the soul.

५. अस्तु तर्हि प्राणवायुरात्मा; अहं जीवामीत्यनुभवात्। न चैकस्मिन्देशे प्राणापानादिभेदेनात्मभेदप्रसक्तौ रुचिभेदेन युगपद्विरुद्धव्यापारयोगः स्यादिति युक्तम्। एकस्यैव व्यापारभेदेन प्राणादिसंज्ञाभेदोपपत्त्या प्राणापानादिभेदे मानाभावात्। न च सुषुप्तयादावपि प्राणादीनां सत्त्वेन ज्ञातृत्वं स्यादिति युक्तम्। इन्द्रियव्यापारविरहेण तद्विरहस्योपपत्तेः। तस्मात्प्राणवायुरेवात्मेति, मैवम्। प्राणवायोरपि देहवन्नियम्यत्वानुभवेन तन्नियामकस्य कस्यचित्परस्यावश्याभ्युपगन्तव्यत्वात्। न च देहादिरेव कार्यनियन्ता।

आत्मत्वेनाभ्युपगतस्य तस्य देहनियामकतया तन्नियम्यत्वायोगात्। वायुविशेषगुणस्य सति तस्मिन् ध्वंसायोगेन स्वापेऽपि तस्य ज्ञातृत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। न चान्तःकरणवर्गस्यात्मत्वम्। तस्याचेतनतया तन्नियम्यत्वात्॥

5. Let the vital air, then, be the soul, since there is the experience 'I live'. Nor does it stand to reason that there being the contingence of several souls in one body through differences of *prāṇa, apāna,* etc., there would be simultaneous conflicting activities; for differences of name such as *prāṇa,* etc., being intelligible even through differences of function of one and the same (vital air), there is no evidence for difference between *prāṇa, apāna,* etc. Nor does it stand to reason that even in sleep, etc., when there exist the *prāṇa,* etc., there should be cognisership too; for its absence because of the absence of the functioning of the senses is intelliglble. Therefore the vital air alone is the self. Not so. For the vital air, too, like the body being experienced as subject to control, there should be admitted a consciousness that controls it. Nor is the body, etc., itself the controller of what is done; for, in the case of that (vital air) which is admitted (*i.e.,* claimed) to be the soul, since it is the controller of the body, its being controlled by that (body) is impossible. And since for that (cognisership) which is a particular quality of (vital) air, destruction is impossible when that (air) exists, there is contingence of cognisorship even for the sleeper. Nor need the claim of the internal organ be reckoned with since by that as inert, what is conscious cannot be controlled.

६. नन्वस्तु ज्ञानसन्ततिरात्मा। न च ज्ञानस्य भेदाभावेन सन्तत्ययोगः। घटपटादिज्ञानभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्। अथ सन्तानिव्यतिरेकेण सन्तानाभावात् सन्तानिनामात्मत्वं वाच्यम्। तच्च न सम्भवति। अन्यानुभूतेऽन्यस्यानुसन्धानाभावेन प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावप्रसङ्गात्। अथ कथं क्षणिक-

विज्ञानस्यात्मत्वमिति, मैवम् । सन्तानैक्यवशेन प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यपपत्तेः । यत्सन्तानप्रविष्टस्य हि ज्ञानस्यानुभवितृत्वं तत्सन्तानपतितस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञातृत्वम् । न च सन्तानस्यान्यस्याभावेन कथमैक्यमिति युक्तम् । वृक्षातिरिक्तस्य वनस्याभावेऽपि वनत्वस्य व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वेनैकं वनमितिवत् सन्तानत्वस्यापि व्यासज्यवृत्तितया सन्तानैक्योपपत्तेः । तस्मात्क्षणिकविज्ञानमेवात्मेति । अत्र प्रतिविधीयते । सुषुप्तौ तावज्ज्ञानसन्तानविच्छेदस्तवापि सम्मतः । अन्यथा तत्कालीनजन्यस्मरणादिप्रसङ्गात् । एवं च यत्पूर्वेद्युर्मया दृष्टं तदेवेदमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञा कथं स्यात् । पूर्वज्ञानसन्तानस्य सुषुप्तौ विच्छेदेन सन्तानैक्यस्याप्यभावात् । ननु सन्तानैक्यं मास्तु प्रयोजकम् । देहैक्यं तु भविष्यति । यद्देहसम्बन्धि ज्ञानमनुभवितृ, तत्सम्बन्ध्येव ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञात्रिति व्यवस्थोपपत्तेरिति चेन्न । त्वन्मते देहस्यापि क्षणिकत्वेन तदेकत्वस्याप्यभावात् । अथ देहसन्तानैक्यं प्रयोजकमिति मन्यसे; एवमपि बालस्याद्यप्रवृत्यनुकूलजन्मान्तरानुभूतस्मरणादेरनुपपत्तेः । तत्र देहसन्तानैक्यस्याप्यभावात् । अत एव जन्मान्तरकृतकर्मफलभोक्तृत्वमपि न स्यात्; अन्येन कृते कर्मण्यन्यस्य फलभोगासम्भवात् । ज्ञानसन्तानैक्यस्य देहसन्तानैक्यस्य वा तद्भोक्तृताप्रयोजकस्याभावात् ॥

6. Now let the stream of cognitions be the soul. Nor is there the impossibility of a stream because of the non-existence of difference in cognition; for difference in cognition as between cloth and pot is established by perception. Now since there is no succession in the absence of the element in the succession, it must be said of these elements that they are the soul; and that is not possible; for there being no recollection by one of what is experienced by another, there is non-contingence of recognition, etc; therefore, how can the momentary cognition be the soul? Not so, since recognition, etc., are intelligible because of the unity of the succession. When there is experiencing for a cognition that enters into a particular succession, to another cognition falling in that succession belongs the

faculty of recognition. Nor does it stand to reason (to ask) how there can be unity (of the succession), since there is no other succession (besides the elements therein). Though there is no forest over and above the trees, there is the usage 'one forest' because of the presence of forestness collectively; similarly, since 'being a succession' is also collectively present, the unity of the succession is intelligible. Therefore the momentary cognition alone is the soul. Here it is replied to, thus. The interruption of the stream of succession in sleep, etc., is admitted even by you, as otherwise there is the contingence of remembrance, etc., generated at that time. And thus, how can there be recognition in the form "that which was seen by me on the previous day, that itself is this", the stream of earlier cognition having been interrupted in sleep and there being no unity of the succession? Now let not the unity of succession be the determinant; the unity of the body may be (the determinant of recognition); for, when a cognition is the experient in relation to a particular body, only as related to that same body another cognition is the recogniser and an adjustment is thus intelligible. If this be said, no; for, on your view, the body too being momentary there is not the unity of even that. Then you may think, the unity of the succession that is the body, is the determinant; even thus, the infant's remembrance of such experiences of a previous life as are helpful for its initial activities (in this life) is intelligible, for, in that case there is not even the unity of the succession that is the body. For the same reason, there would not even be the enjoyership of what was done in another birth since in respect of activity performed by one, enjoyment of fruit by another is impossible and there does not-exist unity of the succession of cognitions or

unity of the succession that is the body as the determinant of that enjoyership.

७. नन्वनुभवितुः प्रत्यभिज्ञातृत्वं कर्तुश्च फलभोक्तृत्वं क्व दृष्टम्? येन स्थायितया आत्मा स्वीकर्तव्यः स्यात्। न च स्थायित्वसिद्धेः पूर्वमैक्यस्य प्रयोजकत्वं भवता ज्ञातुं शक्यते। अतः परस्पराश्रयत्वमत्रेति चेन्न; देवदत्तादन्यस्य यज्ञदत्तादेस्तदनुभूतस्मर्तृत्वस्य तत्कृतकर्मफलभोक्तृत्वस्य चादर्शनेनैक्यस्य प्रयोजकत्वकल्पनायां स्थायित्वसिध्युपपत्तेः॥

7. Now, where is it seen that recognisership is for the experient and enjoyership is for the agent, so as to lead to the admission of the soul as permanent? Nor is it possible to know, prior to the establishment of permanence, that unity is the determinant; therefore there is reciprocal dependence here. If this be said, no. For, in the case of Yajñadatta, etc., who are different from Devadatta, there is not seen the remembrance of what was experienced by the latter, or the experiencing of the fruit of what was done by the latter; hence it is assumed that unity is the determinant; hence the establishment of permanence is intelligible.

८. ननु सर्वस्यापि क्षणिकत्वान्न स्थायित्वमात्मनः सम्भवति। तथा हि — एकस्य कालद्वयसम्बन्धो हि स्थायित्वम्। स च न सम्भवति; एककालसम्बन्धस्यापरकालसम्बन्धाभावेन व्याप्तत्वात्। नीलस्य पीतत्वाभावेन व्याप्तिग्राहकस्य सहचारग्रहादेः सत्त्वात्। स्थायिनोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वरूपस्य सत्त्वस्यायोगेन सतः क्षणिकत्वावश्यम्भावाच्च। तथा हि — स्थायिनोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वं क्रमेण युगपद्वा? नाद्यः। तस्य तावदर्थक्रियाजननसामर्थ्ये समर्थस्य विलम्बायोगेन क्रमायोगात्। असामर्थ्ये तु सुतरां क्रमासम्भवात्। न च समर्थस्यापि कालान्तरेऽपि न तज्जनकत्वमिति सहकारिसन्निधानानुसारेण क्रमेण कार्यजनकत्वं सम्भवतीति युक्तम्। सहकारिणामतिशयानाधायकत्वेऽसहकारिभ्यो विशेषाभावेनाजनकत्वात्। अतिशयाधानाभ्युपगमे अतिशयस्य बीजाद्यपेक्षयाऽतिरेकेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। अनतिरेकेऽङ्कुरजनकस्य

बीजस्य तत्कालोत्पत्तिकत्वाङ्गीकारेण क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः; युगपत्तावत्कार्योत्पादनसमर्थस्य क्षणान्तरेऽपि सत्त्वे तदापि तावत्कार्योत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । क्षणान्तरेऽसद्भावे त्वस्मन्मतप्रवेशात् । तस्मात्सर्वस्यापि क्षणिकत्वमेव । न चैवं स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः; तस्याः तत्सादृश्यविषयकत्वकल्पनात् । स एवायं दीप इत्यादौ तथा दर्शनात् । तस्मान्न स्थायित्वमात्मन उपपद्यत इति चेन्मैवम् । प्रत्यभिज्ञाया ऐक्यविषयत्वसम्भवेन सादृश्यविषयकत्वकल्पनस्यायुक्तत्वात् । न चोक्तयुक्त्या ऐक्यविषयकत्वासम्भवः; एकस्यापि वृक्षस्य कपिपुरुषादिनानासम्बन्धवन्नानाकालसम्बन्धोपपत्तेः, स्थायिनोऽपि सहकारिसन्निधानानुरोधेन क्रमिककार्यजनकत्वोपपत्तेश्च । न चातिशयानाधायकत्वे सहकारित्वानुपपत्तिः; तथात्वेऽप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकादिना सहकारित्वोपपत्तेः । तस्मान्न क्षणिकज्ञानरूप आत्मा ।

8. Now, since everything whatever is momentary, permanence of the soul is not possible. It is thus: permanence indeed is the relation of one to two times; and that is not possible, since relationship to one time is pervaded by non-existence of relation to another time; for as in the case the blue (being pervaded) by non-existence of yellow, there does exist apprehension of concomitance, etc., causing the apprehension of pervasion. Further, since in the case of the permanent, reality consisting in practical efficiency is impossible, the real is necessarily momentary. This is thus: is the practical efficiency of the permanent either in sequence or simultaneous? Not the first. Since its capacity to be practically efficient occurs in conformity with the proximity of accessories, it is possible that it produces its effect in sequence; then (we say) if the accessories produce no new excellence, then there being no difference from what are not accessories, there is non-production (of the effect); if the production of an excellence be

admitted, then, if the excellence be something over and above the seed (the original causal condition), there is contingence of infinite regress; if there be no difference (of the excellence from the seed), there is admitted origination at that time for the seed which is the cause of the shoot and hence there is the contingence of the admission of momentariness. Nor the second (*i.e.*, simultaneity); if that which is capable of producing that much of effect simultaneously should exist even at the next instant, there is the contingence of the production of that much effect even then; but if it should be non-existent at the next instant that is to enter our faith (subscribe to our view). Therefore, there is but momentariness of everything whatsoever. Nor thus is there the unintelligibility of the recognition "This is that same pot", since that relates to the similarity to that (other); for it is seen to be so in "This is that same lamp (flame)," etc. Therefore, the permanence of the soul is not intelligible. Not so; for when recognition can possibly relate to identity it does not stand to reason to assume that it relates to similarity. Nor is there the impossibility of its relating to unity because of the aforesaid arguments; for even in the case of the one, the relation to two different times is intelligible, like the different relations of the one tree to a monkey, a man, etc. Further, even in the case of the permanent, the production of effects in sequence is intelligible, because of the proximity of accessories. Nor is the accessory unintelligible if it does not produce an excellence; for, even if it be thus, its being an accessory is intelligible through co-presence and co-absence; therefore the soul is certainly of the form of non-momentary cognition.

९. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

यद्यज्ज्ञानं भवेत्सर्वं न तच्चिच्छक्तिसम्भवम् ।
तत्सर्वं बौद्धमेष्टव्यं विनाशित्वेन हेतुना ॥

ईश्वरः —

तन्न बुद्धेर्जडत्वेन ज्ञानोत्पादकता कुतः ।
अभिव्यञ्जकसम्बन्धात्कादाचित्कतया चितः ॥
क्षणिकत्वं तु नित्याया अपि सद्योऽनुभूयते ।
यावद्दीपः स्थितस्तावत् पदार्थानां प्रकाशकः ॥
अभिव्यञ्जकहेतूनां सन्तत्यैव प्रवृत्तितः ॥
धारावाहिकधीश्चापि क्षणिकैवानुभूयते ।
अत एव हि भावानां क्षणिकत्वेन संविदः ॥
क्षणिकत्वं ब्रुवाणानामाशापीडा निवारिता ।

ऋषयः —

सत्त्वेन क्षणिकाभावो नेष्यते किमितीश्वर ॥
अर्थक्रियाकारिता हि सत्ता सा क्षणिकेषु च ।
क्रमाक्रमविभागाभ्यां स्थिरेषु तदयोगतः ॥
विळम्बकारणायोगात्तथा स्थैर्यक्षतेरपि ।
अलं स्वतोऽसमर्थस्य सहकारिशतैरपि ॥
अर्थक्रियाकरत्वेन क्षणिकत्वमवस्थितम् ।

ईश्वरः —

क्षणिकत्वे पदार्थानां कार्यकारणताक्षतिः ॥

कार्यकारणरूपेण भवत्कारणतां व्रजेत् ।
वर्तमानघटत्वेन मृत्पिण्डः कुम्भतां व्रजेत् ॥

अतः क्षणद्वयस्थायी कार्योत्पत्तौ तु कारणम् ।
तयोरर्थान्तरत्वेन तदुत्पत्तौ तु कारणम् ॥

अन्यथा समकालोऽपि भावः कस्मान्न कारणम् ।
द्वयोरर्थान्तरत्वेन कालभेदः कथं तयोः ॥

कारणस्य कुतस्त्यो वा विशेषः सहकारितः ।
कुतो वा घटनिष्पत्तिस्तन्तुभ्यो न भवेद्द्विजाः ॥

कार्यकारणभावोऽतः स्थिरेष्वेव व्यवस्थितः ।
अर्थक्रियाकरत्वं च स्थायिनां क्रमशः स्थितम् ॥

समर्थस्य सदा कार्यकरत्वनियमेन च ।
अग्निर्दाहसमर्थोऽपि स्फोटेऽङ्गुलिमपेक्षते ॥

क्रमाक्रमविभागाभ्यां दुराशा क्षणिकत्वधीः ।
किं च प्रागनुभूता या धीः सेयमुपजायते ॥

क्षणिकत्वे कुतस्तस्याः प्रत्यभिज्ञा हि जायते ।
क्षणिकत्वं पदार्थानामथ वास्तु जडात्मनाम् ॥

कारणत्रयमात्रं यत् सर्वकार्येष्वपेक्ष्यते ।
बिन्द्वादयोऽपि ये भावाः समानपरिणामिनः ॥

ज्ञानमेव स्थिरं नित्यं जडवर्गस्य दीपकम् ।
तस्य क्षणिकता ज्ञेया वस्तूनां क्षणिकत्वतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुंस्त्व. प. श्लो. २१४-२३२)

9. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Sages: Whatever is cognition does not arise from *citśakti*; as that should be admitted to be of the nature of the intellect, because of the probans of perishability. *Īśvara*: That is not (so); the intellect being inert, how can it originate cognition? Because (of the appearance) of consciousness as occasional due to the relation (therewith) of what manifests it, there is experienced the momentariness even of that (consciousness) which is eternal. So long as there exists a lamp, it manifests objects (but the objects are not originated with the lamp-flame nor do they perish with it). Because of the functioning in succession of the causes of manifestation, there is the constant stream of cognition which too is experienced as but momentary. For the same reason is removed the evil desire of those who declare the momentariness of consciousness because of the momentariness of things (that manifest). Sages: Why is it, O *Īśvara,* that things are not admitted to be momentary since they are real? Reality indeed is practical efficiency and that is present in the momentary, since by analysis of the possibilities (of production as) in sequence or not in sequence that (efficiency) is impossible among the permanent; for a cause for delay (in production) is not possible; similarly there is also loss of the (alleged) permanence since if it produces all its effects simultaneously its existence at the succeeding instant is unintelligible. For that which of itself is incapable (of production), there is no use of even hundreds of accessories. Thus, because of being, practically efficient, momentariness is established. *Īśvara*: If things were momentary, there would be abandonment of the relation of cause and effect. That which exists (later) as the effect and (earlier) as the cause can attain the position of cause; that lump of clay which

exists (earlier) (but) not as a pot, (later) attains the form of pot; therefore, that which is permanent in two instants is the cause in the origination of the effect. If these two (cause and effect) have wholly different things (without any trace of non-difference in any manner), the one would not be the cause of the origination (of the other). Otherwise (if it be said that though one may not last for two instants, both cause and effect may belong to the same instant) why should not any existent be the cause (of any other existent) belonging to the same time (*i.e.*, why should not clay cause cloth and so on)? The two (cause and effect) being wholly different, how can there be difference in time between the two (since if causality be admitted for an antecedent that is wholly different, then, taking up two things which are antecedent to the seed and the shoot, the origination of both seed and shoot simultaneously would be possible)? And for the cause, how can there result differentiation (in the production of different effects) through (difference in) the accessories (since differentiation by another is impossible on the hypothesis of momentariness)? How, again, is it, O twice-born ones, that there is not the origination of pot from threads (*viz.*, according to you any earlier instant characterised by anything is the cause of any succeeding instant characterised by something else)? Therefore it is established that the relationship of cause and effect obtains only among the permanent." [*Alternative interpretation of the last three verses*: "If those two, the cause and the effect even wholly different, one would not be the cause in the origination of the other; otherwise why should not any existent (like cloth) be the cause of another, existent (pot) belonging to the same time? Since the two (cause and effect) are wholly different, how can there be invariable relation between them as earlier and later (since

simultaneity too is sometimes possible, as between cloth and pot, in the case of what are wholly different)? How, again, can a distinction be created in the case (say, clay) through the accessories (the wheel, staff, etc.) (unless it is admitted that it is the clay which becomes the pot)? Nor may it be said that the accessories are needed for the origination of the non-existent pot; how is that there is not the origination of pot from threads? This is a refutation of *asatkāryavāda* alone. Even among permanent things, practical efficiency is settled to be in sequence; and there is no rule that what is not capable (of producing an effect) should produce the effect always (even when there are no accessories); *e.g.*, fire though capable of burning, requires a finger to producing a blister; the idea that momentariness results from analysis (of production) into sequential and non-sequential is but an evil desire. Further, there arises recognition in the form 'This is the cognition that was experienced before.' If that (cognition) were momentary, whence could there arise the recognition of that? Or let it even be that there is momentariness for things of an inert nature (like ether etc.), (all things) which require the three causes (the agent, the material cause and the instrument) in all production, as also all existents like the *Bindu* which are similar in respect of being transformed. But that which illumines this class of inert things, knowledge, is alone stable, permanent. Its (apparent) momentariness should be understood to be due to the momentariness of the things (that manifest it)."] (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Puṁstvapaṭala, vv. 214 - 32).

१०. श्रीमत्पराख्ये च —

क्षणभङ्गे स्थिते ज्ञाने कस्य कर्मार्जनं भवेत् ।
न तत्कर्मफलं भोग्यं ज्ञाननाशे निरन्वये ॥

या त्वया वासना प्रोक्ता किं नाविच्छिन्नलक्षणा ।
भिन्नरूपा यदा सा न तत्क्षणान्तर्गता भवेत् ।

तत्क्षणेन विनष्टेन सा विनष्टा भवेत्ततः ।
अविच्छिन्ना स्थिरा चैका नानाज्ञानसमाश्रया ॥

श्रुत्या विचारिता युक्त्या नात्मनो व्यतिरिच्यते ।
जन्मान्तराङ्गसंयोगे शोकहर्षादिहास्यतः ॥

जातिसंस्मरणेऽप्येवं प्राक्तनानुभवादितः ।
स्थिरत्वं तत्स्मृतेर्गम्यं स्मृतिर्नानुभवादृते ॥

स्मर्तानुभविता स्थैर्यात्तेन ज्ञाता स्थिरो विभुः ॥ इति ॥

(परा. प्र. प. श्लो. ३०-३५)

10. And in the Sacred *Parākhya*: "If knowledge, (consciousness) be momentarily perishable, for whom can there be acquisition of *karma*? The fruit of *karma* cannot be the object of enjoyment when knowledge (consciousness) perishes and there is none to relate (to that enjoyment). What you call *vāsanā* (impression), is it not characterised by perishability? If it be not of a different nature, it would be included in that instant and when that instant perishes it would also perish. What is non-perishable, stable, one, the substrate of diverse cognitions, is the object of inquiry by revelation and by reasoning is not different from the soul. There is conjunction with another life, etc., because of grief, happiness and laughter etc.; similarly the remembrance of another life is from earlier experience; permanence is to be accepted for that memory; what is remembered cannot be in the absence of experience. The one who has remembrance and experience

is really permanent; therefore one who has knowledge (consciousness) is permanent and pervasive." (*Parākhya*, Pramāṇapaṭala, vv. 30-35).

११. न चैवमात्मा क्षणिकविज्ञानयोगी। ज्ञातृत्वस्य नित्यात्मधर्मत्वात्। न हि लोके नित्योऽनित्यधर्मा दृष्टः। किं च तच्च ज्ञातृत्वं विभ्वात्मधर्मत्वाद्विभु, न क्वाचित्कम्। अत एवात्मा सर्वार्थदृक्क्रियः। यदि त्वस्य ज्ञातृत्वं क्वाचित्कं स्यात् तस्यात्मनो विभुत्वं भज्येत। लोके हि धर्मिणो यावती व्याप्तिस्तावती धर्मस्यापि व्याप्तिर्दृश्यते। यथा पटगतं शौक्ल्यं पटमखिलं व्याप्य तिष्ठति। एवमात्मानमपि ज्ञातृत्वं व्याप्य तिष्ठति। न च विषयासन्निधाने ज्ञानस्यानुदय इति वाच्यम्। स्वरूपस्यैव विषयत्वात्। तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ज्ञातृत्वमपि तन्नित्यं धर्मत्वान्नित्यवस्तुनः।
नानित्यधर्मा धर्मी स्यान्नित्य आत्मा मुनीश्वराः॥

तच्चेह विभुधर्मत्वान्न च क्वाचित्कमिष्यते।
नित्यत्वमिव तेनात्मा स्थितः सर्वार्थदृक्क्रियः॥

ज्ञातृत्वमपि यद्यस्य क्वाचित्कं विभुता कुतः।
धर्मिणो यावती व्याप्तिस्तावद्धर्मस्य च स्थितिः॥
यथा पटस्थितं शौक्ल्यं पटं व्याप्याखिलं स्थितम्।
स्थितं व्याप्यैवमात्मानं ज्ञातृत्वमपि सर्वदा॥
न च निर्विषयं ज्ञानं परापेक्षं स्वरूपतः॥ इति॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. १००-१०४)

11. And thus the soul is non-momentary, since cognisership consisting in conjunction with cognition, is an eternal attitude of the soul. In this world, indeed, it is not seen that the eternal is an attribute of the non-eternal. And that cognisership is pervasive since it is the

attribute of the soul that is pervasive; it is not occasional. For that same reason, the soul is the seer and doer of all things. If, however, its cognisership has been occasional, then the soul's pervasiveness would suffer. In ordinary experience, indeed, it is seen that there is as much pervasion for the attribute as for the substrate of the attributes just as the whiteness of the cloth pervades the entire cloth; similarly cognisership too pervades the entire soul. Nor may it be said that cognition does not arise when there is no proximity of the object, since its own nature is the object. It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "The eternal soul, Oh sages, cannot be the substrate of non-eternal attributes; since that has the attribute of pervasiveness, it is not recognised to be occasional in the same way as (it is recognised) to be eternal; therefore it is settled that the soul is the seer and doer of all things. If its cognisership were occasional, how could there be pervasiveness for it? It is settled that there is as much pervasion for the attribute as for the substrate of the attribute just as the whiteness of the cloth pervades the entire cloth; cognisership too thus pervades the entire soul constantly. Nor is the cognition contentless and dependent on some other (content), since it is from the very nature (of the soul)." (Paśupaṭala, vv. 100 - 104).

१२. नन्वात्मनो व्यापकत्वे सिद्धे तद्धर्मस्य व्यापकता सिद्ध्येत्। न च तत्सम्भवति। देहादन्यत्रानुपलम्भेनात्मनो व्यापकत्वायोगात्। तत्राणुपरिमाण एवात्मेति पाञ्चरात्रा वर्णयन्ति —

वालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च।
भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते॥ इति॥

(श्वेताश्वतर - अध्याय ५. मन्त्र: ९)

12. Now, if the soul's pervasiveness be established, then there would be pervasiveness of its attribute. But since the soul is not cognised elsewhere than in the body, its pervasiveness is impossible; hence the *Pāñcarātras* say that the soul is only atomic in size. "The soul is to be known to be of the form of a hundredth part of the hundredth part of the point of a tip of tail (hair's breadth) and such a soul has no end." (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad,* V. 9).

१३. क्षपणकास्तु प्रदीपप्रभावत्सङ्कोचविकासवानात्मा देहानुरूप-परिमाणवानिति वर्णयन्ति। पक्षद्वयमपि न सङ्गच्छते। आत्मा विभुः, देहादन्यत्र स्थितार्थग्राहकत्वात्, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं, यथा घटः। किं च आत्मा विभुः, सर्वत्रोपलभ्यमानकार्यत्वात्, इति व्यापकत्वसिद्धेः। किं च मध्यमपरिमाणत्व आत्मनो नित्यत्वं न स्यात्। यन्मध्यमपरिमाणं तदनित्यम्, यथा घट इत्यनुमानात्। तस्माद्व्योमवद्व्यापक आत्मा। तद्धर्मभूतमपि ज्ञानं व्यापकम्। तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षत एव निरस्तो वैशेषिकात्मवादः॥

13. The *Kṣapaṇakas,* however, say that the soul which, like the light of a lamp is capable of contraction and expansion, has a size corresponding to that of the body. Both views are unacceptable. The soul is pervasive, since it apprehends things situated elsewhere than in the body; what is not that, is not capable of this; *e.g.*, a pot; moreover the soul is pervasive, since it has acitivity that can be cognised everywhere (even outside the body); from such inferences pervasiveness is established. Further, if the soul were of intermediate size, it would not be eternal, because of the inference, "That which is of intermediate size is non-eternal, like the pot." Therefore, the soul is all-pervasive, like the ether; knowledge too, which is its attribute, is pervasive. Therefore even by perception is refuted the *Vaiśeṣika* teaching about the soul.

१४. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

व्यापकत्वे ह्यणोः सिद्धे धर्मव्यापकता भवेत् ।
अन्यत्रानुपलब्धस्य देहाद्व्यापकता कुतः ॥

ईश्वरः —

न देहपरिमाणत्वमणूनामुपपद्यते ।
तस्माद्देहादतोऽन्यत्र स्थितार्थग्राहकत्वतः ॥
किं चाभिव्यञ्जको यत्र यत्र देहेन्द्रियादिकम् ।
तत्र सर्वत्र तत्कार्यदृष्टेर्व्यापकतात्मनः ॥
व्यापकोऽयममूर्तत्वाद्यथा व्योम ततस्तथा ।
तद्धर्मभूतं ज्ञानं च व्यापकं विषयोन्मुखम् ॥
यन्नित्यरूपं विज्ञानं तच्च निर्विषयात्मकम् ।
पक्षोऽध्यक्षनिरस्तोऽयं स्वपरग्राहकत्वतः ॥
अणोः प्रत्यात्मसिद्धत्वान्नानुमाध्यक्षबाधिका ।
नेह ग्राहकता बुद्धेः साधितत्वाज्जडत्वतः ॥
किं चैतद्ग्राहकत्वं च न भेदादात्मनां स्थितम् ।
स्वरूपं तु ततस्तेषां ग्राहकत्वेन संस्थितेः ॥
न ह्यंशेन पदार्थानां विचारः शोभते क्वचित् ।
अग्निश्शक्तिं विना कीदृगिति चिन्ता न कुत्रचित् ॥
स्वपरग्राहकस्तस्मात्सर्वदात्मा व्यवस्थितः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. १०५-११३).

अन्यत्र —

व्यञ्जकं यत्र यत्र स्याच्छरीरं तत्र तत्र तु ।
भोगार्थं स्याद्गुणव्यक्तिर्व्यापित्वं तेन गम्यते ॥ इति च ॥

14. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Sages: If the pervasiveness of the soul were established there would be pervasiveness of the attribute. How can there be pervasiveness of that which is not cognised elsewhere than in the body? *Īśvara*: It is not intelligible that souls have the size of the bodies because of the apprehension of things situated elsewhere than in those bodies. Further, since wherever there is the body, organs, etc., as the manifestor, there is seen the activity of that (soul), so, the soul is pervasive. It is pervasive, since it is formless, like the ether. Similarly its attribute, knowledge, is pervasive and turned toward objects. As for the inference, knowledge (consciousness) which is eternal, has no objects (since it is eternal), that is refuted by perception, since it cognises both itself (the cognising soul) and others. Since the soul is established in (the experience of) everyone (as the apprehender of itself and others), inference is not the sublator of perception. Intellect is not the apprehender, since it is inert; this has been established. Further this capacity to apprehend does not exist in the souls as wholly different from them (like the *parigraha-śakti*); further since they (the souls) are understood invariably as apprehenders, this (capacity) is but then from nature (inhering in them through *tādātmya*). Nor is it meet to analyse things (with attributes) into parts and trace (different capacities to different parts). Never is it found an analysis as "How is the fire without its capacity (to burn)?" Therefore it is established that soul ever cognises itself and others. (Paśupaṭala, vv. 105-113). Elsewhere: "The manifestation of the *guṇas* is for the sake of the enjoyment (of the soul); thereby is understood its pervasiveness."

१५. न च साङ्ख्योक्तरीत्या आत्मनामज्ञातृत्वम्; तेषामर्थग्राहकत्वस्य दर्शनात्। न च वाच्यमात्मनो ज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वेऽपि महत्तत्त्वापरपर्यायस्य

बुद्धितत्त्वस्य ज्ञातृत्वमिति। तस्य जडत्वेन ज्ञानाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्। किं च आत्मा स्वपरप्रकाशकोऽनुभूयते। परप्रकाशकत्वं च ज्ञातृत्वमात्मन एव गुणः। बुद्ध्या ऐक्यमापन्नस्यात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वमिति वाच्यम्। बुद्ध्यैक्य-साधकस्याध्यासस्यैवासिद्धेः। किंचाध्यासस्यापि परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासत्वे-नात्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य ज्ञातृत्वं वक्तव्यम्। तच्च न सम्भवति। बुद्धेर्जड-त्वेन ज्ञातृत्वाभावस्योक्तत्वात्। अथ चित्प्रतिबिम्बत्वेन बुद्ध्यादेर्ज्ञातृत्वं, तर्हि बुद्धिरपि चेतना स्यात्। किं च चिद्रूपस्य प्रतिबिम्बनमेव न सम्भवति। बुद्धेर्हि परिणामिनो जडस्य प्रतिबिम्बनम्। तस्मात् बुद्धावात्मनः प्रतिबिम्बनं वक्तुं न युज्यत इत्यध्यासेनात्मनः कर्तृत्वं बुद्धिपरिकल्पितम्॥

15. Nor is the soul's cognisership in the manner stated by the Sāṅkhyas since according to them it is not seen to be that which apprehends things. Nor may it be said that though the soul is mere knowledge, yet there is cognisership for it as identified with the intellect; for that (intellection) being inert is (only) what manifests knowledge. Further, the soul is experienced as self-luminous; and cognisership which consists in illumining others is a quality of the soul alone, not of that which has been identified with the intellect, since there is not established (at that stage) the superimposition that accounts for identity with the intellect. Further, superimposition too being the presentation elsewhere of what was formerly seen, cognisership would have to be predicated of what is other than the soul; and that is impossible, since cognisership is not possible for the intellect, that being inert. If there be cognisership for the intellect, etc., as reflecting knowledge (that is the soul), then the intellect too would be intelligent. Further, reflection itself is impossible in the case of what is of the nature of intelligence. It is for the inert and mutable intellect there is reflection; since it is not possible to predicate a reflection

of the soul in the intellect, the agency for the same soul as resulting from superimposition is the assumption of a defective intellect.

१६. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे—

ज्ञाता चायं न तु ज्ञप्तिमात्रोऽर्थग्राहको यतः ।

ऋषयः—

ज्ञप्त्यात्मैवायमुद्दिष्टो ज्ञातृत्वं महतो मतम् ॥
महानध्यवसायात्मा तन्त्रेऽप्यस्मिन्महेश्वर ।

ईश्वरः—

सर्वे ज्ञातार एवेह दृश्यन्ते प्राणिनः सदा ॥
न बौद्धमेतज्ज्ञातृत्वं युक्तं तस्या जडत्वतः ।
किं तु बुध्यादिभिर्ज्ञानं व्यज्यतेऽत्र सदैव हि ॥
किं चानुभूयते ह्यात्मा स्वपरात्मप्रकाशकः ।
परप्रकाशकत्वं च नित्यं नित्यगुणो यतः ॥
ज्ञातृत्वं नैतदध्यासकृतं भवितुमर्हति ।
अन्यत्र दृष्टधर्माणामन्यत्राध्यास इष्यते ॥
आत्मेतरस्य ज्ञातृत्वासिद्धेर्नाध्यास इष्यते ।
अथ चित्प्रतिबिम्बेन बुद्ध्यादेर्ज्ञातृता भवेत् ॥
तर्हि चित्प्रतिबिम्बेन बुद्ध्यादिरपि चिद्भवेत् ।
न चेतनो यतो बुद्धौ चिद्रूपः प्रतिबिम्बितः ॥
न चायं प्रतिबिम्बोऽपि चिद्रूपस्यात्मनो मतः ।
जडे जडस्य सङ्क्रान्तिर्युज्यते परिणामिनः ॥
बुद्ध्यादेः प्रतिबिम्बोऽपि न स्यादात्मन्यसम्भवात् ।
अन्योन्याध्यासवादोऽयं कुदृष्टिपरिकल्पितः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ९१-९९)

16. And then it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "And this (soul) is the cogniser, not knowledge alone, since it is the apprehender of things. Sages: By knowledge alone the soul is referred to; cognisership is considered to belong to the intellect (*mahat*). In this *Tantra* too, Oh Maheśvara, *mahat* is that whose nature it is to determine. *Īśvara*: In this world, all creatures are always seen to be but cognisers. It does not stand to reason that this cognisership belongs to the intellect, because of the inertness of that (intellect). Further, knowledge is constantly manifested here by the intellect, etc.; further, the soul is experienced as that which illumines both self and others. This illumination of others is constant, since it is an eternal quality (of the soul). This cognisership cannot be the product of superimposition. It is of attributes seen in one place that superimposition elsewhere is recognised. (But) since cognisership is not established elsewhere than in the self, superimpositlon is not admitted (here). Then (you may say) there may be cognisership for the intellect, etc., through the reflection of intelligence (therein). Then because of the reflection of intelligence, intellect, etc., would themselves become intelligence, but not the soul (which is considered to be) intelligence, since the nature of intelligence is reflected in the intellect (just as when a flower is kept long in water, the flower is no longer fragrant but the water is). Nor the soul which is of the nature of intelligence, can thus be considered, to be a reflection. The going over of the inert to the inert (by way of reflection) stands to reason in the case of what is mutable. The reflection even of the intellect, etc., could not be, since (reflection) is impossible in the soul. This view of reciprocal superimposition (therefore) is a short-sighted assumption." (Paśupaṭala, vv. 91-99).

१७. नन्वात्मभेदे किं मानम्? प्रत्यक्षमिति चेन्न; तस्यामूर्तद्रव्यत्वेन बाह्येन्द्रियाविषयत्वात्। नाप्यहं सुखी अहं दुःखीत्यादिमानसप्रत्यक्षेणात्मभेदसिद्धिः। तत्प्रत्ययस्य भेदप्रयोजकत्वाभावात्। न च आत्मानः परस्परं भिन्नाः, परस्परविरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वात्, दहनतुहिनवदित्यनुमानं मानमिति वाच्यम्; परस्परविरुद्धधर्माणां तदवच्छेदकोपाधिपरिकल्पिततया आत्मनिष्ठत्वाभावाद्धेतोरसिद्धेः। न ह्येकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युज्यमाने मठाकाशादयोऽपि युज्यन्ते। तस्मात्परिदृश्यमानस्य भेदस्यौपाधिकतयात्मभेदः कथमिति चेत्, उच्यते — आत्मानो भिन्नाः, परस्परविरुद्धजन्ममरणादिधर्मवत्त्वात्, यदेवं तदेवं, यथा घटपटादि। न चात्मनां जन्माद्यभावेन हेतोरसिद्धिः। देहादेरेव जन्माद्यपगमे तत्र चैतन्यमेव न दृश्यते। अतश्चैतन्ययुक्त एव देहादिरुत्पद्यते ॥

17. Now what is the *pramāṇa* that establishes the difference among souls? If it be said that the difference (between souls) is by perception, no; since that (not) being a substance with form is (not) the object of the senses. Nor is the difference among souls established by the mental perception — 'I am happy; I am miserable' (as experienced by different persons). Nor may it be said that there is the inference, 'This cognition is the determinant of difference, since it is the locus of reciprocally conflicting attributes like fire and fog.' For, as the reciprocally conflicting attributes are posited by their respective determining adjuncts, they connot establish differences among souls. Indeed, because dust and smoke are conjoined with one part of ether defined by a pot, they do not attach also to another part of ether defined by a *maṭha*. Therefore the seen difference being due to adjuncts, there is no establishment of difference among souls. If this be said, no, because of (souls) being the loci of reciprocally conflicting attributes like happiness and misery. Reciprocally conflicting attributes like happiness

and misery have different loci, because of having the reciprocally conflicting attributes of orgination and destruction. That which is marked by two reciprocally conflicting attributes of origination and destruction is marked by difference, like cloth, pot, etc. Nor is there non-establishment of the probans because of the non-existence of origination, etc., for the soul; for the soul is not seen to be mere non-originated intelligence. Therefore body, etc., is originated only as associated with intelligence.

१८. ननु नित्यस्य चैतन्यस्य कथमुत्पत्तिः? यथा तव नित्यानां देहेन्द्रियादीनामुत्पत्तिस्तथात्मनोऽपि सम्भवति। अथैवंरूपेण दहेन्द्रिया दयो न नित्याः, किं तु कारणात्मनेति ब्रूषे तदा ममाप्यात्मानोऽवच्छिन्नरूपे-णोत्पत्यादिमन्तः, अनवच्छिन्नास्तु नित्या इति सिद्धमुत्पत्तिलयधर्मकत्वमात्म-नाम्। ननु यथा उत्पत्त्यादयो धर्माः कुम्भकलशोदञ्चनादीनां, न तु तदवच्छि-न्नस्याकाशस्य। एवमुत्पत्त्यादयो धर्मा देहादीनामेव। न तु तदवच्छिन्नस्या-त्मन इति चेन्न; आत्मधर्मस्यैव भोजनगमनादिविषयकस्येच्छादेर्भिन्नत्वेनैवात्म-भेदसिद्धेः। न च तस्याप्यौपाधिकत्वम्; "तस्यात्मनो रूपं दृक्क्रियानन्त्य-लक्षणम्"इति लक्षणाभिधानात्। न च भिन्नतया मेयत्वेनात्मनां मातृत्वं न सिद्ध्येदिति वाच्यम्। मेयत्वमातृत्वयोर्विरोधाभावात्। अन्यथा आत्मनां मेयत्वायोगेन शिवस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं भज्येत। किञ्चैकस्य मुक्तौ सर्वेषां मुक्तिः प्रसज्येत। न चेष्टापत्तिः। प्रपञ्चस्य युगपद्विनाशप्रसङ्गात्। तथाच मोक्षे यत्नोऽपि विफलः स्यात्। तस्माद्भिन्ना एवात्मानः॥

18. Now, of the eternal intelligence, how can there be origination? Just as there is origination for the body, organ, etc., which according to you, are eternal, even so there is origination of intelligence. If you should say that the body, organ, etc., are not eternal (in themselves) but only in respect of that which is their cause, it is established that the souls which are defined are not eternal, but only undefined intelligence and that thus

souls have the attributes of origination and dissolution. Just as origination, etc., are attributes of pots, jars and buckets, etc., not of the ether defined by them; similarly, origination, etc., are attributes of bodies alone, not of the soul defined by them. If this be said, no; for there being difference only in the attribute of the soul, such as the desire to eat or walk, there is established difference in the souls. Nor is that too, due to adjunct, since it is of the soul, "the definition of the soul being given as knowledge, activity and infinitude." Nor may it be said that the soul, as non-different from these being an object of knowledge, cannot be knower; for, there is no conflict between being the knower and being an object of knowledge; otherwise, because of the souls, not being objects of knowledge, Śiva's omniscience would suffer. Further, on the release of one, there would follow the release of all. Nor is this contingence, acceptable, as there would follow the simultaneous destruction (*i.e.*, dissolution) of the world, and thus the pursuit of release too would be fruitless. Therefore souls are certainly different.

१९. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

आत्मानो बहवः प्रोक्ता बहुत्वं केन गम्यते ।
नाध्यक्षगम्यं तत्तावन्नानुमाविषयं ततः ॥

भेदस्य मेयधर्मत्वान्माता मेयः कथं भवेत् ।
न हेतुसाधनाभावोऽप्यात्मभेदोपपादकः ॥

सोपाधिकात्मधर्मस्य भेदात्सोपाधिकान्तर ।
यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ॥

न सर्वे सम्प्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवाः सुखादिभिः ।
तस्मादेकात्मभावेऽस्मिन् परिहारो विधीयताम् ॥

ईश्वरः —

आत्मानो बहवो जन्ममरणादिविभेदतः ।
जन्मनाशादयो धर्मा दृश्यन्ते भिन्नवस्तुषु ॥
ततस्तु जन्मनाशाद्या आत्मनो भेदकाः स्थिताः ।
न देहस्यैव जन्माद्या देहाद्यैः सह चात्मनाम् ॥
देहादेर्यदि जन्माद्या न स्याच्चैतन्यदर्शनम् ।
तद्देहे जातबालानामपि चैतन्यमिष्यते ॥
चैतन्येनावियुक्तः सन् देहादिरुपजायते ।
जन्मादिभेदवन्तोऽतो देहाश्चिद्भेदसाधकाः ॥
चैतन्यस्येह नित्यस्य कथं जन्मेति चेन्मतिः ।
अत्यल्पमिदमेते च नित्या देहेन्द्रियादयः ॥
नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
तस्मादेकात्मवादोऽयं कल्पितो मूढचेतनैः ॥

ऋषयः —

अथाकाशं यथा कुम्भकलशोदञ्चनादिषु ।
एकमेव स्थितं तद्वद्देहेष्वात्मा व्यवस्थितः ॥

ईश्वरः —

तच्चैकरूपमाकाशं नैवं चैतन्यमिष्यते ।
भोक्तुमिच्छा यदैकस्य गन्तुमिच्छापरस्य च ॥
तदेवमात्मचैतन्यं भिन्नरूपमिव स्थितम् ।
यद्यभिन्नं तु सर्वेषां भोक्तुमिच्छैकदा भवेत् ॥

ऋषयः —

सोपाधिकात्मधर्मस्य भेदादिति ननूदितम् ।

ईश्वरः —

अणोरभेदे संसिद्धे तथा वक्तव्यमग्रजाः ॥
युक्तिभिः साधिते भेदे नासिद्धिस्वीकृतिः शुभा ।
अत एव घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ॥
न सर्वे सम्प्रयुज्यन्ते यथान्ये तन्न दूषणम् ।
भेदस्य मेयधर्मत्वादिति यच्चोदितं पुरा ॥
स च हेतुरसिद्धोऽत्र मेयामेयार्थयोर्धृतः ।
भेदोऽप्युभयनिष्ठः स्यान्न च मातुरमेयता ॥
शिवस्य मेया ह्यात्मानो न चेत्सर्वज्ञताक्षतिः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ७४-९१)

अन्यत्र —

स्थितायां सर्वतो मुक्तौ भवोच्छेदः प्रसज्यते ।
न चास्ति स भवोच्छेदस्तेन ते बहवो मताः ॥ इति ॥

19. And thus it has been said in the Sacred *Pauṣkara* "Sages: Souls are said to be many. How is their plurality understood? It is not understood by perception; hence it is not the object of inference (either); as the difference being an attribute of what is known, how can the knower become the known? Nor does the non-existence (otherwise) of what establishes the probans (*viz.*, the distinction of happiness and misery), justify difference among souls; for the attribute which belongs to the soul as having one adjunct, *i.e.*, *sopādhika*, is different from that which belongs to the soul as having another adjunct.

Just as when dust, smoke, etc., are conjoined with the ether in one pot, they are not united with all ether, even so (not all) *jīvas* are united with happiness, etc., (when one *jīva* is so united). Therefore, a reply may be given (to this problem of the distinction of happiness, etc.) on the view of the soul being one. *Īśvara*: Souls are many because of differences of birth, death, etc. The attributes of birth, death etc., are seen (simultaneously) in different things (alone), (nor in one and the same thing); thence it is settled that birth, death, etc., establish difference among souls. Nor are birth, etc., for the body alone; it is for the soul together with the body (senses), etc. If birth, etc., were of the body (alone), then in that body, there would not be seen intelligence, (whereas) intelligence is recognised to exist even in infants just born. (Therefore) the body, etc., are born, only as not dissociated from intelligence. Therefore the embodied ones, which possess such different properties as birth, establish differences in intelligence. If it be asked how there can be birth for the eternal intelligence, this is the answer: this is a very trivial difficulty; since the body, organs, etc., are eternal. No origination is known of what is non-existent (at least as an impression); nor of the existent is there known destruction (without any residue). Therefore this view of a single soul is posited by those of deluded intelligence. Sages: Then (could it be said that) just as there is only one ether in pot, jar, bucket, etc., similarly there is (but one) soul in the (many) bodies? *Īśvara*: That ether is (cognised to be) of one nature; but intelligence is not recognised to be such. When for one there is desire to eat, for another there is desire to walk; therefore it is settled for us that intelligence is of diverse natures; if it were non-different, then for all there should be the desire to eat at the same time.

Sages: Now it was said that this (alleged difference in intelligence) is due to differences in the attributes of the soul as having adjuncts (*i.e.*, the non-existence of the attribute, of a soul with one adjunct, in a soul with another adjunct). *Īśvara*: If the non-difference of souls were well established then there should be given some solution (of difference as due to adjuncts), O! high-born ones. Difference being established by reasoning, the adoption of non-difference (which is not so established) is not proper. For the same reason what was said, *viz.*, "Just as when dust, smoke etc., are united to the ether in the pot, they do not unite with all (ether), similarly in the case of the other (*jīva*)," that is no criticism of our position; for what was said earlier about difference being an attribute of what is known, that probans is non-established, since the difference between what are known (like pot) and what are not known (like the soul) resides in both (terms of the relation of difference). Nor is the knower (necessarily) what is not known; for the souls are objects of knowledge to Śiva; if not, there is loss of (His) omniscience. (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pasupaṭala, vv. 74-91). Elsewhere it is said: "All being released (on the release of one *jīva*) there would result the destruction of the world; and there is not the destruction of the world; therefore the souls are considered to be many."

२०. एवं चात्मनो देहाद्यन्यत्वनित्यत्वचिद्रूपत्वकर्तृत्वनानात्वानि च सिद्धानि। सर्वज्ञत्वमपि स्वतः सिद्धम्। किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वं तु मलरूपकारणात्। तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

अणोः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वान्नानुमाध्यक्षबाधिका ।
नेह ग्राहकता बुद्धेः साधितत्वाज्जडत्वतः ॥

किं चैतद्ग्राहकत्वं च न भेदादात्मनां स्थितम् ।
स्वरूपं तु ततस्तेषां ग्राहकत्वेन संस्थितिः ॥
न चांशेन पदार्थानां विचारः शोभते क्वचित् ।
... ...
तद्वत् स्वतोऽमी सर्वज्ञाः किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वं तु कारणात् ।
निरुद्धं येन सार्वज्ञ्यं स मलः परिपठ्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ११०-११२, ११४).

20. And thus there are established of the soul, (i) difference from the body, (ii) eternality, (iii) the nature of intelligence, (iv) agency, and (v) plurality. Omniscience too results from its own nature, since the parviscience is due to another cause, *mala*. That has been said even there: "Since the soul is established in (the experience of) everyone (as the apprehender of itself and others), inference is not the sublator of perception. Intellect is not the apprehender, since it is inert; this has been established. Further this capacity to apprehend does not exist in the souls as wholly different from them (like the *parigrahaśakti*); since further they (the souls) are understood invariably as apprehenders, this (capacity) is but their own nature (inhering in them through *tādātmya*). Nor is it meet to analyse things (with attributes) into parts and trace (different capacities to different parts). In the same way, these souls by themselves are omniscient; parviscience is due to some other cause. That whereby omniscience is hindered, is called *mala*." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pasupaṭala, vv. 110-112, 114.)

२१. नन्वयं साकारो निराकारो वा? आद्येऽपि दृश्याकारो वा दृश्यादृश्याकारो वा? नाद्यः। देहमध्येऽन्यस्यादर्शनात्; न द्वितीयः; दृश्यादृश्यत्वयोरेकत्र विरोधात्। काष्ठाग्निवच्छाखाचन्द्रवच्चोभयमपि काल-

भेदेन सम्भवतीति चेत्, न; तद्वदेव कदाचिददर्शनप्रसङ्गात्। नापि तृतीयः; सूक्ष्मशरीराव्यतिरेकप्रसङ्गात्। नापि निराकारः; तत्संबन्धेन शरीरे चेष्टाद्ययोगात्। न ह्याकाशसंयोगेन कुत्रचिच्चेष्टा भवति; चेष्टावत्संयोगस्यैव इतिप्रभृतिषु चेष्टाजनकत्वदर्शनात्। किं चात्मनश्चिद्रूपत्व इन्द्रियाणां वैयर्थ्यमापतेत्। न हि चितो ज्ञातृत्वेऽचित्साहित्यमपेक्ष्यत इति युक्तम्। अपि चात्मनो व्यापकत्वे ललाटादिनियतदेशवृत्तित्वायोगेनावस्थापञ्चकानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्ग इत्यनुपपत्तिपराहतमात्मस्वरूपमिति; उच्यते — निराकार एवायमात्मा। न चैवं शरीरे चेष्टानुपपत्तिः; क्रियाशक्त्या तदुपपत्तेः। न च तस्याः सर्वदा सद्भावेन चेष्टापि सर्वदा स्यादिति वाच्यम्; तस्या आणवावृतत्वेनासत्कल्पतयाभिव्यञ्जकबुद्धिवृत्तिरूपसंरम्भसापेक्षतया कार्यस्य कादाचित्कत्वोपपत्तेः। न चैवं संरम्भ एव चेष्टाप्रयोजकोऽस्तु, किं क्रियाशक्त्येति वाच्यम्; संरम्भमात्रस्य जडधर्मतया चेष्टाप्रयोजकत्वानुपपत्तेश्चेतनशक्तेरावश्यकत्वात्संरम्भोत्पादनाय क्रियाशक्तेरावश्यकत्वाच्च। ज्ञानक्रिययोर्मूर्तित्वोपचारेण मूर्तिमानपि भवति। एवमात्मनश्चिद्रूपत्वेऽपि नेन्द्रियापेक्षानुपपत्तिः। चैतन्यशक्तेर्मलावृतत्वेन तदभिव्यक्तये बुद्धिरूपबोधोत्पादनाय तदपेक्षोपपत्तेः। बुद्धिवृत्तेर्जडत्वेन तदभिव्यक्तचिच्छक्तेरेव प्रकाशकत्वात्। एवं व्यापकत्वेऽप्यस्य न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। जाग्रदाद्यवस्थापरिकरस्य ललाटादिवृत्तित्वेन तदवच्छिन्नस्यापि ललाटादिनियतदेशकत्वोपपत्तेः। सूक्ष्मदेहस्य गतिमत्त्वेन तदवच्छिन्नस्य सकलावस्थस्य परलोकगत्याद्युपपत्तेश्च॥

21. Now, has this (soul) a form or is it formless? Even if it be the former alternative, has it a visible form or has it both visible and invisible form? Not the first, since nothing else is seen within the body. Not the second, since visibility and invisibility are contradictory in respect of one and the same (object). If it be said that like the fire in the fuel and the moon at (the tip of) the branch (of a tree), both (attributes) are possible through a difference in time; no, since there is the contingence of non-visibility (at least) sometimes, even in the case of them. Not the third, because of the contingence of

inseparability from the subtle body. Nor is it formless, since there will be no possibility of bodily activity, etc., through conjunction with that (soul). Indeed, there is no activity anywhere through conjunction with the ether alone, since the production of activity is seen in the bellows, etc., only through conjunction with what is itself active. Further, if the soul were of the form of consciousness there would result the futility of the senses; nor does it stand to reason that consciousness in spite of being the cogniser, stands in need of the co-operation of the non-intelligent. Further, if the soul be pervasive, there is the impossibility of presence in particular places like the forehead, etc., and there is the consequent contingence of the unintelligibility of the five states; thus there results the untenability of the essential nature of the soul. The reply is: this soul is certainly formless; nor thus is there the unintelligibility of bodily activity since that is intelligible through identity (of the soul) with conative energy. Nor may it be said that because of its existence constantly there is the contingence of the constant existence of activity, etc. For, that (energy), being enveloped in *āṇava*, is as if unreal and is dependent on an excitement consisting in an intellectual psychosis that is the manifester; hence the occasional nature of activity is intelligible. Nor may it be asked, "Thus the excitement itself might be the cause of activity; where is the need for conative energy?" For, there, the excitement being an attribute of the inert, its causing activity is unintelligible; hence an intelligence-energy is necessary; and conative-energy is needed to originate the excitement. And since cognition and conation here are figuratively spoken of as having form, (the soul) comes to have form too. Thus, even though the soul is of the nature of consciousness, there is no unintelligibility of the need for activity (of the senses);

for that (conation) being enveloped in the case of the intelligence-energy, in order to manifest it and to originate the cognition that is of the form of the intellect, the need of that (activity) is intelligible; the psychosis of the intellect being inert, it is only the intelligence-energy manifested thereby that is the illuminant. Similarly, there is no unintelligibility even in its pervasiveness. The host of states, beginning with waking, being present in the forehead, etc., it is intelligible that (the soul) which is defined by those (states) also exists in particular places like the forehead. Since the subtle body is capable of moving about, going to the other world, etc., are intelligible in the case of what (soul) is defined by that (subtle body) and is in the *sakala* state.

२२. तथा हि — आत्मनस्तिस्रोऽवस्थाः। केवलावस्था, सकलावस्था, शुद्धावस्था चेति। तत्र यदा द्विविधेन देहेन प्राणेन्द्रियान्तःकरणैश्च विनाकृतोऽत एवाभिव्यञ्जकविधुरतयाणवावतसङ्कल्पज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिः किमप्यबुध्यमान आस्ते तदा केवलावस्था। यदा सूक्ष्मदेहेनान्नमयप्राणमयमनोमयविज्ञानमयानन्दमयकोशैश्चावच्छिन्नस्तदा सकलावस्था। यदा कर्मसाम्ये तन्नियतशक्तिनिपाते च सति गुरुकृपावशाच्छिवानन्दाभिव्यक्तेर्मलत्रयनिवृत्त्या शिवैक्याभिव्यक्तिस्तदा शुद्धावस्था। तत्र सकलावस्थातः केवलावस्थाप्राप्तिसमयेऽवस्थाभेदः पञ्चविधः। नादादिपृथिव्यन्तषट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वैः सह यदा ललाटस्थः सर्वान् विषयाननुभवति तदा सप्रतिभा जाग्रदवस्था। सैव सकलावस्था। विषयभोजकादृष्टाभावेन प्रेरकाणि शुद्धानि पञ्चतत्त्वानि भोजयितृकाणि सप्ततत्त्वानि पञ्चमहाभूतानि च; एतेषु सप्तदशसूपरतेषु श्रोत्रादीनि पञ्च, वागादीनि पञ्च, मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्तानि चत्वारि, शब्दादीनि पञ्च, तात्त्विकानि वचनादीनि पञ्च, प्राणादीनि दश चेत्येतैः सह क्षेत्रज्ञनामक आत्मा पञ्चत्रिंशो यदा मुखे तिष्ठन्नपि प्रेरकभोजयितृकाण्डयोर्निर्व्यापारत्वेनाणवातिशयाज्जाग्रन्नपि विषयान् सम्यङ्न जानाति तदा अप्रतिभा जाग्रत्। सूक्ष्मदेहभोगनिमित्तानि शब्दादीनि पञ्च, वचनादीनि पञ्च, प्राणादीनि दश, मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्तानि चत्वारि, एतैः सह पञ्चविंशकः

क्षेत्रज्ञनामक आत्मा यदा कण्ठे स्थितो व्यावहारिकविषयान्विहाय तात्कालिक-प्रातिभासिकविषयाननुभवति तदा स्वप्नावस्था । स्थूलसूक्ष्मदेहभोगान् त्यक्त्वा यदा हृदये चित्तप्राणवायुभ्यां सह तृतीय आत्मा तिष्ठति तदा सुषुप्तयवस्था । यदा नाभिस्थाने प्राणवायुना द्वितीय आत्मा तिष्ठति तदा तुरीयावस्था । यदा तु मूलाधारे तत्त्वतात्त्विकादीन् सर्वान्विहाय आत्मैवैक आणवावृतस्तिष्ठति तदा तुर्यातीतावस्था । सैव नित्यकेवलावस्थेत्यादिना केवलावस्था चतुर्विधा॥

22. It is thus: there are three states of the soul — *kevala, sakala* and *śuddha.* Of these, when a person is devoid (i) of the two kinds of body, (ii) of the vital air, (iii) of the senses and (iv) of the internal organs, and for that same reason possesses a conative energy that is enveloped in *āṇava* and being devoid of a manifester (is as if unreal), and consequently remains without knowing anything, then it is the *kevala* state. When it is defined by the subtle body, and by the sheaths of food, vital air, mind, cognition and bliss, then it is the *sakala* state. When the soul's good and evil actions become balanced, when the grace of God falls on him, when he gets the *guru's* blessings and becomes free from the three *malas* (then he ceases to be finite in intelligence, and becomes omniscient); he realises his oneness with Śiva; this is the *śuddha* state. At the time of passing from the *sakala* state to the *kevala* state, there are (as intermediaries) the five different kinds of states. When (the soul) is situated in the forehead together with the 36 *tattvas* beginning with the *nāda* and ending with the earth, and experiences all objects, then it is the state of *sapratibhā jāgrat*; that itself is the *sakala* state. When because of the non-existence of the *adṛṣṭa* that causes the experience of objects, the five pure *tattvas* that are the prompters, the seven *tattvas* that cause experience and the five gross elements, when all these

seventeen are quiescent, when the soul called *kṣetrajña* who is 35th in conjunction with the five senses of hearing, etc., with the five organs of speech, etc., with the four (internal organs) *viz.*, the mind, intellect, individuation and *citta* (attention), with five subtle elements of the sound, etc., with the five effectuated (*tāttvika*) speech, etc., and with the ten vital airs beginning with *prāṇa*, etc., (the soul) though present in the face (forehead), though waking does not know objects properly, because of the non-functioning of the *tattvas* of the prompting (*preraka*) and *bhojayitṛ* groups, then it is the state of *apratibhā jāgrat*. When the soul called *kṣetrajña* who is the 25th in conjunction with the causes of experience in the subtle body (the causes) — *viz.*, the five, sound, etc., the five, speech, etc., the ten, *prāṇa*, etc., and the four, *manas*, intellect, individuation and *citta*,— (when the soul) is located in the throat, and experiences the fleeting and illusory objects to the exclusion of objects empirically valid, then it is the dream state. When abandoning experiences in bodies, gross and subtle, the soul stands in the heart, as the third in conjunction with *citta* and *prāṇa-vāyu*, then it is the state of deep sleep. When the soul is located in the navel as the second in conjunction with *prāṇavāyu*, then it is the fourth (*turīya*) state. When the soul stands alone in the *mūlādhāra*, enveloped in *āṇava*, but abandoning all *tattvas* and their products then it is the state beyond the fourth (*turyātīta*). That itself is the *nitya-kevala* state; thus the *kevala* state is fourfold.

२३. ननु महाप्रळये तत्त्वतात्त्विकादीनां सर्वेषां लीनत्वादात्मनः केवलत्वेनावस्थानं सम्भवतु; इदानीं तत्त्वानामाप्रलयावस्थायिनां विभोरात्मनश्च सत्त्वेऽपि कथं तत्तद्व्यापाराभाव इति चेत्, सत्यं, अग्नेरयसश्च सत्त्वेऽपि संयोजकपुरुषव्यापाराभावाद्यथायसो न दाहकत्वं तथा विद्यमानानामपि तत्त्वानां भोजकादृष्टाभावप्रयुक्तायाः शिवशक्तिप्रेरणाया अभावान्न विषयभोजकत्वम्। तदुक्तं —

अयसाग्नेर्यथा योगो वियोगोऽग्नेर्यथायसा ।
तत्त्वानामात्मनश्चैव शक्त्या कर्मवशाद्भवेत् ॥ इति ॥

23. Now, since in the great deluge, all *tattvas* and all their products, etc., are resolved, it may be that it is possible for the soul to remain *kevala* then. Now, however, even when there exist the *tattvas* that last till the deluge and the soul that is pervasive, how can there be non-existence of the respective functions? If this be asked, true; (but) just as, though both fire and iron exist, yet because of the non-existence of the activity of a person who brings them together, the iron does not burn; similarly, though the *tattvas* exist, yet because of the non-existence of the prompting by *Śiva-Śakti* which is moved by the *adṛṣṭa* that causes experiencing, (that *kevala* state is possible). That has been said: "Just as there is conjunction of the fire with iron and disjunction of iron from fire, similarly there is the dependence on *karma* of the *tattvas* and (the conjunction and disjunction) of the soul from *śakti*."

२४. अथ निर्मलजाग्रदाद्यच्यते — अकारोकारकारबिन्दुनादाधिष्ठातृ-शिवशक्तियोगेन निर्मलान्तःकरण आत्मा हृदये तिष्ठन् सर्वं दृश्यमानं प्रपञ्चं शिवाकारतया वैषयिकसुखं च स्वरूपानन्दतयानुभवति तन्निर्मलजाग्रत् । जाग्रदवस्थाकारणस्याकारस्योकारे बाह्यविषयग्राहकस्य मनसश्चाहङ्कारे लये सति अहङ्कारादिचतुष्टयस्योकारादिचतुष्टयेन सह कण्ठे सोहम्भावनयावस्थानं निर्मलस्वप्नः । स्वप्नावस्थाकारणस्योकारस्य मकारे अहमित्यभिमानकारण-स्याहङ्कारस्य च बुद्धौ लये सति बुद्ध्यादित्रयस्य तत्प्रेरकस्य मकारादित्रयस्य च सुषुप्तिस्थानभूततालुमूले देहेन्द्रियवृत्तिरहितवाचामगोचरज्ञेयज्ञातृज्ञान-त्रिपुटीरूपेणावस्थानं निर्मलसुषुप्तिः । सुषुप्त्यवस्थाकारणमकारस्य बिन्दौ निर्णायकबुद्धेश्च चित्ते लये सति चित्तसहितात्मनो बिन्दुनादाभ्यां सह तुर्या-वस्थास्थानभूते भ्रूमध्ये बाह्यान्तःकरणव्यापारराहित्येन ज्ञप्तिमात्रेणावस्थानं

निर्मलतुरीयम्। तुर्यावस्थाकारणबिन्दुनादयोः कुटिलायां चित्तस्य च प्रकृतौ लये सति तुर्यातीतावस्थास्थानब्रह्मरन्ध्र आत्मनोऽन्तर्बहिर्व्यापितयैकस्यैव तिष्ठतोऽखण्डाकारसच्चिदानन्दाद्वयपरिपूर्णशिवानन्याभिव्यक्तिः, सैव निर्मल-तुर्यातीतम्। तदेव शुद्धावस्था।

24. Then are described the *nirmala-jāgrat,* etc. When the soul, whose internal organ is pure through the conjunction with *A, U, M, Bindu, Nāda* and the controlling *Śivaśakti,* stands in the heart, and experiences the entire visible world as of the form of Śiva and all the material happiness as essential bliss, that is the *nirmala-jāgrat.* When there is absorption of 'A', the cause of the *jāgrat* state in 'U', and of *manas* in individuation, the abiding of the form beginning with individuation along with the four beginning with 'U', in the throat, meditating 'I am He' is *nirmala-svapna.* When there is absorption of 'U', the cause of the *svapna* state in 'M' and of individuation, the cause of the conceit 'I' in the intellect, and when there is the abiding of the three beginning with the intellect and of their promptness, the three beginning with 'M', in the base of the palate, the seat of the *suṣupti-state,* in a form devoid of the activity of body or senses, beyond speech, but with the three aspects of object of knowledge, knower, and the act of knowledge, that is *nirmala-suṣupti.* When there is absorption of 'M' the cause of the *suṣupti* state in the Bindu and of the determinative intellect in the *citta,* the abiding of the soul conjoined with *citta,* together with Bindu and Nāda, in the middle of the eye-brows, the seat of the fourth state, in the form of mere cognition without the activity of any external organ that is *nirmala-turīya.* When there is absorption of Bindu and Nāda, the cause of the fourth state in the *kuṭila* (*citśakti*) and of *citta* in *prakṛti,* there is in the *brahmarandhra,* the seat of the state beyond the fourth, for the soul

which remains alone as pervading both within and without, the manifestation of non-otherness from Śiva who is impartite, who is existence, knowledge, bliss, who is non-dual and perfect; this alone is *nirmala-turīyātīta*. That alone is the pure (*śuddha*) state.

२५. तदुक्तं सिद्धान्तसारावल्याम् —

बाह्यान्तःकरणैरणोः स्वविषयज्ञानं तु जाग्रत्ततः
स्वप्नोऽन्तःकरणस्थवृत्तिविषयज्ञानं सुषुप्तिः परम् ।
देहे त्विन्द्रियवृत्तिहीनमवचोग्राह्या मतिस्तुर्यकं
देहाक्षोपरतौ स्वचिन्मतिरथातीतं शिवत्वोदयः ॥ इति ॥

(सि. सा.—योगपादे श्लो. ८)

सिद्धान्तबोधे च —

जाग्रत्कारणमेवार्णयोगसंवेदनं हृदि ।
उभयेन्द्रियवृत्त्याथ लीनमाकारवेदनम् ॥
स्वप्नोऽन्तःकरणैरेव केवलैर्गळदेशतः ।
पूर्वविषयाख्याणुयोगेन संवेदनं यदा ॥
लीनान्तकरणं वृत्तेः सुषुप्तिस्तालुदेशतः ।
बिन्दूदयस्तु तुर्यं तु भ्रूमध्ये व्यतिरेकतः ॥
कार्यकारणयोरत्र वृत्त्यार्थादेश्च सङ्ग्रहः ।
सर्वार्थदृक्क्रियावृत्तिहेतोर्नादस्य वेदनम् ॥
तुर्यातीता च रन्ध्रोऽत्र दण्डान्तादेश्च सङ्ग्रहः ॥ इति ॥

25. That has been said in the *Siddhāntasārāvali*: "The soul's knowledge of its objects through the organs, external and internal, that is waking; dream is the knowledge relating to psychoses present in the internal organ;

sleep which is higher is the cognition which is devoid of the activities of body or organs, is indescribable and cannot be apprehended; the fourth is the cognition of one's own consciousness when the body and the senses are quiescent; the (state) beyond is the dawn of Śiva-nature." (Yogapāda, v. 8) In the *Siddhāntabodha* too it is said: "Waking is the cognition that takes place in the heart as the conjunction of the organ and the object of knowledge, through the activities of both organs (external and internal). Cognition in the three-fold form when (the body, etc., are) absorbed, is dream; it is only through the internal organs alone, in the region of the throat. When the cognition consisting the aforesaid conjunction with objects is absorbed, and there is absorption of the activity of the internal organ, there is sleep in the region of the palate. The fourth is the dawn of Bindu in the place in the middle of eyebrows; here effect and cause, psychosis and objects are all absorbed. The state beyond the fourth is the cognition of Nāda, the cause of the manifestation of cognition and conception extending to all objects; it is in the *brahmarandhra*; here is the absorption of *daṇḍānta*, etc."

२६. तदेवमवस्थाभेदोपेतो मलसम्बद्धचिद्रूपो व्यापकः पशुरिति सिद्धम्; एष च पशुरुपाधिभेदेन त्रिविधः सकलः प्रळयाकलो विज्ञानाकलश्चेति। तत्र सकलो नाम मलोपरुद्धदृक्छक्तित्वे सति तत्प्रसाराय कलादिमत्त्वे सति भोगाय कर्मसम्बद्धः। प्रळयाकलो नाम प्रळये उज्झितकलत्वे सति दीक्षया प्रायश्चित्तेन भोगाद्वा अशुद्धाध्वविषयकर्मपरिक्षयवत्त्वे सति भोक्ष्यमाणमिश्राध्वकर्मणा स्ववशीकृतकलासम्बन्धवान्। विज्ञानाकलो नाम विज्ञानादिना सर्वकर्माणि कलाश्च विहाय दृक्क्रियावारकाणवमलमात्रयुक्तो विज्ञानकेवलः।

26. Thus it is established that *paśu* is conjoined to (five) different states, is of the nature of intelligence united

to *mala* and is pervasive. And this *paśu* is of three kinds according to the difference of adjuncts: *sakala, pralayākala* and *vijñānākala;* of these he who is called *sakala* is the one who while having his cognition and conation obstructed by impurity and while possessing *kalā*, etc., and for their clarification, is related to *karma* for the sake of experience. He who is called *pralayākala* is the one who while having *kalā* removed at the deluge and while having consumed *karma* relating to the impure path (*adhvā*) whether by *dīkṣā* or by expiatory rites or through enjoyment (of consequences), gets related to *kalā* that has subjugated him through the *karmas* relating to the mixed path, that have yet to be experienced. He who is called the *vijñānākala* is the *vijñānakevala* who has abandoned all *kalās* and *karmas* through knowledge, etc., and is united to *āṇavamala* alone to obscure his cognition and conation.

२७. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे—

पशवस्त्रिविधा ज्ञेयाः सकलः प्रळयाकलः ।
विज्ञानाकल इत्येषां शृणुध्वं लक्षणं क्रमात् ॥
मलोपरुद्धदृक्छक्तिस्तत्प्रसृत्यै कलादिमान् ।
भोगाय कर्मसम्बन्धः सकलः परिपठ्यते ॥
प्राग्वन्निरुद्धदृक्छक्तिः कर्मपाकात्कलोज्झितः ।
कर्मणैष्यत्कलायोग्यो यस्स च प्रळयाकलः ॥
मलोपरुद्धशक्तित्वाच्छून्यकल्पस्वदृक्क्रियः ।
तृतीयः पठ्यते तन्त्रे नाम्ना विज्ञानकेवलः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ पशु. प. श्लो. २—५)

27. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "*Paśus* should be known to be of three kinds — *sakala*,

pralayākala, and *vijñānā-kala*. Listen to their respective characteristics. He whose cognitive energy is obstructed by *mala*, possesses *kalā*, etc., for the outgoing of that (energy) and is united to *karma* to be enjoyed, is called *sakala*; he who like former, has his cognitive energy obstructed, has his *kalā* removed because of the maturation of *karma*, but because of *karma* (still to be enjoyed) is capable of being associated with *kalā* in the future, he is the *pralayākala*; he whose cognitive energy is as if unreal because of being obstructed by *mala*, is the third class mentioned in the *Tantra*, under the name of *Vijñānakevala*." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Paśupaṭala, vv. 2-5.)

२८. तत्र सकलानामवस्थानमशुद्धमायाधोभागेऽशुद्धाध्वनि । प्रलयाकलानां तु अशुद्धमायामध्यभूतमिश्राध्वनि । विज्ञानकेवलानामशुद्धमायोपरि शुद्धविद्याधोभागे । एतच्चावस्थानं विभुत्वेऽप्युपाधिवशाल्लक्ष्यते । तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

मायादावुदरे चान्ते क्रमेणैषां व्यवस्थितिः ।
अवस्थानं च बन्धेन लक्ष्यतेऽणोर्विभुत्वतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ६)

28. Of these, the residence of *sakalas* is in the lower part of impure *māyā*, in the *aśuddhādhvan*. *Pralayākalas* reside in the middle part of impure *māyā*, in the mixed path (*miśrādhvan*). *Vijñānakevalas* reside above the impure *māyā*, but below the *śuddha-vidyā* (pure knowledge). And such residence (for the soul) though pervasive is indicated as the consequence of the adjuncts. "The respective abodes of these are in the first, middle and last parts of *māyā*; the residence is secondarily indicated through the bonds because of the pervasiveness of the soul (by itself)." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Paśupaṭala, v. 6).

२९. ननु विज्ञानकेवलानां मलमात्रावृतत्वेन मलस्य च व्यापकतया एकदेशे मायान्ते कथमवस्थानम्? उच्यते — अशुद्धमायाया भुक्तत्वेन तत्रेच्छाभावाद्भोक्ष्यमाणशुद्धमायायाश्च बुभुक्षितत्वेऽपि तत्प्रापकशिवेच्छाया अभावात्तयोर्मध्येऽवस्थानमित्युक्तम्। ते च शिवेच्छया शुद्धाध्ववर्तिनो भवन्ति। तद्वर्तिनामपि तेषां न सकलत्वम्। किं तु शिवेच्छया अधिकार-मलसहितत्वेन केवलं विज्ञानकलत्वमेव। विज्ञानरूपा कला येषामिति विज्ञान-कलाः॥

29. Now since the *vijñānakevalas* are enveloped in *mala* alone and since *mala* is pervasive, how is there predicted residence in a particular place, in the last part of *māyā*? Impure *māyā*, having been enjoyed, there would be no desire for it; and in the case of pure *māyā* to be enjoyed, though there be the desire to enjoy, yet because of the absence of Śiva's desire, that (alone) can cause the attainment of that (enjoyment); it is said that (for such souls) there is residence between the two (*māyās*). By the desire of Śiva they come to reside in the pure paths (*adhvās*); though residing there, they do not have *sakala* nature. But being associated with *adhikāramala* by the desire of Śiva they are only *vijñānakalas*. They for whom *kalā* is of the form of cognition (*vijñāna*) are *vijñānakalas*.

३०. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

विज्ञानकेवलाणूनां बन्धस्तु मल एव हि।
मलस्य व्यापकत्वेन मायान्ते संस्थितिः कथम्॥

ईश्वरः —

भद्रं विप्रा महाप्राज्ञाः शुद्धाध्वा यः पुरोदितः।
भोक्ष्यमाणतया तस्य भुक्तत्वेनेतरस्य च॥

अर्थादेव स्थिता मध्ये प्रोक्ता विज्ञानकेवलाः ।
विज्ञानकेवलाः साक्षात्त एव मुनिपुङ्गवाः ॥
शुद्धाध्ववर्तिनः पश्चाद्भविष्यन्ति शिवेच्छया ।
अणोर्नियामकत्वेन मायावच्छुद्धवर्त्मनः ॥
तद्वर्तिनो न सकलाः किं तु विज्ञानकेवलाः ।
अधिकारमलोपेताः शिवेच्छानुमताः सदा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ७-११)

30. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Sages: The bond for *vijñānakevala* souls, however, is but *mala*. But *mala* being pervasive, how can there be (their) residence in the last part of *māyā*? *Īśvara*: O sages of great wisdom, since the pure path mentioned earlier is to be enjoyed while the other (impure path) has been enjoyed, by presumption, the *vijñānakevalas* are said to abide in between (the two). O sages, these *vijñānakevalas* later become by the will of Śiva, dwellers in the pure path. Because the pure path like *māyā* is a restraint on the souls, those who dwell therein do not become *sakalas*; they are rather *vijñānakevalas* associated with *adhikāramala* and constantly conforming to the will of Śiva." (Pasupaṭala vv. 7-11).

३१. तेषां मायाकर्मराहित्ये हेतुरपि तत्रैवोक्तः —

विज्ञानकेवलानां तु सिद्ध्यै युक्तिरिहोच्यते ।
कलातत्त्वान्तरोधिन्या दीक्षया ज्ञानतोऽपि वा ॥
योगेन भोगतो वाथ सन्न्यासाद्वा परिक्षये ।
कर्मणां तु तदायत्तमायायाश्च परिक्षयात् ॥

मल एकोऽवशिष्टः स्यात्तस्माद्विज्ञानकेवलाः ।
बौद्धादिदृष्टिमुक्तानां कैवल्यमपि नेष्यते ॥
यतस्तद्बुद्धितत्त्वोर्ध्वकर्मणामपरिक्षयः ।
सकला एव ते ज्ञेयाः कलायोगो यतः स्थितः ॥
एवमेवाणवो युक्तिसिद्धाः प्रलयकेवलाः ।
तत्त्वानामुपसंहारे प्रळयात्कर्मणोऽथ वा ॥
त्यक्तसूक्ष्मबहिर्देहा एष्यद्भोगनिबन्धनैः ।
अपक्वैः कर्मभिर्युक्ता इष्यन्तां प्रळयाकलाः ॥
सकलास्तु कलायोगात् सूक्ष्मा स्थूला च सा द्विधा ।
प्रतिपुंनियतं तत्त्वं कलाद्यवनिपश्चिमम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ पशु. प. श्लो. १२-१८)

31. The cause of their being devoid of *māyā* and *karma* is declared even there: "The means of arriving at *siddhi* of *vijñānakevalas* is stated here. By *dīkṣā* which purifies all *tattvas* upto *kalā*, or by knowledge, or by enjoyment with the help of *yoga* (taking on several bodies at the same time and so on) or by renunciation, there is consumption of *karmas*; in dependence on that there is the consumption of *māyā* too; hence *mala* alone being left, they are *vijñānakevalas*. There is no *kaivalya* for those who are liberated (*muktas*) according to the views of Bauddhas and others. Because there is no consumption of *buddhitattva*, *karma*, etc., they are known as *sakalas* only; for, the contact of *kalā*, still persists. Thus those souls who are *yuktisiddhas* are only *pralayakevalas*. When the *tattvas* are absorbed in the deluge or when *karmas* are exhausted, those who have abandoned, the subtle and the

external bodies, but are associated with non-matured *karmas* that condition future enjoyment, are recognised as *pralayākalas*. *Sakalas*, however, are such because of association with *kalā*; they are of two kinds - subtle and gross; the *tattvas* that restrain each person begin with *kalā* and end with the earth." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Paśupaṭala vv. 12-18.)

३२. विज्ञानकेवलाश्च प्रशान्तकलुषा अप्रशान्तकलुषाश्चेति द्विविधाः। तेषु कांश्चन मलपरिपाकं निरीक्ष्यैव शिवः शुद्धाध्वन्यधिकारे योजयति। कांश्चिद्भोगाख्ये तत्त्वे योजयति। तत्र योजिताश्च तेऽभीप्सितविविधभोगान् भुञ्जानाः पत्युरिच्छयाधिकारेषु प्रवर्तन्ते। ये त्वीश्वरतत्त्वं प्रापिता अधिकार-गुणोपेता महान्तश्चक्रवर्तिनो यथापूर्वगुणोत्तरा अष्टावनन्ताद्या विद्येश्वराः। केचन पुनर्विद्याख्यं तत्त्वं प्राप्ताः सप्तकोटिमहामन्त्राः। एतेषां मध्ये यस्य स्वाधिकारे वैराग्यं जायते तं मलपरिपाकानुगुण्येनैवेश्वरोऽनुगृह्य परमां मुक्तिं प्रापय्य सादाख्यतत्त्वगतानां पदे ईश्वरतत्त्वगतन्, ईश्वरतत्त्वगतानां पदे विद्यातत्त्वगतान्, तत्रत्यानां पदे मायामस्तकगतांश्च योजयति।

32. The *vijñānakevalas* are of two types: *praśānta-kaluṣas* and *apraśānta-kaluṣas*. Śiva associates some of these with *adhikāra* (positions of authority) in the pure path, only after looking to the maturation of their *mala*, while he associates others with the *tattva* enjoyment (*bhoga*). Those associated with the latter, experience the diverse enjoyments desired, and by the will of the Lord, set out on (the exercise of) authorities (*adhikāras*). Those who are made to attain the *Īśvara-tattva* and associated with the attribute of authority, they are great ones, emperors, *e.g.*, the eight *vidyeśvaras* beginning with *Ananta*, each of whom has an attribute more (than the earlier); some others, again, have attained the *vidyātattva*; they are the seven crores of *mahāmantreśvaras*. Among these, he for whom non-attachment arises in respect of the exercise of his

own authority, is shown grace by the Lord in conformity with the maturation of his *mala*, and is led to supreme release; those who are in *Īśvara-tattva* are placed in the status of those present in the *Sādākhya-tattva*; those who are in the *Vidyātattva* are placed in the status of those present in the *Īśvara-tattva* and those on the top of *māyā* are placed in the status of those in that (*vidyā*) *tattva*.

३३. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

इच्छयैवानुगृह्यादौ शिवो विज्ञानकेवलान् ।
मलपाकमपेक्ष्यैव कांश्चिच्छुद्धाध्वगोचरे ॥
योजयत्यधिकारेषु कृत्वा दृक्क्रिययोत्कटान् ।
तत्त्वे भोगाह्वये चान्यान् योजयत्यीश्वराह्वये ॥
अन्यान् विद्याह्वये तत्त्वे सर्वज्ञान्बलशालिनः ॥
सदाशिवगुणोपेता भोगाख्यं तत्त्वमाश्रिताः ।
मनोऽभिलषितान्भोगान्भुञ्जाना विविधानपि ॥
पतिकृत्याधिकारेषु प्रवृत्ताः पत्युरिच्छया ।
ये प्राप्तास्तत्त्वमैशानं विशेषेण क्रियाधिकाः ॥
अधिकारगुणोपेता महान्तश्चक्रवर्तिनः ।
अष्टावनन्तसूक्ष्माद्या यथापूर्वं गुणाधिकाः ॥
अतिसौन्दर्यलावण्या अक्षीणमनसः सदा ।
विद्याविद्याद्वयं प्राप्ताः सङ्ख्यया सप्तकोटयः ॥
प्रशान्तकलुषाः सर्वे महात्मानोऽमितौजसः ।
एतेषां यस्य वैराग्यमुपजातं महात्मनः ॥
किमेतेनाधिकारेण श्रेयसः परिपन्थिना ।
इति तं परमेशानो मलपाकमपेक्ष्य सः ॥

स्वेच्छयैवानुगृह्णाति मुक्तिव्यक्त्यर्थया दृशा ।
ततो मुक्त्यर्थमासन्नं कनिष्ठं तत्पदे विभुः ॥
नियुनक्त्यनुगृह्यान्यं तत्पदे नियुनक्त्यपि ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ४९-५८)

33. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Śiva, having by His will first shown His grace to the *vijñānakevalas*, associates some in dependence on the maturation of their *mala*, with authority in the share of the pure path, after having caused the shining forth of their cognition and conation. Some of those who are omniscient and strong (*i.e.*, omnipotent) (He unites with) the *tattva* called *Bhoga*, some others with that called *Īśvara* and yet others with the *tattva* called *vidyā*. Those who rest in the *tattva* called *bhoga*, being endowed with the qualities of Sadāśiva, experience the diverse enjoyments desired by the mind, and are active, because of the will of the Lord, in such functions as are to be done by the Lord. Those who have reached the *Īśvara-tattva*, they are specially endowed with an excess of conative energy (over the cognitive); they are endowed with the qualities of (the person exercising) authority (*i.e.*, Īśvara); they are great ones, emperors (rather, those who cause the revolution of the wheel of *māyā*). They are eight beginning with *Ananta* and *Sūkṣma*, each preceding one possessing one attribute more than the succeeding one; they possess great beauty and charm and minds not blurred (by enjoyment). Those who have reached the *vidyā-tattva* are *vidyās* (the *mantra* souls); they are seven crores in number; they are all of matured *mala*, great souls, whose conative energy lies non-manifest (in relation to the cognitive energy). Of those *great* souls, he in whom

arises non-attachment in the form 'What is the good of the authority which is the enemy of beatitude?,' on him, the supreme Īs'vara, having regard for the maturation of *mala*, freely bestows His grace by His glance, so that release may be manifested. Then, the Pervasive one shows grace to the next one who is proximate to release and unites him with the state of that released one; and him who is lower still He unites with the state of that previous one." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Pas'upaṭala, vv. 49-58).

३४. एवं प्रलयाकला अपि द्विविधाः। पक्वमला अपक्वमलाश्चेति। तत्र शिवः पक्वमलाननुगृह्य तेभ्यो भुवनपतित्वं ददाति। प्रलयकालेषु अपक्वमलाः प्राकृतभोगकर्मवशात्पुर्यष्टकदेहयुताश्च सकला भवन्ति। तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

स्वेच्छयैवानुगृह्णाति प्रळयाणूनपीश्वरः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. १९)

अन्यत्र च —

प्रळयाकलेषु येषां पक्के मलकर्मणि व्रजन्त्यन्ये ।
पुर्यष्टकदेहयुतां योनिषु निखिलासु सूक्ष्मकर्मवशात् ॥

कांश्चिदनुगृह्य वितरति भुवनपतित्वं महेश्वरस्तेषाम् ॥ इति ॥

34. Similarly, *pralayākalas* are also of two kinds: *pakvamalas* and *apakvamalas*; of these Śiva bestows grace on the *pakvamalas* and grants them lordship over worlds (*bhuvanas*). The *apakvamalas* among the *pralayākalas*, because of the *karma* that causes material enjoyment are endowed with a *puryaṣṭaka* body and become *sakalas*. That has been said even there: "Īs'vara, of his own will, bestows grace even on the *pralaya* souls." (*Ibid.*, v.19) Elsewhere, also "Of the *pralayākalas* those whose *mala* is mature

abandon *karma*; others being endowed with a *puryaṣṭaka* body enter all kinds of wombs, because of subtle *karma*; Maheśvara shows grace to some of these *pralayākalas*, and confers on them lordship of the worlds (*bhuvanas*)."

३५. सकला अपि त्रिविधाः; सांसिद्धिकवैनयिकप्राकृतभेदात्। तत्र सांसिद्धिको नाम पूर्वजन्मनि कृतश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनोऽनिष्पन्नशिवसाक्षात्कारस्तदर्थं शुकवामदेवजडभरतादिवत्परिगृहीतदेहोऽविच्छिन्ननिदिध्यासनवासनया शिवावानुग्रहाच्छिवसाक्षात्कारवान्। वैनयिको नाम गुरौ विनयशीलः सन् दीक्षां लब्ध्वा मनोवाक्कायिकशिवधर्मैः शुद्धः लौकिकशिवशास्त्रयोः परिज्ञानवान्। तदनुग्रहप्रकारं दीक्षापरिच्छेदे वक्ष्यामः। प्राकृतो नाम स्वप्नज्ञानवत् ज्ञाताज्ञातबोधः प्रकृतिजन्यदेहेन्द्रियादिष्वात्माभिमानवान्। तदुक्तं श्रीमृगेन्द्रे —

विशिष्टधर्मसंस्कारसमुद्दीपितचेतसाम्।
गुणः सांसिद्धिको भाति देहापायोऽपि पूर्ववत्॥
लोकधीगुरुशास्त्रेभ्यो भाति वैनयिको गुणः।
सम्मार्जितो वैनयिको मनोवाक्तनुचेष्टया॥
प्राकृतो देहसंयोगे व्यक्तः स्वप्नादिबोधवान्। इति॥

(प्र. १० श्लो. २६-२८)

35. *Sakalas* too are of three kinds — *sāṁsiddhika*, *vainayika* and *prākṛta*. Of these the *sāṁsiddhikas* are those who have performed hearing (of scriptures), reasoning and meditation in a previous life, but have not had the intuition of Śiva originated in them and for the sake of that have taken on bodies, like Śuka, Vāmadeva, Jaḍabharata, and others and because of the impression of uninterrupted meditation, they come to have the intuition of Śiva. The *vainayika* is the one, who being full of reverence for the preceptor, obtains *dīkṣā* from him and

gains true knowledge both of worldly things and of *Śiva-śāstras* through the exercise of Śaiva duties of the mind, speech and body. This mode of obtaining grace, we shall state in the chapter on *dīkṣā*. The *prākṛta* is the one whose knowledge, like dream-knowledge, is known and not known; he has the conceit of the self in the body, senses, etc., originating from *prakṛti*. That has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The *sāṁsiddhika* whose intelligence is illumined by the impressions of excellent qualities (acquired in a previous life) appears (to be endowed) with those qualities even on the loss of the body, just as before (when he had the body). Cognition of worldly things and *śāstras*, obtained from a preceptor appears in the *vainayika* through activities of mind and speech. The *prākṛta* is the one in whom knowledge, like dream-knowledge, etc., is manifest only when there is conjunction with a body (not when the body has ceased to be)." (X. 26-28).

३६. अस्य च सकलस्य बन्धमोक्षप्रकारावस्थाभेदश्च श्रीमत्किरणे प्रतिपादितः ।

गरुडः —

यद्येवं स पशुस्तावत् कीदृशो बद्ध्यते कथम् ।
मुच्यते कथमाख्याहि सन्देहविनिवृत्तये ॥

भगवानुवाच —

पशुर्नित्यो ह्यमूर्तोऽज्ञो निष्क्रियो निर्गुणोऽप्रभुः ।
व्यापी मायोदरान्तस्थो भोगोपायविचिन्तकः ॥
तस्याशुद्धस्य सम्बन्धं समायाति शिवात्कला ।
तयोद्बलितसामर्थ्योऽविद्यादर्शितगोचरः ॥

रागेण रञ्जितश्चापि प्रधानेन गुणात्मना ।
बुद्ध्यादिकरणानीकसम्बन्धाद्बध्यते पशुः ॥

ततो नियतिसंश्लेषात्स्वार्जिते विनियम्यते ।
कालेन कालसङ्ख्यानकार्यभोगविमोहितः ॥

एवं तत्त्वकलाबद्धः किञ्चिज्ज्ञो देहसंयुतः ।
मायाभोगपरिष्वक्तस्तन्मयः सहजावृतः ॥

ततः सुखादिकं कृत्स्नं भोगं भुङ्क्ते स्वकर्मतः ।
समे कर्मणि संज्ञाते कालान्तरवशात्ततः ॥

तीव्रशक्तिनिपातेन गुरुणा दीक्षितो यदा ।
सर्वज्ञः स शिवो यद्वत् किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वविवर्जितः ॥

शिवत्वव्यक्तिसम्पूर्णः संसारी न पुनस्तदा ।
एवं क्रमेण बद्धः स मुच्यते क्रमयोगतः ॥

केवलः सकलः शुद्धस्त्रयवस्थः पुरुषः स्मृतः ।
मलिनत्वाच्चितेर्मोक्षः प्राप्यते निर्मलाच्छिवात् ॥

पशुरेवंविधः प्रोक्तः किमन्यत्परिपृच्छसि ॥ इति ॥

(किर. पशु. प. श्लो. १४ - २४)

36. The modes of bondage and release for this *sakala* and the knowledge of his *avasthās* are declared in the sacred *Kiraṇāgama*: "Garuḍa: How are these *paśus* bound? How are they released? Thou, O Lord, shouldst resolve this doubt. The Lord said: The *paśu* is eternal, formless, ignorant, devoid of activity, devoid of *guṇas*, dependent, pervasive, residing in the midst of *māyā*, considering the means to enjoyment. For this impure one, there results from Śiva relation to *kalā*; with his capacity reinforced thereby,

he has objects revealed by *avidyā*; he is coloured (affected) by *rāga* and is bound by *prakṛti* constituted of *guṇas* through relations to several instruments such as the intellect. Then by association with *niyati*, he is controlled, in respect (of the enjoyment) of what is earned by him; he is also controlled by time, being deluded by the enjoyment of activities that are of specific period; he is thus bound by *tattvas* and *kalā*, parviscient, endowed with a body, set in the midst of *māyā*-enjoyment, is full of that and enveloped in the connate (*āṇava*); thence he enjoys all enjoyments such as happiness, born of his own *karma*; when there arises equality in respect of *karmas* (when good and evil become balanced) because of the passage of time, then, because of the rapid onset of grace, the soul, purified by the preceptor, omniscient, devoid of parviscience, becomes full with the manifestation of Śiva's nature and never again becomes a transmigrator. Thus he who was in stages bound is also released in stages. The *puruṣa* is known to have three states — *kevala*, *sakala* and *śuddha*. Since they are impure they obtain release from the pure Śiva. Pas'u has been thus described; what else do you question about?" (Pas'upaṭala, vv. 14-24).

३७. एतद्भेदोपाधिभूतमलमायाकर्मणां लक्षणं पाशपटले वक्ष्यते। नन्वात्मनि सिद्धे तद्भेदो युज्यते। तत्सद्भावे किं मानम्? उच्यते; चेष्टमानो देहादिश्चेतनाधिष्ठितो भवितुमर्हति, जडत्वात्, घटवत्; एवं च जडप्रवर्तकत्वेनात्मा सिद्धः। यथा वा ईश्वरकर्तृकं तनुकरणभुवनादिकं कस्यचिदुपभोगाय भवितुमर्हति, जडत्वात्; न चेश्वर एव तदुपभोक्ता, तस्यावाप्तसकलकामत्वात्। नापि भुवनादिकमपि तदुपभोक्तृ; स्वस्यैव भोग्यभोक्तृत्वासम्भवात्। न च वैयर्थ्यम्; प्रेक्षावत्कार्यत्वात्। तस्मात्पारिशेष्याज्जडेश्वरयोरन्येन तदुपभोक्त्रा भवितव्यम्। स चात्मेति सिद्धम्।

37. The characteristics of *mala*, *māyā* and *karma* which are the adjuncts causing the differences among these, will

be described in the *pāśa-paṭala*. Now, if they were established, its differences would be intelligible; what is the evidence for its existence? The reply is: "The body, etc., which are active should be controlled by intelligence since they are inert like a pot." Thus through its causing activity in the inert, there is establishment of the soul. Or else, the body, instruments, world, etc., created by *Īśvara* should be for the enjoyment of someone, since they are inert; nor is *Īśvara* Himself their enjoyer, since all His desires are ever-fulfilled; nor can the world be the enjoyer, since in the case of itself, being the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment are not both (simultaneously) possible; nor can there be futility, since it (the creation) is the work of a wise being. Therefore by elimination, the enjoyer of that should be other than the inert and the Lord. And that, it is established, is the soul.

३८. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

सत्यात्मनि च संसिद्धे प्राक्प्रोक्तं सफलं भवेत् ।
तत्सद्भावे ततः शम्भो! प्रमाणमभिधीयताम् ॥

ईश्वरः —

प्रवर्तमानो देहादिश्चेतनाधिष्ठितः सदा ।
स्वतः प्रवृत्तिशून्यत्वाज्जडत्वेन घटादिवत् ॥
यस्तु प्रवर्तकः सोऽयमात्मेति परपठ्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ५९ - ६१)

38. This has been stated in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Sages: if the soul were established all that was said earlier would be fruitful. Therefore the evidence should

be stated for its existence. *Īśvara*: the body, etc., which are active are always controlled by intelligence, since of themselves they are devoid of activity, being inert, like pot, etc. He who causes the activity is said to be the soul." (Pasupaṭala vv. 59-61).

३९. श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे च —

कार्यं क्षित्यादि कर्तेशस्तत्कर्तुर्नोपयुज्यते ।
न स्वार्थमप्यचिद्भावान्नानर्थ्यं कर्तृगौरवात् ॥
पारिशेष्यात्परार्थं तत् क्षेत्रज्ञः स परस्तयोः ।
परो देहस्तदर्थत्वात् परार्थाः क्ष्मादयो ननु ॥
कायोऽप्यचित्त्वादान्यार्थ्यं सुतरां प्रतिपद्यते ।
चेतनश्चेन्न भोग्यत्वाद्विकारित्वाच्च जातुचित् ॥
भोग्या विकारिणो दृष्टाश्चिद्विहीनाः पटादयः ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. ६ श्लो. २ - ५)

इति श्रीमदतिवर्णाश्रमाचार्यवर्यशैवपरिपालकशिवाग्रयोगीन्द्र-
ज्ञानशिवाचार्यविरचितायां शैवपरिभाषायां
पशुपदार्थनिरूपणं नाम
तृतीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

39. And in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The earth, etc., are products; the creator is *Īśvara*; that (creation) is of no service to the creator. Nor is it for itself, being inert by nature; nor is it futile, because of the worshipfulness (here, wisdom) of the creator. By elimination, that (creation) is for the sake of another; that one, the *kṣetrajña* is different from these two. This other (it may be said) is

the body, since (the others), the earth, etc., are for its sake (as constituting it). (No, we say); the body, too, being non-intelligent, easily comes to be for the sake of (*kṣetrajña*). If it be said (that the body itself is) intelligent, no, since it is an object of enjoyment and since it is subject to transformation. Those which are objects of enjoyment and subject to transformation are seen to be always devoid of intelligence, like cloth, etc. That (body) too is thus." (VI. 2-5)

Here ends the Third Chapter called
Establishment of Paśupadārtha in the Śaivaparibhāṣā
written by Śivāgrayogin, the Ativarṇāśramācārya and Protector of Śaiva.

चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः

१. अथ पाशपदार्थो निरूप्यते। तत्र पाशत्वं नाम शिवानन्दाभिव्यक्तिविरोधित्वम्। तच्चाणवमलस्याच्छादकतया, तिरोधायकशक्तेस्तु तच्चोदयितृत्वेन, विन्दुमायाकर्मणामपि भोगभोग्यसम्पादनद्वारा वैषयिकसुखादिजनकत्वेन च बोध्यम्। अयं च पाशः पञ्चविधः। आणवं तिरोधायकशक्तिर्विन्दुर्माया कर्म चेति। तत्र चत्वारः पदार्था जडरूपाः। तिरोधायकशक्तिस्तु चिद्रूपापि पाशानुग्राहकत्वात् पाश इत्युपचर्यते। तत्राणवत्वं नाम आत्मनो दृक्क्रियारोधकत्वम्। अस्य चाणवत्वोक्तिर्विभोरात्मनोऽणुत्वसम्पादनात्॥

Fourth Chapter

1. Next is discussed the category of *pāśa*. Here being *pāśa* consists in obscuring the manifestation of Śiva's bliss (in the soul). And that belongs to *āṇavamala* as veiling, to the *tirodhāyakaśakti* as prompting that (*mala*) and also to *bindu, māyā* and *karma* as producing material happiness, etc., through the channel of bringing about enjoyment and objects of enjoyment. And this *pāśa* is of five kinds — *āṇava, tirodhāyi, bindu, māyā* and *karma*. Of these, four categories are inert by nature. *Tirodhāyi* is, however, of the nature of intelligence; since it favours the (functioning of *pāśa*), it is figuratively called *pāśa*. Of these, what is called *āṇava* is that which obstructs the soul's cognitive and conative energy; it is called *āṇava* since it brings about atomicity (*i.e.*, limitedness) to the pervasive soul.

२. नन्वस्य सद्भावे किं मानम्? न तावत्प्रत्यक्षः, तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वाभ्युपगमात्। नाप्यनुमानम्; तस्य क्वचिदप्यदर्शनेन सहचारग्रहविरहेणान्वयिनोऽसम्भवात्। व्यतिरेकस्योक्तन्यायेन प्रत्यक्षानुमानावगम्यतया तदभावे व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेरग्रहे व्यतिरेकिणोऽप्यनवतारात्। तस्मान्मलसद्भावे न किञ्चिन्मानं पश्यामः। अत्रोच्यते — आत्मा किञ्चिदावृतसार्वज्ञयः, किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वात्, यः किञ्चिदावृतसार्वज्ञयो न भवति स किञ्चिज्ज्ञोऽपि न भवति, यथा शिव इति व्यतिरेक्यनुमानेन मलसिद्धिः। न चात्मनां सर्वज्ञत्वे न किंचिन्मानमिति वाच्यम्; तेषां ज्ञानशक्तिः सर्वविषया, ज्ञानशक्तित्वात्, ईश्वरशक्तिवत्, इत्यस्य तत्र मानत्वात्। न चास्याप्रयोजकत्वम्; विषयनैयत्यप्रयोजकस्य तत्तद्विषयसम्बद्धकरणजन्यत्वस्याभावेन नियतविषयत्वायोगात्। स्वाभाविके वा तेषां किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वे मुक्तौ सर्वज्ञत्वश्रुतिविरोधाच्च। एवं च ज्ञानशक्तेर्न स्वाभाविकसर्वगोचरत्वमित्याच्छादनाधीनमेवाभ्युपेयम्। तच्चाच्छादकजन्यमित्याच्छादकत्वेन मलसिद्धिः। उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

आत्मा मलावृतः सर्वज्ञत्वे किञ्चिज्ज्ञता यतः।
न किञ्चिज्ज्ञस्तु यः सोऽयं मलेनापि न संवृतः॥
यथा शिवस्तथा नायं मलेनैव समावृतः॥ इति॥

(पौ पशु. प्र. श्लो. १२५-१२६)

2. Now, what is the proof of its (*mala's*) existence? Not perception, since it is admitted to be super-sensible. Nor inference; for, since that is not seen anywhere, it is devoid of the apprehension of concomitance and an instance of co-presence is impossible. Since co-presence has, on the afore-mentioned reasoning, to be understood by perception or by inference, there is no apprehension of negative concomitance; hence, even co-absence is not possible. Therefore we see no evidence for the existence of *mala*. The reply to this is: The soul is an omniscient being veiled by something, since he is parviscient. If he were not an omniscient being veiled by something, he

could not even be parviscient, like Śiva. Nor may it be said that, there is no evidence for the souls being omniscient, for there is this evidence that their cognitive energy, like the energy of *Īśvara* is a cognitive energy that extends to all things. Nor is this inference of no avail, for there being no cause of the restriction of objects, such as is generated by the respective related organs, it is impossible for it to relate to restricted objects. And if their parviscience were natural, there would be conflict with the scriptural declaration of omniscience at release. Thus since not relating to all is not natural to cognitive energy, that should be admitted to be certainly dependent on obscuration. And since that is produced by an obscuring agent, *mala* is established as the obscurer. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "The soul is enveloped by *mala*, for being omniscient (by nature), he is yet parviscient. He would not be parviscient even, if like Śiva, he be here not enveloped in *mala*; and thus this soul is certainly enveloped in *mala*." (Pasupaṭala, vv. 125-26).

३. न चाज्ञानेनार्थान्तरत्वम्; विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथाहि—तदज्ञानं ज्ञानाभावः अन्यथाज्ञानं वा? नाद्यः; अभावस्याकिंचित्करत्वात्। न हि घटाद्यभावाः किंचित्कार्यं कुर्वन्ति। किं च स च ज्ञानाभावः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावः अत्यन्ताभावो वा? नाद्यः; कालान्तर एव ज्ञानोदयप्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः; कालान्तरे ज्ञानानुदयप्रसङ्गात्। नापि तृतीयः; बाधात्। नाप्यन्यथाज्ञानम्; तस्य दोषं विनानुदयात्। किञ्चेदमन्यथाज्ञानमागन्तुकं स्वाभाविकं वा? आगन्तुकं चेन्नित्यचिच्छक्तेर्बाधकं न स्यात्। नापि द्वितीयः; तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वेऽन्यथात्वायोगात्।

3. Nor is (the inference) satisfied otherwise by the acceptance of *ajñāna*, since this does not stand analysis. Is this *ajñāna* either absence of cognition or erroneous cognition? Not the first, since non-existence cannot

effect anything; truly the non-existence of the pot does not produce any effect. And this absence of cognition, is it antecedent non-existence or non-existence subsequent to destruction or absolute non-existence? (It is) not the first, because of the contingence of the rise of knowledge (which is natural) only at a subsequent time; it is not the second, because of the contingence of knowledge not arising at a subsequent time; nor the third, because of sublation. Nor (is this *ajñāna*) erroneous cognition, since this does not arise in the absence of a defect. Further is this erroneous cognition either adventitious or natural? If it be adventitious, it could not be the sublator of the eternal *citśakti*. Nor could it be the second, since if it be natural it could not be erroneous.

४. तथा चोक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

तदिह ज्ञानमात्रं चेज्ज्ञानाभावः किमज्ञता ।
अन्यथाप्रतिभासो वा गतिरन्या न विद्यते ॥

ज्ञानाभावो न चाज्ञानं तस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वतः ।
नाभावोऽपि घटस्येह जलमाहरति क्वचित् ॥

ज्ञानस्य प्रागभावश्चेज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः प्रसज्यते ।
नाप्येतदन्यथाज्ञानं तस्याप्यनुदयात्स्वतः ॥

शुक्तिकारजतज्ञानं न भवेत्पटलं विना ।
किञ्चैतदन्यथाज्ञानमागन्तुकमथेतरत् ॥

आगन्तुकं चेच्चिच्छक्तेर्बाधकं न कदाचन ।
यद्यनागन्तुकं तर्हि नान्यथाज्ञानमेव तत् ॥

अनित्यमेव तज्ज्ञेयं रजतज्ञानवद्द्विजाः ।
किञ्चैतदन्यथाज्ञानं न सम्यग्ज्ञानबाधकम् ॥
न दृष्टं शुक्तिकाज्ञानं रजतज्ञानबाधितम् । इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ११५-१२१)

4. And thus it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "If it be said that this (*mala*) here is but *ajñāna*, is this *ajñāna* the non-existence of cognition or presentation otherwise? No other alternative exists. *Ajñāna* is not non-existence of cognition, since this (non-existence) cannot effect anything. Nowhere indeed does the non-existence of pot carry water; if it be the antecedent non-existence of cognition, there is the contingence of the origination of knowledge. Nor is this (*ajñāna*) erroneous cognition, since this too does not arise of itself; there does not arise the cognition of nacre-silver in the absence of the film (obscuring the ego). Further is this erroneous cognition either adventitious or otherwise? If adventitious, it could never be the sublator of *citśakti*; if non-adventitious, it could not be erroneous cognition at all. O twice-born ones, it should be certainly understood to be impermanent, like the silver-cognition; further, this erroneous cognition is not the sublator of valid congnition; it is not seen that the nacre-cognition is sublated by the silver-cognition." (Paśupaṭala, vv. 115-121).

५. अयं च मलो द्रव्यरूपो भवितुमर्हति; अनेकशक्तिमत्त्वात्, अनलवत् । उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

किञ्च द्रव्यं मलोऽनेकशक्तिमत्त्वाद्यथानलः । इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. ११५)

अत एवायमात्मनो न गुणः; गुणत्वे गुणगुणिसम्बन्धस्य नित्यत्वात् तस्य निवृत्त्यभावप्रसङ्गेन मुक्तौ तन्निवृत्तिश्रवणविरोधात्। न चाणवसाधकस्यानुमानस्य रागेणार्थान्तरत्वम्; तस्य निर्मले अकिंचित्करत्वात्। यदि निर्मलेऽपि स्यान्मुक्तात्मस्वपि स्यात्। किञ्च बुद्धिधर्मस्य रागस्य प्राकृतत्वेना नित्यतया नित्यायाश्चिच्छक्तेर्बाधकत्वं न सम्भवति।

5. And this *mala* should be of the nature of substance (*dravya*), since it possesses many *śaktis*, like fire. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Further, *mala* is a substance, since it has many *śaktis*, like fire." (Paśupaṭala, v. 115.) For that same reason, this is not a quality of the soul. If it were a quality, then, because of the permanence of the relation between quality and possessor of the quality, there is the contingence of the non-existence of its removal; consequently there is conflict with the scriptural declaration of its removal at release. Nor is the inference establishing *āṇava* satisfied otherwise with (the establishment of) *rāga*, since this can effect nothing in the case of the pure. If it could exist in the pure, it should exist even in released souls. Further *rāga* and *dveṣa*, which as qualities of the intellect, are products of *prakṛti* and hence impermanent, cannot possibly be sublators of the eternal *citśakti*.

६. उक्तं च पौष्करे —

रागोऽस्ति कारणं सक्तेरिति चेत्किं मलेन तु।
सत्यं रागोऽस्ति तद्धेतुर्न स किञ्चित्करोऽमले॥
अमलेऽपि स चेत्सक्तयै स्यान्मुक्तेष्वविशेषतः।
न हि मुक्तः शिवो वापि भोगासक्तः कदाचन॥
किञ्चायं प्रत्ययात्मोक्तो रागो बौद्धो यतस्ततः।
बुद्धिश्च प्रकृतेः सिद्धा तस्मादेष विनश्वरः॥

चिच्छक्तेर्नित्यसिद्धाया बाधकः कथमिष्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. १२७-१३०)

6. And this has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "If it be asked '*rāga* exists as the cause of (the experience of) attachment; what is the need for *mala*?', true, *rāga* exists as the cause of that; but it can do nothing in the case of the pure; if even in the pure it could exist for the sake of attachment, it should exist in the released too, since there is no distinction; but neither the released nor Śiva is ever attached to enjoyment. Further, this is said to be of the nature of a *pratyaya*, since it is of the nature of the intellect; and the intellect results from *prakṛti*; therefore it is impermanent; how can it be admitted to be the sublater of the eternally established *citśakti*?" (Paśupaṭala, vv. 127-130).

७. नापि कर्मणा अर्थान्तरत्वम्; तस्य चिच्छक्तिसाध्यतया ज्ञानात्मकभोगहेतुतया च तदावारकत्वायोगात्। आवारकत्वे वा तस्य बुद्धिधर्मधर्माधर्मरूपतया बुद्धितत्त्वादूर्ध्वं बन्धकत्वायोगाच्च। किञ्च भोगैकव्यापृतयोस्तयोरावरणे कथं व्यापारः ॥

7. Nor is the inference otherwise satisfied by *karma*; for, being sublatable by *citśakti*, being enjoyment consisting of the nature of knowledge and being the cause of enjoyment, it cannot be the obscurer of that (*citśakti*). Or, even if it be the obscurer, yet since it is of the nature of merit or demerit, the attributes of the intellect, it cannot serve to bind all those who are above the category of the intellect. Further, for these two which function in respect of enjoyment, how can there be functioning in respect of obscuration?

८. नन्वेवं तदेव कार्यद्वयसाधकमस्तु; किं पदार्थान्तरकल्पनक्लेशेनेति चेत्, हन्त तर्ह्येकयैव विद्यया समस्तकार्यसंसिद्धौ कार्यभेदादर्शनात्तत्त्वान्तर-

क्लृप्तिर्व्यर्था स्यात्। तस्मान्न कर्म चिच्छक्तेरावारकमिति स्थितम्। उक्तं च तत्रैव —

कर्मणापि न च ज्ञानबाधः सम्भवति द्विजाः ।
साध्यत्वात्कर्मणः पुंसः साधकत्वेन संस्थितेः ॥
किञ्च भोगैकहेतुस्तत्कथं भोगस्य बाधकम् ।
यतो ज्ञानात्मको भोगो न हि तेन तदावृतिः ॥
धर्माधर्मात्मकं कर्म तौ च बौद्धौ व्यवस्थितौ ।
व्याप्तयभावात्तयोरूर्ध्वं बन्धकौ सर्वतः कथम् ॥
किं च भोगप्रवृत्तौ तौ व्याप्रियेते कथं वृतौ ।
अन्यत्रापि प्रवृत्तस्य यद्यप्यत्रापि हेतुता ॥
अनेकतत्त्वसंक्लृप्तिः कार्यभेदाद्विहन्यते ।
तस्मान्न कर्म चिच्छक्तेर्बाधकं संव्यवस्थितम् ॥
किञ्चाभिव्यञ्जकं कर्म चिच्छक्तेर्बाधकं कथम् । इति ॥

(पौ. पशु. प. श्लो. १३०-१३५)

8. "Now, let that itself be the instrument of both effects; why the trouble of assuming another thing?"—if this be asked, alas! then, all effects being established even by the single (category of) *vidyā*, the ascertainment of different categories because of differences in the products would be futile. Therefore, it is settled that *karma* is not the obscurer of *citśakti*. And this has been said there itself: "O twice-born ones! the sublation of knowledge is not possible even through *karma*; for, it is something brought about by man and is settled to be instrumental (to his welfare, unlike the obscuring impurity). Further how can that which is the cause of enjoyment alone be the

sublater of enjoyment? Since enjoyment is of the nature of knowledge, there is no obsuration of the latter by the former. *Karma* is of the nature of merit and demerit; and those two exist in the intellect; since they do not pervade above that (intellect), how can they serve as bonds throughout? Further, they function in respect of activity for enjoyment; how could they function in respect of obscuration? If for what is active elsewhere there be causality, here too, the enumeration of diverse *tattvas*, because of difference in the products, is affected. Therefore it is settled that in no way is *karma* the sublater of *citśakti*." (Paśupaṭala, vv. 130-135).

९. न च माययार्थान्तरत्वम्; तस्याः कार्यान्तरजनकतया क्लृप्तत्वेनावरणरूपकार्यान्तरजनकत्वायोगात्। किञ्च कलाद्युत्पादनद्वारा दृगादिशक्तिव्यक्तिं प्रति हेतुतया तद्विरुद्धाच्छादनहेतुत्वासम्भवाच्च। उक्तं च तत्र —

न च माया मलस्तस्माद्यतः कार्यात्प्रकाशिका।
कार्यात्प्रकाशकं यत्तु स्वात्मनाच्छादकं न तत्॥
यथा प्रकाशकौ दृष्टौ वह्निदीपावुभावपि।
न दीपकारणं वह्निः क्वचिदप्यप्रकाशकः॥
न च माया स्वरूपेण पुंसां कार्यकरी स्थिता।
कार्यैरणूपकारित्वाद्यदित्थं तन्न चात्मना॥
यथा तन्तुः स्वकार्येण पटेनैव न चात्मना॥ इति॥

(पौ. माया. प. श्लो. ५१-५४)

9. Nor is the inference satisfied otherwise with *māyā*; for this being settled to be the originator of some other effect, it cannot be the originator of the effect of the nature of obscuration. It is the cause of the manifestation

of cognitive energy, etc., through originating *kalā*, etc., hence it cannot be the cause of the opposite (effect), obscuration. And this has been said: "Nor is *māyā* (the same as) *mala*, since by its products it is illuminating; that which is illuminating through its products, cannot in its own nature be an obscurer. In the example, fire and the lamp which are seen to be illuminants, the fire which is the cause of the lamp (light), is never a non-illuminant. Nor is *māyā* established to do anything in its own nature for men; since it is helpful to souls through its products (alone), not in its own nature, like the thread (which is helpful) through its product, the cloth, not in its own nature." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Māyāpaṭala, vv. 51-54).

१०. अत एव न देहस्याप्याच्छादकत्वम्; तस्यापि बुद्धिवृत्त्याद्युत्पादनद्वारा तदभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्। तस्मादात्मनां दृक्क्रियावारकप्रत्यात्मस्थस्वकालान्तापायिशक्तिसमूहवदेकमनादिव्याप्याणवमिति सिद्धम्। उक्तं च श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे —

तदेकं सर्वभूतानामनादिनिबिडं महत्।
प्रत्यात्मस्थस्वकालान्तापायि शक्तिसमूहवत्॥ इति॥

(मृ. प्र. ७ श्लो. ४)

10. On the same ground, the body is also not the obscurer; since that too, through the channel of originating intellectual psychoses, etc., is a manifester. Therefore, in respect of the obscuration of cognitive and conative energies of the souls, there is established (as cause), *āṇava*, which possesses a host of *śaktis*, each perishing at its own appropriate moment, and which is one, beginningless and pervasive. And this has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "That is one for all creatures, beginningless, dense, great;

it possesses a host of *śaktis* present in each soul and perishing each at its appropriate moment." (VII. 4).

११. एतदनुग्राहिका शिवस्य रोधकशक्तिः। तदुक्तम् —

तासां माहेश्वरी शक्तिः सर्वानुग्राहिका शिवा।
धर्मानुवर्तनादेव पाश इत्युपचर्यते ॥ इति ॥

तथान्यत्र — (सिद्धान्तसारावल्यां)

नीहारोऽनादिरेको मनुजसहभवस्ताम्रगा काळिकेव
स्वाधीकारान्तनाशिप्रतिपुरुषदृगावारकानेकशक्तिः।
पाश्यः शोध्यश्च बोध्यः स तु भवति यतो भोक्तृता पारतन्त्र्यं
कर्मादेर्योग एतत्कृतिमनुकलिता रोधयित्रीशशक्तिः ॥ इति ॥

(सि. सा. श्लो. ६)

11. That energy which helps this (*mala*) is Śiva's *Rodhaśakti*. That has been said: "This *śakti* of Maheśvara which is helpful to all and is Śiva, is figuratively called *pāśa* even because of its conforming to the law of those (*pāśas*)." Similarly elsewhere (in *Siddhāntasārāvali*): "*Nīhāra* is beginningless, one, connate to humanity like verdigris in copper, possesses many *śaktis* which perish each at the termination of its function, and while each obscures the cognition of one individual it is denotable, purifiable and cognisable; it is dependent on enjoyership; the union of this with *karma*, etc., is produced by Īśa's *rodhayatrī śakti*." (verse 6).

१२. अयं च मलो मोहमदरागविषादतापशोषवैचित्र्याख्यकार्यभेदात्सप्तधा। तत्र मोहो नामात्मनामनादिः सहजो मदादीनां षण्णां हेतुः जानतामपि वनितादिषु मोहकारी मलः। स्वकीयतया प्राप्तेष्वङ्गनादिष्वतिशयाभिमानो मदः। रागो नाम विषयाभिलाषः। तदलाभे विषण्णत्वं विषादः।

ततः प्रलापरूपस्तापः। पुत्रमित्रकळत्रादिभिर्धनादिभिश्च मत्समो नास्ती-त्यादिविषयचिन्ता वैचित्र्यम्। तद्विनाशे स्तब्धात्मकत्वं शोषः।

12. This *mala* (*rodha-śakti*) is sevenfold because of the difference of its products called *moha, mada, rāga, viṣāda, tāpa, śoṣa,* and *vaicitrya.* Of these what is called *moha* is beginningless, connate, the cause of the six beginning with *mada* and is the *mala* that is the cause of delusion in respect of women and, even in those who know (what is right and wrong). Excessive conceit in (fondness for) women, etc., that have become one's own is *mada.* What is called *rāga,* is the desire for objects. Despair at their non-attainment is *viṣāda.* Lamentation because of that is *tāpa.* The conceit, "There is none equal to me in sons, friends, wives, etc.", is *vaicitrya.* Stupor on their loss is *śoṣa.*

१३. उक्तं च पौष्करे —

मलोऽपि सप्तधा ज्ञेयो मोहश्चापि मदस्तथा।
रागोऽन्यश्च विषादाख्यस्तापः शोषश्च सप्तमः॥

वैचित्र्यमपि सर्वेषां मलिनानां प्रकीर्तितम्।
मोहो नाम मलः पुंसां सहजोऽनादिमानिह॥

योनिः षण्णां मदादीनां प्रधानत्वाद्द्विजोत्तमाः।
यस्मिन्सत्यात्मनो मोहो जानतोप्यङ्गनादिषु॥

स मोह इति विख्यातो वर्ज्यावर्ज्यविभागतः।
प्राप्तामपि स्त्रियं येन स्तौति नास्याः पराङ्गना॥

दिव्याङ्गनेयमेवेति स मदः परिठच्यते।
तदलाभे विषण्णत्वं बाष्पलोचनता यतः॥

स विषादो मलो नाम प्राणिनामतिदुःखदः ।
ततस्तापो भवेदन्तःप्रलापात्मातिविस्तरः ॥
स ताप इति विख्यातो मलः शोषो भवेत्ततः ।
स्तब्धात्मा तु यदा यस्मान्मलोऽतीव सुदुस्तरः ॥
एष बन्धुरियं भार्या मृष्टं चेदं धनं मही ।
कृतार्थोऽहमतो यद्वा कस्त्राता मामकस्य च ॥
कुटुम्बस्यैवमाद्या तु चिन्ता येन नृणां भवेत् ।
नानामतिकरः सोऽयं मलो वैचित्र्यसंज्ञितः ॥
सप्तैते सहजाः प्रोक्ता मला मलवतां नृणाम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ पशु. प. श्लो. १३७-१४६)

13. And it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "*Mala* too should be known as sevenfold: *moha, mada, rāga, viṣāda, tāpa, śoṣa* and *vaicitrya*; these are declared in the case of all persons with impurity. The *mala* called *moha* is connate to men, beginningless, the cause of the six *mada*, etc., since it is primary, O best of the twice-born! That on the existence of which, there is delusion in respect of women, etc., even for those who know what is to be abandoned and what is not to be abandoned, that is called *moha*. That because of which one praises even the woman already obtained, saying "There is none equal to her; she is a beautiful woman", that is called *mada*. On the non-existence of that (attained), there is despair as seen from the eyes with tears, that is the *mala* called *viṣāda*, which causes great grief to all creatures. Thence arises lamentation of the nature of great bewailing to oneself; that is the *mala* called *tāpa*. Thence arises *śoṣa*, which is of the nature of stupor; this *mala* is very

difficult to cross over. "This is my relative, this is my wife, this wealth and lands are plentiful, I am therefore satisfied. Or, who can take away the family that is mine?" — that whereby such conceits occur in man, that which produces such diverse cognitions, that *mala* is called *vaicitrya*. These are what are called the sevenfold connate *malas* present in men that possess *mala*." (*Pauṣkara*, Paśupaṭala, vv. 137-146).

१४. कः पुनरात्ममलयोः संबन्धः? समवाय इति चेत्; मलस्य गुणत्वप्रसङ्गः। न चेष्टापत्तिः; गुणस्य जडत्वे गुणिनोऽपि जडत्वप्रसङ्गात्। किं च समवायस्य नित्यतया अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गाच्च। तस्माद्द्रव्यमेव मलोऽयुतसिद्धभावेन गुणवद्भाति। अतस्तयोः सम्बन्धः संयोग एव॥

14. What, again, is the relation between the soul and *mala*? If it be said to be inherence (*samavāya*), there is the contingence of inertness becoming a quality (of the soul). Nor is it a contingence of the acceptable; for if the quality be inert, there is the contingence of the possesser of the quality being also inert. Further, inherence being eternal, there is also the contingence of non-release. Therefore, *mala*, which is but a substance appears as if it were a quality, because of inseparable relationship. Therefore the relation of these too is but conjunction.

१५. ननु युतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः संयोग इति संयोगलक्षणात् संयोगोऽपि न सङ्गच्छते। सत्यम्; तस्य जन्यसंयोगलक्षणत्वात्। संयोगमात्रस्य तूपादानोपादेयभावरहितयोर्द्रव्ययोः सम्बन्ध इति लक्षणं द्रष्टव्यम्। तदेवमाणवं तदनुग्राहिका रोधकशक्तिरिति पाशाख्यं सिद्धम्॥

15. Now since the definition of conjunction is that conjunction is the relation beween what are established in separation, even conjunction does not fit in (here).

True, but since that is the definition of conjunction that is originated, the definition of conjunction in general should be understood to be the relation between two substances that are not in the relationship of matetial cause and effect. Thus, two *pāśas* have been established, *viz.*, *āṇava* and *rodhaka-śakti* that are helpful thereto.

१६. अथ विन्दुर्निरूप्यते — शुद्धस्य तादृशानां च तत्त्वानामुपादानं विन्दुः। सा च जडरूपा भगवतः परिग्रहशक्तिः कुण्डलिन्यपरपर्याया। अत्रैव शिवस्य लयादिरवस्थाभेदो रुद्राणूनां प्रबोधो विमुक्तिश्च। उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

लयादिभेदः प्रागुक्तो यदुपाधौ शिवस्य तु ॥
स बिन्दुरिति मन्तव्यः सैव कुण्डलिनी मता।
किं च रुद्राणवो येन बध्यन्ते यत्र वा स्थिताः ॥
विमुच्यन्ते यतो वायं स बिन्दुरिति गम्यताम्। इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. १ - ३)

16. Then is discussed *bindu*. *Bindu* is the material cause of that sound which is pure and of the *tattvas* which are so (pure). And that is inert by nature and is a *parigraha-śakti* of the Lord; it is otherwise called *kuṇḍalinī*. The differences of *laya* (*bhoga* and *adhikāra*) for Śiva are only in this; also the awakening and release of Rudra-souls. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "That in which there are the afore-mentioned differences of *laya*, etc., for Śiva, that should be understood to be *bindu*; that itself is considered to be *kuṇḍalinī*. Further, that by which the Rudra-souls (*i.e.*, *Śrīkaṇṭha*, etc.) are enlightened, or that wherein they live or that whereby they are released, that is to be understood to be *bindu*." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Bindupaṭala, vv. 1-3).

१७. तत्सद्भावे मानं तु अनन्तेश्वरादिशरीराणि तदाधारभूततत्त्वभुवनादिकं च सोपादानं, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत् इति। न चाश्रयासिद्धिः। कलादिक्षित्यन्तं कार्यं शरीरकर्तृकम्, दुःखानुषक्तकार्यत्वात्, सम्मतवदित्यनुमानेन समस्तमायेयकार्यकरणत्वेनानन्तेशशरीरस्य सिद्धिः। तथा — तच्छरीरं भुवनवृत्ति, शरीरत्वात्, तच्च भुवनं तत्त्वजन्यं, भुवनत्वात् सम्मतवदिति तत्त्वभुवनयोरपि सिद्धिसम्भवात्। न च माययार्थान्तरत्वम्; अनन्तशरीरादेः समस्तमायाकार्यजनकतयैव सिद्धया मायाकार्यत्वायोगात्। अन्यथा तत्रापि शरीरान्तरकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात्। तथा अनन्तेशः सविकल्पकज्ञानवानेव सन् कार्यं करोति, प्रयोज्यकर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवदित्यनुमितसविकल्पकज्ञानविषयतया शुद्धशब्दसिद्धौ तद्धेतुतयापि बिन्दुसिद्धिः। न च तदीयसविकल्पकज्ञानविषयत्वमशुद्धस्यैव शब्दस्यास्त्विति वक्तुं युक्तम्; कलादिसृष्टेः पूर्वमशुद्धस्य शब्दस्यासम्भवात्। तथा शुद्धाध्ववर्तिनामवकाशप्रदातृतयापि तत्सिद्धिः। मायेयस्याकाशस्य तत्रावकाशप्रदातृत्वायोगात्।

17. The evidence for the existence of that consists of the bodies of Anantes'a, etc. The *tattvas*, and *bhuvanas* that are the support of those bodies have a material cause, since they are products, like a pot. Nor is there non-establishment of the probans. "All products beginning with *kalā* and ending with the earth have a body as agent, since they are products attended by misery, like the one which is admitted (by both of us)" — by this inference there is established a body for Anantes'a as the instrument in the production of all *māyā*. Similarly, that body exists in a *bhuvana*, since it is a body; and that *bhuvana* is generated by the categories, since it is a *bhuvana*, like the one which is admitted (by both of us); by these (inferences) the establishment even of *tattvas* and *bhuvanas* is possible. Nor is (this inference) satisfied otherwise with (establishing) *māyā*; for the the body, etc., of Ananta being established only as generating all the products of *māyā*, it is not possible for

these too to be the products of *māyā*; otherwise, there is the contingency of the assumption of another body for that (creation) too. Similarly, Anantes'a produces effects, only as possessing determinate knowledge, since he is a creator under direction, like the potter; thus pure sound being established as the object of the determinate knowledge inferred above, there is the establishment of *bindu* even as the cause of that (sound). Nor does it stand to reason to say "Let impure sound itself be the object of His (Ananta's) determinate knowledge;" for, prior to the creation of *kalā*, etc., there is no possibility of impure sound. Similarly, even as giving room for those who live in the pure path (*śuddha-adhvā*), there is the establishment of that (*bindu*); since it is not possible for ether, the product of *māyā*, to function there by giving room.

१८. उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

किं च मायाद्युपादानं देहेन्द्रियकरं नृणाम् ।
क्षुब्धं कार्यकरं तस्य कर्तुर्देहेन्द्रियादिकम् ॥
यदुपादानतो जातं स बिन्दुरिति गम्यताम् ।
किं च शब्दानुसंविद्धा जायन्ते प्रत्यया नृणाम् ॥
न ह्यकारणकाः शब्दाः सम्भवेयुः कदाचन ।
तेषां यत्कारणं विप्राः! स बिन्दुर्बहुवृत्तिकः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. १२ - १४)

मायापि नात्रोपादानं मोहकत्वात्स्वतेजसा ।
यतः प्रबुद्धपुंकायकरणानां न कारणम् ॥
शुद्धाध्ववर्तिनः सर्वे प्रबुद्धाः शिवतेजसा ।
देहेन्द्रियादिमन्तोऽपि नाबुद्धास्तेषु ते पुनः ॥

किं च कर्मोज्झिताः सर्वे पुद्गलाः शुद्धवर्त्मनि ।
कथं कर्मानुसारेण माया परिणता सती ॥

तेषां देहेन्द्रियादीनामुपादानं भवेद्द्विजाः ।
तस्माच्छुद्धाध्वनश्चास्य स्वानुकार्येव कारणम् ॥

इष्यतां कुण्डलिन्याख्यं शुद्धमेतद्द्विजोत्तमाः ।
सा च कुण्डलिनी शम्भोः शक्तिः शुद्धा जडात्मिका ॥

न तादात्म्यात्स्थिता किं तु वर्तमाना परिग्रहे ।
शिवे कर्तरि तादात्म्यान्नेयं कुण्डलिनी स्थिता ॥

उपादानत्वतो हेतोः कुलाले मृत्तिका यथा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ६-१२)

18. And it has been said: "Further the material cause wherefrom have arisen the body, organs, etc., of the agent, that should be understood to be *bindu*. Further, cognitions arise in men, as accompanined by sounds; sounds cannot arise without a cause, at any time; that which is the cause, O Sages, is *bindu* which has several functions." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Bindupaṭala, vv. 12-14). "*Māyā* is not the material cause, but since by its own light it is delusive; therefore it is not the cause of the body, organs of enlightened beings; all those who exist in the pure path or those who have been enlightened by Śiva's light, though existing there and possess body, organs, etc., they are not unenlightened. Further, all souls in the pure path have conquered *karma*; how then can *māyā* be transformed in accordance with *karma* and become the material cause of bodies, organs, etc., for them? Therefore let us recognise for those in the pure path a cause in conformity with their nature and called

kuṇḍalinī; this O best of the twice-born! is pure. This *kuṇḍalinī* of Śambhu is pure and of inert nature; it does not stand in a relation of identity (with Śiva) but through *parigraha*. This *kuṇḍalinī* does not stand in a relation of identity with Śiva, the creator, for the reason that it is the material cause, just as clay (does not stand in a relation of identity) with the potter." (*Ibid.*, vv. 6-12)

१९. न चात्र शिवशक्तिरेवोपादानम्; चिद्रूपत्वात्। अचितः खलु परिणामः। ननु चितो विवर्त एवास्तु; तथा च शिवशक्तिरेव तत्तदाकारेण विवर्तत इति चेन्न; तथा सति कार्यजातस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रसङ्गात्। न चेष्टापत्तिः; सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धस्य जगतस्तथात्वानुपपत्तेः। उक्तं च तत्रैव —

नात्र शक्तिरुपादानं चिद्रूपत्वाद्यथा शिवः।
परिणामोऽचितः प्रोक्तश्चिद्रूपस्य न युज्यते॥
चितो विवर्त एवेष्टस्तथात्वे कार्यशून्यता।
सर्वप्रमाणसंसिद्धं चिद्विवर्तं कथं जगत्॥ इति॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ४-५)

19. Nor is *Śivaśakti* itself the material cause here, since it is of the nature of intelligence; transformation is indeed of the non-intelligent. "Now let it but be an illusory manifestation of intelligence; and thus *Śiva-śakti* itself is illusorily manifested in the form of that (inert body, etc.,)" — if this be said, no, because of the contingence of illusoriness for the whole host of products. Nor is this a contingence of the acceptable, since that (illusory) nature is unintelligible in the case of the world established by all *pramāṇas*. And it has been said there itself: "Śakti is not the material cause here, being of the nature of intelligence, like Śiva; transformation which is declared of the non-intelligent, does not fit in with what is of the nature

of intelligence. If of intelligence illusory manifestation alone may be declared, then, there is the nature of the void for all products; how can the world, established by all *pramāṇas*, be an illusory manifestation of intelligence?" (*Pauṣkara*, Bindupaṭala, vv. 4-5).

२०. अत्र शब्दवृत्तिश्चतुर्धा, सूक्ष्मा पश्यन्ती मध्यमा वैखरी चेति। तत्र ज्ञानैकाश्रया अर्थसामामान्यप्रकाशिका वाणी सूक्ष्मा। मयूराण्डरसवदविभक्तवर्णार्थविशेषबोधनाक्षमा वाणी पश्यन्ती। बुद्ध्युपारूढवर्णा तत्क्रमविशेषोपेता प्राणवृत्त्यगोचरीभूता सैव मध्यमा। प्राणवृत्त्याभिव्यक्ता श्रोत्रग्राह्यार्थविशेषबोधनक्षमा सैव वैखरी। तत्र सूक्ष्मा पश्यन्त्याः, पश्यन्ती मध्यमायाः, मध्यमा वैखर्याश्च कारणं द्रष्टव्यम्। एताश्च वृत्तयोऽणूनां प्रत्ययात्मिकाः। तत्र तिस्रोन्तरेव स्थिताः। अन्या बहिः स्थिता। एते च शब्दाः शुद्धाध्वनि सूक्ष्माः, मिश्राध्वनि स्थूलाः, अशुद्धाध्वनि स्थूलतराः॥

20. Here, the modes of sound are fourfold: *sūkṣmā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. Of these, that sound which rests in cognition alone and illumines things in their generality is *sūkṣmā*. The sound which is undifferentiated like the liquid in the peahen's egg, and is not capable of giving knowledge of things in their particularity is *paśyantī*. That wherein letters are present in the intellect which is associated with particular sequences among those (letters) and is above the functioning of the *prāṇa* (air), that alone is *madhyamā*. That which is manifested by the functioning of *prāṇa*, is apprehended by the sense of hearing, and is capable of giving knowledge of things in their particularity, that alone is *vaikharī*. Of these, *sūkṣmā* should be known to be the cause of *paśyantī*, *paśyantī* of *madhyamā*, and *madhyamā* of *vaikharī*. These modes are of the form of products of the intellect (*pratyayas*). Of these, three remain only within; the other remains outside. These sounds are

subtle in the pure path, gross in the mixed path and grosser still in the impure path.

२१. तदुक्तं तत्रैव—

शब्दाश्चतुर्विधास्तेऽपि वैखर्यादिविभेदतः ।
वैखरी मध्यमाख्या च पश्यन्ती सूक्ष्मसंज्ञिता ।
वैखरी श्रोत्रविषया स्थूलवर्णपरिग्रहा ।
स्थानेष्वपि धृते वायौ प्रयोक्तुरुपकारिणी ॥

बुद्ध्या वर्णानुसन्धानपूर्वमर्थस्य वाचिका ।
प्राणवृत्तिमतिक्रान्ता वागेषा मध्यमाह्वया ।
वर्णरूपानुसन्धानविरहान्तः समुज्ज्वला ।
मायूराण्डरसो यद्वन्निर्विशेषार्थधारिका ।
पश्यन्ती वागियं ज्ञेया तृतीया शिवशासने ।
सूक्ष्मा चिदेकशरणा निवृत्ताशेषशक्तिका ॥

वैखर्याः कारणं मध्या पश्यन्ती मध्यमां प्रति ।
पश्यन्त्याः कारणं सूक्ष्मा निर्विकल्पस्वरूपिणी ॥

एताश्च वृत्तयोऽणूनां चतस्रः प्रत्ययात्मिकाः ।
अन्तरेव स्थितास्तिस्रो बहिरन्या व्यवस्थिता ॥

आगोपालाङ्गनाबालं म्लेच्छाः प्राकृतभाषिणः ।
अन्तर्जलगताः सत्त्वा नित्यं जल्पन्ति ता गिरः ॥

आभ्यो न परमो बन्ध आभ्यो मुक्तिस्तु नापरा ।
तन्निवृत्त्यविनाभूतो दृक्क्रियावारको यतः ॥

विविक्तान्मन्वते तेभ्यः पुद्गलाः स्वान्न कुत्रचित् ।
दुःख्यहं सुख्यहं चेति मतिर्या शब्दताडिता ॥

सूक्ष्माः शुद्धाध्वनि गिरः स्थूला मिश्राध्वनि स्थिताः ।
अशुद्धाध्वनि ता वाचः स्थिताः स्थूलतराः सदा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. २०-३०)

21. That has been said even there: "Those sounds are of four kinds, being divided into *vaikharī*, etc; they are called *vaikharī*, *madhyamā*, *paśyantī* and *sūkṣmā*. *Vaikharī* is the object of the sense of hearing, apprehends gross letters; when the (*prāṇa*) air moves in the appropriate places, it (is manifested and) is helpful to him who uses it; that speech which as preceded by the intellectual cognition of letters, denotes things, is above the functioning of *prāṇa*, that is called *madhyamā*. That which is devoid of the cognition of the forms of letters, is of the nature of an illumination within (the heart), and like the liquid in the peahen's egg, is associated with things unparticularised, this sound (speech) is called *paśyantī*; it is the third in Śaiva teaching. *Sūkṣmā* is cognisable by intelligence alone, devoid of all capacity (to reveal things). The cause of *vaikharī* is *madhyamā*, *paśyantī* in respect of *madhyamā*, the cause of *paśyantī* is *sūkṣmā*, which is of indeterminate nature. These four modes are of the nature of *pratyayas* of the souls (*i.e.*, are cognised in the souls and are of the nature of the souls). Three are situated within (the body) itself; the other is situated outside (the body). Cowherds, women, infants, barbarians, those who speak *prākṛt* tongues, creatures living within the waters, — all these utter that (*vaikharī* and other forms of) speech. (Thus, as the material cause of the sounds known to all, there is the establishment of *bindu*). There is no greater bondage than from them; release is from them, not anything else. (Now release from *mala*, etc., is supreme release, not from the modes of speech;

to this He says:) For, that which obscures cognition and conation is inseparable from the removal of those (modes) (*i.e.*, *mala* is pervaded by those modes through their own non-existence). For the reason that cognitions like 'I am happy', 'I am miserable' are (certainly) associated with sound (speech), souls do not ever consider themselves to be dissociated from these (modes of speech). (Since thus all cognitions are certainly associated with speech, this itself is the cause of bondage). Speech in the pure path is subtle; in the mixed path it is gross; the same speech in the impure path is always grosser still." (*Ibid.*, vv. 20-30)

२२. किं च निवृत्यादिकलाहेतुत्वेनापि बिन्दुसिद्धिः। उक्तं च तत्र—

अन्याश्च वृत्तयो बिन्दोर्निवृत्त्यादिकलात्मिकाः।
निवृत्तिश्च प्रतिष्ठा च विद्या शान्तिस्तथैव च॥

शान्त्यतीता च पञ्चैताः शुद्धमार्गे पुरात्मिकाः।
मिश्राशुद्धाध्वनोरेतास्तत्त्वाद्याधारिकाः स्थिताः॥

वस्तुरूपाः कला ज्ञेयाः शब्दरूपाः परोदिताः।
शब्दवस्तूभयात्मासौ बिन्दुर्नान्यतरात्मकः॥ इति॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. श्लो. ३०-३२)

22. Moreover, *bindu* is established, as that which causes the *kalās* such as *nivṛtti*; it is also stated there: "There are other manifestations of *bindu*, which are of the nature of *kalās*, beginning with *nivṛtti*. The five manifestations are *nivṛtti*, *pratiṣṭhā*, *vidyā*, *śānti* and *śāntyatīta* and are of the nature of cities in the pure path. These five *kalās* themselves stand as the basis (support) of the *tattvas* of mixed and impure paths (*miśra* and *aśuddha adhvās*). *Kalās* are known to be in the form of *vastu*

(object); *parā*, etc., exist in the form of sound (*śabda*). *Bindu* is essentially of the form of both *vastu* and *śabda* and nothing else." (*Pauṣkarāgama*, Bindupaṭala, vv. 30-32).

२३. अत्र बिन्द्वारब्धानि शिवशक्तिसदाशिवेश्वरशुद्धविद्याख्यानि पञ्च(?) तत्त्वानि। उक्तं च तत्रैव —

वृत्तिस्तत्त्वात्मिका चास्य चतुर्धा संव्यवस्थिता।
शिवतत्त्वं सदेशाख्यमैशं विद्याह्वयं तथा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ३३)

23. Here, there are five *tattvas* produced by *bindu* and called Śiva, Śakti, Śadāśiva, Īśvara and Śuddha Vidyā. And it has been said there itself: "Its fourfold modifications in the form of *tattvas* are held to be *Śiva-tattva, Sadeśa, Īśatattva* and *Vidyā*." (Bindupaṭala, v. 33)

२४. तत्र शिवतत्त्वे सूक्ष्माभिधाना वाग्वृत्तिः। अत्रैव शान्त्यतीतभुवनानामवस्थितिः। उक्तं च —

विकल्पबोधायाणूनां तत्त्वानां स्थितये कलाः।
पञ्च तत्त्वानि लोकांश्च मन्त्रादीनसृजच्छिवः ॥

शान्त्यतीता पुराधारं शिवतत्त्वं पुराभवत् ॥ इति ॥

24. Of these in the *Śivatattva* there is the mode of speech called *sūkṣmā*; there too exist the *śāntyatīta* worlds. And it has been said: "For the sake of the sustentation of the determinate knowledge of souls and of the *tattvas*, Śiva created the (five) *kalās*, the five *tattvas*, the *lokas*, the *mantras*, etc.; first arose the *Śiva-tattva* as the support of the *Śāntyatīta* city."

२५. अस्य च शिवाधिष्ठितत्वेन शिवतत्त्वव्यपदेशः। शिवतत्वविकारः शक्तितत्वम्। अत्रैव पश्यन्त्याख्याया वाग्वृत्तेः निवृत्यादिकलानां चावस्थानम्। अस्य च शिवशक्त्यधिष्ठानत्वेन शक्तितत्वपदवाच्यता। शक्तितत्वविकारः सदाशिवतत्वम्। इदमेव मध्यमाभिधानाया वाण्या अधिष्ठानम्। तथा कामिकादितन्त्रभेदकारणानां प्रणवादीनां सामीप्यादिमुक्तिभाजां च तनुभुवनादिकारणम्। ईश्वरतत्वविकारो विद्यातत्वम्। इदमेव वैखर्याख्याया वाग्वृत्तेरधिष्ठानम्। तथा करणभूतानां सप्तकोटिसंख्यानां मन्त्राणां विद्याराज्ञीनां च तनुभुवनादिसम्पादकम्॥

25. And this is said to be *Śivatattva,* as controlled by Śiva. The modification of *Śiva-tattva* is *śakti-tattva;* there alone are found the mode of speech called *paśyantī* and the *kalās* beginning with *nivṛtti.* As it is the locus of *Śivaśakti*, it is referred to as *śaktitattva.* The modification of *śaktitattva* is *Sadāśivatattva.* The *Sadāśiva-tattva* is the abode of the speech called *madhyamā.* And thus it is the cause of the *praṇava,* etc., which are the causes of the different *tantras* like the *Kāmika,* and of the bodies, worlds, etc., for those who experience modes of release like proximity (to Śiva). The modification of *Sadāśiva-tattva* is *Īśvara-tattva.* This is the cause of bodies, worlds, etc., for *Ananteśa,* etc., and for the *Rudras* who by worshipping them have attained to their status. The modification of *Īśvara-tattva* is *vidyā-tattva;* this alone is the abode of the mode of speech called *vaikharī;* and thus it is that which brings about seven crores of *mantras* (*i.e., mantreśas*) who are causes and bodies, worlds, etc., for the *vidyā-rājñīs* (Queens of *Vidyā*).

२६. उक्तं च श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे —

भृगुणी ब्रह्मवेताली स्थाणुमत्यम्बिका परा।
रूपिणी नन्दिनी ज्वाला सप्त सप्तार्बुदेश्वराः॥

विद्याराज्ञ्यः समाख्याता विद्यायां रुद्रसंस्तुताः ।
तासामुपरि दीप्तश्रीर्देवो विद्याधिपः स्थितः ॥
मन्त्रेशेशचिदाविष्टरुद्रव्यूहाष्टकानुगः ।
उच्छुष्माश्चम्बराश्चण्डा महावीर्यपदद्रुगाः ॥
रुद्रा गणाश्च दिक्पालाः शास्त्राणि पतयःस्थिताः ।
ते चानन्तप्रभृतयो गदिता एव नामतः ॥
स्वरूपतश्च ते विप्राः पूर्वं प्रश्नानुषङ्गतः ।
सदाशिवे पवित्राङ्गः सकळादिपरिच्छदः ॥
देवः सदाशिवो बिन्दौ निवृत्त्यादिकलेश्वराः ।
नादे ध्वनिः पतिः शक्तौ सर्वशक्तिमतां वरः ॥
योनिर्विश्वस्य वागीशाः पतयः परतः शिवः ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. १३ श्लो. १५७-१६२)

26. And it has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The seven *vidyārājñīs* are Bhṛguṇī, Brahmavetālī, Sthāṇumatī, Ambikā, Parā Rupiṇī, Nandinī, Jvālā. Īśvaras are seven crores. They are called *vidyā-rājñīs*, who are praised by Rudra, in the *vidyā*(*-tattva*). Above them is situated the shining *dīpta-śrī* 'the lord of *vidyās*'. He is the lord of Rudras, *Gaṇas* (*Ambikā, Skanda, Vṛṣabha*, etc.), the protectors of the cardinal direction (Indra, etc.), and of the *śāstras*. In the *Sadāśiva*(*-tattva*), He is surrounded by *sakalas* who have pure parts (organs). In the *bindu* there are the lords of *nivṛtti* and other *kalās*. The primal sound (*dhvani*) is the lord of *Nāda*; the lord of *śakti* (energy) is the great lord of all powers; the origin of the universe (*viśva*) is from *Vāgīśa* and other Lords; the great Paramaśiva is supreme." (XIII, 157-162).

२७. अन्ये तु पञ्चानामपि शिवद्वारकं लक्षणं वदन्ति । ज्ञानमात्रयुक्तेन परमात्मनाधिष्ठितं तत्वं शिवतत्वम् । क्रियामात्रयुक्तेनाधिष्ठितं शक्तितत्वम् । समप्रवृत्तोभयवताधिष्ठितं सदाशिवतत्त्वम् । अधिकक्रियावताधिष्ठितमीश्वर-तत्वम् । अधिकज्ञानवताधिष्ठितं विद्यातत्वमिति । केचित्तु शिवादितत्व-पञ्चकमपि साक्षाद् विन्दुकार्यमेवेत्याहुः । एतच्च शिवतत्वादिकं विन्द्वादिविशिष्टशिवस्य वृत्तिरूपं कार्यम् । न परिणामः; सर्वत्र कारणानुस्यूततया पूर्वावस्थापरित्यागाभावात् । नाप्यारम्भवादः पुञ्जवादो वात्र सङ्गच्छते । एकस्यैव हि शिवस्य कारणत्वेन निश्चितत्वात् । एतच्च वृत्तिरूपं कार्यं कारणात्मनैव सत् । कार्यात्मनापि सत्त्वे तत्वानामवस्थापाय-रूपप्रळयायोगात् । तत्वव्यपदेशस्त्वाकल्पावस्थायितया न विरुध्यते । अयं च शुद्धाध्वा न बन्धकः; कर्मान्वयाभावात् ॥

27. Others, however, state the definition of the five *tattvas* through the channel of Śiva thus. That which being associated with knowledge alone, is controlled by the supreme Self, is *Śiva-tattva*; that which is controlled (by Him) as associated with conation alone is *śakti-tattva*; that which is controlled (by Him) as associated with both (energies) which have begun (to be active) is *Sadāśiva-tattva*; what is controlled (by Him) with an excess of conation is *Īśvaratattva*. What is controlled by Him, with an excess of knowledge is *vidyā-tattva*. Some say that all the five *tattvas* from *Śiva-tattva*, are but the direct products of *bindu*. And these, *Śiva-tattva*, etc., are products consisting in the *manifestation* of Śiva as qualified by *bindu*, etc., not *transformation*; for the cause being constantly present throughout, the abandonment of the prior condition is impossible. Nor are the views of creation or *puñja* (aggregation) consistent with this, since causality is ascertained to belong to one alone, *viz.*, Śiva. And this product is of the nature of a *vṛtti* (expansion) and is real only in its causal nature; if it were real in the effect-nature too, *pralaya*, which is the

state of non-existence of the *tattvas*, would be impossible. Their designation as reals (*tattvas*) is not contradicted because of their permanence till the end of the aeon. This pure path is not a bond, since there is not the presence of *karma*.

२८. ननु शुद्धाध्ववर्तिनां कथं विचित्रभोगः? तद्धेतोः कर्मणोऽभावात्। कथं वा ज्ञानोदयः? तद्धेतोः कलाया अभावात्। कथं वा विषयाभिमुख्यम्? तद्धेतोर्विद्याया अभावात्। कथं च विषयेष्वासक्तिः? रागाभावात्। कथं वा भोगेयत्तापरिच्छेदः? कालाभावात्। कथं च भोक्तृविशेषनियमः? नियतेरभावात्। उच्यते — सन्ति तावच्छुद्धाध्वनि वैन्दवानि कलादीनि तत्वानि तनुकरणभुवनभोगादयश्च। तत्र यद्यपि भोगवैचित्र्यकारणं कर्म नास्ति, तथापि मलपरिपाकवशाद्विचित्रो भोगः सम्भवति। तथा हि — यस्य प्रकृष्टो मलपरिपाकः स सादाख्ये भोगं भुङ्क्ते। यस्य तु प्रकृष्टतरः स त्वीश्वरतत्वे विद्यातत्वे च। तस्मान्न कर्मात्र भोगकारणम्। किं त्वीश्वरेच्छैव। न च शिवस्यात्र वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये; तत्र दुःखरूपभोगाभावात्। तस्माच्छुद्धाध्वनि मलपरिपाकाधीनः सुखात्मैव भोगः।

28. Now for those who live in the pure path, how is there diversity of enjoyment, since the cause of that, *karma*, does not exist? How again is there the rise of knowledge, since the causes thereof, *kalā*, etc., do not exist? How, again, can there be turning towards objects, since the cause of that, *vidyā*, is non-existent? How, again, is there attachment to objects, there being no *rāga*? How, again, is there the ascertainment of the quantity of enjoyment, there being no time? And how is there the fixing of the particular enjoyer, there being no *niyati*? The reply: In the pure path, there do exist *tattvas* like *kalā*, etc., bodies, worlds and enjoyments, as the products of *bindu*. There though *karma* does not exist as the cause of diversity of enjoyment, yet diversity of enjoyment is possible being dependent on the maturation of *mala*. It is thus: He, whose

maturation of *mala* is far advanced, experiences enjoyment, in *Sādākhya*; he whose maturation is further-more advanced (experiences it) in the *Īśvara-tattva* and *vidyā-tattva*. Therefore *karma* is not the cause here, but desire of divinity alone. Nor for Śiva are there partiality and cruelty, since there is no experiencing of misery here. Therefore, in the pure path, enjoyment is dependent on the maturation of *mala* and is of the nature of happiness alone.

२९. उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

किञ्च कर्मान्वयाभावाच्छुद्धाध्वानो न बन्धकाः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ४३)

तथा —

अध्वायं भोग्य उद्दिष्टो भोगो रागादिभिः स्थितः ।
अत्र तेषामभावेन कथं भोगो महेश्वर ॥

ईश्वरः —

अत्रापि कालमुख्यानि सन्ति तत्त्वान्यधो यथा ।
किन्तु तान्यत्र शुद्धानि बैन्दवानि द्विजोत्तमाः ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ५६-५७)

तथा —

शुद्धान्येतानि तत्त्वानि रुद्राणूनां महात्मनाम् ।
विचित्रपुरमालाभिः खचितानि महान्ति च ॥
दिव्यश्रीभिर्महाश्चर्यैर्भोगैर्दुःखविवर्जितैः ।
तनुभोगेन्द्रियाद्यैश्च वर्जितान्युन्नतानि च ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ३४-३५)

तथा —

शुद्धाध्वनि महाभोगः कर्म नास्तीति चोदितम् ।
कथं तद्वर्तिनां भोगो विचित्रस्तद्वदेश्वर ॥

ईश्वरः —

न कर्म भोगवैचित्र्ये कारणं शुद्धवर्त्मनि ।
मलस्य परिपाको यो विचित्रः सोऽत्र कारणम् ॥
यस्य प्रकृष्टस्तत्पाको भोगतत्त्वे स भोगभुक् ।
इतरस्त्वीशविद्याख्यतत्त्वयोर्भोगभाग्भवेत् ॥
किं कर्मणात्र विप्रेन्द्रा यत्रेच्छाभोग इष्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ४५ - ४८)

तथा —

नैवेह शम्भोर्नैर्घृण्यं भवतीह कदाचन ॥
दुःखेषु हि नियुञ्जानो निर्घृणो नापरत्र च ।
शुद्धेऽध्वनि सुखात्मैव भोग एवं स च स्मृतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. बिन्दु. प. श्लो. ५२ - ५३)

एतच्च शुद्धतत्वजातं प्रलयाकलसकलानां प्रेरककाण्ड इत्यभिधीयते ॥

29. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Further, since there is no attachment of *karma*, the pure paths are not bonds." (Bindupaṭala, v. 43). Similarly, "This path is said to be an object of enjoyment, it is settled; the enjoyment is through *rāga*, etc; since they do not exist here, how is there enjoyment, O Maheśvara? *Īśvara*: Here too, as in the lower paths there exist the *tattvas* beginning with *kāla*; but here they are pure and the products of *bindu*, best of the twice-born." (*Ibid.*, vv. 56-57). Similarly, "These *tattvas* of the great Rudra-souls are pure; they are adorned by beautiful cities, etc., by glorious damsels and wonderful enjoyments, free from misery, which are enjoyed through (pure) bodies, organs, etc., and are excellent." (*Ibid.*, vv. 34-35). Similarly, "It was said that in the pure

path there is no *karma* and yet there is great enjoyment. How, then, can there be diversity of enjoyment for those residing there? Tell us that O *Īśvara*. *Īśvara*: In the pure path, the cause of diverse enjoyment is not *karma*; but the maturation of *mala*, which is diverse, is the cause here. He, for whom that maturation is far advanced, experiences enjoyment in the *bhoga-tattva* (*Sadāśiva-tattva*); the other comes to experience enjoyment in the *tattvas* called *Īśvara* and *vidyā*. When enjoyment is recognised to come from desire, where is the need for *karma*, oh sages?" (*Ibid.*, vv. 45-48). Similarly, "Nor does there result at any time cruelty for Śambhu in this matter. It is he who plunges one into misery that is cruel, nor (he who plunges) into the other. In the pure path, enjoyment is of the nature of happiness alone." (*Ibid.*,vv. 52-53). And this sort of pure *tattvas* is said to be the *preraka-kāṇḍa* for *pralayākalas* and *sakalas*.

३०. अथ माया निरूप्यते। सा च मयति ददाति विश्वमिति वा, मात्यायाति विश्वमत्रेति वा अन्वर्था॥ तदुक्तं पौष्करे —

मयत्यस्माज्जगद्विश्वं माया तेन समीरिता ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. १)

अन्यत्र —

माति यत्र जगत्सुप्तौ सृष्ट्वा वा याति सा ततः ।
माया तेन समाख्याता तत्त्वमुक्तं गुरूत्तमैः ॥ इति ॥

इयमपि कलादेः पृथिव्यन्तस्य कार्यजातस्योपादानभूता जडा भगवतः परिग्रहशक्तिः। सा चैका। बहुत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। नित्या; मूलकारणत्वात्। अनित्यत्वे प्रलये कर्मणां निराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च बिन्दुस्तदाश्रयः; तस्य कर्मोत्तरत्वात्। नाप्यात्मानः; तेषां जडत्वप्रसङ्गात्। सा च व्यापिनी; सर्वत्र कार्योपलम्भात्।

30. Next *māyā* is discussed. It means either that which gives one (*mayati*) the world, or that into which the world is resolved and whence it returns. That has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "The whole world proceeds from this; hence it is called *māyā*." (Māyāpaṭala, v. 1). Elsewhere (it is said): "That wherein the world goes in the period of sleep (dissolution), thence it issues forth at the creation; hence it is called *māyā*. Thus it is held by great preceptors." This is the material cause of the host of products beginning with *kalā* and ending with the earth, is inert and is a *parigraha-śakti* of the Lord. And that is one, since there is no evidence for its multiplicity. It is eternal, since it is the primal cause; for if it be non-eternal, there is the contingence of *karma* having no locus at the dissolution. Nor is *bindu* their locus since that is above *karma*. Nor the souls, because of the contingence of their inertness. And it is pervasive, since its products are cognised everywhere.

३१. तदुक्तं पौष्करे —

नित्यैका व्यापिनी वस्तुरूपा कर्माश्रयाशिवा ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. २)

श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे च —

तदेकमशिवं बीजं जगतश्चित्रशक्तिमत् ।
सहकार्यधिकारान्तसंरोधि व्याप्यनश्वरम् ॥
कर्तानुमीयते येन जगद्धर्मेण हेतुना ।
तेनोपादानमप्यस्ति न पटस्तन्तुभिर्विना ॥
तदचेतनमेव स्यात्कार्यस्याचित्त्वदर्शनात् ।

(मृ. प्र. ९ श्लो. २-४)

तदाधाराणि कार्याणि शक्तिरूपाणि संहृतौ ॥
विकृतौ व्यक्तिरूपाणि व्याप्रियन्तेऽर्थसिद्धये ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. ९ श्लो. १३)

तथा पौष्करे —

नित्यैषाऽशेषकार्याणां कारणत्वाद्यदन्यथा ।
न तन्नित्यं यथा तन्तुस्तस्मान्मायाप्यनश्वरा ॥

अनित्यैषा यदीष्येत कर्मणां कुत्र संस्थितिः ।
न बिन्दुः कर्मणां स्थानं बिन्दुः कर्मोत्तरो यतः ॥

न चात्मनि स्थितिस्तेषां यस्मादात्मा जडो भवेत् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. २७ - २९)

31. It has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "Eternal, one, pervasive, substantive, the locus of *karma*, not of the nature of Śiva." (Māyāpaṭala, v. 2). And in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "That is one, not of the nature of Śiva, the cause of the world, the possessor of diverse *śaktis*; it is a fetter so long as its auxiliary has any authority; it is pervasive and imperishable. By the probans which has the property of the world, the creator is inferred; by that same probans (it is established that) there is a material cause too; there is no cloth without threads. That (*upādāna*) should certainly be non-intelligent, since the effect is seen to be non-intelligent." (IX. 2 - 4). "The products based thereon exist at destruction in the form of *śaktis*; and at creation they function in manifest forms so that things (or practical activity) may result." (IX. 13) Similarly in *Pauṣkara*: "This is eternal, being the cause of all products without

exception; what is otherwise is non-eternal, like threads; therefore, *māyā* is imperishable. If this were admitted to be non-eternal, where is the abode for *karma*? *Bindu* is not the abode of *karma*, since *bindu* is above *karma*; nor do they reside in the soul, since the soul would become inert." (Māyāpaṭala, vv. 27-29).

३२. अस्याश्च विचित्रशक्तित्वं विचित्रकार्यजनकतया । अनात्मनि देहादावात्मभ्रमहेतुतया मोहिनीत्वं च । एषा च सर्वेषां सकलानां साधारणी, प्रलये लीनदेहानां तेषां सूक्ष्मस्थूलात्मकदेहादेः कारणम् । उक्तं च पौष्करे —

साधारणी च सर्वेषां सकलानां मुनीश्वराः ।
प्रळये लीनदेहस्य कर्मिणोऽणोरहर्मुखे ॥
देहादेः कारणं माया सूक्ष्मस्थूलात्मकस्य तु ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. २-३)

इयंच वस्तुरूपा वस्त्वात्मकस्य जगतः कारणत्वात् ।

32. Its possession of diverse *śaktis* is (known) because of the production of diverse effects; its delusiveness is because of being the cause of the delusion of the self in the not-self, body, etc. And this (*māyā*) is common to all *sakalas*. In the case of those whose bodies have been resolved at the deluge, it is the cause of their bodies, etc. And it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "O sages, this is common to all *sakalas*. For those souls whose bodies have been resolved at the deluge and who yet possess *karma*, *māyā* is the cause of bodies, etc., subtle and gross at the beginning of the day (in the first creation)." (Māyāpaṭala, vv. 2-3). And this is substantive, of the nature of a real thing, since it is the cause of the world.

३३. ननु प्रपञ्चस्य वस्त्वात्मकत्वमसिद्धम्; प्रमाणप्रमेयसम्बन्धानां दुर्निरूपत्वात्। तथा हि — न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम्; प्रमात्रादिभेदरूपस्येतरनिषेधस्य घटमहं जानामीति विधिविषयकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वाभावात्। अतः प्रमातृ-भिन्नप्रमेयसद्भावे न प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम्। व्याप्तेरपि तन्मूलत्वेनानुमानमपि नात्र प्रमाणम्। प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धविषयस्यागमस्य ग्रावप्लवनादिवाक्यवन्न स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यम्। तस्मात्प्रपञ्चसद्भावे न किञ्चिन्मानम्। अस्तु वा प्रमाणप्रमेयसद्भावः; कस्तयोः सम्बन्धः? न तावत्तादात्म्यलक्षणः सम्बन्धः; तथात्वे स्वप्नज्ञानजनकस्य स्वाप्निकपदार्थस्य सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। तस्मात्प्रपञ्च-मिथ्यात्वे तन्मूलभूतमायापि मिथ्येति।

33. Now the reality of the world is non-established, since the *pramāṇa*, the *premeya* and their relation cannot be demonstrated (intelligibly established). It is thus: *pratyakṣa* is not (the *pramāṇa*), since differences like the cogniser, (the cognised), etc., and the negation of the other are not the contents of perception, "I know the pot," whose content is affirmative. Therefore, *pratyakṣa* is not a *pramāṇa* in respect of the reality of the object of knowledge as different from the knower. Therefore, there is no evidence at all for the reality of the world. Or let it even be that there is *pramāṇa* in respect of the reality of the object known; what is the relation between the two? It is not of the nature of identity (*tādātmya*), since no one recognises identity between the *pramāṇa* and the pot. Nor is the relation of the nature of the relationship of cause and effect; if that were so, in respect of a thing in a dream which generates the cognition in the dream there is the contingence of reality. Therefore, the world being illusory, its root cause, *māyā*, is also illusory.

३४. अत्रोच्यते — अस्ति तावत्सत्यप्रमेयगोचरं प्रत्यक्षम्। तथा हि — स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति संशये नायं पुरुषः, स्थाणुरेवेति कोट्यन्तरनिषेधपुरस्सरं जायमानं प्रत्यक्षं कथं न तद्भेदगोचरम्? न चास्य सविकल्पत्वेन भ्रान्तत्वम्;

बाधाभावात्। न हि वक्रकोटरादिमत्वेन स्थाणुत्वे निश्चिते तस्य कदाचिद्-बाधः सम्भवति। न च रज्जुसर्पादावेवं बाधाभावः। तस्य सर्वलोकसिद्ध-त्वात्। किं च रज्जुसर्पयोः साम्येन भ्रान्तिस्तत्र सम्भवति। चैतन्यस्य घटादिरूपतया प्रतीतौ न किञ्चन सादृश्यं पश्यामः। अपि च प्रमेयस्य निर्विकल्पकविषयत्वेऽपि भेदप्रत्यक्षसिद्धिः। अन्यथा अगृहीतभेदस्य पुंसो देवदत्तो ब्राह्मणोऽयमिति व्यावृत्तविषयकमुत्तरं सविकल्पकं कथं जायेत। किञ्च प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वगोचरं प्रमाणं मिथ्या वा न वा? आद्ये प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वं सिद्धम्। द्वितीये तु मिथ्यात्वहेतोस्तत्र व्यभिचारः। तस्मात् प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वं सिद्धम्। न च ज्ञानज्ञेययोः सम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः; विषयविषयिभावस्य सम्बन्धस्य विद्यमानत्वात्। तस्मात्सर्वस्य जगतः सत्यत्वात्तन्मूलभूतमायापि सत्येति सिद्धम्॥

34. The reply to this is: there does exist perception which is true and has the object of knowledge for its sphere. It is thus: when there is the doubt "post or man," the perception that arises after the negation of one alternative in the form "This is not a man," how can that not have difference as its sphere? Nor is this delusive as being determinate, for there is no sublation. Indeed when its being a post is ascertained on the ground of possessing crookedness, holes, etc., there does not result sublation for it at any time; nor is it that there will be no sublation even in cases like that of the rope and the snake, since that (sublation) is established for the whole world. Further, because of the similarity of rope and snake, delusion occurs there; but in the cognition of intelligence as of the form of pot, etc., we see no similarity. Further, even if the object of knowledge be the content of indeterminate perception, there is established the perception of difference. Otherwise, for the man who has not apprehended difference, how could there arise the subsequent determinate cognition with an exclusive content, in the form "This is Devadatta, a brahmin"? Further, the *pramāṇa*

whose sphere is illusoriness, is it illusory or not? On the first, there is established the reality of the world; on the second, however, there is inconstancy of the probans of illusoriness, in respect of that (*pramāṇa*). Therefore the reality of the world is established. Nor is the relation between cognition and the cognised unintelligible; for there exists the relationship of object and subject. Therefore because of the reality of the whole world, it is established that its root cause, *māyā,* is also certaintly real.

३५. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

न हि प्रपञ्चो वस्त्वात्मा प्रमाणानामभावतः ।
प्रमेयाभावतस्तद्वत्सम्बन्धाभावतोऽपि च ॥

प्रपञ्चोऽयं प्रमात्रादिभेदात्मा नाक्षगोचरः ।
यतः प्रत्यक्षमर्थानां विधातृ न निषेधकम् ॥

निषेधमन्तरा भेदो न समस्ति कदाचन ।
तस्मात्प्रपञ्चसद्भावे प्रत्यक्षं न तु साधकम् ॥

व्याप्तेस्तत्पूर्वकत्वेन नानुमानमपि प्रमा ।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धेऽर्थे नागमस्य प्रमाणता ॥

तस्मात्प्रमेयाभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावतः स्थितः ।
अस्तु मानं प्रमेयं च सम्बन्धो दुर्लभस्तयोः ॥

न तावज्ज्ञानघटयोर्योगस्तादात्म्यलक्षणः ।
ज्ञानस्याभ्यन्तरत्वेन घटश्चाभ्यन्तरो भवेत् ॥

नोत्पाद्योत्पादकात्मा प स्वप्नेऽप्यर्थस्तु सन् भवेत् ।
एवं प्रपञ्चावस्तुत्वे वस्तु माया कथं भवेत् ॥

ईश्वरः —

अस्ति प्रमाणं सद्भावे प्रपञ्चस्य पुरातनम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं तावदर्थानां प्रमाणं भेदगोचरम् ॥

स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति सन्देहे स्थाणुरेव सः ।
पुरुषो नेति भेदात्मा दृश्यते प्रत्ययोऽक्षतः ॥

भ्रान्तोऽयं सविकल्पत्वाद्रज्जुवन्नेष्यतामिति ।
सर्वेषां सर्वदा कुम्भः कुम्भ एवेष्यतेऽक्षतः ॥

नैवं रज्जुः कदाचित्त यतः सर्पायते नृणाम् ।
मालायते तदन्येषां नैवं कुम्भघटादयः ॥

किं चाहिरज्ज्वोस्साम्येन भ्रान्तिरत्रोपपद्यते ।
चितो घटादिरूपेण प्रतीतौ का समानता ॥

निर्विकल्पाक्षबोधेऽपि भेदात्मा प्रत्ययः स्थितः ।
अन्यथोत्तरविज्ञानं व्यावृत्तं नोपजायते ॥

अगृहीतार्थभेदस्य तन्नामादिविशेषवत् ।
किं च येन प्रमाणेन प्रपञ्चाभाव उच्यते ॥

तत्प्रमाणं प्रमाणं वा न वेति परिचिन्त्यताम् ।
प्रमाणं चेत्प्रपञ्चोऽस्ति तत्तदन्तर्गतं यतः ॥

यद्यप्रमाणं सुतरां भावरूपं जगद्भवेत् ।
सम्बन्धो ज्ञानघटयोर्ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकलक्षणः ॥

एवं वस्त्वात्मकं विश्वं भवेत्कथमवस्तुजम् ।
तस्माद्वस्त्वात्मिका माया स्थिता विश्वस्य कारिणी ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. १०-२६)

35. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "The world is, verily, not real, because of the absence of *pramāṇas*, the absence of the object of knowledge and also the absence of the relation (between the two). This world is of the nature of difference like that of cogniser, (cognised), etc., and is the sphere (of cognition) for the witness (-intelligence); for, perception affirms things, it does not deny them; there is never any difference in the absence of negation. Therefore perception is not instrumental in establishing the reality of the world. Since pervasion is preceded by that (perception), inference too is not *pramāṇa* (in this regard). In respect of a thing opposed to perception, etc., scripture has no authoritativeness. Therefore, because of the absence of *pramāṇas*, the absence of objects of knowledge is also settled. Let there be *pramāṇa* and also *prameya*; the relation between the two is difficult to obtain. The relation between cognition and the pot does not consist of identity; because of the cognition being internal, the pot too should become internal. Nor is that (relation) of the nature of effect and cause; else, reality would be possible in dreams. The world being thus unreal, how can *māyā* be real? *Īśvara*: In respect of the world being real, there is a *pramāṇa* of great antiquity. Perception is the *pramāṇa* for things; it has difference for its sphere. When there is the doubt 'post or man', there is seen the (subsequent) perceptual cognition of the nature of difference, in the form, 'it is certainly a post, not a man'. 'This is a delusion, like the rope(-snake), since it is determinate; we do not recognise it'; (all such objections are to be refuted). For all persons at all times a jar is admitted to be but a jar; nor thus is the rope, since sometimes it becomes a snake for (some) men, a garland for some others; not thus are jar, pot, etc. Further, because of the similarity of rope and snake, the delusion

there is intelligible, (but) in the cognition of intelligence in the form of pot, etc., what is the similarity? Cognition of the nature of difference exists even in indeterminate perceptual cognition; else, the subsequent cognition which is exclusive and qualified by name, etc., would not arise for him who has not apprehended difference in the thing. Further, that *pramāṇa* by which the non-existence of the world has been declared, is that a *pramāṇa* or not (a *pramāṇa*)?—this should be considered; if a *pramāṇa*, then the world is real, since this (*pramāṇa*) is included in that (world); if not a *pramāṇa*, much more easily would the world be real. The relation between cognition and pot is that of what is made known and what makes known. Thus the world which is real, how can it be born of the unreal? Therefore it is settled that *māyā*, the cause of the world is real." (Māyāpaṭala, vv. 10-26)

३६. अस्याः सद्भावे मानं तु, कलादिक्षितिपर्यन्तं तत्त्वजातमविभागेन कारणे कुत्रचित्प्रलीनम्, एकस्य कार्यत्वे सति विभक्तत्त्वात्, बीजे स्कन्धपलाशादिवत्; कलादिकं सोपादानम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्; प्रळयकालीनं कर्म किंचिदाश्रितम्, संस्कारत्वात्, सम्मतवदित्याद्यनुमानानि। न च कालेनार्थान्तरत्वम्; कालस्य वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या विनाशित्वेन तदानीमाश्रयत्वायोगात्।

36. Now, in respect of the reality of *māyā*, the following inferences constitute the *pramāṇa*: the host of *tattvas* from *kalā* to the earth are dissolved without differentiation in some cause, since being products of one (cause) they are yet differentiated, like the trunk, leaves, etc., (which are resolved) in the seed; further, *kalā*, etc., have material cause, being products, like pot; *karma* at the time of the deluge has some locus, being a residual impression, like what is admitted. Nor

is the inference satisfied otherwise by time (*kāla*), for time being perishable, in the manner to be declared, it could not be the locus then.

३७. ननु कर्मणि सिद्धे तदाश्रयत्वेन मायासिद्धिः, तत्सद्भावे किं मानम्? उच्यते — प्राणिनां सुखदुःखभोगः किंचिदायत्तः, अस्वाभाविकत्वात्, पाकजरूपवत्, इष्टापूर्तादिकं फलोत्पत्तिप्राक्क्षणवर्तिव्यापारकम्, तदुत्पत्तिपूर्वं विनष्टत्वे सति तज्जनकत्वात्, कृषिचिकित्सादिवदिति। न चेश्वरप्रसाद एव व्यापारोऽस्त्विति युक्तम्; तस्याविळम्बितत्वेन फलजनकतया समनन्तरमेव फलोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। उक्तं च पौष्करे —

अविशिष्टे तु भोक्तृत्वे भुञ्जते दिवि केचन।
केचनावीचिमुख्येषु न स्यादेतदहेतुकम्॥
यत्तत्र हेतुः कर्मेति मन्तव्यं मुनिपुङ्गवाः।
उभयोः कृषिसाम्ये तु कश्चिद्धान्यानि यच्छति॥
न किंचिदपरस्तस्य कर्म कारणकं द्विजाः॥ इति॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. ३१-३३)

37. Now, if *karma* were established there would be the establishment of *māyā* as the locus of that. In respect of its (own) existence, what is the evidence? The reply is: the enjoyment of happiness and misery by creatures is dependent on something since it is not of their nature, like the colour produced by baking. *Iṣṭāpūrta*, etc., have a function which exists in the instant prior to the origination of the fruit; for though perishing prior to that origination, yet they generate that (fruit), like the activities of farming. Nor does it stand to reason that the grace of God alone may be functional; for, since it does not

generate fruit after delay, there is the contingence of the generation of fruit even immediately afterwards. And it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "Though enjoyership is common (to all), some enjoy in heaven, some others in hells like Avīcī, this cannot be causeless; that which is the cause here is to be understood to be *karma*, O sages. In spite of the equality of the agricultural activities of both, one obtains food, the other nothing at all, that, O twice-born ones, has *karma* for the cause." (Māyāpaṭala, vv. 31-33).

३८. न च तत्प्रकृतिजन्यमिति वाच्यम्; प्रकृतेर्भोग्यत्वेन भोजकत्वायोगात्। ननु प्राकृतमेव बुद्धिधर्मरूपं कर्म, भावात्मतया भोग्यम्, कर्मात्मकतया भोजकमस्त्विति चेत्, बुद्धिधर्मरूपस्य तस्य भावमात्रात्मकत्वात्। तेषां च साम्याभावेन केनचित्प्रयोजकेन भवितव्यम्। न च स्वयमेव स्वस्य प्रयोजकमिति वाच्यम्; स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात्। तथा चोक्तं पौष्करे —

न चात्र प्रकृतिर्हेतुर्भोग्यत्वेन विरोधतः ।
यद्भोग्यं भोजकं नैकं तस्मात्कर्मान्यदिष्यताम् ॥
प्रकृतेः परिणामो यो बौद्धो भावाष्टकात्मकः ।
स स्यात्कर्मात्मकोऽन्यस्तु भोग्यः स्यादिति चेन्मतिः ॥
तदप्यसारं भावानां प्रत्ययात्मकता यतः ।
प्रत्ययास्ते च विविधा दृश्यन्तेऽणुषु सर्वदा ॥
न समास्तत्र केनापि हेतुना भाव्यमग्रजाः ।
न च स्वयं स्ववैविध्ये हेतवस्त्वनवस्थितेः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. ३३-३७)

38. Nor may it be said that that (difference) is generated by *prakṛti*, for *prakṛti* being what is enjoyed, it cannot be that which brings about enjoyment. Now,

karma, which is of the nature of merit, an attribute of the *prakṛti*-produced intellect, may be an object of enjoyment being of the nature of a disposition (of the intellect and *buddhi*); as of the nature of activity, it may be that which brings about enjoyment. If this be said, since that (merit) as an attribute of the intellect is of the nature of a disposition alone, and since these (dispositions) are in a state of inequality, something else should be that which impels. Nor may it be said that it is what impels itself, since activity in respect of oneself is self-contradictory. And thus it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "Nor is *prakṛti* the cause here, because of opposition (to causality) as being an object of enjoyment. That which is an object of enjoyment is not that which causes enjoyment; therefore let us recognise *karma* as distinct. 'That which is a transformation of *prakṛti*, is of the nature of the eight dispositions of the intellect that is not of the nature of *karma*; that (which) is an object of enjoyment is other (than *karma*)' — if this be the view, that too is unsound; since the dispositions are of the nature of *pratyayas* (creations of the intellect). These dispositions are always seen to be diverse among men, but not equally; this should be brought about by some cause, O men of superior birth. Nor is a thing the cause of its own diversity, because of infinite regress." (Māyāpaṭala, vv. 33-37)

३९. एतच्च कर्म त्रिविधम्। मनोवाक्कायरूपकारणभेदात्। तत्र मनोजन्यमिष्टदेवतानुध्यानपरस्त्रीजिहीर्षादिरूपम्। वाचिकं मन्त्रजपपरापवादादिरूपम्। कायिकं देवतार्चनागम्यागमनादिरूपम्। तथा तन्न कारणत्रैविध्यात् त्रिविधकर्मकार्यं च सुखदुःखादिकमाध्यात्मिकादिभेदेन त्रिविधम्। तत्र चित्तप्रसादोद्वेगादिकमाध्यात्मिकम्। चन्दनानुलेपनखड्गघातादिजन्यमाधिभौतिकम्। अभिमतानभिमतवर्षातपादिजन्यमाधिदैविकम्। तथा लौकिकवैदिकाध्यात्मिकाधिमार्गिकमान्त्रभेदेन पञ्चविधं कर्म। तत्र वापीकूपादि-

निर्माणाभक्ष्यभक्षणादिजनितं निवृत्तिकलाव्याप्ताध्वावधिभोगस्य तद्धेतुशरीरादेश्च जनकं लौकिकम्। ज्योतिष्टोमाद्यनुष्ठानजनितं प्रतिष्ठाकलाव्याप्ताध्वावधिभोगजनकं वैदिकम्। वैराग्यादिजन्यं विद्याकलाव्याप्ताध्वावधिभोगजनकमाध्यात्मिकम्। योगजन्यं शान्तिकलाव्याप्ताध्वावधिभोगजनकमाधिमार्गिकम्। विज्ञानजन्यं शान्त्यतीतकलाव्याप्ताध्वावधिभोगजनकं मान्त्रम्। तदेतत्पञ्चविधमपि कर्म वैषयिकसुखदुःखादिहेतुतया पाशः। एतत्कर्माश्रयत्वेन सिद्धाया मायायाः साक्षात्परम्परया च जातानि कलादीन्येकत्रिंशत्तत्त्वानि। तत्र भोगेयत्तापरिच्छेदात्मकस्य कलनस्य हेतुः कालः लवत्रुट्यादिप्रतीतिविशेष्यो मायायाः प्राथमिको विकारः। केचित्तु कलैव प्रथमो विकार इत्याहुः। अयं च सृष्टिकालः स्थितिकालः संहारकालश्चेति त्रिविधः॥

39. And this *karma* is three-fold because of difference in the cause as mind, speech and body. Of these, what is generated by the mind is of the nature of the contemplation of the deity of one's choice, the desire to appropriate another's property and so on. What is produced by speech is of the recitation of *mantras*, scandalising others, etc. What is generated by the body is of the nature of worship of the deity, going to the place where one ought not to go, etc. Thus the cause is three-fold. The effect of *karma* is three-fold, being divided into happiness and misery that are *ādhyātmika*, etc. Of these clarity of the mind, its affliction, etc., are *ādhyātmika*. What is generated by the besmearing of sandal paste, striking with a sword, etc., is *ādhibhautika*. The desired or the undesired produced by rain, heat, etc., is *ādhidaivika*. Similarly, (*karma*) is five-fold as worldly, scriptural, *ādhyātmika*, *ādhimārgika* and *māntra*. Of these that which is generated by the construction of wells, tanks, etc., or by eating what ought not to be eaten, etc., and what generates the enjoyment bounded by the path pervaded by *nivṛtti-kalā*, as also the bodies which are the causes of that (enjoyment), is worldly (*laukika*). What is generated by

the practice of *jyotiṣṭoma*, etc., and generates enjoyment, bounded by the path pervaded by *pratiṣṭhā-kalā*, is scriptural (*vaidika*). That which is generated by *vairāgya*, etc., and generates the enjoyment bounded by the path pervaded by *vidyā-kalā*, is *ādhyātmika*. What is generated by *yoga*, and generates enjoyment, bounded by the path pervaded by *śāntikalā*, is *ādhimārgika*. What is generated by *vijñāna*, and generates enjoyment, bounded by the path pervaded by *śāntyatītakalā* is *māntra*. This fivefold *karma*, being the cause of material happiness, misery, etc., is a *pāśa* (bond). From *māyā*, which is established as the locus of this *karma*, there arise directly or indirectly the thirty-one *tattvas* beginning with *kalā*. Of these, *kāla* is the cause of that action which is of the nature of determining the extent of the enjoyment; it is that which is qualified by such cognitions as *lava*, *truṭi*, etc.; it is the first transformation of *māyā*. Some, however, say that it is *kalā* which is the first product. And this (time) is three-fold as the time of creation, the time of sustentation, and the time of destruction.

४०. नन्वस्य कथं कार्यत्वम्? एकत्वे सति प्रवाहानादिकार्यजनकत्वेनानादित्वात्। न च विशेषणासिद्धिः; भेदे मानाभावेन लाघवसहकृतेन मानेन कालसिद्धौ तदेकत्वस्यापि सिद्धेः। अत एव जडत्वे सत्यनेकत्वेन कार्यत्वमस्यानुमीयत इत्यपि न युक्तम्; विशेष्यासिद्धेः। न च पूर्वापरादिभेदः कालेऽनुभूयत इति वाच्यम्; य एव पूर्वः स एवान्यदा पर इति पूर्वापरादिभेदस्यौपाधिकत्वावश्यम्भावात्। तस्मात्कालोऽनादिरेवेति, मैवम्; कालभेदस्यौपाधिकत्वे सर्वत्रोपाधिनैव तत्तत्कार्योपपत्त्या कालस्यैवासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्, कालस्यैकत्वेऽधिकरणत्वेन तस्य सर्वकार्यहेतुतया कालविशेषव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तस्य कार्यविशेषव्यतिरेकस्यानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च। क्षणलवादिभेदे उपाधेरभावाच्च। तस्मात्कालस्य स्वाभाविक एव भेदः। अत एव जडत्वे सत्यनेकत्वादुत्पत्तिविनाशावपि॥

40. Now how is this a product since while being one, it is beginningless as generating an effect which is beginningless like a stream? Nor is there non-establishment of of the qualification ("being one"); for there being no evidence for difference, time is established by a *pramāṇa* only as associated with the principle of parsimony, and hence its oneness too is established. Hence it does not stand to reason to say that its being a product is inferred from its being manifold, while being inert; for there is non-establishment of that which is qualified (being manifold). Nor may it be said that differences like earlier and later are experienced in respect of time; since that which is earlier is itself later at another time, the difference should necessarily be due to external adjuncts; therefore time is certainly beginningless. Not so; if differences of time were due to external adjuncts, then, since in every case the product of time would be intelligible even through the external adjunct, there is the contingence of the non-establishment of time itself. Further if there were one, that being the cause even because of being the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) there is the contingence of the unintelligibility of the absence of particular effects as determined by non-existence of particular time; further, where there is non-difference in respect of characteristics etc., there is no external adjunct. Therefore difference is, but natural to time. Hence it is that since it is manifold, while being inert, there are origination and destruction too (for it).

४१. नन्वेवं कथमात्मनां नित्यत्वम्? नित्यकालवृत्तित्वस्यैव नित्यशब्दार्थत्वादिति चेत्, न; कालावच्छेदराहित्यस्यैव तदर्थत्वेनात्मनां नित्यत्वसम्भवात्। तदुक्तं पौष्करे —

कलादिभिस्त्रिभिस्तत्त्वैः प्रवृत्तं पुरुषं ततः ।
लवत्रुटयादिभिः कालः कलयत्यात्मवृत्तिभिः ॥
ताश्च भौवनदेहोर्ध्वा एव यस्मात्क्रियास्तदा ।
अतीतवर्तमानेष्यद्वृत्तीनां कारणं तु यत् ॥
स काल इति मन्तव्यो भोग्यार्थोत्पादको नृणाम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पाश. प. श्लो. ४७-४९)

तथा —

काल एको विभुर्नित्य इष्यते कैश्चिदीश्वर ।
तथा किमिति नेष्टोऽत्र भगवन्वक्तुमर्हसि ॥

ईश्वरः —

काल एको यदीष्येत क्रियातो नातिरिच्यते ।
यस्मात्स्वतः क्रियायास्तु नास्त्यतीतादिरूपता ॥
तस्या एव यदीष्येत सैव कालः प्रसज्यते ।
ततश्च वर्तमानादिपदार्थानां मुनीश्वराः ॥
वर्तमानादिरूपैस्तु कालैर्भिन्नैर्व्यवस्थितिः ।
ततश्च नैकः कालोऽयं किंत्वनन्तात्मवृत्तिकः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पाश. प. श्लो. ५३-५६)

तथा —

जडत्वे सत्यनेकत्वान्न नित्योऽयं यथा घटः ।
अनित्यस्य सतस्तस्य विभुत्वं विनिवारितम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पाश. प. श्लो. ६१)

ऋषयः —

अनित्यः काल उद्दिष्टस्तत्कथं नित्यतात्मनाम् ।
नित्यकालानुवर्तित्वं नत्यत्वं तद्वदेश्वर ॥

ईश्वरः —

कालावच्छेदशून्यत्वान्नित्यत्वं कालवत्स्थितम् ।
न हि कालस्य नित्यत्वं कालवस्त्वनवस्थितेः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पाश. प. श्लो. ६४-६५)

41. Now, thus, how can there be eternality for souls, since the meaning of 'eternality' is only to abide in eternal time? If this be asked, no; for the meaning of that (word) being only freedom from determination by time, the eternality of the soul is possible. That has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "*Kāla* (time) through its modes such as *lava, truṭi*, etc., catches hold of the man who is active through the three *tattvas* beginning with *kalā*, and these exist only in the paths of worlds and bodies; that which is the cause of the modes of past, present and future is to be understood as *kāla*; it is that (time) which generates objects of enjoyment for men." (Pāśapaṭala, vv.47-49). Similarly, "(Sages:) *kāla* is recognised by some, O *Īśvara*, to be one, pervasive, eternal. You should tell us, O Lord, why it is not recognised to be so here. *Īśvara*: If time be recognised as one, it would not be different from the activity, (*kriyā*), since for activity of itself, there is not the nature of belonging to the past, (present), and so on. If these (distinctions) be recognised even of that (activity), there is the contingence of that itself being *kāla*. Hence, in the case of things which are present, etc., their ascertainment is through their nature as present, etc., through times which are different. Therefore this *kāla* is not one, but has manifold modes." (*Ibid.*, vv. 53-56). Similarly, "Because of being manifold, while being inert, this (*kāla*) is non-eternal, like the pot. For that which is non-eternal, pervasiveness is excluded."

(*Ibid.*, v. 61) "Sages: *kāla* is said to be non-eternal; how then is there eternality for the souls? Eternality is abiding for eternal time; tell us that O, *Īśvara*. *Īśvara*: eternality is established because of non-determination by time, in the same way as for time (on the view of those who maintain its eternality). Nor is there eternality for time (through abiding in eternal time), because of infinite regress in the case of (this other time)." (*Ibid.*, vv. 64-65).

४२. न च महार्थसंहारे कालस्याप्युपसंहारात्तत्रापि कालान्तरापेक्षेति वाच्यम्; ईश्वरेच्छयैव तदुपपत्तेः। तदुक्तं तत्रैव —

ऋषयः —

मायोत्थत्वेन कालस्य विनाशित्वं व्यवस्थितम्।
कथं महार्थसंहारे नियमः कालतो भवेत्॥

ईश्वरः —

स्वेच्छयैवोपसंहारे नियमं विदधाति सः।
ततः क्रियोपसंहारे कालापेक्षा न संमता॥

प्रळयेऽप्यनुगृह्णाति सृजत्यवति हन्ति च।
तिरोदधाति भगवान्न कालापेक्षया सदा॥ इति॥

(पौ. पाश. प. श्लो. ६८, ७०-७१)

42. Nor may it be said: "*Kāla* too being destroyed at the final deluge, there is need for another *kāla* even then (to determine the period of the deluge, before a fresh creation)," since this (duration of the deluge) is intelligible even through the will of the Lord. That has been said even there: "Sages: as arising from *māyā*, the

perishability of *kāla* is well settled. How, then, can there be temporal regulation when there is the final deluge of all things? *Īśvara*: He dispenses the regulation by his own will, at the time of the deluge. Therefore, the requirement of *kāla* is not admitted in respect of the activities at the destruction. Even during the deluge, the Lord always bestows grace, creates, protects, destroys and conceals, (but) not being dependent on *kāla*." (*Ibid.*, vv. 68, 70–71.)

४३. दिक्तु न तत्त्वान्तरं स्यात्; प्रेरकभोगभोग्यकाण्डेषु नियमेनापेक्षाभावात्। ननु किं सर्वात्मना दिशो न सन्त्येव? न; तास्तु सूर्याद्युपाधिघटिताः साधारणाः प्रतिपदार्थापेक्षया असाधारणाश्च धर्माधर्मव्यवस्थार्थमङ्गीक्रियन्ते॥

43. There is no separate *dik-tattva*, since it is not invariably required in the *preraka-kāṇḍa*, the *bhoga-kāṇḍa* and the *bogya-kāṇḍa*. Now, is it that there are no directions at all? They are admitted, as general, being determined by adjuncts like the sun, and particularly in relation to each thing, for the sake of distinctions of merit and demerit.

४४. नियमनस्य कारणं तत्त्वं नियतिः। इयं च मायाया एव द्वितीयो विकारः। नियमनं तु दुष्कर्मकर्तुस्तत्फलेन योजनम्, सुकृतफलस्याकर्तृसम्बन्धव्यावर्तनम्, तच्छरीरादेः पुरुषान्तरसम्बन्धिभोगाजननं च। इदमेव कार्यं नियतितत्त्वे प्रमाणम्। नियतितत्त्वाभावे हि दुष्कृतफलं न कश्चिदपि भुञ्जीत। परकृतस्यापि सुकृतस्य फलमपरो भुञ्जीत। यज्ञदत्तशरीरमपि देवदत्तस्य भोगं जनयेत्।

44. The *tattva* which is the cause of regulation is *niyati*. And this is the second product of *māyā* itself. Regulation is the linking of the fruit of evil acts with the agent thereof, the specific relation of the fruit of good

deeds with the respective agents and the non-origination by those bodies etc., of enjoyment in the case of other persons. This function is itself the evidence for the category of *niyati*. If indeed there were no *niyati-tattva*, no one would enjoy the fruit of evil deeds, one would enjoy the fruit of another's good deeds, and Yajñadatta's body would produce enjoyment for Devadatta.

४५. ननु दुष्कृतस्य फलजनकत्वनियमात्तदनुपभोगो ह्यप्रसक्त एवा न हि सामग्रीसत्त्वे कार्याभावप्रसक्तिवारणाय तत्त्वान्तरमुपेयते। न च दुष्कृतस्य फलजनकत्वनियमोऽसिद्धः; निषेधकशास्त्रस्यैव तत्र मानत्वात्। एवंसुकृतस्यापि कर्तृगतं फलं प्रत्येव स्वरूपयोग्यत्वादकर्तुः फलभोगोऽप्रसक्तः। अतो न तत्त्वान्तरं तद्वारणायाङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। न हि जलस्य दाहकत्ववारणाय तत्त्वान्तरं स्वीक्रियते। न च तस्य जनकत्वं कर्तृगतफलं प्रत्येवेत्यसिद्धम्; कर्तृगामिफले विहितेनात्मनेपदेन तत्सिद्धेः; "कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात्" (ब्र. सू. २-३-३३) इत्यादिन्यायेन तत्सिद्धेश्च। अन्यथा अनुष्ठानस्य वैफल्यप्रसङ्गाच्च। एवं शरीरस्यापि तत्तत्कर्मार्जितत्वेनैव तत्तद्भोगजनकत्वनियम उपपद्यत इति न तदनुरोधेनापि नियतितत्त्वसिद्धिः। तस्मादन्यथासिद्धत्वान्नियमस्य न तादर्थ्येन नियतिरङ्गीकार्येति, मैवम्; दुष्कृतस्य फलजनकत्वनियमेऽपि न कर्तुः फलभोगनियमः; अन्यस्य फलसम्बन्धेनापि तदुपपत्तेः। एवं सुकृतस्यापि फलजनकत्वमात्रं श्रुत्या अवधारितम्, न तु कर्तरि फलसम्बन्धप्रापकत्वमपि। नन्वात्मनेपदादिना फलस्य कर्तृसम्बन्धोऽवधारित इति चेत् — सत्यम्। अत एव तत्कारणतया नियतितत्त्वमुपेयम्। न च कर्मैव तत्रापि जनकम्; कृष्यादेः सस्यादिकं प्रतीव तस्य फलस्वरूपजनन एव चरितार्थत्वात्; पुरुषविशेषसंबन्धप्रापणाय राजाज्ञादेरिव नियतेरप्यपेक्षितत्वात्। एवं शरीरस्यापि तत्तत्कर्मार्जितत्वेऽपि न नियत्यभावे नियम उपपद्यते। राजाज्ञाभावे तत्तत्कृष्यार्जितस्यापि सस्यादेस्तत्तद्भोगजनकत्वदर्शनात्। ननु सर्वमपीदं नियमनं शिवशक्त्यैव भवतीति नियतिर्व्यर्थेति चेन्न; तस्य क्लृप्ततत्तत्कारणसाहित्येन तत्तत्कार्यजनकतया केवलायास्तज्जनकत्वायोगात्। तस्मान्नियमनाय नियतितत्त्वमङ्गीकार्यम्॥

45. Now, because of evil deeds invariably producing their fruit, there is no contingence at all of their non-enjoyment, so as to cause the admission of another *tattva* to avoid the contingence of the non-existence of the effect when the causal aggregate is present. Nor is there non-establishment of the invariability of evil deeds producing their fruit, since the scared teaching of prohibitions is itself evidence therefor. Similarly, even in the case of good deeds, since they have natural capacity only in respect of the fruit attaching to the agent, there is non-contingence of enjoyment by him who is not an agent. Therefore no other *tattva* need be admitted to avoid that (contingence). Truly, another *tattva* is not admitted to avoid the combustibility of water, nor is it non-established that the productivity of these (good deeds) is only in respect of the fruit attaching to the agent; it is established by the *ātmanepda* (in "*yajeta*", etc.) which lays down the fruit that goes to the agent; further it is established by such arguments as "He is the agent, since sacred teaching is purportful" (*Brahmasūtras* II. iii. 33); otherwise there is the contingence of the futility of observances. Similarly in the case of the body too, since it is earned because of the respective *karmas*, the invariable generation of the enjoyment on the respective *karmas* is intelligible; hence not even in conformity with this, is there the establishment of the *niyatitattva*. Therefore, since regulation is otherwise explained, *niyati* does not have to be accepted for the sake of that. Not so; though the production of fruit by evil deeds be invariable, there is no invariability of the enjoyment of (that) fruit by the agent; since that (production) is intelligible even with the relation of the fruit to another, similarly in the case of good deeds too, the generation of fruit alone is definitely

laid down by scripture, not also the bringing about of the relation of the fruit to the agent. "Now by the *ātmanepada* etc., it is definitely laid down that the fruit relates to the agent (alone)" — if this be said, true; hence it is that as the cause thereof, the *niyati-tattva* has to be admitted; for, *niyati* is required by *karmas*, in the same way as the command of the king, etc. Similarly in the case of the body too, though obtained by the respective *karmas* regulation is not intelligible in the absence of *niyati*; for in the absence of the king's command, the grains, etc., though produced by the agricultural toil of particular (farmers), are not seen to cause enjoyment to those respective (agents). "Now since all this regulation may happen even through *Śiva-śakti*, *niyati* is futile"— if this be said, no; for, since that (*śakti*) produces the respective effects in conjunction with the respective settled causes, the production of these by that alone is impossible. Therefore, *niyati-tattva* should be admitted for the sake of regulation.

४६. नन्वातिवाहिकशरीरानुप्रविष्टेऽसाधारणे नियतितत्त्वे नियमनहेतुत्वसद्भावेऽपि साधारणस्य भुवनाद्याधारस्य न तद्धेतुत्वमिति कथं नियतितत्त्वम्? तत्सद्भावे वा किं मानमिति चेन्न; तज्जातीयत्वेन तस्यापि नियमनजनकत्वात्। तत्सद्भावे त्वागम एव मानम्। तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

समासेनाथ नियतिं शृणुध्वं मुनिपुङ्गवाः।
भोगायाभिप्रवृत्तस्य कलाविद्यादिवृत्तिभिः॥

कर्मणामार्जितानां तु फलापहरणे सति।
तद्विनाशे प्रवृत्तेयं नियतिः शिवशासने॥

न तद्वन्नियमेनापि मलमायाख्यकर्मणाम्।
प्रवृत्ता किन्तु तद्युक्तपुरुषस्यैव हे द्विजाः॥

अपि भोगेष्वनिच्छन्तं नियोजयति सा बलात् ।
स्वार्जितेष्वेव नेहान्यैरार्जितेषु कदाचन ॥

यदि सा न भवेदन्ये भुञ्जीरन्नार्जितं परैः ।
राजाज्ञामन्तरा यद्वद्भुञ्जते दस्यवः परैः ॥

आर्जितानि तथैवेयमसामञ्जस्यनाशिका ।
अनया नियतं तच्च यच्छरीरेन्द्रियादिकम् ॥

अथ चेच्छाङ्करी शक्तिर्या सैव स्यान्नियामिका ।
सत्यं न सा स्वतः किं तु नियतिव्यवधानतः ॥

तत्सम्बन्धाद्विमुच्येरन् सैव चेन्नियतिर्यदि ।
न कर्म स्वफलं पुंसां सम्बन्धयितुमर्हति ॥

कर्मत्वात्कृषिवत्तस्मान्नेह कर्म नियामकम् ॥ इति ॥

(घौ पाश. प. श्लो. ७९-८७)

46. Now, even though the *niyati-tattva* that has entered into the bodies of persons (*ātivāhikas*) qualified (for particular enjoyments) and is thus distinctive, may be the cause of regulation, the *niyati-tattva* which is common as the supports of the worlds, etc., is not such a cause; hence how can there be regulation by it? What is the evidence for the existence of that (regulation)? If this be asked, no; for, as belonging to that class, that (*tattva*) too produces regulation. And in respect of its existence, revelation itself is the evidence. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Listen next briefly to *niyati*, O sages! When for the person who through the functioning of *kalā*, *vidyā*, etc., has set out on enjoyment, there is the contingence of the filching of fruit (by another) in respect of the fruit

acquired (by himself); in order to stop that, there sets out this *niyati* in the Śaiva teaching. It does not do so invariably (in the case of all souls, those in the *śuddhādhvā* being free from *karma*), nor (is it regulative) of *mala*, *māyā* and *karma* (in the same way as it controls souls); but it is active, O twice-born ones, only in respect of the person that is associated with those (*mala*, *māyā*, and *karma*) By its own capacity, it links to enjoyment even those who do not desire it (since it is unpleasant); (it links them) only to those (enjoyments) earned by themselves never to those earned by others. If it did not exist, one would enjoy what has been acquired by another, just as in the absence of the king's rule, the thieves would enjoy what has been earned by others; even in the same way this (*tattva*) is the destroyer of impropriety. Body, organs, (objects of enjoyment) are all regulated by this (*tattva*). Then it may be said that the *śakti* of Śiva may itself be the regulator; true, it is (the regulator), not of itself (directly) but through the interposition of *niyati*. (If this were not so), then, because of being in relation to that (*Śivaśakti*), (all souls) would be released (straightaway without any regulation). *Karma* is not capable of linking its own fruit to souls, since it is *karma* like agricultural activities; therefore, *karma* is not what is regulative here." (Pāśapaṭala, vv.79-87).

४७. आत्मनो दृक्क्रियारूपचैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकं तत्त्वं कला। अभिव्यक्तिश्चाच्छादकमलनिवृत्तिः। सापि नाच्छादकस्य स्वरूपविनाशः; किं त्वाच्छादनशक्तिविनाशेन तद्विशिष्टशक्तिनिवृत्तिः। शैवालोदकन्यायेन कार्याक्षमत्वम्। एतत्सद्भावे मानं तु चैतन्याच्छादकस्य निवृत्तिः असाधारणकिञ्चिदायत्ता, कार्यत्वात्, संमतवत्, इत्यनुमानम्। अदृष्टादेः साधारणत्वान्न तेनार्थान्तरत्वम्। इयं च पुंसां कर्मानुसारेण मलस्यैकदेशनिवर्तनं करोति। उक्तं च —

चैतन्यं ज्ञत्वकर्तृत्वरूपं तद्बलमात्मनः ।
कलया व्यज्यते तत्तु तस्यैव हि तिरस्कृतम् ॥

सर्वात्मना कला नैतच्चैतन्यं व्यञ्जयत्यणोः ।
किं तु कर्मानुसारेण कला वृत्त्यैकदेशतः ॥ इति ॥

47. The *tattva* that is the manifester of the soul's cognitive and conative intelligence is *kalā*. Manifestation is the removal of obscuration. And that is not the destruction of the existence of what obstructs; but, through the removal of the capacity to obscure, it is the removal of that which possesses that capacity, *i.e.*, making it incapable of practical utility on the analogy of the moss in the water, (where it has been temporarily cleared). The evidence for the existence of this (*tattva*) is this inference: the removal of what obstructs intelligence is dependent on some distinctive cause, since it is an effect, like what is admitted (by both of us). Since *adṛṣṭa*, etc., are non-distinctive, by these that (inference) is not otherwise satisfied. And this (*tattva*) in accordance with the *karma* of souls, effects the partial removal of *mala*. That has been said: "Intelligence is of the nature of knowership and agency; its full force is mainfested for the soul by *kalā*; that *kalā*, however, is the destroyer of that alone; *kalā* does not manifest the soul's intelligence fully but only partially through the functioning of it in accordance with *karma*."

४८. ननु दृक्क्रियाशक्त्यभिव्यक्तिर्बुद्धिधर्मेण यत्नेन भवतु; यत्नस्य चाभिव्यञ्जकत्वं त्वयाप्यभ्युपेयम्; अन्यथा मृत्पिण्डादिगोचरयत्नं विनापि कलामात्रेण दृक्क्रियाभिव्यक्त्या कुलालादेर्घटादिकर्तृत्वापत्तेरिति चेन्न; तस्य दृक्क्रियाशक्त्यभिव्यक्त्यनन्तरभावित्वेनाभिव्यञ्जकत्वानुपपत्तेः। तथा हि — मृत्पिण्डादिगोचरो यत्नो मृदादिगोचरेण ज्ञानेन। तदपि मनोव्यापारेण।

सोऽपि तद्गोचरेणाधिष्ठानेन। अधिष्ठानं चाभिव्यक्तदृक्क्रियाशक्तिरूपम्। न च तदभिव्यक्तिर्यत्नेन सम्भवति; यत्नस्याप्यभिव्यक्त्यधीनमनोव्यापाराधीनत्वात्। तस्मादन्यत्र यत्नस्य दृक्क्रियाशक्त्यभिव्यञ्जकत्वेऽपि प्राथमिके मनोव्यापारादौ कलाया एव दृक्क्रियाशक्त्यभिव्यञ्जकत्वमभ्युपेयम्। तस्माद्दृक्क्रियाशक्त्यभिव्यक्तये कलातत्त्वमभ्युपेयम्॥

48. Now, let the manifestation of cognitive and conative energy be through effort, an attribute of the intellect, since you must admit of it the property of manifesting; otherwise, even without the effort relating to the lump of clay, etc., and through the manifestation of cognitive and conative energies by *kalā* alone, there is the contingence of the creatorship of the pot, etc., for the potter, and so on. If this be said, no; for, since effort comes into being after the manifestation of cognitive and conative energies, its being their manifester is unintelligible. It is thus: the effort relating to the lump of clay, etc., is through, the cognition relating to the clay, etc.; that again is through the functioning of *manas*; that too is through the substrate relating to it; and the substrate is of the nature of the non-manifest cognitive and conative energies. Nor is it of manifested form. Nor is its manifestation possible through effort, since effort is dependent on the functioning of *manas*, which is dependent on manifestation. Therefore, though it (effort) may elsewhere be the manifester of cognition and conation, in the first functioning of the *manas*, etc., it should be admitted that the manifestation of cognitive and conative energies is only through *kalā*. Therefore, for the manifestation of cognitive and conative energies, *kalā-tattva* should be admitted.

४९. कलोद्वलितचैतन्यानां पुंसां विषयेषु प्रवर्तकं तत्त्वं विद्या। बुद्धिसंवेदनं सकरणम्, क्रियात्वात्, संमतवदित्यनुमानेनेयं सिद्धा। तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे—

कलया कर्तृभूतस्य बुद्धिलक्षणकर्मणः ।
आलोकने यत्करणं सा विद्या शिवशासने ॥

बुद्धिर्हि कर्म ग्राह्यत्वादात्मनो घटकुड्यवत् ।
ग्राह्यं करणसापेक्षं दृष्टं रूपादिकं यथा ॥

ततस्तु चक्षुराद्यैश्च क्रमेणार्थे विनिश्चिते ।
बुद्ध्यन्तैर्निश्चितार्थैस्तां पुमान् संवेत्ति विद्यया ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पाश. प. श्लो. ९-११)

49. The *tattva*, which prompts in respect of objects, persons whose intelligence have been reinforced by *kalā*, is *vidyā*. The cognition of the intellect has a distinctive cause (*karaṇa*), since it is an act, like what is admitted; by this inference this (*vidyātattva*) is established. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "In him who has become agent through *kalā*, that which is the distinctive cause (*karaṇa*) in the cognitive act characteristic of the intellect, is *vidyā*, in the Śaiva teaching. Intellect, indeed, is an object since like pot, wall, etc., it is an object of apprehension; the object of apprehension, like colour, etc., is seen to require a distinctive cause; and then, when the object is gradually ascertained through these which begin with the sense of sight and end with the intellect, the person knows those ascertained objects, through *vidyā*."(Pāśapaṭala, vv. 9-11).

५०. न च मनसा अर्थान्तरत्वम्। तद्व्यापाराधीननिश्चयायत्तत्वात्। बुद्धिव्यापारस्य च बुद्धिसंवेदनायत्तत्वात्। तस्माद्बुद्धिसंवेदनस्य मनोव्यापारात्पूर्वभावितया न तत्र मनो जनकम्। मनसः सङ्कल्पादिमात्रहेतुत्वेनैव सिद्धत्वाच्च। यद्यपि चिच्छक्त्यभिव्यक्तौ बुद्धिप्रकाशो हेतुतयाऽवश्यं कल्पनीयः; तथापि बुद्धिप्रकाशानुकूलेन्द्रियादिगोचरचिच्छक्त्यभिव्यक्त्यादौ विद्यैव हेतुः॥

50. Nor is the inference satisfied otherwise by the (admission of) *manas*, since its functioning is dependent on certitude which is the function of *buddhi*; and the functioning of the *buddhi* is dependent on the cognition of the intellect. Therefore, the cognition of the intellect, being prior to the cognition of the functioning of *manas*, the former is not generated by the mind; further, *manas* is established as the cause of cognition and conation alone. Though in the manifestation of intelligence, the illumination of the intellect is necessarily to be assumed as a cause, yet in that manifestation of intelligence which relates to the organs, etc., favourable to the illumination of the intellect, *vidyā* alone is the cause.

५१. विषयानुरञ्जकं तत्त्वं रागः । तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

कलातो जायते रागः सद्यः पुंसां प्रवृत्तये ।
अनिच्छन्नहि भुञ्जानो दृश्यते क्वचिदप्यणुः ।
रागाद्भोग्येषु सक्तत्वाद्भोग्यं भोक्तुमतोऽर्हति ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पाशप. श्लो. २६-२७)

अयं च प्राथमिकेन्द्रियादिव्यापारानुकूलेच्छाशक्त्यभिव्यञ्जकत्वेन सिद्धः। अन्यत्र बुद्धिधर्मस्याभिषङ्गाभिव्यञ्जकत्वेऽपि तत्र रागतत्त्वस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वात्। तथा बुद्धिधर्मस्याभिषङ्गहेतुत्वेनापि तत्सिद्धिर्द्रष्टव्या ॥

51. The *tattva* that causes attachment to objects is *rāga*. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "From *kalā* arises *rāga* for causing immediate activity in souls. No soul is indeed seen to enjoy even though not desiring. Because of being attached to enjoyments by *rāga*, he becomes capable of enjoying objects of enjoyment." (*Ibid.* vv. 26-27). And this is established by that manifestation of *icchā-śakti* which is favourable to the first functioning of the organs. Though elsewhere, (*rāga* as)

an attribute of the intellect, is the manifester of attachment, what manifests (even) here is the *rāga-tattva*; hence, the establishment of that (*tattva*) is to be understood even as the cause of the attachment, that is an attribute of the intellect.

५२. ननु तत्र सुखादिसाधनताज्ञानमेव जनकम्। न च विरक्तस्य तस्मिन्सत्यपि अभिषङ्गो नोपलभ्यत इति युक्तम्; तत्र तस्य विषयदोषदर्शनादिना तदनुत्पत्तेस्त्वयाप्यभ्युपेयत्वात्। अन्यथा रागतत्वेन तत्र तस्य त्वन्मतेऽप्यभिषङ्गोत्पत्तेरप्रतीकारात्। नियतविषयाभिलाषं प्रति रागतत्वस्य हेतुत्वायोगेन सुखादिसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव हेतुत्वौचित्याच्च। तस्माद्बुद्धिधर्मोऽभिषङ्गो विषयसौन्दर्यायत्तो न रागतत्वाधीन इति, मैवम्; विषयसौन्दर्याधीनस्यापि विषयविशेषाभिषङ्गस्य माञ्जिष्ठकादिरागस्य त्रिफलाकषायाधीनत्ववदिच्छाशक्तिसामान्याभिव्यञ्जकरागतत्वाधीनत्वात्॥

52. Now, the generator here is but the cognition of instrumentality to happiness, etc. Nor does it stand to reason to say that attachment is not seen for the non-attached person even when that (knowledge) exists; for you too have to admit then, that (attachment) does not arise because of the perception of defect in the object, and so on; otherwise, the origination of attachment for him through *rāga-tattva* is irremediable even on your view. Further, since the *rāga-tattva* cannot be the cause of the desire for particular objects, it is meet that the cause is only the knowledge of instrumentality to happiness, etc. Therefore, attachment which is an attribute of the intellect is dependent on the attractiveness of the object, not dependent on the *rāga-tattva*. Not so; attachment to particular objects, though dependent on the attractiveness of the object, is dependent on the *rāga-tattva* which is the manifester of *icchā-śakti* in general, in the same way as the colour *māñjiṣṭhaka*, etc., is dependent on the colour of the decoction of *triphalā*.

५३. आत्मनः प्रकृतिभोक्तृत्वप्रयोजकं तत्वं पुरुषतत्वम्। इदं च कलादिपञ्चकञ्चुकेनाविद्यया चारब्धम्। एतच्च सकलस्यैवाणोर्भोजकम्। न विज्ञानप्रळयाकलयोः। तयोः कलादिसंस्पर्शाभावात्। न च कलादिकमेव तत्र प्रयोजकमस्तु, किमन्तरा तत्वान्तरेणेति वाच्यम्। तस्य कार्यान्तर-जनकतयैव क्लृप्तत्वादिहापि तस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वे तत्वसाङ्कर्यप्रसङ्गात्; विज्ञानाकलस्येव सकलस्यापि भोक्तृत्वायोगाच्च। नाप्यविद्यादिः पुंस्त्व-प्रयोजकः; कलाद्यभावे पुंसः कर्तृत्वायोगात्। तस्मात्प्राकृताविद्यादिसहित-कलाद्यारब्धं प्राकृतभोगप्रयोजकं पुंस्तत्वमभ्युपेयम्।

53. The *tattva* that causes enjoyership for the soul in respect of *prakṛti* is the *puruṣa-tattva*. And this is produced by the five sheaths of *kalā*, etc., and by *avidyā*. And this causes enjoyment to *sakala* souls alone, not to *vijñānākalas* or *pralayākalas*, since for them there is no contact of *kalā*, etc. Nor may it be said, "*kalā* etc., be themseleves the cause (of enjoyment); why the need for another *tattva*?" For, these being settled to cause only other *kalā*, etc., if here too that itself were the cause, there would be confusion among *tattvas*. Further, enjoyership is impossible in the case of *sakala* also, as in the case of *vijñānākala*. Nor do *avidyā*, etc., cause *puṁstattva*, since in the absence of *kalā*, etc., the person cannot be an agent. Therefore, there must be admitted the *puṁstattva* which is a product of *prakṛti*, is produced by *kalā*, etc., in conjunction with *avidyā*, etc., and is the cause of the enjoyment of *prakṛti*.

५४. उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

पञ्चकञ्चुकसंयुक्तः प्रकृतिं भोक्तुमुद्यतः।
अविद्यादिसमायुक्तः पुरुषः परिकीर्तितः॥

न विज्ञानाकलस्तेन नापि प्रळयकेवलः ।
पुरुषाख्यां लभेद्यस्मान्नाविद्यादिविवर्जितः ॥
तस्मात्सकल एवाणुर्लभते पुरुषाह्वयम् ।
कलादिपञ्चकस्यैव यदि पुंस्त्वे निमित्तता ॥
तदा प्रकृतिभोक्तृत्वं न स्याज्ज्ञानाकले यथा ।
तथाऽविद्यादिमात्रस्य नापि पुंस्त्वे निमित्तता ॥
कलाद्यभावे कर्तृत्वाभावाद्भोक्ता कथं भवेत् ।
प्राकृतो यस्त्वविद्यादिः पुंसां पुंस्त्वमलः स्मृतः ॥
तदाक्रान्तः कलाद्याढ्यः पुरुषस्तेन संमतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १-६)

प्रयोगश्च — अणोः प्रकृतिभोगः प्रतिनियतकिञ्चिदायत्तः, कार्यत्वात्, संमतवदिति । इदं च तत्वं प्रतिपुरुषनियतमेव ॥

54. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "He who is associated with the five sheaths, is intent on the enjoyment of *prakṛti*, and is conjoined with *avidyā*, is called *puruṣa*. Neither the *vijñānākala* nor the *pralayākala* attains that (*tattva*) which is called *puruṣa*, for the reason that he is not devoid of *avidyā*, etc.; the *sakala* soul alone attains what is called *puruṣa*. If the five, beginning with *kalā*, were themselves the cause of *puṁstattva*, then there could be no enjoyership of *prakṛti* any more than for *vijñānākalas*. Similarly, *avidyā*, etc., are not of themselves the cause of *puṁstattva*. Since there is no agency in the absence of *kalā*, etc., how can he become an enjoyer? He, who is overpowered by *avidyā*, etc., which are related to *prakṛti* and are known as the *puṁstva-mala* of persons, and is endowed, with *kalā*, etc., is, therefore,

admitted to be a *puruṣa*." (Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 1-6). The inference too (is thus). The soul's enjoyership of *prakṛti* has *puṁstattva* for cause, since it is an effect, like what is admitted. And this *tattva* is distinctive for each individual.

५५. ननु दीक्षायां पुंस्तत्वे भुवनान्युक्तानि। कथं तेषां तत्रावस्थानमिति चेदुच्यते। गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादिवद्भोग्यतया पुरुषसन्निकृष्टायाः प्रकृतेर्मस्तक एव तेषामवस्थानसम्भवात्। उक्तं च तत्र —

दीक्षायां च पुरा पुंसि भुवनान्युदितानि हि।
कथमत्र स्थितिस्तेषां छिन्धि सन्देहजं तमः॥

ईश्वरः —

यत्र लक्षणया वृत्त्या भुवनस्थितिरीरिता।
ततस्तत्प्रान्तवर्तिन्यां प्रकृतावेव कल्प्यताम्॥
गङ्गायां ग्राम इत्युक्ते तत्तटे कल्प्यते यथा॥ इति॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. ७-९)

एतानि मायादीनि पुरुषान्तानि सप्त तत्त्वानि शुद्धाशुद्धरूपाणि भोजयितृकाण्ड इत्यभिधीयन्ते॥

55. Now in *dīkṣā* there are mentioned *bhuvanas* (worlds) as existing in *puṁstattva*. How can these exist therein? If this be asked, the reply is: as in "the village on the Ganges", it is possible for them to exist on top of the *prakṛti* itself which is in the proximity of *puruṣas* as their object of enjoyment. And there it has been said: "In the *dīkṣā*, however, there have been declared *bhuvanas* in *puṁstattva*. How can these exist there? Rend this veil of darkness born of doubt. *Īśvara*:

the existence of worlds is declared by secondary implication (of the words); therefore, we shall assume them to exist only in *prakṛti* which exists in their proximity, just as when it is said 'the village on the Ganges' the bank thereof is assumed (as the meaning)." (*Pauṣkara*, Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 7-9). These seven *tattvas* beginning with *māyā* and ending with *puruṣa*, which are pure and impure are said to constitute the *bhojayitṛ-kāṇḍa*.

५६. गुणादिपृथिव्यन्तमूलोपादानं प्रकृतिः। इयं च श्रीकण्ठशक्तिक्षोभ्या कलातो जायते। ननु गुणोपादानं न प्रकृतिः; किं तु साम्यावस्थां प्राप्ता गुणा एव। ते च परमकारणम्। कार्यत्वे मानाभावात्। तत एव महदहङ्कारादयः प्रकृतिविकृतिरूपा जायन्त इति चेन्न; गुणानां जडत्वे सत्यनेकत्वेन कार्यतया परमकारणत्वायोगात्। न च गुणानां नानात्वेऽपि तेषां साम्यमेकमेव। तदेव च प्रकृतिरिति युक्तम्; साम्यस्यैकत्वेऽपि गुणानां नानात्वेनोपादानसापेक्षतया उपादानान्तरस्य कल्पनीयत्वात्। गुणवैषम्ये सति साम्यस्योपादानस्य निवृत्त्या कार्यस्यापि निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च। तेषां गुणत्वान्न तत्त्वेषु गणना। उक्तं च —

गुणादिक्षितिपर्यन्तं तत्त्वजातं यतो भवेत्।
तदव्यक्तमिति प्रोक्तं क्षोभ्यं श्रीकण्ठविक्रमैः॥

ऋषयः —

गुणा एव समावस्थां प्राप्ताः प्रकृतिरुच्यते।
तत्कथं तदुपादानं प्रकृतिः प्रतिपाद्यते॥

ईश्वरः —

न गुणानां समावस्था प्रकृतिः शिवशासने॥
अचेतनत्वेनैकत्वाद्गुणानां मुनिपुङ्गवाः॥
इष्टं कारणपूर्वत्वं तत्तु प्रकृतिसंज्ञितम्॥ इति॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १८ - २१)

56. *Prakṛti* is the primal material cause of all those beginning with *guṇas* and ending with the earth. This arises from *kalā*, as agitated by *Śrīkaṇṭhaśakti*. Now *prakṛti* is not the material cause of *guṇas*, but only the *guṇas* in a state of equilibrium (constitute *prakṛti*). They are the primal cause, since there is no evidence of their being products; thence alone arise *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc., which are evolvements and evolutes. If this be said, no; *guṇas* being manifold, while being inert, are products; hence they cannot be the primal cause. Now, though *guṇas* are manifold; their equipoise is but one; and that itself is called *prakṛti*. This cannot be said, since though the equipoise is one, the *guṇas* being manifold, there is need for a material cause; some material cause other than those (*guṇas*) has to be assumed. When there is disparity among the *guṇas*, the equipoise said to be the material cause, ceases and there is the contingence of the cessation of the product too. Since they are qualities (*guṇas*) they are not reckoned among the *tattvas*. And it has been said: "That whereupon comes the host of *tattvas* from *guṇa* to the earth, that is said to be the *avyakta*, which is agitated by this energy of *Śrīkaṇṭha*. Sages: *guṇas* alone in a state of equipoise are said to be *prakṛti*, then how is *prakṛti* said to be the material cause? *Īśvara*: the state of equipoise of the *guṇas* is not *prakṛti* in Śaiva teaching; since *guṇas*, O sages, are non-intelligent and manifold, they are recognised to have a cause; and that is named *prakṛti*." (*Ibid.* vv. 18-21).

५७. एतानि कलादिपर्यन्तानि सप्त तत्त्वानि भोजयितृकाण्ड इत्युच्यन्ते। अस्मादेव प्रकृतितत्त्वाद्वैषम्योन्मुखगुणत्रयरूपं ज्ञानोल्लेखमात्रजनकं गुणाव्यक्तापरपर्यायं चित्ताख्यं तत्त्वमुत्पद्यते। चित्तं महान् गुणः अव्यक्तमिति कार्यमायापरपर्यायप्रकृत्यधोभागपर्यायनामानि। अयं च गुणः सत्त्वरजस्तमोभेदेन त्रिविधः। तत्र प्रकाशवृत्तिकं सत्त्वम्। प्रवृत्त्यादिवृत्तिकं रजः। नियमनादिवृत्तिकं तमः। उक्तं च —

क्रिया प्रकाशनिष्ठात्मा रजादिगुण ईरितः ॥

तथा —

स्थैर्यं धैर्यं तथा दाक्ष्यं मार्दवं लघुतापि च ।
सन्तोषमार्जवं शौचं व्यवसायः क्षमा स्मृतिः ॥

सौहित्यं परमौत्सुक्यं दान्तिः शान्तिर्दया परा ।
सत्त्वस्य वृत्तयः प्रोक्ताः रजसश्चाथ कथ्यते ॥

शौर्यं क्रौर्यं महोत्साहः साभिमानः सकल्कता ।
दाढर्यं च निर्दयत्वं च भोगो डम्भो रजोगुणाः ॥

अरतिर्मन्दता दैन्यं पैशुन्यं गुरुता तथा ।
निद्राधिक्यं मदालस्यं निरोधो मूढता च या ॥

तमसो वृत्तयः प्रोक्ता विभिन्नाः सर्वजन्तुषु ।
एवं संक्षेपतो विप्रा गुणतत्त्वमुदाहृतम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. २१; ३७ - ४१)

57. These seven *tattvas*, ending with *kalā*, etc., are referred to as *bhojayitṛkāṇḍa*. From this same *prakṛti-tattva* there arise the *tattva* called *citta* which is of the nature of the *guṇas* about to become disparate, which is the generator of the mere prefiguring of cognition and which has other names as *guṇa* and *avyakta*. *Citta, mahān, guṇa* and *avyakta* are synonymous names of the evolute of *prakṛti*, also known as *kārya-māyā*. And this *guṇa* is three-fold, as divided into *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. Of these, that whose function is illumination is *sattva*; that whose function is actuation, etc., is *rajas*; that whose function is restraint, etc., is *tamas*. And it has been said: "*Rajas* and other *guṇas* are said to be

of the nature of activity, illumination and inertia. Steadfastness, courage, skill, softness, buoyancy, contentment, straight-forwardness, purity, industry, patience, remembrance, friendliness, eagerness, equanimity, calmness, mercy — these are said to be the functions of *sattva*. Next are related those of *rajas*: bravery, cruelty, great joy, conceit, wickedness, strength, mercilessness, enjoyment and ostentation are the qualities of *rajas*. Non-satisfaction, dullness, weakness, tale-bearing, heaviness, excess of sleep, stupor, laziness, confinement and stupidity — these are said to be the different functions of *tamas* in all creatures. Thus has been explained briefly the *guṇa-tattva*, O sages!" (*Ibid.*, vv. 21; 37-41)

५८. यद्यपीन्द्रियतन्मात्रादीनां अहंकाराख्यैकतत्त्वोपादानकत्वेऽपि यथा नैकतत्त्वता तथा गुणानामप्येकतत्त्वता न युक्ता; तथापि सम्भूयैव कार्यकारित्वेन तत्त्वैक्यं युक्तम्। न च सर्वत्र कार्ये सर्वस्य गुणस्य जनकतया 'इदं सात्त्विकमिदं राजसम्' इत्यादिव्यपदेशः कथमिति युक्तम्; तत्तद्वृत्तीनां प्रकाशादीनां प्राचुर्येण तस्योपपत्तेः। गुणसद्भावे मानं तु — सुखदुःखमोहादिकं किञ्चिज्जन्यम्; कार्यत्वात्, संमतवदिति। न च विषयविशेषज्ञानेनैव तदुपपत्तिः; एकस्यैव वनितादेर्विषयस्य पुरुषभेदेन सुखदुःखादिजनकत्वात्। तथा हि — चैत्रस्य पद्मावत्यां प्रीतिः, तामविन्दतो मैत्रस्य दुःखम्, तत्सपत्नीनां च मात्सर्यान्मोहः। पद्मावत्यां च सर्वे भावा व्याख्याताः। न च स्वीयत्वपरकीयत्वाभ्यां विशेषः; साधारणेऽपि सङ्गीतादौ पुरुषभेदेन सौमनस्यवैमनस्यादेर्दर्शनात्। न च तथापि गुणक्रियारब्धे विषये कथं पुरुषभेदेन सुखदुःखादिकमिति युक्तम्; यस्य गुणस्य यदा यं प्रत्युद्भवस्तदा तं प्रति तत्कार्यं सुखादिकमुत्पद्यत इति व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः।

58. Though the *indriyas, tanmātras,* etc., have the *ahaṅkāra-tattva* as their material cause, they are independent *tattvas*; thus there is not any inappropriateness in the *guṇas* not being a single *tattva*; yet since they produce even

single effect only in conjunction, their being a single *tattva* stands to reason. Nor does it stand to reason to ask how it is possible to speak of this as *sāttvika* and this (other) as *rājasa* since in all products all the *guṇas* are the causes; for that is intelligible through the preponderance of the respective functions, such as brightness. The evidence for the existence of *guṇa* is this: pleasure, pain, delusion, etc., are generated by something, since they are products, like what is admitted. Nor is this intelligible even through the cognition of particular objects. For even a single object, *e.g.*, a damsel, produces pleasure, pain, etc., through differences in the persons (affected). It is thus: Caitra experiences pleasure from Padmāvatī; for Maitra who has not obtained her, there is pain; for her co-wives there is envy and delusion; all these dispositions have been explained through (the single illustration of) Padmāvatī. Nor is there difference (in the experiences) because of (the object) being one's own or being another's. For even in what is common, like music, there are seen pleasure, pain, etc., because of difference in the persons. Nor does it stand to reason to ask, "Even according to you, in respect of objects produced by the activity of *guṇas*, how can there be pleasure, pain, etc., through differences in the persons?" For a distinction is intelligible in the way, that when a particular *guṇa* arises for a particular person, then for that person, that product generates pleasure, etc., (its appropriate function).

५९. अस्मादेव चित्ततत्त्वादुद्भूतसत्त्वं न्यग्भूतरजस्तमस्कं बुद्धितत्त्वमुपजायते। सा बुद्धिर्द्विविधा। अध्यवसायिनी अनध्यवसायिनी चेति। तत्राध्यवसायिन्यां बुद्धौ संस्कारस्यावस्थानम्। एतत्सद्भावे मानं तु इष्टापूर्तादिजनितमपूर्वं किञ्चिदाश्रयकम्, संस्कारत्वात्, संमतवत्। न चात्मनां तदाश्रयत्वम्; विकारित्वप्रसङ्गात्। तथा निश्चयः किञ्चिदायत्तः, कार्यत्वात्,

संमतवत्। तथा धर्मज्ञानादयो गुणाः किञ्चिन्निष्ठाः, गुणत्वात्, संमतवत्; तथा स्मृतिजनकसंस्काराश्रयत्वेनापि तत्सिद्धिः।

59. From this same *citta-tattva* arises the *buddhi-tattva* wherein *sattva* is predominant while *rajas* and *tamas* are subordinate. That *buddhi* is two-fold: determinative and non-determinative. In the non-determinative intellect resides residual impression (*saṁskāra*). The evidence for its existence is thus: the *apūrva* generated by sacrificial acts and acts like digging wells, has some locus, since it is a residual impression, like what is admitted. Nor can the soul be its locus, because of the contingence of mutability. Similarly, ascertainment is dependent on something, since it is an act, like what is admitted. Similarly, the qualities, merits, etc., reside in something, since they are qualities, like what is admitted. This being the case, there is the establishment of that (*tattva*) even as the generator (of ascertainment) and as the locus of residual impression.

६०. उक्तञ्च —

गुणतत्त्वापरा बुद्धिरभवन्मुनिपुङ्गवाः।
रजस्तमोभ्यां न्यग्भूता वृत्तिः सत्त्वेन चोत्कटा॥

सा बुद्धिरुदिता तन्त्रे विषयाध्यवसायिनी।
बोधोऽत्र द्विविधो प्रोक्तो विषयाध्यवसायकः॥

अन्योऽनध्यवसायात्मा व्यवसायात्मकस्तु यः।
सा बुद्धिरितरस्त्वात्मस्वभावो ग्राहकात्मनः॥

किञ्च प्रपातटाकादिक्रियाः क्लृप्ताः फलार्थिभिः।
समनन्तरमेवेह न यच्छन्ति फलानि तु॥

आमुष्मिकत्वात्किं तूर्ध्वं विनष्टा अपि ताः क्रियाः ।
फलकालानुवर्तित्वात् संस्कारोऽपूर्वसंज्ञितः ॥
कल्प्यते न स पुंसि स्याद्विकारित्वेन हेतुना ।
कृष्यादेरपि संस्कारो न पुंसि परिदृश्यते ॥
कुर्वन्ति यत्र संस्कारं क्रिया साष्टगुणा मता ।
एवं ज्ञानादिसंस्कारोऽप्यूह्यतां मुनिपुङ्गवाः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. ४२-४९)

60. And it has been said: "*Buddhi* arises subsequent to the *guṇa-tattva*, O sages. In it *sattva* is predominant, while *rajas* and *tamas* are subordinate. That *buddhi* is said, in the Tantra, to be determinative of objects. The function of *buddhi* is two-fold, being of the nature of disposition and determination; the first of these is non-determinative in nature. That which is of determinative nature is the intellect; the other, however, is of the nature of the apprehending soul (*i.e.*, of the nature of *citśakti*). Further, acts like the construction of wells and tanks performed by those desirous of the fruit do not bring about their fruit immediately even here but ony subsequently since that (fruit) belongs to the hereafter; therefore these acts though having perished, yet persist till the time of the fruit; hence a residual impression called *apūrva* is assumed; that cannot be in the soul, because of his being subject to change (in that case); the residual impressions even of farming, etc., are not seen in the soul; that wherein acts create impressions is the intellect with eight qualities. Similarly are to be inferred residual impressions of cognition, etc., as well, O sages." (*Ibid.*, vv. 42-49)

६१. ते चाष्टगुणाः धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्याधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याणि। तत्र धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्याणि सात्त्विक्यो वृत्तयः। अवैराग्यं तु राजसम्। अधर्माज्ञानानैश्वर्याणि तामसानि। अत्र धर्मो द्विविधः यमो, नियमश्चेति। तत्र यमः पञ्चविधः,

अहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयं ब्रह्मचर्यमकल्कता। इति॥

नियमोऽपि पञ्चविधः,

अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचं संतोष आर्जवम्। इति॥

61. Those eight qualities are: merit, knowledge, non-attachment, lordly powers, demerit, ignorance, attachment, and absence of lordly powers. Of these, *dharma*, *jñāna*, *vairāgya* and *aiśvarya* are *sāttvika* modes; *avairāgya* is *rājasa*; the remaining three are *tāmasa*. Of these *dharma* is two-fold, *yama* and *niyama*. *Yama* is five-fold: "non-injury, truth, non-stealing, continence and non-wickedness." *Niyama* too is five-fold: "non-anger, service of the preceptor, purity, contentment, and straightforwardness."

६२. तत्राहिंसा नाम परेषु द्रुह्यत्स्वपि तेषु दुःखानुत्पादनम्। शास्त्रीयहिंसाप्याहिंसा। सत्यं तु आपद्भीतिगतेनाप्यसत्यानुल्लेखः। गुरुदेवताब्राह्मणार्थेऽसत्योल्लेखश्च सत्यम्। अस्तेयं नाम अनीत्या परवित्तस्य स्वीकाराभावः। श्रुतदृष्टविशिष्टवस्तुनस्तृणीकारोऽपि। ब्रह्मचर्यं नाम प्रार्थयन्त्यामपि स्त्रियां मातृवद्बुद्धिः, विकाराभावोऽपि। अपकारेऽपि कालुष्याभावोऽकल्कता। एते च यमाः पञ्च। अक्रोधो नाम ताडनेऽपि कोपाभावः। गुरुशुश्रूषा नाम गुर्वादीनामाज्ञानुपालनम्, नित्यादिकर्मसु श्रद्धा च। शौचं नाम मृदम्भोभिः शरीरशोधनम्, भावशुद्धिश्च। संतोषो नाम लाभालाभयोः समत्वम्। आर्जवं नाम कौटिल्याभावः। एते पञ्च नियमाः। ज्ञानं तु दशविधम्। तन्मुक्तिप्रकरणे वक्ष्यते। वैराग्यमपि व्याध्यादिसकलविषयानुभवतृप्तयाध्यात्मिकादिदुःख - द्रव्यार्जनादिदुःख - स्निग्धवियोग-स्त्रीदोषदर्शनदेहदुष्पूरताप्रतिग्रहादिशास्त्रज्ञानहेतुकं प्राक्तनपुण्यपरिपाकमात्रहेतुकं चेति

दशविधम्। ऐश्वर्यमप्यणिमादिभेदेनाष्टविधम्। तल्लक्षणमप्युदाहरिष्यमाण-वचनेषु स्फुटम्। अधर्मोऽपि हिंसा-चौर्य-मिथ्याकथनागम्यागमनापकार-प्रत्यपकार-मात्सर्य-नित्यकर्मादिलोपाशौचासंतोष-कौटिल्यभेदेन दशविधः। अज्ञानमपि तमो-मोह-महामोह-तामिस्रान्धतामिस्रभेदेन पञ्चविधम्। तत्र तमो नामानात्मन्यात्मभावः। तच्च चार्वाकादिदर्शनभेदेन दशविधम्। मोहो नाम अणिमाद्यष्टैश्वर्यसिद्धौ तत्परत्वप्रतिपत्तिः। महामोहस्तु दिव्यादिव्यभेदेन दशधा भिन्नेषु शब्दादिषु परत्वाध्यवसायः। तामिस्रो नाम दिव्यादिव्यभेदेन दशविधानां शब्दादीनां अणिमाद्यष्टकस्य च नाशात्तापः। अन्धतामिस्रो नाम शब्दादिष्वणिमादिषु च परेण भुज्यमानेषु तदसहनम्। अवैराग्यमप्यतुष्टिवैचित्र्याच्छतविधम्। अनैश्वर्यमप्यष्टविधम्। इदञ्चाशक्तिवशाद्भवति, अशक्तिश्च षट्सप्तत्यधिकशतसङ्ख्याका। एवं च धर्मो दशविधः। ज्ञानमशीतिः। शतसङ्ख्यो विरागः। चतुष्षष्टिविधमैश्वर्यम्। अधर्मो दशविधः। अज्ञानं चतुष्षष्टिः। अवैराग्यं शतम्। अनैश्वर्यं चतुरशीत्यधिकं शतम्। आहत्य बुद्धेर्वृत्तयो द्वादशाधिकषट्छतसङ्ख्याकाः।

62. What is called non-injury is not causing pain to others though they may be enemies; such injury as is prescribed by the sacred teaching is also non-injury. Truth is non-utterance of a falsehood even by him who is in fear of danger; the utterance of a falsehood for the sake of one's preceptor or a deity or a brahmin is truth. What is called non-stealing is the non-appropriaion of another's possessions which have not been gifted to one; it is also the making light of valuable things heard of or seen. What is called continence (*brahmacarya*) is to treat as a mother even a woman who solicits. To be free from mental blemish even when injured is non-wickedness. These are the five *yamas*. What is called non-anger is the absence of anger even when beaten. What is called service of the preceptor is the carrying out of the commands of the preceptor, etc.; also faith in obligatory and other such rites. What is called purity is the purification of

the body by water, and purity of the disposition. What is called contentment is equanimity in gain and loss. Straightforwardness is the absence of crookedness. These are the five *niyamas*. *Jñāna* is of ten kinds. They will be declared in the section on release. Non-attachment too is of ten kinds, generated by (1) disease, etc., (2) satisfaction at the enjoyment of all material objects, (3-5) the three kinds of misery, internal, external and elemental, (6-8) the misery in acquiring, preserving and spending wealth, (9) the loss of friends, and (10) the perception of defect (in the objects of enjoyment); it has as its cause either knowledge of the sacred teaching in this life or the maturation of merit from a former life. Lordly powers are eight-fold divided into *aṇimā*, etc. Their characteristics will be clear from the texts to be cited below. *Adharma* too is of ten kinds: injuriousness, utterance of falsehood, going with those with whom one should not go, stealing, jealousy, anger, neglect of obligatory rites, impurity, discontent, and crookedness. *Ajñāna* too is five-fold, divided into *tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra, andhatāmisra.* What is called *tamas,* is the conceit of non-self in the self; and that is ten-fold being divided into the system of the Cārvākas and so on. What is called *moha* is the cognition of the supremacy of the lordly powers, *aṇimā,* etc., when they are attained. *Mahāmoha* is the determination of the supremacy of sound, etc., which are ten-fold, as divided into divine and non-divine. *Tāmisra* is suffering from the loss of sound, etc., which are ten-fold, as divided into divine and non-divine and of the eight lordly powers, *aṇimā* etc. *Andhatāmisra* is intolerance of another person's enjoyment of the ten, *śabda,* etc., and of the eight, *aṇimā,* etc. *Avairāgya* is of a hunderd kinds through differences in *tuṣṭi,* etc. *Anaiśvarya* is eight-fold; and it is 176,

in dependence on *śakti*. Thus, *dharma* is ten-fold, *jñāna* is of 80 kinds, non-attachment is of 100 varieties, *aiśvarya* is of 64 kinds, *adharma* is ten-fold, *ajñāna* is 64, *avairāgya* is of 100 varieties, *anaiśvarya* is 184; altogether the modes of the intellect are 612 in number.

६३. उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

धर्मो ज्ञानं च वैराग्यमैश्वर्यं बुद्धिवृत्तयः ।
त्रयोऽत्र धर्ममुख्यास्तु सात्त्विकाः परिकीर्तिताः ॥
रागस्तु राजसः शिष्टास्तामसाः परिकीर्तिताः ।
एते धर्मादयश्चाष्टौ भावयन्ति यतस्ततः ॥
लिङ्गभावाः समुद्दिष्टाः पठ्यन्ते ते क्रमेण तु ।
धर्मश्च द्विविधस्तत्र यमश्च नियमस्त्विति ॥
चित्तस्य संयमस्तत्र स यमः परिपठ्यते ।
अशास्त्रीयक्रियात्यागाच्छास्त्रीयेष्वपि कर्मसु ॥
नियमः पठ्यते शास्त्रैर्योऽयमिन्द्रियसंयमः ।
यमः पञ्चविधोऽहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयमेव च ॥
ब्रह्मचर्यमकल्कत्वं यम एवं तु पञ्चधा ।
अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचं संतोष एव च ॥
आर्जवं चेति नियमः पञ्चधा परिकीर्तितः ।
परेषु दुःखानुत्पादोऽहिंसा द्रोहशतैरपि ॥
सा न हिंसेति विज्ञेया या हिंसा शास्त्रचोदिता ।
आपदो भीतितो वापि न तथ्यं सत्यमुच्यते ॥

असत्यमपि तत्सत्यं गुरुदेवप्रयोजनम् ।
अदत्तास्वीकृतिस्त्यागो वित्तस्यान्यायजस्य च ॥
श्रुतस्य परिदृष्टस्य तृणीकारोऽप्यचोरता ।
कर्मणा मनसा वाचा श्रवणाद्दर्शनादपि ॥
मातृवन्मन्यते नित्यं प्रार्थयन्त्यामपि स्त्रियाम् ।
तदेव ब्रह्मचर्यं स्याच्छेषा व्रतविडम्बकाः ।
स्वच्छता समता प्रीतिरपकारशतैरपि ॥
कालुष्यं नोत्सहेद्धैरं सेयमुक्ता ह्यकल्कता ।
एते पञ्च यमाः प्रोक्ता यतीनां सुशिवात्मनाम् ॥
नित्यं प्रध्वस्तकालुष्यो न कोपस्ताडनादपि ।
देवानां शिवभक्तानां पित्रोरपि गुरोरपि ॥
आज्ञानुपालनान्नित्यं काम्यनैमित्त्यकर्मणाम् ।
दानोपवासतीर्थानां श्रुताध्ययनयोरपि ॥
श्रद्धया करणं पुंसां शुश्रूषा परिकीर्तिता ।
गात्रप्रक्षाळनं शौचं मृदम्भोभ्यामुदाहृतम् ॥
सन्तोष उदितस्तन्त्रे लाभेऽलाभे समा मतिः ।
जानन्नपि च विप्रेन्द्रा जडवन्मूकवत्तथा ॥
निवृत्तः परपीडायाः श्रद्धधानश्च भावतः ।
आर्जवं तस्य तत्प्रोक्तं नियमस्त्विति पञ्चधा ॥
ज्ञानं बुद्ध्यात्मकं यत्तद् गुणाव्यक्तान्तगोचरम् ।
तस्मात्कैवल्यसंसिद्धिरिति तत्सिद्धिरुच्यते ॥
अशीतिसंख्यया सा च संक्षेपात्परिकीर्तिता ।

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. ४९-६७)

63. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "*Dharma, jñāna, vairāgya* and *aiśvarya* are the modes of the intellect. Three beginning with *dharma* are said to be *sāttvika*; *rāga* is *rājasa*; the rest are said to be *tāmasa*. Since these eight (qualities), *dharma*, etc., make known (the substrate, intellect), by serving as probans, they are called *bhāvas*. They are now described in sequence. *Dharma* is two-fold as *yama* and *niyama*. The control of *citta* by the abandonment of acts not conformable to the sacred teaching is called *yama*; the control of the organs in the performance of acts prescribed by the sacred teaching is called *niyama* in the *śāstra*. *Yama* is of five kinds as *ahiṁsā, satyam, asteyam, brahmacaryam* and *akalkatvam*; similarly *niyama* is said to be five-fold, as *akrodha, guru-śuśrūṣā, śaucam, santoṣam* and *ārjavam*. *Ahiṁsā* is the non-origination of pain to others though guilty of a hundred treacheries. That cruelty which is prescribed by the sacred teaching is not known as *hiṁsā*. Non-utterance of falsehood even when in fear of danger is said to be *satyam*; even that falsehood which is of service to the preceptor and the deity, is *satyam*. The non-appropriation of what is not given or the abandonment of the wealth which has been improperly acquired, and also the treating as trivial of what has been heard of or seen (to be excellent), that is said to be non-stealing (*acoratā*). That alone is *brahmacaryam* which in deed, thought and word, whether by hearing or by sight treats as a mother even a woman who solicits; others are a mere display of the observance of vows. Purity, equanimity, friendship, and intolerance of mental agitation or hatred, even in the case of those who have done a hundred injuries, that is called *akalkatā*. For those well established in the path of Śiva, the above are called the five *yamas*. He who has quelled all agitation even if beaten,

for him there is non-anger. The carrying out of the command of gods, devotees of Śiva, parents and preceptor, and the performance with faith of obligatory, optional and occasional rites, gifts, fasts, pilgrimages and of the study of scriptures, etc., this is known as *śuśrūṣā*. The cleaning of the body with mud and water is said to be purity. Having an equal view of gain and loss is said, in the *Tantra* to be contentment. *Ārjava* is the quality of him who though knowing (other's faults) behaves as if ignorant and dumb, who has turned away from afflicting others and who has faith (in prescribed duties); this is the fifth *niyama*. Knowledge (*jñāna*) is five-fold as having for its sphere the (three) *guṇas*, the non-manifest (*prakṛti*) and the *puruṣa*. Since the attainment of release (*kaivalya*) is from that (*jñāna*), that (*jñāna*) itself is said to be an attainment (*siddhi*). That is said briefly (in the *śāstra*) to be eighty in number. (*Ibid.*, vv. 49 - 67)

[The elements, the *tanmātras*, the organs, *manas*, individuation, *buddhi*, *guṇa*, the non-manifest and the persons (attached to *pradhāna* or *kalā*) are the places of attainment (*i.e.*, release) for those who abide in those respectively. *Siddhi* (*i.e.*, release) is attained only by the cognition of the self in those respective places. The Cārvākas obtain attainment in the element alone, since they maintain that the (elemental) body is the self; so too those who know astrology since the stellar sphere is what is to be attained (according to them); even so the Kaulas, since they are liable to perish on account of their doctrine of the soul as nothing but their (bodily) selves, are those who attain to the elements (alone). Some Smārtas say that the cause of this elemental sphere is *Brahman*; hence they are to be known as those who attain to the *tanmātras*; some others among sages, who hold senses like that of sight to be intelligence, attain to those (*indriyas* alone...)]

६४.

अथ वैराग्यभेदोऽपि संक्षेपेणाधुनोच्यते ॥

व्याध्यादिपीडितस्यास्य स्वदेहेऽपि विरागता ।
सन्तुष्टः सर्वकार्येषु निःस्पृहत्वाज्जुगुप्सति ॥

आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखेभ्यो वैराग्यं नियतं भवेत् ।
आर्जने रक्षणे चोरहरणे द्रविणस्य यत् ॥

दुःखं तन्मन्यमानस्य वैराग्यं सहसा भवेत् ।
स्निग्धाद्वियुज्यमानः सन् रुदन् दुःखेन पीडितः ॥

दुःखस्य कारणं स्नेह इति मत्वा विरज्यति ।
कामुकस्तु स्त्रियां दृष्ट्वा किञ्चिद्वैराग्यकारणम् ॥

सद्यो वैराग्यमायाति श्रेयसः प्राप्तिकारणम् ।
सत्यन्ने ध्रियते देहः पानीयादौ च नान्यथा ॥

एकाहस्याप्यपाने च ग्लानिं बध्नाति तत्क्षणात् ।
दुष्पूरोऽयमतो हेतोर्वैराग्यमुपजायते ॥

क्वचित्प्रतिग्रहादिभ्यो वैराग्यमुपगच्छति ।
अकस्माज्जायते कश्चिद्विरक्तः पुण्यवैभवात् ॥

इत्येवं तुष्टयः प्रोक्ता दशधा शिवशासने ।
अत्रैवान्तर्गताः सर्वास्तुष्टयोऽन्या द्विजोत्तमाः ॥

एताश्च भूताद्यव्यक्ततत्त्वानां प्रापकत्वतः ।
संभूय शतसंख्यास्तु तुष्टयः शिवशासने ॥

अथैश्वर्यविभेदोऽपि लक्ष्यते लेशतोऽधुना ।
बुद्ध्यात्मनोर्विभागेन स्थितमैश्वर्यमष्टधा ॥

धर्मिणो ज्ञाननिष्ठस्य विरागेच्छोश्च धीमतः ।
सत्त्वमुत्पादयेद्बौद्धमणोरैश्वर्यमिच्छया ॥
अणिमा परमाण्वादेरपि सूक्ष्मतरा स्थितिः ।
लघिमा शीघ्रवेगित्वं पङ्कादावप्यमज्जनम् ॥
महिमा व्याप्यवस्थानं बृहद्देहेन्द्रियादिभिः ।
तृतीयं कार्यतः सिद्धमैश्वर्यमणिमादिकम् ॥
प्राप्त्यादयो गुणाः पञ्च योगिनः करणात्मजाः ।
मनसाभीष्टसंसिद्धिः प्राप्तिर्नाम गुणालयः ॥
निर्माय स्त्रीसहस्राणि क्रीडाप्राकाम्यमाशु या ।
आज्ञाविधानं ब्रह्मादौ तत्पूजा चेशिता मता ॥
वशीकृतिर्वशित्वं स्याज्जगन्निर्माणमेव च ।
भुञ्जानस्यास्य कर्माद्यैरबाधे गरिमा मतः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. ८७-१०३)

64. Next are mentioned briefly the varieties of *vairāgya*. For him whose body is afflicted by disease, etc., there is non-attachment even to his own body. He who has been pleased with all objects has a distaste for them, because of non-attachment (for them). Non-attachment arises invariably through the miseries like *ādhyātmika*. For him who considers wealth to be misery in its acquisition, preservation and in its loss through thieves, non-attachment comes easily. He who is dissociated from friends, laments them and is afflicted by misery, considers friendship (attachment) to be the cause of misery and becomes detached. The lover, having seen some causes for non-attachment in his own beloved, immediately attains

non-attachment, the cause of the attainment of beatitude. When there is food, drink, etc., the body is maintained, not otherwise; when there is no drink even for a day, it immediately wastes away; this (body) is difficult to satisfy; for that reason non-attachment arises. Sometimes non-attachment arises through the acceptance (of what is impure) and so on. Some because of the greatness of accumulated merit are born by chance without attachment. Thus, contentments are spoken of as ten-fold in the *śaiva* teaching. Next, the divisions of lordly powers are also briefly indicated. It is settled that lordly powers are eight-fold, being divided into those (three) related to the body and those (five) related to the internal organ. For that soul who is virtuous, settled in wisdom, desirous of non-attachment, endowed with a (keen) intellect (*i. e.*, discrimination), the constituent of *sattva* in the intellect generates lordly powers according to his desires. *Aṇimā* is existence in a form subtler than even that of the primal atom, etc. *Laghimā* is moving quickly and not sinking even in mire, etc. *Mahimā* is existing pervasively with the help of big bodies, organs, etc. These three lorldy powers beginning with *aṇimā* are established through the body. The five beginning with *prāpti* arise for *yogins* through the (internal) organ; the attainment of whatever is desired by the mind is what is called *prāpti*; it is the abode of (is that which brings about) all (desirable) qualities. *Prākāmyā* is that which can quickly create thousands of women (with the mind alone) and play with them. To lay down commands to Brahmā, and others and to be worshipped (by them) is considered to be *Īśitā*. To attract and to create the world constitute *vaśitvam*. Non-interference by *karaṇa*, etc., for him who enjoys (material objects, etc.) is *garimā*." (*Ibid.* vv. 87-103)

६५. एतच्चैश्वर्यं पार्थिवं पिशाचानामष्टगुणम्। राक्षसानां पार्थिवाप्यं षोडशगुणम्। यक्षाणां पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं चतुर्विंशतिगुणम्। गन्धर्वाणां पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायव्यं द्वात्रिंशद्गुणम्। इन्द्रस्य पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायव्याकाशीयं चत्वारिंशद्गुणम्। सोमस्य पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायव्याकाशीयमानसमष्टाचत्वारिंशद्गुणम्। प्रजापतेस्तु पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायव्याकाशीयमानसाहंकारिकं षट्पञ्चाशद्गुणम्। ब्रह्मणस्तु पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायव्याकाशीयमानसाहंकारिकबौद्धं चतुष्षष्टिगुणम्। उक्तं च शिवधर्मोत्तरे —

तत्राष्टगुणमैश्वर्यं पार्थिवं पिशिताशिनाम्।
तत्सायुज्यगतानां च नराणां तत्समं स्मृतम्॥

रक्षसां षोडशगुणं पार्थिवाप्यं च तद्द्विधा।
एतन्निरवशेषेण यक्षेष्वन्यच्च तैजसम्॥

गन्धर्वाणां च वायव्यं याक्षं च सकलं स्मृतम्।
पाञ्चभौतिकमिन्द्रस्य चत्वारिंशद्गुणं महत्॥

सोमस्य मानसं दिव्यं यच्चाधः पाञ्चभौतिकम्।
सौम्यात्प्रजापतिस्थानमहंकारगुणान्वितम्॥

चतुष्षष्टिगुणं ब्राह्मं बौद्धमैश्वर्यमुत्तमम्॥ इति॥

65. The eight qualities of demons are of the earth; for Rākṣasas there are 16 qualities, belonging to the earth and water; for Yakṣas, 24 qualities of earth water and fire; for Gandharvas, 32 qualities of earth, water, fire and air; for Indra, 40 qualities of earth, water fire, air, and ether; for Soma, 48 qualities of earth, water, fire, air, ether and *manas*; for Prajāpati, 56 qualities of earth, water, fire, air ether, *manas* and *ahaṅkāra*; for Brahman, 64 qualilities of earth, water, fire, air, ether, *manas*, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi*. And it has been said in the

Śivadharmottara: "For the demons (those who eat flesh) there are eight lordly qualities, of the earth; that is understood for men too who are associated with them. For Rākṣasas there are 16 qualities, being two-fold as of the earth and that of water. For Yakṣas there are (eight) others of fire, without leaving out any of the former. For Gandharvas there are all that belong to Yakṣas and the qualities of air; for Indra there are 40 qualities belonging to all the five elements; for Soma, there are the qualities of *manas*, besides those of the five elements mentioned below; the status of Prajāpati is greater than that of Soma by the addition of the qualities of *ahaṅkāra*; the lorldly powers of the supreme Brahman are 64 by the addition of the qualities of *buddhi*."

६६. तथा श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

पिशाचानां यथोद्दिष्टमणिमादिगुणाष्टकम् ।
रक्षसां द्विगुणं ज्ञेयं यक्षाणां त्रिगुणं भवेत् ॥
चतुर्गुणं तु गान्धर्वमैन्द्रं पञ्चगुणं भवेत् ।
सोमानां षड्गुणं सप्तगुणं स्यात्तु प्रजापतेः ॥
चतुष्षष्टिगुणं बौद्धमैश्वर्यं ब्रह्मणः स्मृतम् ।
ततः समासादैश्वर्यं चतुष्षष्टिगुणं मतम् ॥
ततस्त्वैश्वर्यभोगेन विषयेष्वपि संस्थिताः ।
चरन्ति क्षीणकर्माणः शुचीनां श्रीमतां गृहे ॥
ततो धर्मेण युज्यन्ते भोगनिद्रामदाकुलाः ।
हिंसायामपि चौर्ये वा मिथ्याकथन एव वा ॥
गुर्वङ्गनाधिगमनेऽप्यपकारप्रतीकृतौ ।
क्रोधे नित्यादिलोपे वाशौचे वातोष एव वा ॥

अनार्जवे च सततं प्रवर्तन्तेऽन्धदृष्टयः ।
अधर्मवृत्तायस्त्वेता दशसङ्ख्यास्तु पूर्ववत् ॥

अथाधर्मे प्रवृत्तं तमणुमज्ञानसन्ततौ ।
नियुनक्ति महेशानो यथा मूढो न पश्यति ॥

तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रश्चान्धपूर्वकम् ।
तामिस्रमिति पञ्चैव मता अज्ञानवृत्तयः ॥

अनात्मन्यात्मभावो यः स तमः परिकीर्तितम् ।
भूताद्यव्यक्तपर्यन्तं तत्त्वदर्शनभेदतः ॥

दशधा तम उद्दिष्टं मोहस्त्वष्टविधो मतः ।
अणिमादिषु लब्धेषु परत्वप्रतिपत्तितः ॥

दिव्यादिव्यविभेदेन शब्दादिषु दशस्वपि ।
परताध्यवसायो यो महामोहः प्रकीर्तितः ॥

शब्दादीनां दशानां च दिव्यादिव्यविभेदतः ।
अणिमाद्यष्टकस्यापि वैकल्यात्साधनेऽथ वा ॥

प्राप्तानां नाशतस्तापो यस्तामिस्रं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
शब्दादावणिमादौ च भुज्यमाने परेण तु ॥

तत्सुखाहरणे यत्तत्तामिस्रं चान्धपूर्वकम् ।
ततश्चाज्ञानभेदोऽयं चतुष्षष्टिविधो मतः ॥

अवैराग्यं च शतधा तुष्टीनां व्यत्ययात्मतः ।
न जुगुप्सादयः सर्वपदार्थेषु तदा नृणाम् ॥

अष्टभेदमनैश्वर्यमैश्वर्यव्यत्ययात्मकम् ।
तच्चाशक्त्या भवेत्सा च षट्सप्तत्यधिकं शतम् ॥

अज्ञानातुष्टिरूपत्वाच्चतुष्षष्ट्युत्तरं शतम् ।
बुध्द्यशक्तिश्च तुष्टिः स्यात्कारणस्यार्कसंख्यया ॥

अशक्तिरेवं संक्षेपात् षट्सप्तत्यधिकं शतम् ।
इति धर्मादयो भावा बुद्धिस्था वासनात्मना ॥

क्रमेण प्रत्ययात्मानः प्रोक्तास्तद्वृत्तिभेदतः ।
प्रत्याययन्ति क्षेत्रज्ञं तेन ते प्रत्ययाः स्मृताः ॥

धर्मो दशविधो ज्ञानमशीतिशतसंख्यया ।
विरागोऽष्टाष्टधैश्वर्यमधर्मो दशधा मतः ॥

अज्ञानं च चतुष्षष्टिरवैराग्यं शतं भवेत् ।
अष्टसंख्यमनैश्वर्यं षट्त्रिंशच्च चतुश्शतम् ॥

षट्सप्तत्यधिकाशक्तिः संख्यया शतधा मता ।
संम्भूय वृत्तयो बुद्धेः षट्शतं द्वादशाधिकम् ॥

एवं संक्षेपतः प्रोक्ता बुद्धिर्भावाष्टकात्मिका ।
अष्टारेऽस्मिन्महाचक्रे पर्यटन्ति पुनः पुनः ॥

पुद्गलास्तेन तेषां तु नान्तं पश्यन्ति पुद्गलाः ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १०४-१२८)

66. Similarly in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "There are the eight qualities of *aṇimā*, etc., as above-mentioned for demons (Piśācas). For Rākṣasas these should be understood to be twofold; for Yakṣas they would be three-fold, for Gandharvas they are four-fold, and for Indra five-fold; for Soma six-fold, seven-fold for Prajāpati; sixtyfour qualities of the intellect are known to be the lorldly powers of Brahman. Therefore, lorldly powers are briefly

reckoned to be 64. Thence, through the delusion about lordly powers (that they are supreme), becoming strongly attached to material objects, they wander about in the houses of pure persons endowed with lordly powers, while their own powers (caused by *yoga*) dwindles. Thence, being afflicted by sleep and delusion through (such) enjoyment, they become associated with demerit. Injuriousness, cruelty, utterance of falsehood, consorting with the preceptor's wife, revenge, anger, neglect of obligatory and other duties, impurity, discontent and crookedness, in all these they engage themselves, their vision blinded. The moods of *ajñāna* are held as five - *tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra* and *andhatāmisra*. The conceit of Self in the not-self is said to be *tamas*. Because of the differences of the *tattvas* from the elements to the non-manifest (in respect of which there may be this conceit), this delusion is said to be ten-fold. *Moha*, however, is reckoned to be eight, from the cognition of supremacy in respect of *aṇimā*, etc., when they are attained. The conclusion of supremacy in respect of sound, etc., which are ten as divine and non-divine, is said to be *mahāmoha*. When, in respect of sound, etc., which are ten, as divine and non-divine, and of the eight-fold *aṇimā*, etc., because of defectiveness in the means or destruction after attainment, there is suffering that is called *tāmisra*. When in respect of sound, etc., and *aṇimā*, there is deprivation of one's enjoyment by another, (the suffering) then it is *andhatāmisra*. Thus the varieties of *ajñāna* are reckoned to be sixty-four, and *avairāgya* is reckoned at a hundred, since it is of the nature of what is opposed to *tuṣṭi* (which is a hundred-fold). At that stage, there is for men no distaste in respect of anything. *Anaiśvarya* which is of a nature opposed to that of lordly powers (*aiśvarya*) is of eight varieties; and that results

from incapacity (*aśakti*); and that (*aśakti*) is of 176 kinds. Since it is of the form of *ajñāna* and *atuṣṭi*, it is 164; these are the incapacities of the intellect; the incapacities of the organs are twelve in number; altogether thus the incapacities are 176. Thus the dispositions beginning with merit, which reside in the intellect in the form of impressions, which are of the nature of *pratyayas* (creations of the intellect) have been mentioned in sequence with their different modes. They are called *pratyayas* since they cause cognition for the *kṣetrajña* (the soul). Merit is of ten kinds; *jñāna* is of eighty kinds; non-attachment is a hundred-fold; *aiśvarya* is of 64 kinds; demerit is reckoned to be ten; *ajñāna* is 64; *avairāgya* is a hundred; *anaiśvarya* is eight-fold; thus there are 436; *aśakti* is reckoned to be 176; altogether the modes of the intellect are 612. Thus has been briefly described the intellect which is of the nature of the eight dispositions. In this big wheel with eight spokes, the souls revolve repeatedly; hence the souls see no end to these." (*Pauṣkara*, Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 104-128).

६७. ननु धर्मादयो भावाः परस्परविरुद्धाः कथमेकस्मात्कारणाज्जाताः? उच्यते — धर्मादयः परस्परविरुद्धा न भवन्ति, प्रत्ययात्मकत्वात्। अत एव ज्ञानाभावो नाज्ञानम्; किन्त्वन्यथाज्ञानमेव। ततश्चाधर्मादीनामपि ज्ञानत्वेन सामान्यविशेषभावाद्विरोधाभावः। उक्तं च पौष्करे —

अष्टौ धर्मादयो भावा विरुद्धास्तु परस्परम्।
गुणाः सत्त्वादयश्चैवमेककारणकाः कथम्॥

ईश्वरः —

न विरुद्धास्तु धर्माद्या यतस्ते प्रत्ययात्मकाः।
ज्ञानाभावोऽत्र नाज्ञानमन्यथाज्ञानमेव तत्॥

तस्माज्ज्ञानविशेषास्ते सर्वे धर्मादयः स्थिताः ।
न विशेषास्तु सामान्याद्विरुद्धा हि कदाचन ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. मा. प. श्लो. ४४-४६)

67. Now the dispositions like merit, etc., are reciprocally conflicting; how can they arise from a single cause? The reply is: merit, etc., are not reciprocally conflicting, since they are of the nature of *pratyayas* (cognitions). Hence, it is that *ajñāna* is not absence of knowledge but only erroneous knowledge. Therefore, even for merit, etc., there is no conflict since they are particularisations of the generality, *viz.*, cognition. And it has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "The eight dispositions, merit, etc., conflict one with another; so too the *guṇas*, *sattva*, etc.; how can they have a single cause? *Īśvara*: merit, etc., do not conflict, since they are of the nature of cognitions. *Ajñāna*, here is not the absence of knowledge, but only erroneous knowledge. Therefore, all those, merit, etc., are settled to be varieties of cognition; the species do never conflict with the genus." (Māyāpaṭala, vv. 44-46).

६८. अस्मादेव बुद्धितत्त्वादिन्द्रियाद्यारम्भकं तत्त्वमहंकारः स्वोपधानेन आत्मन्यहंबुद्धिहेतुश्चोत्पद्यते। एतद्व्यापारात्प्राणादीनां संचारः। एतत्सद्भावे मानं तु अहमाकाराध्यवसायः किंचित्कारणकः, कार्यत्वात्, संमतवदित्यनुमानमेव। न च बुद्ध्यैव तदुपपत्तिः; बुद्धेः कार्यस्याध्यवसायस्य प्रत्यर्थं भिन्नरूपत्वं विषयग्राहकरूपत्वं च, अहमाकाराध्यवसायस्य त्वेकरूपत्वं विषयिग्राहकरूपत्वं चेति, बुद्धिकार्यादध्यवसायादस्य विलक्षणत्वात्। बुद्धेरहमध्यासहेतुत्वे विषयग्रहे सर्वत्राहमुपरागप्रसङ्गाच्च। न च विषयग्रहे आत्मभानसामग्र्यनुप्रवेशाननुप्रवेशाभ्यां तदुपरागानुपरागयोरुपपत्तिः; आत्मनः संयोगस्य सर्वत्रानुप्रवेशेनाननुप्रवेशाभावात्। अस्मन्मते तु अहंकारव्यापाराव्यापाराभ्यामुपरागानुपरागावुपपन्नाविति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। तदेवमहमाकाराध्यवसायहेतुत्वेनाहंकारसिद्धिः॥

68. From this same *buddhi-tattva* arises *ahaṅkāra* which causes enjoyership through sense-channels and which through itself as the defining adjunct causes the cognition "I" in the soul. The movement of the vital air, etc., arises because of the function of this (*tattva*). The evidence for its existence is but this inference: "The determinative cognition of the form "I", has some cause, since it is a product, like what is admitted." Nor is this (cognition) intelligible even through the intellect; the determinative cognition that is produced by the intellect is different for everything and is of the nature of the object apprehended. In the case of the determinative cognition of the form "I" there is however singleness of form and the form of what apprehends an (external) object; then this (cognition) is different from the determination that is a product of the intellect. Further, if the intellect were the cause of the determination "I", there is the contingence of the association of "I" in every case of the apprehension of objects. Nor is its association or dissociation intelligible through the entry or non-entry of the causal aggregate for the manifestation of the self into the apprehension of the object; for since the conjunction, with the self enters into every case (of cognition), there is no non-entry. On our view, however, the association or dissociation is intelligible through the functioning or non-functioning of *ahaṅkāra*; thus there is no unintelligibility. Therefore, as the cause of the determinative cognition with such form, there is the establishment of *ahaṅkāra*.

६९. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

अत ऊर्ध्वमहंकारतत्त्वं संक्षिप्य वर्ण्यते ।
प्रत्यात्मनियतं तच्च प्रसिद्धमहमात्मकम् ॥
मनः पूर्वमधस्तत्त्वं यत एवोपजायते ।

ऋषयः —

प्रत्ययोऽधोऽहमात्मात्र व्यवसायात्मको यतः ॥
बुद्धिरेव ततो भूयात्किमनेन वदेश्वर ।

ईश्वरः —

विषयाध्यवसायो यः प्रत्यर्थं भेदतः स्थितः ।
अयमित्यात्मकः सर्वो बुद्धिशब्देन गण्यते ॥

अहमात्मैकरूपस्तु सर्वतः संव्यवस्थितः ।
ग्राहकव्यवसायात्मा बुद्धिरेषा कथं भवेत् ॥

विषयाभिमुखी बुद्धिरहं विषयसङ्ग्रहः ।
ऐक्यं कथं तयोर्विप्राः कथ्यतेऽत्यन्तभिन्नयोः ॥

ऋषयः —

अहंकृदेकमेष्टव्यं सर्वेषां अहमात्मनः ।
प्रत्ययस्योदयात्तत्किं प्रत्यात्मनियतं भवेत् ॥

ईश्वरः —

इदमित्येव सर्वत्र धीस्तावदुपजायते ।
नैतावता तदेकत्वं वाच्यं प्रत्यक्षबाधतः ॥
किं च सर्वेषु कुम्भेषु कुम्भ इत्येव जायते ।
सर्वेषां प्रत्ययो वापि कुम्भैक्यं न प्रदृश्यते ॥

प्रत्यात्मनियतोऽहंकृद्गच्छामीति च वर्तते ।
एकस्यान्यस्य पश्यामीत्येवं बुद्ध्युदयस्तथा ॥

अन्यथैकप्रकाराहंमतिः स्यादुभयोरपि ।
अहंकारः पृथक्सार्वजनीन इति बुद्ध्यताम् ॥

यद्यभिन्नमहंकृत्स्याद्देवदत्तोऽप्यहंमतिः ।
अन्यस्य चोपजायेत नात्मैकत्वं ततः स्थितम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १२९-१४०)

69. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "After that (*buddhitattva*), the *tattva* of *ahaṅkāra* is described briefly. It is invariable for every soul and is well known to be of the form 'I'; it is that from which the lower *tattvas* beginning with *manas* arise. Sages: since cognition of the form 'I' is determinative, it might result from *buddhi* itself; why (the need for) this (*tattva*)? Tell us, *Īśvara*. *Īśvara*: that (product of the intellect, which is a) determination of objects, stands different for different objects. Further, what is reckoned as the denotation of the word '(function of the) intellect' is only all that is denoted as 'this'. The determinative cognition of the form 'I' is, however, settled to be of a single nature at all times. Further, it is of the nature of a determination of the apprehender, (not of the object). How can that be (a function of) the intellect? The intellect is what is turned towards objects; individuation is that which apprehends objects; how can identity be predicated of the two, O sages, which are absolutely different? Sages: since for all, there arises the cognition (only) in the form 'I', one individuation (alone) should be admitted, not manifold (of individuations), each restricted to a particular soul. *Īśvara*: in every case (pot, cloth, etc.), there arises the cognition (only) in the form 'this'; but with this much, there may not be declared the unity of (all objective) cognition, since it is sublated by perception. Further, in respect of all jars (for all men) there arises cognition only as 'jar'; yet the unity of jars is not perceived. Individuation, which restricted to each soul, exists in one

in the form 'I go', when in another there arises the cognition 'I see'. Otherwise there would be cognition in the same form for both. Therefore let it be understood that individuation is different in different people. If individuation were non-different for all, the cognition of 'I' in respect of Devadatta would arise even for another; therefore it is established that there is no unity of individuation." (Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 129-140).

७०. अयं चाहंकारः प्रथमं तावज्जीवनसंरम्भगर्वभेदेन त्रिविधः। तत्र जीवनो नाम पञ्चप्राणवायुधारकः। संरम्भो नाम प्रयत्नः। गर्वो नामाहमिति ग्राहकाध्यवसायः। उक्तं च तत्त्वप्रकाशे—"स्यात्त्रिविधोऽहंकारो जीवनसंरम्भगर्वभेदेन" इति। मृगेन्द्रे —

संरम्भाद्यस्य चेष्टन्ते शरीराः पञ्च वायवः। इति ॥

अन्यत्र च —

संरम्भोऽहंकृतो वृत्तिः .....। इति च ॥

70. And this individuation is first divided into three: *jīvana, saṁrambha* and *garva*. What is called *jīvana* is a modification of the five vital airs; what is called *saṁrambha* is effort; what is called *garva* is the determinative cognition of the apprehender in the form "I". And it has been said in the *Tattvaprakāśa*: "Individuation is of three kinds, being divided into *jīvana, saṁrambha* and *garva*." In *Mṛgendra*: "By whose effort, the five vital airs move about in the body." And elsewhere also: "*Saṁrambha* is a function of individuation."

७१. अयं पुनः सात्त्विकादिभेदेनापि त्रिविधः। तत्र तैजसः सात्त्विकसंज्ञः, राजसो वैकारिकाभिधः, तामसो भूतादिनामा। तत्र तैजसाहंकारान्मनः चक्षुरादीनि पञ्च ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि चोत्पद्यन्ते। वैकृतादहंकाराद्वागादीनि पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाण्युत्पद्यन्ते। भूतादेरहंकाराच्छब्दादीनि पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युत्पद्यन्ते।

तत्र सङ्कल्पविकल्पकारणं तत्त्वं मनः। चक्षुरादिनालोचिते 'अयं ब्राह्मणः' इत्यादिनिश्चयः सङ्कल्पः। सम्यग्विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन अर्थकल्पनारूपत्वात्। तादृशेऽर्थे 'अयं ब्राह्मणो वा क्षत्रियो वा' इत्यादिसंशयो विकल्पः। विविधकल्पनारूपत्वात्। तत्सद्भावे मानं तु सङ्कल्पविकल्पप्रत्ययः सकारणकः, कार्यत्वादिति। अयं च नाहंकारिको नापि बौद्धः; बुद्ध्यहंकारयोर्निश्चयाहंप्रत्यययोर्हेतुत्वेन क्लृप्तत्वात्। न चायमैन्द्रियिकः; चक्षुरादिदृष्टस्यार्थस्य मनसैव बुद्ध्युपारोहणात्। अन्यथा घटे दृष्टे पटस्यापि निश्चयः स्यात्। न च बुभुत्सैव तन्नियामिकेति वाच्यम्। बुभुत्साया इच्छारूपत्वेन मनोजन्यत्वात्। तस्मात्सङ्कल्पविकल्पकारणत्वेन मनः सिद्धम्॥

71. And this (*ahaṅkāra*) is also divided into three as *sāttvika*, etc. Of these, the *sāttvika* is called *taijasa*, the *rājasa* is called *vaikārika*, the *tāmasa* is called *bhūtādi*. Of these, from the *taijasāhaṅkāra* arise *manas* and the five organs of sense — the sense of sight, etc. From the *vaikṛta-ahaṅkāra* originate the five organs of action — speech, etc. From the *bhūtādi-ahaṅkāra* arise the five *tanmātras*, sound, etc. Of these, *manas* is the cause of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*. When there is perception by the sense of sight, etc., the certitude, "This is a brahmin", etc., is *saṅkalpa*. Doubt as to whether he is brahmin or of some other caste is *vikalpa* since it is of the form of the formulation of diverse possibilities. The evidence for the existence of that (*manas*) is: the cognition of the form of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa* has a cause, since it is a product; and this is not a product of individuation or of the intellect; for the intellect and individuation are ascertained to be the causes of the cognition of determination and of the cognition by "I". Nor is it a product of the senses, since the thing seen by the sense of sight, etc., enters the intellect through *manas* alone; otherwise, when the pot is seen there would be certitude of cloth as well. Nor may it be said that it is the desire to know which regulates this (certitude);

for desire to know, being a form of desire, is generated by the mind. Therefore, the mind is established as the cause of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*.

७२. इदं च मनो महत्। ननु क्रमेणार्थप्रकाशनादण्वेव। महत्त्वे सर्वदा सर्वपदार्थप्रकाशनप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्मैवम्। मनसो महत्त्वेऽपि कर्मवशात्सामग्र्यपेक्षणात्तमसाभिभवादपि ज्ञानस्य क्रमिकत्वोपपत्तेः। किं च मनसोऽणुत्वे अणोरेव पदार्थस्यावभासनं स्यात्। यस्य कारणस्य यावती व्याप्तिस्तावत्येवार्थभासनस्य प्रदीपसूर्यादौ दृष्टत्वात्। न च महताल्पस्य ग्रहणमयुक्तमिति वाच्यम्। विरोधाभावात्। तस्मान्मनो महदिति स्थितम्। तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियतम्।

72. And this *manas* is pervasive. Now, since it manifests things in sequence it is but atomic, since if it be pervasive there is the contingence of the manifestation of all things at all times. If this be said, not so; for even if *manas* is pervasive, yet because of *karma*, or because of dependence on causal aggregates (for manifestation) or even because of being overpowered by darkness, the non-origination of cognition is intelligible. Further, if *manas* were atomic, there would be manifestation only of an atomic object. For in the case of the lamp, the sun, etc., it is seen that the manifestation of the object is only as extensive as the pervasion of the cause. Nor may it be said that the apprehension of the atomic by the pervasive does not stand to reason, since there is no conflict (in them). Therefore it is settled that *manas* is pervasive.

७३. उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

स च त्रिविध उद्दिष्टः प्रथमस्तत्र तैजसः।
वैकारिको द्वितीयः स्यात्तथा भूतादिकः परः॥

सत्त्वेनोत्कृष्टभागो यः स तैजस इहोच्यते ।
वैकृतो रजसोत्कृष्टो भूतादिस्तमसाधिकः ॥

तैजसादप्यहङ्कारान्मनो बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि च ।
पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि स्युरहङ्कारात्तु वैकृतात् ॥

अहङ्कारात्तु भूतादेर्जाता तन्मात्रसंहतिः ।
यः सङ्कल्पविकल्पात्मा प्रत्ययोऽन्तर्गतो नृणाम् ॥

स नाहङ्कारिको नापि बौद्धो व्यापारभेदतः ।
स तु मानस एवेष्टस्तन्त्रेऽस्मिन्मुक्तिसागरे ॥

चक्षुषालोकिते ह्यर्थे तमर्थं बुद्धिगोचरम् ।
विदधातीह यद्विप्रास्तन्मनः परिपठ्यते ॥

अन्यथालोचिते कुम्भे पटेऽपि स्याद्विनिश्चयः ।
किं च सास्नादिमत्पिण्डे गोशब्दमनुभूय यत् ॥

भूयस्तत्सदृशे दृष्टे गोशब्दोच्चारहेतुकम् ।
तन्मनः कथ्यते तन्त्रे विकल्पप्रत्ययात्मकम् ॥

केचिन्मनोऽणुमिच्छन्ति क्रमेणार्थविराजनात् ।
महच्चेत्सर्वदा सर्वपदार्थावगतिर्भवेत् ॥

तदसत् कर्मवशतः क्रमाज्ज्ञानोदयो नृणाम् ।
सामग्र्यपेक्षातश्चापि तमसाभिभवादपि ॥

मनोऽणु चेदणुद्रव्यग्राहकं सर्वदा भवेत् ।
यावती ग्राहकव्याप्तिस्तावद्ग्राह्यं च गृह्यते ॥

दीपेन ग्रहणं यद्वत्तथा आदित्यरश्मिभिः ।
अल्पार्थग्राहकत्वेन मनोऽल्पमिति चेन्मतिः ॥

तदसन्महतोऽप्यल्पग्रहणं परिदृश्यते ।
महदेव मनस्तत्त्वं प्रत्यात्मनियतं च तत् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १४०-१५३)

73. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "And that (*ahāṅkāra*) is said to be of three kinds. First of these is *taijasa*; *vaikārika* is the second and *bhūtādi* is the next. That part which is predominantly *sāttvika* is said to be *taijasa*; *vaikṛta* is that which is predominantly *rājasa*; *bhūtādi* is that which is predominantly *tāmasa*. From the *taijasa ahaṅkāra* arise the *manas* and the organs of sense; the five organs of action arise from the *vaikṛta ahaṅkāra*; the host of *tanmātras* arises from the *bhūtādi ahaṅkāra*. The cognition present in men in the form of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*, that is not a product of individuation, nor of the intellect, because of the difference of (their) functions. That (cognition) is admitted to belong to the *manas* alone in this *Tantra* which is an ocean of release (since in it are to be found all kinds of release suitable to all grades of capacity). When the object is cognised by the sense of sight, that which makes the object come into the sphere of the intellect is said to be the *manas*; otherwise when the jar is seen, there might be certitude about the cloth as well. Further, when after having experienced the word 'cow' in respect of a particular possessing a dewlap, etc., the word 'cow' is pronounced, when again there is seen something similar to that (former individual), the cause of that in the *Tantra* is said to be *manas*, the cause of (*saṅkalpa* and) *vikalpa* cognition. (According to the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, *manas* is established even as the cause of cognition in sequence, *kramika-jñāna*.) Some recognise the *manas* to be

atomic, since it manifests objects in sequence. If it were pervasive, there would be the cognition of all things at all times. This is unsound; the rise of cognition for men in sequence is due to (i) *karma* or (ii) the requirement of causal aggregates or (iii) overpowering by darkness (*tamas*). If *manas* were atomic, it would at all times be the apprehender of only atomic substances. Only so much of the object is apprehended as there is pervasion of it by the apprehender, as in the apprehension with a lamp or the rays of the sun. If it be the view that because of apprehending small things, *manas* is small, that is not sound, since there is seen the apprehension of the small even by the great. The *tattva* of *manas* is certainly *mahat* (*i.e.*, big, not all-pervasive; the word 'pervasive' wherever used in conjunction with *manas* is to be understood thus) and different for each soul." (Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 140-156)

७४. एतानि च चित्तबुद्ध्यहंकारमनांसि बाह्यार्थालोचने असामर्थ्यादन्तःकरणानि। तथा च न श्रोत्रादिवद्वर्तमानमात्रग्राहकाणि। अपि तु भूतभविष्यतोरपि ग्राहकाणि। सात्त्विकराजसाहंकारान्यतरप्रभवं तत्त्वमिन्द्रियम्। तच्च द्विविधम्। बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं चेति। तत्र सात्त्विकाहंकारप्रभवं ज्ञानेन्द्रियम्। प्रकाशकत्वात्। राजसाहंकारप्रभवं कर्मेन्द्रियम्। क्रियाजनकत्वात्। तत्र ज्ञानेन्द्रियं श्रोत्रादिभेदेन पञ्चविधम्। तत्र शब्दग्राहकमिन्द्रियं श्रोत्रम्। स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक्। रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः। गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणम्। रसग्राहकं रसनम्। उक्तं च श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कथ्यन्ते श्रोत्रं त्वक्चक्षुरेव च ।
जिह्वा घ्राणं च पञ्चेति सुप्रसिद्धानि तानि च ॥

प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वेन तेषां सिद्धेर्न युक्तयः ।
कथ्यन्ते तान्यहङ्कारादुपजातानि सात्त्विकात् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १५८, १५९)

74. These — *citta, buddhi, ahaṅkāra* and *manas* — have no capacity in respect of sensing external things and are hence called internal organs; similarly unlike the sense of hearing, etc., they do not apprehend the present alone, but apprehend the past and the future as well. The organs are the *tattvas* which arise from *sāttvika* and *rājasa* individuation. They are of two kinds — organs of sense and organs of action. Of these, the organs of sense arise from *sāttvika* individuation, since they illuminate. The organs of sense are five-fold being divided into the sense of hearing, etc. The organ which apprehends sound is the sense of hearing; the organ apprehending touch is the skin; the organ apprehending colour is the sense of sight; the organ apprehending odour is the sense of smell; the organ apprehending taste is the sense of taste. And it has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara:* "The organs of sense are said to be five alone, the sense of hearing, the sense of touch, the sense of sight, the sense of taste and the sense of smell; these are well known; they are established even because of having perceptible objects; hence no arguments are urged; they arise from the *sāttvika* individuation." (*Ibid.*, vv. 158, 159)

७५. ननु श्रोत्राद्यधिष्ठानत्वाभिमतानि कर्णशष्कुल्यादीन्येव शब्दादिग्राहकाणि सन्तु। कृतं श्रोत्रादिभिरिन्द्रियैः। न च प्राप्यकारित्वानुरोधेनाधिष्ठानातिरिक्तमिन्द्रियं स्वीकर्तव्यमिति युक्तम्। त्वगाद्यधिष्ठानस्यैव प्राप्यकारित्वोपपत्तेः। चक्षुःश्रोत्रयोः प्राप्यकारित्वासिद्धेश्च। न चैवं कुड्यादिव्यवहितस्याप्युपलम्भप्रसङ्गः। कुड्याद्यभावस्यापि तत्र हेतुत्वेन कुड्यादिसत्त्वे तदनुपलम्भोपपत्तेः। स्फटिकाद्यन्तरितस्यापि दर्शनाच्च। प्राप्यकारित्वे शाखाचन्द्रयोर्युगपदुपलम्भायोगाच्च। तस्मादधिष्ठानातिरिक्तमिन्द्रियं नोपेतव्यमिति मैवम्। चक्षुषः प्राप्यकारित्वाभावे कुड्यादिव्यवहितस्याप्युपलम्भप्रसङ्गात्। न च कुड्यं प्रतिबन्धकम्। तस्य साक्षात्प्रतिबन्धकत्वे कुड्याद्बहिः

स्थितस्येव कुड्यपुरुषयोर्मध्यगतस्यापि अनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गेन सन्निकर्षविघटनद्वारैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्याङ्गीकार्यत्वात्। न च ग्राह्यग्राहकमध्यगतत्वेन तत्प्रतिबन्धकम्; मध्यावस्थानस्यापि सन्निकर्षविघटनायैवापेक्षितत्वात्। अन्यथा अभिमुखस्थितस्येव पश्चाद्भागस्थितस्यापि ग्रहणप्रसङ्गाच्च। ग्रहीतृग्राह्ययोर्मध्ये अन्यस्याभावात्। स्फटिकान्तरितानुपलम्भप्रसङ्गस्तु तवापि समानः। त्वन्मतेऽपि मध्यवर्तिपदार्थस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्य सद्भावात्। अस्वच्छस्य तस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वे मन्मतेऽपि सन्निकर्षे तस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वं सुवचम्। तस्मात्सन्निकृष्टमेव चक्षुर्ग्राहकम्। न च नयनगोळकस्य घटादिभिः सन्निकर्षः सम्भवतीति तदधिष्ठानकं सङ्कोचविकासधर्मकमन्यदेव चक्षुरङ्गीकार्यम्। न च चक्षूरश्मीनां घटादिसन्निकर्षे अन्तरा पुरुषादिव्यवधानेऽपि तद्ग्रहः स्यात्। सन्निकर्षविघटनहेतोराश्रयविनाशस्यान्यतरकर्मणो वा अभावादिति वाच्यम्। गवाक्षपिधाने तदन्तर्गतानां सूर्यरश्मीनां विनाशवदपसरणवद्वा इहापि विनाशापसरणान्यतरसम्भवेन संयोगविघटनस्यैवोपपत्तेः॥

75. Now, let the ear-cavity, etc., which are considered to be the loci of the sense of hearing, etc., be themselves the apprehenders of sound, etc.; the senses, like that of hearing are superfluous. Nor does it stand to reason that in conformity with their being effective by reaching to the object, there should be recognised a sense-organ other than the locus (which cannot go out); for in the case of the sense of touch, etc., it is intelligible that the locus itself (*i.e.*, the skin) is effective by reaching to the object; and in the case of sight and hearing, it is not established that they are effective by reaching to the object. Nor is there thus the contingence of the perception even of what is hidden by a wall, etc.; for even the absence of a wall, etc., being (part of) the cause in respect of that (cognition), non-perception is intelligible; further, there is perception even of what is in the middle of a crystal, etc. If the

senses were effective by reaching to the object, there would not be the cognition of the branch (of a tree) and the moon simultaneously. Therefore, there need not be admitted a sense-organ other than the locus. Not so; if the sense of sight were not effective by reaching to the object, there is the contingence of the perception of what is hidden by a wall, etc. Nor is the wall an obstacle. If it were directly (of itself) an obstacle, then, as in the case of what is beyond the wall, so even in the case of a pot between the wall and oneself there is the contingence of non-perception; hence it should be admitted by you too, to be an obstacle only through being a hindrance to sense-contact. Nor is it an obstacle as being between the apprehender and the apprehended, since "being in the middle" is also required only to be a hindrance to sense-contact. Further, as in the case of what is in front, there is the contingence of the apprehension even of what is behind, since there is nothing there between the apprehender and the apprehended. As for the contingence of the non-perception of what is in the middle of a crystal, that is common to you too, for even on your view, there does exist an obstacle, in the shape of an intervening object. If that be an obstacle only when not transparent, then, on my view too, it is easy to say that (non-transparent object) alone is an obstacle to sense-contact. Therefore, of all objects the apprehender is the sense of sight; there is no contact of the eyeball with the pot, etc.; hence there must be admitted a sense of sight which has that locus, is different from it and has the property of expansion and contraction. Nor may it be said: "When there is contact of the rays from the sense of sight with pot, etc., there should be the apprehension thereof though there be the

interposition of a person in the middle; for there is neither the destruction of the locus nor any other act to disturb the sense-contact." When a window is closed, the sun's rays that were within are either destroyed or driven away; so here too, destruction or driving away being possible, it is only a hindrance to contact that is intelligible.

७६. ननु श्रोत्रस्य कथं विषयसम्बन्धः? न च चक्षुर्वृत्तेरिव श्रोत्रवृत्तेर्बहिर्निर्गमेन सम्बन्धोपपत्तिः। दूरदेशस्थस्य तारस्येव मन्द्रस्यापि ग्रहणप्रसङ्गादिति चेन्न। वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन सन्तत्या कर्णदेशोत्पन्नस्य शब्दस्य ग्रहणोपपत्तेः। न च कर्णदेशोत्पन्नस्येव दूरदेशोत्पन्नस्य श्रोत्रसंयुक्त आकाशे समवायेन ग्रहः स्यादिति वाच्यम्। कर्णावच्छिन्नाकाशसमवायस्यैव ग्राहकत्वात्। नन्वेवं वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेनोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमे कर्णस्यैव सन्निकर्षसम्भवादतिरिक्तेन्द्रिये मानं नास्तीति चेत्, बधिरस्य सत्यपि कर्णे शब्दानुपलब्ध्या तदधिष्ठानकस्यान्यस्याभ्युपेयत्वात्। तस्मात्कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्ननभोदेशाधिष्ठानकं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियं सिद्धम्। तच्च वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन सन्तत्या कर्णदेशोत्पन्नशब्दग्राहकमिति। यत्त एवं सति अतिदूरोत्पन्नोऽपि शब्दः सन्तत्या श्रोत्राकाशदेशेऽपि शब्दमुत्पादयेदिति तदसत्; तथात्वे मन्द्रतारशब्दभेदेन समीपदूरग्रहव्यवस्थापि न स्यात्। तस्मान्निमित्ततारतम्यादेकस्यैव बाणस्य यथा दूरसमीपपातित्वं तथा एकः शब्द एव निमित्ततारतम्याद्दूरसमीपस्थपुरुषकर्णप्रदेशं प्राप्नोति। एवं कुष्ठादिना त्वगाद्युपघाते स्पर्शाद्यप्रतीत्या तदधिष्ठानमिन्द्रियमङ्गीकार्यम्। कुष्ठादेः स्वतो दोषत्वे मानाभावात्।

76. Now, in the case of the sense of hearing, how is there contact with the object? Nor, as in the case of the psychosis of sight, is it intelligible in the case of the psychosis of hearing that it goes out and contacts; for in the case of sounds at a distance, there is the contingence of the apprehension of a low sound in the same way as of a loud one. If this be said, no; for it is intelligible that there is apprehension of a sound produced in the

neighbourhood of the ear indirectly, on the analogy of the waves and ripples. Nor may it be said that as in the case of what is produced in the region of the ear, there may be apprehension even of what is produced at a distance, through inherence in the ether, which is in conjunction with the sense of hearing; for the apprehender is the inherence in that ether alone which is defined by the ear. Now if thus origination be admitted on the analogy of waves and ripples, contact is possible for the ear itself; there is no evidence for a sense-organ over and above this; if this be said, in the case of the deaf, since there is no cognition of sound, though the ear exists, there should be admitted another (sense-organ) which has that (ear) as locus. Therefore, it is established that the sense of hearing has as its locus, the region of ether defined by the ear-cavity. And it is unsound to say that it apprehends the sound which on the analogy of waves and ripples is indirectly produced in the region of the ear. For if that were so, even the sound that is produced at a great distance would produce a sound indirectly even in the region of the ear; and there would not be the distinction of the apprehension of near and far through differences in the sound as low or loud. Therefore, just as one and the same missile falls near or far according to differences of gradation in the cause (of propulsion), similarly one and the same sound reaches the region of a person's ear, whether far or near, according to differences of gradation in the cause. Similarly when the sense of touch, etc., is affected by leprosy, etc., there being no cognition of touch, etc., there should be admitted a sense-organ which has that as the locus; for there is no evidence to say that leprosy, etc., are in their own nature obstacles (to sense-perception, except through hindrance to sense-contact).

७७. नन्वेकमेवेन्द्रियमधिष्ठानभेदेन भिन्नविषयग्राहकमस्तु; कृतमिन्द्रियभेदेन; अन्धबधिरत्वादिव्यवस्थापि तत्तच्छक्तिविनाशेन भविष्यतीति चेन्न। धर्मिग्राहकेणोक्तेन प्रमाणेन भिन्नतयैवेन्द्रियाणां सिद्धेः। अभेदे प्रमाणसिद्धे कथञ्चिच्छक्तिभेदेन व्यवस्थोपपादनीया। न च तत्र प्रमाणमस्ति। तदेवमिन्द्रियाणि भिन्नानि।

77. Now let it be that there is only one sense-organ which apprehends different contents because of difference of loci; no need to have different sense organs; the distinction of blind, deaf, etc., through the lack (apparently) of the respective sense-organs is also possible through the destruction of the respective capacities of one and the same sense-organ. If this be said, no; for, the senses-organs are established only as different, even by the evidences cited for their existence. If there were evidence for their non-difference, distinction could somehow be explained through difference of capacity. But there is no evidence for that (non-difference). Thus therefore the sense-organs are different.

७८. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ननु गोळकमेवेष्टं चक्षुः कैश्चित्सहेतुकम् ।
सान्तरग्रहणाच्छाखाचन्द्रयोर्युगपत्स्थितेः ॥
स्थूलार्थग्रहणाच्चैव तथा किमिति नेष्यते ।

ईश्वरः —

गोळकादीन्द्रियत्वेन सान्तरग्रहणं मतम् ॥
व्याप्तमेवं हि गृह्येत ग्राहको दीपवन्मतः ॥
गोळकस्य तदव्याप्त्या चाक्षुष्यं दूरवारितम् ।
पृथ्वर्थग्रहणं यत्तद्व्यापकत्वेन युज्यते ॥

नो चेद्गोळकमात्रस्य भात्रस्य ग्रहणं भवेत् ।
एककाले तु शाखेन्द्वोर्ग्रहणं व्यापकत्वतः ॥

वस्तुस्थित्या तु शाखेन्द्वोर्ग्रहणं नैककालजम् ।
आशुत्वेनाभिमानं तत्सहस्रदळभेदवत् ॥

ऋषयः —

ननु गोळकमेवेष्टमाधारत्वेन चक्षुषः ।
यत्रैवाधारसद्भावस्तत्राधेयो व्यवस्थितः ॥

व्यापकत्वेन या सत्ता सा त्वकिञ्चित्करी मता ।
व्यापकोऽपि यथा जीवो व्योमदेशे न बोधकः ॥

कथं पुनर्दविष्ठार्थं प्राप्य गृह्णाति लोचनम् ।

ईश्वरः —

तदसत्तैजसत्वेन गोळकस्य बहिष्कृतेः ।
दीपवत्तत्कृतास्थानं चक्षुर्गृह्णाति नोद्भुतम् ॥

दीपेनोपकृतं चक्षुस्तमसा वार्थसञ्चयम् ।
ततो गन्धादिनोक्तेन प्रसङ्गो दूरवारितः ॥

चक्षुराधारभूतस्य गोळकस्य प्रवृत्तितः ।
ननु नायनतेजोभिर्निस्सृतैर्मिलितैरपि ॥

अर्थो गृह्येत तन्नाशुविनाशान्मीलनोत्तरम् ।
घटान्तस्थस्य दीपस्य प्रभा इव पिधानतः ॥

दृशो गोळकमात्रत्वे ह्यप्राप्तग्रहणं भवेत् ।
यद्यप्राप्तं च गृह्णीयात्तत्तु स्याद्व्यवधानतः ॥

तस्माद्व्यापकमेष्टव्यं चक्षुर्दूरार्थदर्शने ।
एवं सति त्वगादेश्च गत्वार्थग्रहणं भवेत् ॥

इति चेत्तन्न वाय्वादिभूताधिष्ठानगोचरम् ।
गत्वार्थग्रहणं नैषां किं तु प्राप्तार्थमापकाः ॥

ऋषयः —

नेत्रवच्छ्रवणं गत्वा न गृह्णाति यदि ध्वनिम् ।
दिग्देशोपहितः शब्दः कथमत्रोपगृह्यते ॥

ईश्वरः —

तदसद्वेगतः शब्दः सन्तत्या श्रोत्रमागतः ।
बाणादिपातवत्सद्यो दिग्देशाननुमापयेत् ॥

तदा प्रागनुभूत्यैव भेर्याद्यनुमितिश्च या ।
गृह्णाति प्राप्तमेवार्थमिन्द्रियाणीत्यतः स्थितिः ॥

नैकमिन्द्रियमेष्टव्यं चक्षूरूपाद्यवेदनात् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १७३-१९१)

78. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Now, by some it is admitted with arguments that the eye-ball itself is the sense of sight, since there is apprehension of what is within (a crystal), since there is simultaneous apprehension of the branch and the moon, and since there is the apprehension of gross objects (if a subtle sense-organ be admitted, it could apprehend subtle objects alone). Why is that not admitted? *Īśvara*: it is not because of the eye-ball, etc., being the sense-organ that there is apprehension of what is within (a crystal). It is the sense-organ that as pervasive apprehends it; the apprehender is considered to be like the light of a lamp. Since the eye-ball cannot pervade that (object), its being the sense of sight is far removed. As for the apprehension of gross objects

that is consistent with pervasiveness (of the sense-organ). If not, there would be the apprehension of a thing only of the size of the eye-ball. The apprehension of the branch and the moon at the same time is because of pervasiveness. In reality, however, the apprehensions of the branch and the moon are not produced at one time; that is a conceit due to quickness, like the piercing of a thousand leaves (simultaneously). Sages: now, the eye-ball alone is recognised as the support (locus) of the sense of sight; what is supported is settled to exist only where the support exists; therefore, the existence (of the sense-organ) which is considered to be pervasive, that is of no service, just as the *jīva* though pervasive, is not a cogniser, in the region of the ether (where he has no sense-organs to cognise with). How then, can the eye reach to and apprehend objects at a great distance? *Īśvara*: that is unsound; since the sense of sight, being of the nature of *taijasāhaṅkāra* goes forth beyond the eye-ball, that sense, though having that (eye-ball) as locus, apprehends (objects at a distance) like the light of a lamp; that is nothing wonderful. Just as the sense of sight though situated in darkness apprehends objects pervaded by the rays of a lamp, similarly it apprehends objects pervaded by rays from itself. Thus the contingence mentioned earlier (of sense organs being products of the elements) is far removed on the ground of smell, etc., (being manifested by the elements and therefore requiring a sense-organ produced by the elements). Since the eye-ball which is the locus of the sense of sight cannot go forth and be active (it follows that the sense of sight functions by going out to the object). Now, even when the eyes are closed, the objects should be apprehended by the rays which went forth from the eyes

(immediately before the closing); that is not so, since the rays quickly perish immediately after the closing of the eyes, like the light of a lamp within a pot, when the pot is covered. If the sense of sight were only the eye-ball, there would be apprehension without reaching to the object; and if that (eye-ball) apprehended objects even without reaching to (*i.e.*, having contact with) them, there might be that apprehension even when there is interposition (as of a wall), (since such intervening objects are not as such obstacles). Therefore, in the cognition of distant objects, the sense of sight should certainly be admitted to be pervasive. This being the case, even for the sense of touch, etc., there should be apprehension of objects by going forth; if this be said, that is not so; in the case of those objects (like touch) which have the air, etc., as loci, the apprehension is not by reaching to the object; but those senses make known the objects which have come to them. Sages: if the sense of hearing does not go forth like the sense of sight and apprehend sound, how is it intelligible that there is (apprehension of) sound as conditioned by place and direction? *Īśvara*: that is unsound; since sound comes quickly to the sense of hearing through a succession (of air-waves) as in the quick flight of an arrow, etc., the place and direction are inferred. As for the inference of the drum, etc., (as producer of the sound), that is but due to (inference from) past experience. It is therefore established that the senses (other than that of sight) apprehend only those objects which come to them. The sense-organ is not to be recognised as one alone, since there would not be such distinctions as that colour is apprehended by sight alone and so on." (*Ibid.*, vv. 173-191).

७९. नन्वेतानि कथमाहङ्कारिकाणि? प्रतिनियतगुणग्राहकत्वेन भौतिकत्वस्यैवोचितत्वात्। तथा हि — श्रोत्रादीनि शब्दाद्याश्रयप्रकृतिकानि, तदभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्, यद्यस्याभिव्यञ्जकं तत्तदाश्रयप्रकृतिकम्, यथा कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्जकं घृतमिति, मैवम्; नीलाभिव्यञ्जकेन तदाश्रयपृथिवीप्रकृतिकत्वरहितेन चक्षुषानैकान्तिकत्वात्। नन्वेषां प्रकृतिभेदाभावे कथं विषयप्रतिनियम इति चेत्, न प्रकृतिभेदप्रयुक्तो विषयनियमः। किं तर्हि? नियतिविशेषप्रयुक्तः। किं च विषयप्रतिनियमः कीदृग्रूपः? किं यत्प्रकृतिकं यदिन्द्रियं तत्तस्यैव गुणं गृह्णाति नान्यस्येति? किं वा यदिन्द्रियं यत्प्रकृतिकं तत्तद्गुणमेव गृह्णाति न तु तद्गुणान्यदिति। नाद्यः; चक्षुषा पृथिवीगुणस्य नीलादेरग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः; कर्मसामान्यादेरग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। नन्विन्द्रियाणि तत्तदाश्रयप्रकृतिकानि, शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये तत्तन्मात्राभिव्यञ्जकत्वादिति चेत्, न। शब्दमात्रव्यञ्जकत्वादित्यत्र दृष्टान्ताभावात्। एवं रसमात्रव्यञ्जकत्वादित्यत्रापि जलस्य नवशरावादिगन्धव्यञ्जकत्वादृष्टान्ते साधनवैकल्यम्। सर्वत्र वाप्रयोजकत्वमाहङ्कारिकत्वबोधकागमबाधितत्वं च। तस्मान्न भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि, किं त्वाहङ्कारिकाणीति सिद्धम्॥

79. Now, how are these the products of *ahaṅkāra*, since as apprehending the respective qualities (of the elements) it is proper that they should be produced by the elements alone? It is thus: hearing, etc., have for material cause the loci of sound, etc., since they manifest these; when a particular (sense) has for material cause the locus of a particular (quality), the former is the manifester of the latter, because of having the locus of that (quality) as the material cause; *e.g.*, ghee which is the manifester of the odour of safflower. Not so; since the probans is inconclusive in respect of the sense of sight which has not the earth as material cause and yet manifests blackness (the colour of the earth). Now, thus, there being no difference in the material cause, there is no regulation of functions; if this be said, the regulation in regard to objects is not determined by

difference of material cause. What then? It is brought about by differences of *niyati* (*tattva*). Further, what is the nature of the question? Is it that the sense-organ which has a certain material cause, apprehends the quality of that alone, not of another? Or is it that the sense-organ which has a certain material cause apprehends only the quality of that, not anything other than the quality? Not the first, because of the contingence of the non-apprehension of blackness, etc., the colour of the earth, by the sense of sight. Nor the second, because of the contingence of the non-apprehension of activity, generality, etc. Now, the senses have the respective elements as material cause, since among the five, sound, etc., they manifest only that much (sound or smell or taste, etc.). This is not sound, since there is no illustration. Even in the inference "Taste has water as material cause, since it manifests taste alone," there is lack of probandum in the illustration (water), since water manifests (not merely taste but) also the smell of a new pot, etc. In all these inferences, there is the inconclusiveness of the probans as also sublation by revelation, which teaches the senses to be products of *ahaṅkāra*. Therefore, it is established that the senses are products not of the elements, but of individuation.

८०. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

ऋषयः —

यदभिव्यञ्जकं यस्य सजातीयं हि तस्य तत् ।
यथाभिभूतगन्धस्य निम्बत्वक्चन्दनस्य च ॥

शब्दाभिव्यञ्जकं श्रोत्रमाकाशात्मकमेव तत् ।
त्वगादेश्चैवमुन्नेयमाहंकारिकता कथम् ॥

ईश्वरः —

भौतिकत्वेन मूर्तत्वमिन्द्रियाणां घटादिवत् ।
ग्राह्यत्वं चेन्द्रियैरन्यैरवस्थानं न कुत्रचित् ॥

किं च मूर्तोपरोधेन मूर्तानां ग्रहणं न हि ।
स्फटिकान्तर्गतं वस्तु न गृह्णीयात्तु लोचनम् ॥

पानीयान्तर्गतं वापि तस्माच्चक्षुर्न तैजसम् ।

ऋषयः —

यद्येवं सति कुड्यान्तर्निहितस्यापि वस्तुनः ॥
ग्रहणं स्यादमूर्तत्वेनाहंकारोद्भवत्वतः ।

ईश्वरः —

तदसत्तामसत्वेन कुड्यादेर्गतिरोधतः ॥

व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकयोर्यत्तु सजातीयत्वमीरितम् ।
तदप्यचारु यत्कर्मजात्योर्दृग्विषयत्वतः ॥

रूपैकविषयं नातस्तैजसत्वं च हीयते ।
तथात्वे तद्दविष्टार्थग्रहणं नोपपद्यते ॥

नाप्राप्तग्रहणं दृष्टं यत्किंचिद्व्यवधानतः ।
प्राप्तमेवेन्द्रियं सर्वं गृह्णाति त्वग्यथेन्द्रियम् ॥

किं च मूकाद्यनुत्पत्तिर्देहाङ्गत्वे प्रसज्यते ।
घ्राणाद्यवयवोपेतो मूकादिः परिदृश्यते ॥

ततो व्यापकमेवेष्टं चक्षुर्दूरार्थदर्शने ।
श्रोत्रादीनि क्रमोक्तानि तद्ग्राह्याः पञ्च च क्रमात् ॥

भूतपञ्चकसम्बन्धशब्दानां ग्राहिका श्रुतिः ।
ततोऽवशिष्टभूतेषु स्पर्शस्त्वग्ग्राह्य इष्यते ॥

एवमन्येष्वपि ज्ञेयं तद्ग्राह्याः पञ्च च क्रमात् ।
श्रोत्रत्वग्लोचनादीनां क्रमेणोत्पत्तिरीरिता ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. १६०-१७२)

80. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Sages: when something manifests something else, the former is of the same class as the latter, just as the bark of the neem tree is (of the same class as the) sandal whose odour is dormant; the sense of hearing, which manifests sound is certainly of the nature of the ether; the same is to be understood even in the case of the sense of touch, etc.; how then can they be products of individuation? *Īśvara*: for the sense-organs, if produced from the elements they would be material, like pot, etc., and would also be cognised by other sense-organs; and there would then be infinite regress. Further, because of the defect of being material, there would be no transcending of other material substance, and thus the eye cannot apprehend an object within a crystal or an object immersed in water; therefore the sense of sight is not a product of the element of fire. Sages: if this be so, there might be apprehension even of an object hidden by a wall, because of (the sense-organ) being immaterial and a product of individuation. *Īśvara*: that is unsound, since the progress (of rays from the sense of sight) is obstructed by the wall, etc., they being (predominantly) *tāmasa*. As for the community of class alleged between that which is manifested and that which manifests, that too is unsound, since activity and generality are the objects of sight which

has not colour alone for its object; therefore, its being a product of fire is non-established. If that were so, the apprehension of objects at a distance would not be intelligible. There is not seen the apprehension of what is not reached to, *e.g.*, that which is hidden by something. All senses apprehend only that which is reached to (*i.e.*, is in contact) as for example, the sense of touch. Further, if (the senses were) parts of the body, there is the contingence of the non-origination of mutes; for mutes, etc., are seen to be endowed with the organs of smell, etc.; therefore, for the sake of cognising things at a distance, the sense of sight is certainly recognised to be pervasive. The five senses beginning with hearing have been mentioned in sequence; the five objects of their apprehension have also to be understood in sequence. Hearing apprehends the sounds connected with the five elements; touch is recognised to apprehend touch in the remaining (four) elements; similarly are to be understood in sequence even the rest of the five objects of apprehension. The origination of hearing, touch, sight, etc., has been declared in sequence." (*Ibid.*, vv. 160-172).

८१. कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु वाक्पादपाणिपायूपस्थानि। तेषां व्यापारास्तु वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः। ते च सत्यपीन्द्रियाधिष्ठानत्वाभिमते क्वचिन्नोत्पद्यन्ते। तस्मादधिष्ठानातिरिक्तेन्द्रियसिद्धिः। तदुक्तं पौष्करे —

कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वाक्पादपाणिगुह्यगुदानि च।
वचनादानगमनानन्दोत्सर्जनहेतवः॥ इति॥

81. The organs of action are the speech, the feet, the hands and the organs of excretion and generation. Their functions are speech, motion, grasping, excretion and pleasure. These are not generated in some though there

exist what are considered to be the loci of these organs; hence there is established the organ as distinct from the locus. That has been said in the *Pauṣkara*: "The organs of action are the speech, the feet, the hands, the organ of generation and the organ of excretion; they are the causes of speech, motion, grasping, pleasure and excretion."

८२. तामसाहङ्कारप्रभवं तत्त्वं तन्मात्रम्। तच्च पञ्चविधम्। शब्दतन्मात्रं स्पर्शतन्मात्रं रूपतन्मात्रं रसतन्मात्रं गन्धतन्मात्रं चेति। तत्र ध्वनित्ववर्णत्वतारत्वमन्द्रत्वादिविशेषहीनं शब्दसामान्यं शब्दतन्मात्रम्। शीतोष्णत्वादिविभागरहितं स्पर्शसामान्यं स्पर्शतन्मात्रम्। शुक्लत्वादिविशेषशून्यं रूपसामान्यं रूपतन्मात्रम्। मधुरत्वादिविभागविधुरं रससामान्यं रसतन्मात्रम्। सुरभित्वादिविशेषानाक्रान्तं गन्धसामान्यं गन्धतन्मात्रम्॥

82. *Tanmātra* is what is originated from *tāmasa ahaṅkāra*; and that is of five kinds as *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, and *gandha*. Of these, *śabda-tanmātra* is the generality of sound devoid of such distinctions as pitch, letter, loudness, softness, etc. The generality of touch devoid of such distinctions as cold and hot is *sparśa-tanmātra*. The generality of colour devoid of such distinctions as white is *rūpa-tanmātra*. The generality of taste devoid of such distinctions as sweet is *rasa-tanmātra*. The generality of odour unaffected by the distinctions of fragrant, etc., is *gandha-tanmātra*.

८३. ननु तन्मात्रसद्भावे किं मानम्? न तावत् 'आकाशादीनि भूतानि उपादानारब्धानि, कार्यत्वात्,' इत्यनुमानं मानम्; तामसाहङ्कारेण परमाणुभिर्वार्थान्तरत्वात्; नापि तारादयो विशेषाः सामान्यपूर्वकाः, विशेषत्वादित्यनुमानम्; खण्डमुण्डादिषु विशेषेषु गोसामान्यपूर्वकत्वाभावेन विरुद्धत्वात्। तस्मात् तन्मात्रसद्भावे मानं नास्तीति, मैवम्; तामसाहङ्कारस्याकाशादिकारणत्वे आकाशादिषूत्तरोत्तरगुणाधिक्यस्यादृष्टमात्रहेतुकत्वं स्यात्। अतो दृष्टहेतुकत्वाय शब्दतन्मात्रादिहेतुकत्वमभ्युपेयम्। एवं ह्याकाशस्य

शब्दतन्मात्रारब्धतया शब्दगुणकत्वम्। वायोः शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रारब्धतया गुणद्वयकत्वम्। तेजसः शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मात्रारब्धतया गुणत्रयकत्वम्। जलस्य शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसारब्धतया गुणचतुष्टयाधिकरणत्वम्। पृथिव्याः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्रारब्धतया गुणपञ्चकाधिकरणत्वं युज्यते। न च तत्तद्गुणाधिकरणपरमाणूपादानतया तत्तद्गुणाधिकरणत्वमेतेषामिति युक्तम्; सूक्ष्मस्य गुणस्यैव कारणत्वसम्भवे गुणाधिकरणस्य सूक्ष्मस्य कारणत्वकल्पनायां गौरवात्। तस्मात्तन्मात्राण्येव भूतानामुपादानत्वेनाभ्युपेतव्यानि।

83. Now what is the evidence for the existence of *tanmāntras*? The evidence is not the inference that the gross elements are products of a material cause, since they are products; since the inference is otherwise satisfied by *tāmāsa ahaṅkāra* or by primal atoms. Nor is it the inference "distinctions like loudness have a generality as antecedent, since they are particulars;" for, in the case of particulars like *khaṇḍa* and *muṇḍa*, there is not the antecedent existence of a general cow; hence the probans is contradicted. Therefore there is no evidence for the existence of *tanmātras*. Not so. If *tāmasa ahaṅkāra* were (directly) the cause of ether, etc., the excess of one quality in each succeeding element in the series from ether, would have no cause but unseen potency. Therefore, in order that they may have a seen cause, they should be admitted to have *śabda-tanmātra*, etc., as causes. Thus indeed since the ether is produced by the *śabda-tanmātra*, it is intelligible that it has the quality of sound; since air is produced by the *tanmātras* of *śabda* and *sparśa*, it has two qualities; since fire is produced by the *tanmātras* of *śabda*, *sparśa* and *rūpa*, it has the three qualities; since water is produced by the *tanmātras* of *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa* and *rasa*, it is the locus of four qualities; since earth is produced by the *tanmātras* of *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*, it is appropriately

the locus of five qualities. And it does not stand to reason that as having for material causes primal atoms, possessing the respective qualities, they are the loci of the respective qualities. For, when it is possible for the quality which is subtle to be the cause, there is prolixity in assuming the cause to be that which is not subtle, *viz.*, the locus of the quality. Therefore, the *tanmātras* alone should be admitted as the material causes of the gross elements.

८४. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

तन्मात्राण्यपि वर्ण्यन्ते क्रमात्प्राप्तानि सम्प्रति ।
बाह्येन्द्रियपरिच्छेद्यगुणत्वाद्भूतसंहतिः ॥

प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽस्मदादीनां स्थिता कारणपूर्विका ।
यत्तत्र कारणं विप्राः सा तु तन्मात्रसंहतिः ॥

विशेषत्त्वाच्च शब्दादेस्ते च सामान्यपूर्वकाः ।
यत्तत्रापि च सामान्यं तन्मात्रमिति भावयेत् ॥

एकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चगुणास्तन्मात्रसंहतिः ।
अत एव हि भूतानामभियोगो गुणैः क्रमात् ॥

स्थौल्यसौक्ष्म्यकृतो भेदो भूततन्मात्रयोरिव ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. २४१-२४५)

84. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Now are described the *tanmātras* to which we have come in sequence. Since the aggregate of elements possesses qualities ascertainable by external sense-organs, in the perception of those like us, it is settled that they have causes. That which is their cause, O sages, is the

aggregate of *tanmātras*. Since sound, etc., have distinctions, they (the distinctions) must have an antecedent generality; and that generality too should be understood to be *tanmātra*. The aggregate of *tanmātras* has one, two, three, four and five qualities; hence it is that the elements are conjoined with qualities (each) in sequence (having more than what preceded it in the series). The difference between element and *tanmātra* is due to grossness and subtleness." (Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 241-245).

८५. तन्मात्ररभ्यं तत्त्वं भूतम् । इन्द्रियग्राह्य(जातीय)गुणाधिकरणं वा। तच्चाकाशादिभेदेन पञ्चविधम् । तत्रावकाशप्रदानव्यापारकं तत्त्वमाकाशः । स्पर्शतन्मात्रानुपादेयत्वे सति शब्दतन्मात्रोपादेयं वा । अस्य च शब्द एव गुणः । गुणत्वं चास्योत्कर्षापकर्षयोगित्वेनानुमेयम् । ननु शब्दस्य भेर्यादिगुणत्वोपपत्तेः कथमाकाशसिद्धिरिति चेन्न; श्रोत्रसन्निकर्षाय शरपातन्यायेन शब्दं प्रत्युपादानत्वेनाकाशसिद्ध्युपपत्तेः भेर्यादिर्नोपादानम्; किन्तु निमित्तमेव । नन्वस्य कथं शब्द एव गुणः? नीलं नभ इत्यनुभवेन रूपस्यापि सत्त्वात् । निस्पर्शत्वादिना नीरूपत्वानुमानस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वादिति चेन्न; यस्मिन्नेव प्रदेशे दूराद्नीलोपलम्भस्तत्रैव समीपोपसर्पणेन तदभावोपलब्धेः तज्ज्ञानस्य दूरत्वादिदोषजन्यतया भ्रमत्वनिश्चयात् । न चास्य सकलमूर्तद्रव्याभावत्वेनोपपत्तेस्तत्त्वान्तरत्वकल्पनं निरर्थकमिति वाच्यम्; शब्दगुणस्य निराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अभावस्य समस्तभूतावकाशप्रदानगमनागमनाद्याधारत्वरूपभावधर्मानुपपत्तेश्च ।

85. The *tattva* that arises from *tanmātras* is the gross element (*bhūta*). It belongs to the class of what can be apprehended by the sense-organ and is the locus of qualities. It is of five kinds as ether, etc. Of these the *tattva* that gives space is ether (*ākāśa*); it is that which while not being originated by the *tanmātra* of touch, is originated by the *tanmātra* of sound. Of this, sound is the only quality; and its being a quality is to be inferred from its possession of degrees of high and

low. "Now, since it is intelligible that sound is a quality of the drum, etc., how is ether established?" If this be asked, no; for, the establishment of sound is intelligible as the material cause of sound, in order that, on the analogy of the flight of a missile, there may be contact with the sense of hearing. The drum, etc., are not the material cause, but only the efficient cause. "Now, how is sound alone the quality of this (ether), since there exists colour too, because of the experience of blue colour? As for the inference of colourlessness because of the non-possession of touch, etc., that is sublated by perception." — if this be said, no; for in respect of the very space of which there was cognition of blueness from a distance, there is cognised the absence of it, on a nearer approach; and hence the cognition of that (colour) is ascertained to be a delusion generated by defects like distance. Nor may it be said that since this (space) is intelligible through the non-existence of all material things, the assumption of another *tattva* is pointless; for there is the contingence of the quality of sound having no locus. Further, it is unintelligible that ether which gives space to all creatures and is of the nature of the substrate of all motion, could be of the nature of non-existence.

८६. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

महाभूतानि जायन्ते क्रमात्तन्मात्रपञ्चकात् ।
आकाशं पवनस्तेजस्तोयं भूरिति संज्ञया ॥

गमागमादिव्यापारो यस्मिन्सति नृणां भवेत् ।
तद्धेतुभूतमाकाशमिष्यतां मुनिपुङ्गवाः ॥

नो चेत्तदवकाशाख्यं विहरेयुः क्व जन्तवः ।
न हि भूम्यन्तरा दृष्टौ प्राणिनां तु गमागमौ ॥

तस्मादाकाशमेष्टव्यमवकाशस्य कारणम् ।
किं च तीव्रादयः शब्दा गुण्यपेक्षा गुणत्वतः ॥

गुणी चाकाशमित्युक्तं तच्च नृणामतीन्द्रियम् ।

ऋषयः —

ननु प्रत्यक्षमाकाशमुत्पतत्खगदर्शनात् ॥

अनक्षं चेन्न दृश्येत पक्षिणो दिवि यद्गतिः ।

ईश्वरः —

एवं चेन्मूर्तमाकाशं स्पर्शादिगुणयोगतः ॥

इत्यादि वदतः पृथ्वीसाधर्म्येणातिशोभते ।
अन्यस्य कार्येणान्यस्य स्वरूपपरिनिश्चये ॥

आलोकेन हि संयोग आकाशे दृश्यते तयोः ।
नीलं व्योमेति तन्मिथ्या दूरत्वादिनिबन्धनात् ॥

व्योमानक्षं दविष्टत्वाद्यथा तन्मात्रसंहतिः ।

ऋषयः —

व्योमाह्वयकृतः कश्चिद्भावो नास्त्यवकाशतः ॥

अवकाशश्च पृथ्व्यादेरभावात्मक एव सः ।
इत्याहुरपरे तत्र समाधानं विधीयताम् ॥

ईश्वरः —

अभावो भावधर्मस्तु तथा भावोऽपि तद्गतः ।
यद्यभावो न तद्धर्मो घटाभावः पटस्य च ॥

अभावोऽयं पदार्थस्य धर्मश्चेच्छशशृङ्गवत् ।
सर्वदानुपलम्भः स्यादिति चैतदचोदनम् ॥

अभावोऽनुपलब्धिर्हि सा च कार्यसमाश्रिता ।
तद्धेतोः कार्यभूता सा तामसोद्रेकतः स्थिता ॥

अभावः शक्त्यवस्थातो भावकार्यात्मना स्थितिः ।
भावाभावौ न चैकत्र भावानां तेन संमतौ ॥

मूर्ताभावोऽप्यभावत्वान्मूर्तेष्वेव व्यवस्थितः ।
तत्कथं तदभावोऽयमवकाशो भवेदिह ॥

यो यस्य धर्मस्तस्येह युक्ता तद्धर्मिणि स्थितिः ।
अवकाशः पुनः सोऽयं व्यापी सर्वत्र दृश्यते ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. २७९-२९४)

86. And that has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: 'And from these five *tanmātras* arise the gross elements in sequence, under the name of ether, air, fire, water and earth. That on the existence of which there is the function of motion for human beings, as the cause of that (motion) ether is recognised, O sages ! If that, which is called space did not exist, wherein would creatures move? Creatures are not indeed seen to move in the middle of the earth; hence ether is to be admitted as the cause of what is called space. Further, sounds high (and low), since they are qualities, require a possessor of (these) qualities; and the possessor of the qualities is said to be ether; and this is super-sensible for human beings. Sages: now, ether is perceptible since it is seen to be conjoined with that which flies. If it were super-sensible, the motion of birds in space would not be seen. *Īśvara*: if this be so, then, the nature of one (element, ether) being ascertained by its conjunction with the functioning of another, ether would become material because of conjunction with

qualities like touch; and the reasoning is clever indeed which because of conjunction with other qualities makes out (ether) to be of the same nature as earth, etc.! When there is conjunction (of the birds) with light, there is seen the conjunction of these two (birds and light) (not the conjunction of birds and space). As for the cognition 'the sky is blue', that is illusory, conditioned by distance, etc. Ether is imperceptible, being far removed (from that possibility), like the aggregate of *tanmātras*. Sages: 'there is no existent which gives space and is produced by what is called ether; ether is only non-existent' — thus say others; let the answer be given. *Īśvara*: non-existence too is (an attribute of existents; similarly existence too is (an attribute) present in that (non-existent). If non-existence were not an attribute, there would be constant existence of (things like) a cloth. "If non-existence be an attribute of things, there should always be non-cognition as of the horns of a hare" — if this be said, that should not be urged as an objection. Non-existence is, indeed, (nothing more than) non-cognition; and that is located in the product; it is of the nature of a product of the material cause of that (thing) when *tamas* is preponderant. Non-existence is (existence in) the state of potency; existence is (existence) in the form of the effect. Therefore, in the case of existents, existence and non-existence are not admissible in respect of one and the same thing. The non-existence of material things, being a non-existence, exists therefore in material things alone. Then how can there be such non-existence for them as becomes space here? In the case of an attribute of a particular thing, it stands to reason that it exists in its substrate; but space is pervasive and is seen to exist everywhere." (Puṁstattvapaṭala, vv. 279-294).

८७. रूपतन्मात्रानारब्धत्वे सति स्पर्शतन्मात्रारभ्यो वायुः। अस्य च शब्दस्पर्शौ गुणौ। ननु शब्दो न वायुगुणः, श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वात्, यो वायुगुणः स न श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते, यथा स्पर्शः; वायुर्वा न शब्दगुणकः, आकाशेतरत्त्वात्, यः शब्दगुणकः स आकाश इत्यनुमानाभ्यां शब्दस्य वायुगुणकत्वाभावनिश्चयात् कथं शब्दस्य वायुगुणत्वमिति चेन्न; शकशकादिध्वनेर्वायुगतत्वेनोपलम्भेनानुमानयोः प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वात्। एवं धमधम, छलछल, खडखडादिध्वनीनामग्न्यादिगतत्वानुभवात्तेजःप्रभृतीनामपि शब्दगुणकत्वम्। अयं च त्वगिन्द्रियजप्रत्यक्षविषयः; वायुं स्पृशामीत्यनुभवादुद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वाच्च। न च नीरूपस्य कथं प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वमिति युक्तम्; रूपस्य चाक्षुषतायामेव प्रयोजकत्वात्।

87. *Vāyu* (air) is that which, while not being orginated by the *tanmātra* of colour, is orginated by the *tanmātra* of touch; it has the qualities of sound and touch. Now sound is not a quality of air, since it is apprehended by hearing; touch which is a quality of air is not apprehended by hearing. Or, air does not have the quality of sound, since it is different from ether; that which has sound as quality is (but) ether. Since by such inferences it is ascertained that sound is not a quality of air, how can sound be a quality of air? If this be asked, no; for sounds like *śaka-śaka*, being cognised as sounds present in air, the inferences are sublated by perception. Similarly sounds like *dhama-dhama*, *chala-chala*, *khaḍa-khaḍa*, being experienced as present in fire, etc., even fire, etc., possess the quality of sound. And this (air) is the object of perception by the sense of touch, because of the experience "I touch air" and because of its possession of manifest touch. Nor does it stand to reason to ask "How is there possession of touch by what has no colour?" since possession of colour is the determinant of visibility alone.

८८. रसतन्मात्रानारभ्यत्वे सति रूपतन्मात्रारभ्यं तेजः। अस्य च शब्दस्पर्शरूपाणि गुणाः। तस्य च यद्यपि प्रकाशस्वभावतया ज्ञानेन्द्रियवत्सात्त्विकाहंकारारब्धत्वमेवोचितम्; तथापि घटाद्यपेक्षया प्रकाशकत्वेऽपि इन्द्रियापेक्षया प्रकाश्यत्वात् परम्परया तामसाहंकारारब्धत्वमुक्तमिति द्रष्टव्यम्।

88. Fire is that which, while not being originated by the *tanmātra* of taste, is originated by the *tanmātra* of colour. Of this, sound, touch and colour are qualities. Though it is proper that because of its nature of luminosity it should like the senses be a product of *sāttvika ahaṅkāra* alone, yet it is said to be indirectly produced by the *tāmasa ahaṅkāra*, since though an illuminant in respect of pot, etc., it is the illuminated in respect of the senses.

८९. गन्धतन्मात्रानुपादेयत्वे सति रसतन्मात्रोपादेयं जलम्। अस्य रसोऽपि गुणः। अस्य च शब्दः छलछलः, स्पर्शः शीतो, रूपं शुक्लं, रसो मधुरः। कूपादिषु रसभेदप्रतीतेराश्रयभेदकृतत्वात्॥

89. Water is that which, while not produced by the *tanmātra* of odour, is produced by the *tanmātra* of taste. This has the quality of taste also (besides sound, touch and colour). It has *chala-chala* sound, cold touch, and white colour. The taste (of water) is sweet, the cognition of differences of taste in wells, etc., being due to differences of loci.

९०. गन्धतन्मात्रारभ्या पृथिवी। अस्याश्च गन्धोऽपि गुणः। अत्र रूपं श्वेतनीलपीतहरितरक्तकपिशभेदभिन्नम्। रसोऽपि मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकटुकषायभेदभिन्नः। स्पर्शोऽनुष्णाशीतः। गन्धः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च। स च पाकजापाकजभेदेन द्विप्रकारः। अस्याश्च शब्दः खडखडः। एते च प्रकृत्यादयः पृथिव्यन्ता अप्यशुद्धभोग्यकाण्ड इत्यभिधीयन्ते। इन्द्रियादीनां स्वतो भोग्यत्वाभावेऽप्यालोचनादिद्वारा बुद्धौ विषयार्पकत्वेन विषयावच्छिन्नबुद्धिरूपभोग्यसम्पादकत्वेन भोग्यत्वमिति भोग्यकाण्डान्तर्भाव उपपन्नः।

90. Earth is that which is produced by the *tanmātra* of odour. Odour too is its quality. Its colours are white, black, yellow, green and red; its tastes are sweet, sour, salt, bitter, pungent and astringent; its touch qualities are hot and cold; its odour is fragrant and non-fragent. These qualities are of two modes, those due to heating (*pākaja*) and those not due to heating (*apākaja*). Its sound is *khaḍa-khaḍa*. These (*tattvas*) beginning with *prakṛti* and ending with the earth are said to be the impure *bhogya-kāṇḍa*. Though the senses, etc., are not of themselves objects of enjoyment, yet they are so as offering objects to the intellect through the channel of observation, etc., and as bringing about objects of enjoyment consisting in cognitions defined by objects; hence their inclusion in the *bhogyakāṇḍa* is intelligible.

९१. तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे —

वाय्वादीनां समुत्पत्तिः क्रमेणैवाभिधीयते ।
वायुरग्निस्तथा तोयं पृथ्वीत्येतच्चतुष्टयम् ॥
अनिलः स्पर्शतन्मात्रादभवद्व्यूहनात्मकः ।
उत्क्षेपणादिव्यापारहेतुत्वेनोपकारकः ॥
दशधा वर्तमानोऽन्तःशरीरे सर्वजन्तुषु ।
प्राणापानसमानादिव्यानोदानादिसंज्ञया ॥
अनलो रूपतन्मात्राज्जायते पक्तिलक्षणः ।
स च त्रिधा स्थितो लोके गार्हपत्यादिसंज्ञया ॥
अतोऽन्य एव शैवाग्निस्ततो बिन्दूदरान्तरे ।
यद्यदश्नाति लोकोऽयं तदनेनैव पच्यते ॥
अतोऽयमनलोऽत्यन्तं प्राणिनामुपकारकः ।
अभवद्रसतन्मात्रात्तोयं सङ्ग्रहणक्रियम् ॥

तोयेनैव प्रतिष्ठास्य स्थिता लोकस्य वस्तुनः ।
स्वतो धूल्यात्मकत्वेन पृथ्वी चानेन वै दृढा ॥
पृथिवी गन्धतन्मात्रादभवद्धारणक्रिया ।
नाकाशाज्जायते वायुर्न वायोरग्निसम्भवः ॥
नाग्नेरापस्ततः पृथ्वी धर्मातिशयदर्शनात् ।
कारणाद्गुणसंक्रान्तिर्युक्ता कार्येषु न स्वतः ॥
व्योम्नः पञ्चगुणत्वं स्यात्तथा सृष्टिक्रमो यदि ।
तन्मात्रपञ्चकाज्जातं ततो व्योमादिपञ्चकम् ॥ इति ॥

(पौ. पुं. प. श्लो. ३४९-३५८)

91. That has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "The origination of air, etc., is related in sequence as air, fire, water and earth. Air arises from the *tanmātra* of touch and is of the nature of the gatherer; it helps as the cause of such functions as going up; it exists in the bodies of all creatures in ten forms, under the names of *prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna* and so on. Fire arises from the *tanmātra* of colour and is characterised by cooking. It exists in three forms in the world, under the names of *gārhapatya*, etc. *Śaivāgni* (the Śaiva fire) is different from these and exists within bodies; whatever is eaten by people in the world is digested by this (fire) alone; therefore this fire is of greatest help to all creatures. Water arises from the *tanmātra* of taste; its function is holding together; the things of this world are stable only because of water; earth, since it is of itself of the nature of dust, is firm only because of this (water). Earth arises from the *tanmātra* of odour; its function is to support. Air does not arise from ether, nor does fire arise from air; nor water from fire, nor the

earth from that (water); for there is seen an excess of qualities (in each succeeding element). It stands to reason that the effects attach to them from the causes and do not arise (in the effects) of themselves. If the order of creation were thus (as alleged here), the ether should have five qualities. Therefore the five beginning with ether originate from the five *tanmātras.*" (Puṁstattva-paṭala, vv. 349-358)

९२. तथा श्रीमन्मतङ्गे —

अभवच्छब्दतन्मात्रं सूक्ष्मं नैत्रोपलभ्यते ।
तन्मात्रशब्दः शेषार्थविनिवृत्यर्थमुच्यते ॥

अतोऽन्यत्स्पर्शतन्मात्रं किञ्चिच्छब्दसमन्वितम् ।
रूपतन्मात्रमप्येवं शब्दस्पर्शसमन्वितम् ॥

ततोऽन्यद्रसतन्मात्रं प्रागुक्तत्रितयान्वितम् ।
गन्धतन्मात्रमप्येवं चतुष्टयसमन्वितम् ॥ इति ॥

(मतङ्ग. अहं. प. श्लो. १०१-१०४)

श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे च —

व्योमप्रभञ्जनाग्न्यम्बुभूमयो भूतपञ्चकम् ।
शब्दाद्येकोत्तरगुणमवकाशादिवृत्तिमत् ॥

धूननज्वलनप्लावखरत्वावेदिनो गुणाः ।
शब्दा वाय्वादिषु व्योम्नि सवर्णप्रतिशब्दगाः ॥

व्यूहोऽवकाशदानं च पक्तिस्तद्बृहधारणाः ।
वायुव्योमहुताशाम्बुधरणीनां च वृत्तयः ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. ११ श्लो. १७-१९)

अन्यत्र —

खविशेषगुणः शब्द आश्रयादन्यतः स्थितेः ।
हेतुर्वैशेषिकोक्तोऽयं हेत्वाभासोऽवगम्यते ॥
कालात्ययोपदिष्टश्च प्रत्यक्षागमबाधतः ।
पृथिव्यां खडखडः शब्दो जले छलछलोऽनले ॥
धकधकः शकशको वायौ व्योम्नि प्रतिध्वनिः ॥ इति ॥

92. Similarly in the sacred *Mataṅga*: "There arises the subtle *tanmātra* of sound; it is not perceptible. The word '*tanmātra*' is used to distinguish it from the rest. The *tanmātra* of touch is different therefrom and associated with some sound. The *tanmātra* of colour is also thus united to sound and touch; the *tanmātra* of taste is different from that and united to the three above-mentioned; the *tanmātra* of odour is also thus united to the other four." (*Mataṅgāgama*, Ahaṅkārapaṭala, vv. 101-104). And in the *Mṛgendra*: "The five elements are ether, air, fire, water and earth; they possess qualities beginning with sound and increasing one by one; they have functions like giving space, etc.; blowing about, flaming, melting, and solidity are the qualities of the others (besides ether). Sounds are present in air, etc., (too); in ether, there are sounds present in echoes of the same kind as the original sounds." (XI, 17-19). Elsewhere, "The probans urged by the Vaiśeṣikas to prove that sound, which is a distinctive quality of ether, does not exist elsewhere than in that substrate, is understood to be fallacious, since it is sublated by both perception and revelation. In the earth there is the sound *khaḍa-khaḍa*, in water *chala-chala*; in fire *dhaka-dhaka*; in air *śaka-śaka* and echo in ether."

९३. श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रे च—

इति पञ्चसु शब्दोऽयं स्पर्शो भूतचतुष्टये ।
अशीतोष्णौ महीवाय्वोः शीतोष्णौ वारितेजसोः ॥

भास्वदग्नौ जले शुक्लं क्षितौ शुक्लाद्यनेकधा ।
रूपं त्रिषु रसोम्भस्सु मधुरः षड्विधः क्षितौ ॥

गन्धः क्षितावसुरभिः सुरभिश्च मतो बुधैः ।
व्यूहोऽवकाशदानं च पक्तिसङ्ग्रहधारणाः ॥

वायुव्योमहुताशाम्बुधरणीनां च वृत्तयः ।
देहेऽस्थिमांसकेशत्वङ्नखदन्तेषु चावनिः ॥

मूत्ररक्तकफस्वेदशुक्रादौ वारि संस्थितम् ।
हृदि पक्तौ दृशोः पित्ते तेजस्तद्धर्मदर्शनात् ॥

प्राणादिवृत्तिभेदेन नभस्वानुक्त एव ते ॥ इति ॥

(मृ. प्र. १२ श्लो. २६-३०)

93. And in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "This sound in the five, touch in the four elements; that which is neither cold nor hot belongs to the earth and air; the cold to water, and the hot to fire; bright colour is present in fire; white in water; several kinds like white, in the earth; thus colour is present in the three; taste in water is sweet; and it is of six kinds, in the earth; odour in the earth is reckoned by the wise to be fragrant and non-fragrant; gathering, giving room, burning, holding together and supporting — these are the functions of air, ether, fire, water and the earth. In the body, in bone, flesh, hair, skin, nails and teeth, earth is present; in urine, blood, phlegm, sweat, semen, etc., water is present; in the

heart, the gastric fire, sight and bile, fire is present, its property being seen in them. Through various modes such as *prāṇa*, air is present; these modes have been mentioned. (Ether is present in all the *nāḍis* through the constant presence of the activity of egoity.)" (XII. 26-30)

९४. एतैश्च कलाद्येकत्रिंशत्तत्त्वैरारब्धानि शरीराणि पुंसां भोगसाधनानि। लोकान्तरगत्यागतिहेतुभूतं तु पुर्यष्टकाख्यं सूक्ष्मशरीरम्। तच्च तन्मात्रपञ्चक-मनोबुद्ध्यहंकारात्मकम्। तदुक्तं त्रिशतीकालोत्तरे —

शब्दः स्पर्शश्च रूपं च रसो गन्धश्च पञ्चमः।
मनो बुद्धिरहङ्कारः पुर्यष्टकमुदाहृतम्॥ इति॥

एतत्सद्भावेऽनुमानमपि — आत्मनः परलोकगत्यादिकं, किञ्चित्करण-साध्यम्, क्रियात्वात्, स्थूलशरीरक्रियावत्। न चैतद्व्यापकस्यात्मनः स्वतः सम्भवतीति औपाधिकं वाच्यमित्युपाधित्वेन तत्सिद्धिः॥

तदेवं तिरोधानशक्तिमलबिन्दुमायाकर्मरूपाः पञ्च पाशा इति सिद्धम्॥

94. The bodies constituted by the thirty-one *tattvas* beginning with *kalā* serve as the instruments of enjoyment for people. That, however, which is instrumental to persons for enjoyment and is the cause of their going to and returning from other worlds is the subtle body called *puryaṣṭaka*. And that is of the nature of the five *tanmātras*, *manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahaṅkāra*. That has been said in the *Triśatīkālottara*: "Sound, touch, colour, taste, odour as the fifth, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra* are said to constitute the *puryaṣṭaka*." For its existence there is also the support of the inference: the soul's going to another world, etc., is to be accomplished by some instrument, since it is an act, like a member of the gross body. Nor is this possible directly for the self which is pervasive; hence it should be said to have an adjunct; hence that (subtle

body) is established as an adjunct. Thus it is established that there are five bonds: *tirodhāna-śakti, mala, bindu, māyā* and *karma.*

इति श्रीमदतिवर्णाश्रमाचार्यवर्यशैवपरिपालकशिवाग्रयोगीन्द्र-
ज्ञानशिवाचार्यविरचितायां शैवपरिभाषायां
पाशपदार्थो नाम चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः ॥

Here ends the Fourth Chapter called Discussion of the category PĀŚA in the Śaivaparibhāṣā writen by the preceptor, Śivāgrayogin, the Ativarṇāśramācārya, and protector of Śaiva.

पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः

FIFTH CHAPTER

१. एतेषां च पाशानामसंस्पर्शे शिवैक्येन शिवानन्दाभिव्यक्तिलक्षणां मुक्तिं क्रमेणायमात्मा प्राप्नोति। तथा हि — ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियो वैश्यः सच्छूद्रः सवर्णाद्यनुलोमजातिश्च यदा कर्मसाम्यमलपरिपाकाभ्यां युज्यते तदा तस्मिन् पारमेश्वरी शक्तिः पतति। तदा तस्य श्रेयोवेदने श्रद्धा जायते। विषयेभ्यश्च दोषदर्शनाद्यधीनं वैराग्यं भवति। एवं सञ्जातवैराग्यः श्रेयोवेदनाय गुरुकुलमुपसर्पति। तस्माच्च गुरोर्भक्त्याद्यनुमितस्वाधिकारात् समयदीक्षां लब्ध्वा समयिधर्मान् शिवारामपरिपालनशिवालयसंमार्जनशिवपूजोपयुक्तपुष्पाद्याहरणशिवभक्तपूजाभस्मोद्धूलनत्रिपुण्ड्ररुद्राक्षादिधारणादीननुतिष्ठति ॥

1. As the human soul is freed from these *pāśas* (shackles) (discussed above), the soul becomes one with Śiva, and (then) gradually obtains liberation (*mukti*) of the nature of the emergence of *Śivānanda* (blissfulness of divine communion). It is as follows: When a *brāhmaṇa*, a *kṣatriya*, a *vaiśya*, a good *śūdra*, or one of *anuloma* caste such as *savarṇa* reaches *karmasāmya* (the state wherein the soul's good and bad deeds become balanced), and *malaparipāka* (when the soul's blemishes become sufficiently ripe to fall off), then the *pārameśvarī śakti* (Lord's grace) falls on him. Then there arises in him a deep interest in knowing the good (*śreyas*). He becomes detached as a result of his realising the evil nature of sensuous objects. Thus becoming detached, he approaches the teacher for knowing the good. From the teacher who infers the eligibility by his devotion, etc., he receives

samayadīkṣā (spiritual initiation). Then he follows the duties of the Śaiva way of life such as (i) looking after the garden of Śiva, (ii) cleaning the temple of Śiva, (iii) gathering flowers, etc., useful for the worship of Śiva, (iv) rendering service to the devotees of Śiva, (v) smearing (his body) with Śiva's sacred ash, (vi) marking (his fore-head, etc.) with *tripuṇḍra* and (vii) wearing *rudrākṣa*.

२. एवमनुतिष्ठतोऽस्य पूर्वं मन्दतरतया स्थितः शक्तिपातो मन्दो भवति। तदा अस्य शिवपूजागमाध्ययनादौ श्रद्धा जायते। अनन्तरं तादृशश्रद्धा-परिपाकाभिज्ञाद्गुरोरागमाध्ययनशिवपूजाद्यधिकारभूतां विशेषदीक्षां लभते। तदनन्तरं गुरूपदिष्टागमाध्ययनादौ श्रद्धा जायते। शिवपूजादीन् पुत्रकधर्मा-ननुतिष्ठति। एवमागमोक्तपुत्रकधर्मान् वैदिकांश्च नित्यादीनाचरतोऽस्य पूर्वं मन्दतया स्थितः शक्तिपातस्तु तीव्रो भवति। तदा चातिपक्वमलतया प्रथममापातप्रतिपन्नेषु आगमार्थेषु पूर्वापराविरोधेन तत्त्वजिज्ञासा जायते। अनन्तरं तदभिज्ञाद्गुरोस्तत्त्वज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकर्तृसकलसञ्चितकर्मनिबर्हणीं निर्वाण-दीक्षां प्रपद्यते। अनन्तरं स्वात्मनः किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादि कर्ममलादिकृतं, शिवैक्येन सर्वज्ञत्वादिकमेव स्वाभाविकमिति गुरूपदेशेन प्रतिपद्यते। अनन्तरं च तमेवार्थं युक्तिभिः प्रतिष्ठाप्य निरन्तरं ध्यायते। एवं निरन्तराभ्यासे तत्परिपाकसह-कृतया गुरुकृपया स्वरूपज्ञानमभिव्यज्यते। तस्मिन्नेव क्षणे मलेन च विनिर्मुक्तो भवति। एवं मलविमुक्तोपि प्रारब्धेन कर्मणा देहबन्धमनुभवन्नास्ते। एवं निष्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानतया तदुत्पादककर्मणोऽनपेक्षितत्वेऽपि कदाचित् तदनुतिष्ठति। कदाचित् तत्परित्यजति। कदाचिन्निविडमपि कर्मानुतिष्ठति। न च तैर्लिप्यते। एवं प्रारब्धकर्मफलं सुखं दुःखं वानुभवति। तथापि तत्र न सज्जते। न वा विषीदति। एवं स्थितः प्रारब्धभोगान्ते मलकर्मणोरभावेन मायाया अपि देहादिद्वारा बन्धकत्वासम्भवेनैकीभूतः सन् अलौकिकमद्भुतं वाचामगोचरं अखण्डाकारसच्चिदात्मकं शिवानन्दं लभते। इयमेव मोक्षावाप्तिः। एतत्सर्वं क्रमेणोपपाद्यते।

2. As he practises (the *samayidharmas*), his fitness for Lord's grace which was very low earlier heightens to

some extent. Then he gets an active interest in the worship of Śiva and in the study of the (Śaiva) *Āgamas*. Thereafter, when the teacher observes him to possess such an earnest interest, he gets from the teacher the special initiation which is an essential requisite for doing (perfectly) Śiva-worship and studying the *Āgamas*. Afterwards, there arises (in him) faith in the *Āgamas*, etc., as instructed by the teacher. Then he performs *Śivapūjā*, etc., referred to as *putraka-dharmas*. (In due course) while he performs the *putraka-dharmas* as enjoined in the *Āgamas* and the Vedic rites such as the *nitya-karmas*, the *śaktipāta* which was mild earlier becomes intense. Then because the *mala* has become very much ripe, there arises in him a desire to inquire into the truth found in the tenets of the *Āgamas* which he knew only in an outline at first, as they are free from internal inconsistencies. Then when the teacher finds his interest (to know the truth), he receives from the *guru* the *nirvāṇadīkṣā* that destroys all *sañcita-karmas* which impede the realisation of the truth. Afterwards, he understands through the teaching of the *guru*, that (i) his limited knowledge, etc., are but the effect of *karma-mala*, etc., and that (ii) as he becomes one with Śiva he gets the essential nature of omniscience, etc. Thereafter, he establishes it through reasonings and meditates thereon incessantly. Thus, through the help of the teacher's grace which arises when the constant practice (of meditation) becomes mature, there emerges in him the knowledge of his essential nature. At that time itself he becomes liberated from *mala*. Thus, though freed from *mala* he continues to experience the bondage of the body owing to *prārabdhakarma*. In his way, though there is no need for him to perform duties which lead to knowledge, as he has already known the truth,

sometimes he performs them; sometimes he abandons them; and sometimes he even performs rigorous duties. However, he is not affected by them. Thus he experiences pleasure or pain which is the fruit of *prārabdhakarma*. However, he is neither elated nor disheartened. Being in this state, after enjoying *prārabdhakarma*, he becomes free from *mala* and *karma*, and also from the bondage through the body, etc., caused by *māyā*. So becoming united with Śiva, he attains the bliss of Śiva which is supra-sensuous, wondrous, beyond speech, and of the nature of undivided reality and consciousness. This alone is the attainment of *mokṣa* or deliverance. All this will be set forth in the sequence.

३. तथा हि — दीक्षायां चत्वारो वर्णाः षडनुलोमाश्चाधिकारिणः। अनुलोमाश्च सवर्णादयः। तत्र क्षत्रियायां ब्राह्मणाज्जातः सवर्णः। वैश्यायां तस्मादेव जातो निषादः। तस्मादेव शूद्रायां जातः पारशवः। वैश्यायां क्षत्रियाज्जातो माहिष्यः। तस्मादेव शूद्रायां जातो दौष्यन्तः। शूद्रायां वैश्याज्जात उग्रः। एतेभ्यो दशभ्योऽतिरिक्ता दीक्षायां नाधिकारिणः। तेषामागमपुराणादिश्रवणस्य —

अन्ये च ब्राह्मणा विष्णो राजानश्च तथैव च।
वैश्याश्च तारतम्येन ज्ञानाभ्यासेऽधिकारिणः॥

अस्ति शूद्रस्य शुश्रूषोः पुराणेनैव वेदनम्।
अन्येषामपि सर्वेषां ज्ञानाभ्यासो विधीयते॥

भाषान्तरेण कालेन तेषां सोऽप्युपकारकः।

इत्यादिना भाषान्तरश्रवणविधानमुखेन निषिद्धत्वात्। यद्यपि चात्र "अन्य" शब्द अनुलोमानामप्युपस्थापकः, तथापि जामदग्न्यविदुरादीनामनुलोमानां वेदाध्ययनभागवतश्रवणादेस्तत्र तत्रोक्ततया तदन्यविषयः। एवं च वर्णानुलोमातिरिक्तानामागमाध्ययनं प्रत्यनधिकारे तदङ्गभूतदीक्षायामप्यनधिकार एव। प्रधानाधिकारिण एवाङ्गेऽधिकारात्। यद्यपि शूद्रस्यापि —

दीक्षा कार्या हि सर्वेषां तच्छक्तिविधियोगिनाम् ।
त्रयाणामपि वर्णानां न तु शूद्रान्त्यजातिषु ॥

इति दीक्षायामधिकारो निषिद्धः, तथापि —

अमद्यपास्तु ये शूद्राः शौचाचारक्रियादराः ।
शिवभक्ताश्च ये तेषां दीक्षा कार्यान्यथा न हि ॥

इति निषेधोऽसच्छूद्रविषयतया व्यवस्थापित इति सच्छूद्रस्यैवाधिकारः ।

3. It is explained as follows: to obtain (*samaya-*) *dīkṣā*, persons of four castes and six *anulomas* are eligible. The *anulomas* are *savarṇa*, etc. Of the *anulomas*, one who is born to a *brāhmaṇa* and a *kṣatriya* (woman) is *savarṇa*; one who is born to him and a *vaiśya* (woman) is *niṣāda*; one who is born to him and a *śūdra* (woman) is *pāraśava*. One who is born to a *kṣatriya* and a *vaiśya* (woman) is *māhiṣya*; one who is born to him and a *śūdra* (woman) is *dauṣyanta*; and one who is born to a *vaiśya* and a *śūdra* (woman) is *ugra*. All others excepting these ten persons are not eligible to obtain *dīkṣā*. For, in the case of others, listening to the *Āgamas*, *Purāṇas*, etc., is prohibited, because it is enjoined that they should study them in other languages according to the following (verses): "O, Viṣṇu! others, namely *brāhmaṇas*, *kṣatriyas* and *vaiśyas* have eligibility in their distinctive order (of merit), to the practice of *jñāna*; for a *śūdra* who desires to know, knowing (it) through the *Purāṇa* only is allowed. For all the rest, the practice of *jñāna* is prescribed through other languages and after sometime; for them, it too is helpful." Here (in the above verses), even though the word *anya* (others) includes *anulomas* also, nevertheless 'others' refer to those persons other than them (*anulomas*); for, concerning *anulomas* such as Jāmadagnya, Vidura, and others, the listening to

the *Bhāgavata*, etc., and the study of the *Vedas* has been stated in various contexts. Thus when they (*viz.*, persons other than those of four castes and six *anulomas*) have no right to study the *Āgamas*, they have no eligibility for *dīkṣā* also, which is ancillary to it; for, those, who have the right in the principal alone, have the right in the ancillary. Even though a *śūdra* is not eligible for *dīkṣā*, according to the following (verse): "the *dīkṣā* is to be given to all persons of the three castes, who are endowed with the (requisite) power and discipline, and not to *śūdras* and *antyajātis*," nevertheless, such a prohibition is intended for *asat-śūdras*, in accordance; with the following (verse): "the *dīkṣā* is to be given to those *śūdras*, who do not drink liquor, who have high regard for purity, discipline and (good) deeds, and who are devotees of Śiva, and not for others;" hence *sat-śūdras* alone are eligible (to obtain *dīkṣā*).

४. तथा मलपरिपाकः कर्मसाम्यं चाधिकारिविशेषणम्।

परिपाको मलस्यैव किं त्वनुग्रहकारणम्।

इत्यादिवचनात्।

तस्य शिष्यस्य विप्रेन्द्राः कर्मसाम्ये सति द्विजाः।
शाम्भवी शक्तिरत्यन्तं तस्मिन् पतति चिद्घना॥

इत्यादि वचनाच्च। तत्र कर्मसाम्यं समबलयोः विरुद्धफलयोः पुण्यरूपयोरपुण्यरूपयोः पुण्यापुण्यरूपयोर्वा युगपत्फलौन्मुख्यम्। इदं च तिरोधानशक्तिनिवर्तनद्वारा अनुग्रहशक्तिनिपाते हेतुरित्यधिकारिविशेषणम्। अतुल्यबलत्वे अविरुद्धफलत्वे च तत्फलभोगस्यावश्यकत्वेन तिरोधानशक्तेर्निवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वान्न तत्र कर्मसाम्यमिति तद्व्यावर्तनाय तुल्यबलत्वं विरुद्धफलत्वं च विशेषणमुपात्तम्। मलस्य परिपाको हि विश्लेषौन्मुख्यावस्थाविशेषः। मलपरिपाकादियुक्ते अधिकारिणि शक्तेः पातोऽपि परिपाकादेः पूर्वं संवतायाः परिपाकादौ

सति सुव्यक्तायास्तस्या अनुग्रहौन्मुख्यमेव। अस्य च शक्तिपातस्य संसारविद्वेष-मुमुक्षाशिवभक्त्यादीनि चिह्नानि। एतैश्चिह्नैरधिकारिणं ज्ञात्वैव गुरुणा दीक्षा कर्तव्या। गुरुश्च चातुर्वर्णिक एव। तत्र ब्राह्मणो ब्राह्मणादीनां चतुर्णा-मनुलोमानां च षण्णां गुरुः। क्षत्रियः क्षत्रियादीनां नवानाम्। वैश्यो वैश्या-दीनामष्टानाम्। शूद्रः शूद्रस्यैव। आश्रमक्रमेऽपि सन्न्यासी सन्न्यासिप्रभृतीनां चतुर्णाम्। वानप्रस्थो वानप्रस्थादीनां त्रयाणाम्। गृहस्थो गृहस्थब्रह्म-चारिणोः। ब्रह्मचारी तु यदि नैष्ठिकस्तदा सन्न्यासिव्यतिरिक्तानां त्रयाणाम्। उक्तरूपस्य गुरोरसम्भवे क्षत्रियो ब्राह्मणस्य गुरुः। वैश्योऽपि क्षत्रियस्य। शूद्रस्तु शूद्रस्यैव। न कदाचित् स्वोत्तमवर्णस्य गुरुः। एवमाश्रमक्रमेऽपि वानप्रस्थः सन्न्यासिनोऽपि गुरुः। गृहस्थो वानप्रस्थसन्न्यासिनोरपि। ब्रह्म-चारी गृहस्थवानप्रस्थसन्न्यासिनामपि। चातुर्वर्णिकोपि वृत्तवयोयोनिगुणा-कारादिसम्पन्नो दोषहीन एव गुरुः। गुरुश्च न पशुत्वयोगी। किं तु निगमागमादिश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनपरिपाकाधीनसाक्षात्कारेण सम्पन्नशिव भावः।

आचार्यमूर्तिमास्थाय चतुर्धा शक्तिपाततः।
भगवाननुगृह्णाति स एव सकलानपि॥

आचार्यः शिव एवाहुः .....।

इत्यादिवचनात्। कुम्भादिष्विव गुरौ सन्निधानेन शिवस्यानुग्रहकर्तृत्वमिति औपचारिकार्थपरिग्रहस्य मुख्यार्थबाधाभावेऽयुक्तत्वात्। एवंविधाद्गुरोरुक्त-रूपेणाधिकारिणा प्रथमं समयदीक्षा लब्धव्या॥

4. Likewise, the (two) essential qualifications of an *adhikāri* (for getting *dīkṣā*) are *malaparipāka* and *karma-sāmya*; for, it is said, "the cause of *anugraha* (Lord's grace) is the maturity of *mala* alone;" and it is also said, "O best of the twice-born! when the disciple has attained *karma-sāmya*, the *Śāmbhavī-śakti*, full of knowledge descends on him." In this context, the *karmasāmya* is that state when two *karmas*, whether meritorious or non-meritorious or

both meritorious and non-meritorious are about to yield their fruits simultaneously on account of their equal strength or on account of their yielding mutually opposed fruits. This *karmasāmya* is the qualification of the eligible person (*adhikāri*) inasmuch as it is the cause for the descent of *anugrahaśakti* through the removal of *tirodhāna-śakti*. When the *karmas* are of unequal strength or when they do not yield mutually opposed results, the enjoyment of their fruits becomes necessary, with the result that it is impossible to remove *tirodhānaśakti*; in that case there will not be *karmasāmya*. With a view to overcome this contingency, the attributes "equal strength" and "yielding mutually opposed results" have been used. The maturity of *mala* is, indeed, the particular state in which the loosening of bonds is about to take place. In the case of the *adhikāri*, who is associated with *malaparipāka*, etc., the *śaktipāta* which remained concealed before the attainment of maturity, etc., becomes fully manifest after the maturity, etc.; so the *śaktipāta* is about to favour him. This *śaktipāta* has the characteristics such as aversion to bondage, desire for release, and devotion to Śiva. Only after noticing these characteristics of the eligible person, *dīkṣā* is to be imparted (to him) by the *guru*. And, the guru should be from one among the four castes. Of these, a *brāhmaṇa* is (eligible to be) the teacher of the four castes beginning with *brāhmaṇas* and the six *anulomas*; a *kṣatriya*, the teacher of the nine, beginning with *kṣatriyas*; a *vaiśya*, the teacher of the eight beginning with *vaiśyas*; and a *śūdra*, the teacher of *śūdras* only. In the order of *āśramas* also, a *sannyāsī* is the teacher of (those in) four *āśramas*, beginning with *sannyāsīs*; a *vānaprastha*, the teacher of the three beginning with *vānaprasthas*; a *gṛhastha*, the teacher of *gṛhasthas* and *brahmacārīs*. In the case

of a *brahmacārī*, if he is a *naiṣṭhika* (then he is eligible to be a teacher) of those in the three *āśramas* other than *sannyāsīs*. In the absence of a *guru* as specified above, a *kṣatriya* can be a teacher of a *brāhmaṇa*; a *vaiśya* also, of a *kṣatriya*; but a *śūdra* (can be a teacher) of *śūdra* alone; he can never be a teacher for one of the higher order. Thus, even in the order of *āśramas*, a *vānaprastha* can be a teacher of even a *sannyāsī*; a *gṛhastha*, of a *vānaprastha* and a *sannyāsī*; a *brahmacārī*, of a *gṛhastha*, a *vānaprastha* and a *sannyāsī*. (However) one belonging to one among the four castes, and endowed with character, age, (good) birth, virtues, nature, etc., can be a teacher only if he is bereft of blemishes. Also, a teacher should not be a bound soul; on the contrary, he should be one who has attained the nature of Śiva through realisation which arises from the fruition of the study, reflection and meditation of the *Vedas*, the *Āgamas*, etc. For, it is said: "Assuming the form of *guru*, the lord, through the fourfold *śaktipāta*, blesses; He Himself blesses even the *sakalas*; the *guru* is said to be Śiva Himself." It is not proper to say that the Lord's agency to bless takes place through His divine presence in the *guru*, as in the case of (*pūrṇa-*) *kumbhas*, etc.; for, it is not proper to resort to secondary denotation while the primary denotation (of a word) is not stultified. From such a preceptor, first *samayadīkṣā* should be obtained by an *adhikāri*, as set forth above.

५. दीक्षासामान्यलक्षणं तु आगमिकनित्याद्यधिकारागमश्रवणाद्यधिकारान्यतरनिर्वर्तनसमर्थशिवव्यापारत्वम्। तत्र समयदीक्षा विशेषदीक्षा च शिवालयपरिचर्याशिवपूजादिनित्याद्यधिकारसम्पादिका। निर्वाणदीक्षा तु आगमश्रवणमनन्नाद्यधिकारसम्पादिका। चातुर्वर्णिकत्वादिनियतव्यापारानुलोमनियतव्यापारव्यावृत्तये शिवव्यापारग्रहणम्। इयं च दीक्षा चाक्षुष्यादिभेदेन सप्तविधा। तत्र पाशबन्धविमोक्षाभिप्रायेण वीक्षणं चाक्षुषी दीक्षा।

तेनैवाभिप्रायेण दक्षिणहस्तेन स्पर्शनं स्पर्शदीक्षा। तदुद्देशेनैव संहितामन्त्रोच्चारणं वाचिकी दीक्षा। अस्य पाशविमोक्षो भवत्विति मनसाभिध्यानं मानसदीक्षा। तदभिप्रायेण शास्त्रप्रदानं शास्त्रदीक्षा। तदुद्देशेनैव शिवे संयोजनं योगदीक्षा। कुण्डमण्डपादियुक्ता हौत्री। सापि द्विविधा, ज्ञानवती क्रियावती चेति। यत्र कुण्डमण्डपादिषु क्रियमाणं कर्म क्रमेण मनसैव निर्वर्त्यते सा ज्ञानवती। इयं च ज्ञानवती दीक्षा शैवसन्न्यासपद्धतौ स्पष्टमुक्ता तत्र द्रष्टव्या। यत्र तु कायव्यापारेण सा क्रियावती। क्रियावत्यपि द्विविधा। निर्बीजा सबीजा चेति। तत्र स्त्रीबालवृद्धव्याधिग्रस्तादीनामसमर्थानां समयाचारसंशोधनेन समयाचारहीना निर्बीजा। इयमपि द्विविधा। सद्योनिर्वाणदा असद्योनिर्वाणदा चेति। यत्र प्रारब्धकर्मणोऽपि विशोधनं सा सद्योनिर्वाणदा। यद्यपि प्रारब्धस्य भोगेनैव तत्र तत्र विनाशः प्रतिपादितः, तथापि स तीव्रवेगप्रारब्धविषयः। प्रारब्धं हि तीव्रवेगमन्दसुप्तभेदेन चतुर्विधम्। तत्र तीव्रवेगयोः भोगं विना न विनाशः। मन्दस्य दीक्षायां संयोजनसञ्जननपूर्वक भोगभोजनेन विनाशः। सुप्तस्य तु भोगभोजनं विनैव नाशः। एवं च यत्र शिष्यगतं तीव्रतरं शक्तिनिपातं तादृशं च मलपरिपाकं मन्दं सुप्तं च प्रारब्धं ज्ञात्वात्यन्तसमर्थेन गुरुणा भोगभोजनेन तद्विना वा विनाशः क्रियते, सा सद्योनिर्वाणदा। यत्र प्रारब्धसंशोधनं नास्ति सा असद्योनिर्वाणदा। समयाचारसमर्थानां क्रियमाणा सबीजा। इयमपि शिवधर्मिणी लोकधर्मिणी चेति द्विविधा। धर्माधर्मयोरुभयोरपि यत्र संशोधनं सा शिवधर्मिणी। अधर्ममात्रस्य यत्र संशोधनं सा लोकधर्मिणी। क्रियावती प्रकारान्तरेण त्रिविधा। समयदीक्षा विशेषदीक्षा निर्वाणदीक्षा चेति। यत्र रुद्रपदे योजनं क्रियते सा समयदीक्षा। यत्रेश्वरपदे योजनं सा विशेषदीक्षा। अनयोरुभयोरपि नास्ति शिखाच्छेदः। यत्र शिवपदे योजनं सा निर्वाणदीक्षा। यत्र निर्वाणदीक्षापूर्वकं सन्न्यासः तत्र त्वस्ति शिखाच्छेदः। निर्वाणदीक्षायामध्वशुद्धिः कार्येति अध्वा निरूप्यते।

5. The general definition of *dīkṣā* is but the eligibility for *Śaiva* practice, *viz.*, the observance of obligatory duties, etc. (as enjoined) by the *Āgamas* or the study, etc. of the *Āgamas*. The *samayadīkṣā* and the *viśeṣa-dīkṣā* make the soul eligible for rendering service in the temples

of Lord Śiva, worship of Śiva, etc., and the observance of obligatory duties, etc. But the *nirvāṇa-dīkṣā* is one whice provides eligibility for the study, reflection, etc., of the *Āgamas*. The term "*Śaiva* practice" is indicated as distinct from the obligatory duties of the members of the four castes and *anulomas*. This (*nirvāṇa-dīkṣā*) is of seven kinds as *cākṣuṣī* etc. Of these, the *cākṣuṣī-dīkṣā* is looking at (the soul) with the intention of releasing it from bonds. The *sparśadīkṣā* is to touch (the disciple) with the right hand with the same intention alone. The utterance of the hymns of the *Saṁhitās* with the same intention is *vācikī dīkṣā*. Meditation through the mind to the effect, "Let him be released from bonds" is *mānasadīkṣā*. The imparting of *śāstras* with that intention is *śāstra-dīkṣā*. The *yogadīkṣā* is to unite him with Śiva, with the very same intention. The *hautrī dīkṣā* is that which is associated with *kuṇḍa* (fire-place), *maṇḍapa* (fire-altar), etc. This, again, is twofold: *jñānavatī* and *kriyāvatī*. When the rite which is to be performed in the *kuṇḍas*, *maṇḍapas*, etc., are carried out in the prescribed order through mind itself, it is known as *jñānavatī*. This *jñānavatī* is clearly set forth in the *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati*, and so it should be referred to (for details). But, that which is performed through the body is *kriyāvatī-hautrī*. And, *kriyāvatī* is twofold: *nirbījā* and *sabījā*. *Nirbījā* is that which is free from religious practices; and it is given to the weak persons such as women, children, the aged and the sick, through purifying them with religious practices. This (*nirbījā*), again, is twofold: (i) that which gives forth liberation at once, and (ii) that which gives forth liberation in future. When the fructified deed (merits and demerits) too is atoned, then there is liberation at once. It is true that at several places it has been said that fructified deed will

come to an end only by experiencing its fruit; yet these statements relate to the fructified deed that is very intense and intense. The fructified deed, indeed, is fourfold as exceedingly intense, intense, slow and dormant. Of these, the fructified deed that is exceedingly intense or intense cannot be removed without the experience of its fruit. If the fructified deed is slow (in giving forth its fruit), then it is made to disappear by providing objects of enjoyment preceded by uniting him with Śiva at the time of initiation. But that which is dormant is removed without any experience of its fruit. Thus noticing that the *Śaktinipāta* in the disciple is very intense and also in the same way, his impurities are in the process of becoming slackened, and also noticing that his fructified deed is rather slow or dormant, the fructified deed is destroyed by the highly competent *guru* by providing objects of enjoyment or not; this initiation produces *mukti* immediately. When the fructified deed is not atoned, then there is no immediate *mukti*. The *dīkṣā* (initiation) given to those who are able to receive (and practise) *samayācāra* (religious conduct), is known as *sabījā*. This (*sabījā*) is, again, twofold: *śivadharmiṇī* and *lokadharmiṇī*. In the former, there takes place the atonement of both *dharma* and *adharma*; whereas, in the latter there takes place the atonement of *adharma* alone. According to another classification, *kriyāvatī* is threefold: *samayadīkṣā*, *viśeṣadīkṣā* and *nirvāṇadīkṣā*. When the soul is united with *rudrapada*, then, it is called *samayadīkṣā*. When it is united with *Īśvarapada*, then it is known as *viśeṣadīkṣā*. In the case of these two *dīkṣās*, there is no *śikhāccheda* (tonsure). When there is union with *śivapada*, then it is called *nirvāṇadīkṣā*. When *sannyāsa* is made through *nirvāṇadīkṣā*, then there is *śikhāccheda*. When *nirvāṇadīkṣā* is given, the *adhvaśuddhi* is to be performed; so, *adhvā* is explained.

६. अध्वा च मन्त्रपदवर्णभुवनतत्त्वकलाभेदेन षड्विधः। तत्र उत्तरोत्तरः पूर्वपूर्वव्यापकः। मन्त्रा एकादश। पदान्येकाशीतिः। वर्णाः पञ्चाशत्। भुवनानि चतुर्विंशत्यधिकद्विशतसंख्यानि। तत्त्वानि षट्त्रिंशत्। कलाः पञ्च। तत्र निवृत्तिकलायां पृथिव्याख्यं तत्त्वमेकम्। कालाग्न्यादीनि अष्टोत्तरशतं भुवनानि। तत्र ब्रह्माण्डकरण्डमध्ये षट्। प्राच्याद्यासु दशसु दिक्षु दश दश। ऊर्ध्वं द्वे। तदेवमष्टोत्तरशतं भुवनानि। सद्योजातहृदयाख्यौ मन्त्रौ। अष्टाविंशतिः पदानि। वर्ण एकः। पदवर्णानां स्वरूपमन्यत्र प्रदर्शितम्। वर्णः पीतः। मण्डलं चतुरश्रम्। गन्धादयो विषयाः। ब्रह्मा कारणम्। प्रतिष्ठाकलायां तत्त्वानि त्रयोविंशतिः। तानि च जलादीनि प्रकृत्यन्तानि। षट्पञ्चाशद्भुवनानि। तानि चामरेशादीनि श्रीकण्ठान्तानि। तानि जलतेजोऽनिलाकाशेषु तन्मात्रेन्द्रियमनोगर्भेऽहङ्कारे बुद्ध्यव्यक्तयोश्चाष्टावष्टौ। शिरोवामदेवौ मन्त्रौ। एकविंशतिः पदानि। वर्णास्त्रयोविंशतिः। वर्णः शुक्लः। मण्डलमर्धचन्द्राकारम्। विषया रसादयः। कारणं विष्णुः। विद्याकलायां तत्त्वानि सप्त। तानि च पुरुषादिमायान्तानि। भुवनानि सप्तविंशतिः। तानि च वामादीन्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रान्तानि। तत्र पुरुषे षट्। रागनियतिमायासु पञ्च पञ्च। इतरेषु द्वे द्वे। शिखाघोरौ मन्त्रौ। विंशतिः पदानि। वर्णाः सप्त। वर्णः शोणः। मण्डलं त्रिकोणम्। विषया रूपादयः। कारणं रुद्रः। शान्तिकलायां तत्त्वानि त्रीणि। तानि (शुद्ध)विद्यादीनि सदाशिवान्तानि। भुवनान्यष्टादश। तानि वामादीनि सदाशिवान्तानि। तत्र विद्यायां नव। ईश्वरे अष्टौ। सदाशिव एकम्। तत्पुरुषकवचौ मन्त्रौ। पदान्येकादश। वर्णास्त्रयः। मण्डलं षट्कोणम्। विषयाः स्पर्शादयः। कारणमीश्वरः। शान्त्यतीतकलायां शक्तिशिवाख्ये तत्त्वे। भुवनानि पञ्चदश। तानि निवृत्त्यादीनि अनाश्रितान्तानि। तत्र शक्तितत्त्वे चत्वारि। शिवतत्त्वे एकादश। शिवास्त्रेशाना मन्त्रास्त्रयः। पदमेकम्। वर्णाः षोडश। (शुक्लवर्णः) स्फटिकाभः। मण्डलं वृत्तम्। विषयः शब्दः। कारणं सदाशिवः। तदेवं पञ्चाध्वगर्भितासु कलासु संयोजनादिक्रमेण शुद्धिः कार्या॥

6. *Adhvā* is sixfold: hymn, word, letter, world, *tattva* and *kalā*. Of these, the subsequent ones pervade the preceding ones. *Mantras* are eleven. Words are 81. Letters are 50. Worlds are 224. The *tattvas* are 36.

Kalā-s are five. Here, in the *Nivṛttikalā*, there is one *tattva*, named *pṛthivī*; the worlds are 108 such as *kālāgnī*; of these worlds, six (worlds) are in the midst of *brahmāṇḍakaraṇḍa*; there are 10 worlds each in ten directions beginning with east; there are two worlds above; thus the worlds are 108; the two *mantras* are called *sadyojāta* and *hṛdaya*; the words are 28; the letter is one; the nature of letters and words is shown elsewhere; *varṇa* (colour) is yellow; the *maṇḍala* is of four sides; the objects are smell, etc; the cause is Lord Brahmā. There are 23 *tattvas* beginning with water and ending with *prakṛti* in *Pratiṣṭhā-kalā*; the worlds, from *amareśa* to *śrīkaṇṭha*, are 56; there are eight worlds each, in water, fire, air, ether, *ahaṅkāra* (which includes tanmātras, indriyas and manas), *buddhi* and *avyakta*; the *mantras* are *śiro-mantra* and *vāmadeva-mantra*; the words are 21; the letters are 23; the colour is white; the *maṇḍala* is of half lunar shape; the objects are *rasa*, etc.; the cause is Lord Viṣṇu. In *Vidyā-kalā*, there are seven *tattvas*, beginning with *puruṣa* and ending with *māyā*; the worlds, from *vāma* to *aṅguṣṭhamātra*, are 27; of these, six worlds are in *puruṣatattva*; there are five worlds each, in *rāga*, *niyati* and *māyā*; there are 2 (worlds) each, in the other 3 (tattvas); the *mantras* are *śikhā* and *aghora*; the words are 20 and the letters are 7; the colour is red; the *maṇḍala* is triangular; the objects are colour, etc.; the cause is Rudra. There are 3 *tattvas*, beginning with (*śuddha*) *vidyā* and *sadāśiva* at the end, in *Śānti-kalā*; the worlds, from *vāma* to *sadāśiva*, are 18; of these, 9 worlds are in *vidyā* (*tattva*), 8 in *Īśvara* (*tattva*), and one in *sadaśiva* (*tattva*); the *mantras* are *tatpuruṣa* and *kavaca*; the words are 11; the letters are 3; the *maṇḍala* is hexagonal; the objects are touch etc.; the cause is *Īśvara*. In *Śāntyatītakalā*, *śakti* and *śiva*

are the two *tattvas*; the worlds, from *nivṛtti* to *anāśrita*, are 15; of these, 4 worlds are in *śaktitattva* and 11 in *śivatattva*; the *mantras* are three, *viz.*, *śiva*, *astra* and *īśāna*; the word is one; the letters are 16; the colour is white, shining like crystal; the *maṇḍala* is circular; the object is sound; the cause is Sadāśiva. Thus in all the five *Kalās* that contain five *Adhvās*, the purification is to be made in the order of *saṁyojana* (uniting), etc.

७. तदेवं स्थिते समयदीक्षां लब्ध्वा गुरुणा शिक्षितान् समयिधर्मानुतिष्ठेत्। समयिधर्माश्च शिवालयशिवभक्तपरिचर्यादयः त्रिपुण्ड्ररुद्राक्षधारणादयश्च। अस्य च समयिधर्मस्य दासमार्ग इति व्यवहारः। एतच्च त्रिपुण्ड्ररुद्राक्षधारणादिकं न केवलं समयिमात्रस्यानुष्ठेयम्। किं तु सर्वेषामपि नित्यकर्मवन्नित्यतयानुष्ठेयम्। अननुष्ठाने पातकादिश्रवणेनानुष्ठानश्रद्धाप्रशंसया नित्यत्वोक्त्यादिभिश्च तस्य नित्यतया विधानात्। तथा हि — स्कान्दे अकरणे पातकं श्रूयते —

त्रिपुण्ड्रोद्धूलनादौ च तन्मानश्रवणेऽपि च।
वाञ्छा न जायते येषां ते महापापसंयुताः॥ इति॥

वासिष्ठलैङ्गे —

येषां भस्मनि विद्वेषो वर्तते हृदये सदा॥
संकीर्णा तु भवेद्ब्रह्मंस्तेषां वंशपरम्परा।
(अ. ५ श्लो. २६-२७)

येषां क्रोधो भवेन्नित्यं ललाटे भस्मदर्शनात्॥
तेषामुत्पत्तिसांकर्यमनुमेयं विपश्चिता। (अ. ५ श्लो. २२)
ये भस्मधारिणं दृष्ट्वा वाचा निन्दन्ति मानवाः॥
तेषां शूद्रेण सम्भूतिरनुमेया विपश्चिता। (अ. ५ श्लो. २३)

ये भस्मधारिणं दृष्ट्वा नराः कुर्वन्ति ताडनम् ॥
तेषां चण्डालतो जन्म ब्रह्मन्नूह्यं विपश्चिता । (अ. ५ श्लो. २४)
येषां श्रद्धा मुने नास्ति श्रौतभस्मनि सर्वदा ॥
गर्भाधानादिसंस्कारस्तेषां नास्तीति निश्चयः ॥
(अ. ५ श्लो. २५-२६)

इत्यादिना अननुष्ठातॄणां जन्मसाङ्कर्यं द्विजसंस्काराभावश्च श्रूयते ।

7. This being the case, a person, after obtaining *samayadīkṣā*, should follow the *samayidharmas* as instructed by the teacher. *Samayidharmas* are doing service in the temples of *Śiva* and rendering service to the devotees of *Śiva*, etc., as well as wearing of *tripuṇḍra*, *rudrākṣa*, etc. This *samayidharma* is popularly known as *dāsamārga*. The wearing of *tripuṇḍra*, *rudrākṣa*, etc., is to be followed not only by those initiated into *samayadīkṣā*, but also by all daily like an obligatory ritual. For, these (*śaiva* practices) are enjoined as obligatory through texts which speak of them as daily (practice) by referring to sin, etc., which will accrue when they are not performed and through the praise of earnestness in their observance. Thus in the *Skānda*, the sin due to non-observance is spoken of: "Those in whom there does not arise any desire to wear *tripuṇḍra*, to besmear oneself with sacred ash, etc., in spite of knowing the authority therefor, are associated with heinous sins." In the *Vāsiṣṭha-Laiṅga* (the following texts are found): "O brahmin, those in whose heart there is always hatred towards *bhasma*, must belong to the family of mixed birth. (V. 26-27). A wise man should infer that those who are always angry on seeing the *bhasma* on the forehead (of the śaivites) must be born of people of mixed birth. (V. 22). A wise man should infer that

those persons who speak ill of others wearing *bhasma,* are born to *śūdras.* (V. 23). O brahmin, a wise man should conclude that those persons, who beat people wearing *bhasma* after seeing them, are of *caṇḍāla* origin. (V. 24). It is certain, O sage, that those who are never interested in wearing *bhasma* of scriptural authority, are bereft of the *saṁskāras, garbhādhāna,* etc." (V. 25-26). From the above passages the mixed birth and the absence of *saṁskāras* (of the twice-born) in the case of those who do not follow (the *śaiva* practices) is known.

८. तथा पराशरोपपुराणे —

त्वद्भक्ता ब्राह्मणाः साक्षात्त्रिपुण्ड्रे भस्मकुण्ठने ।
भवेयुर्विमुखा नित्यं वेदसिद्धे विमुक्तिदे ॥

(अ. ३ श्लो. ३५)

इति तत्परित्यागस्य शापफलत्वं श्रूयते । तथा तत्रैव —

वेदोत्कर्षे शिवोत्कर्षे विद्योत्कर्षे तथैव च ।
त्रिपुण्ड्रोद्भूलनोत्कर्षे श्रद्धा पुण्यवतो भवेत् ॥
अनेकजन्मसिद्धानां श्रौतस्मार्तानुवर्तिनाम् ।
वेदोक्तेनैव मार्गेण त्रिपुण्ड्रे जायते मतिः ॥

(अ. ६ श्लो. २१, अ. ४ श्लो. २७-२८)

इति त्रिपुण्ड्रादिश्रद्धा महापुण्यफलत्वेन स्तूयते । तथा तत्रैव —

ब्राह्मणो विधिनोत्पन्नं त्रिपुण्ड्रं भस्मनैव तु ।
ललाटे धारयेन्नित्यं तिर्यग्भस्मावकुण्ठनम् ॥

(अ. ५ श्लो. २५-२६)

इति नित्यशब्दयोगेन विधानं दृश्यते

आदिब्राह्मणभूतेन त्रिपुण्ड्रं भस्मना धृतम् ।
यतोऽत एव विप्रस्तु त्रिपुण्ड्रं धारयेत्सदा ॥
भस्मना वेदसिद्धेन त्रिपुण्ड्रं धारयेत्सदा ।

(पराशरोप. अ. ५ श्लो. २७-२८)

इत्यादिना सदाशब्दयोगेन विधानं दृश्यते । किं च तत्रैव —

भस्मना वेदसिद्धेन त्रिपुण्ड्रं देहकुण्ठनम् ।
रुद्रलिङ्गार्चनं चापि मोहतो वापि न त्यजेत् ॥ इति ॥

(पराशरोप. अ. १० श्लो. ४०)

स्कान्दे च —

त्रिपुण्ड्रं धारयेद्भक्त्या मनसापि न लङ्घयेत् ।

इति त्यागो निषिध्यते ।

8. In the same way, in the *Parāśaropapurāṇa* it is said that the giving up of this (*samayidharma*) is the result of curse: "Your devotees, O brahmins, will be averse to wear *tripuṇḍra* and to besmear the body with sacred ash, which possess Vedic sanction and yield *mokṣa.*" (III. 35). Likewise even there, the earnestness in wearing *tripuṇḍra* etc., are praised as a result of great merit: "A meritorions person shows earnestness in the greatness of the *Vedas*, the greatness of Śiva, the greatness of learning and also in the greatness of wearing *tripuṇḍra*, and the besmearing (one's body) with sacred ash. Only the mind of those, who have followed in their several births the religious observances enjoined in *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, turns towards wearing *tripuṇḍra* in the way taught by the *Vedas.*" (*Parāśaropapurāṇa*, VI. 21; IV. 27-28). Also there itself, there is injunction by the mention of the

word '*nitya*': "A brahmin should daily wear *tripuṇḍra* horizontally on his forehead, with the sacred ash prepared according to śāstraic principles; and he should besmear (his body) with sacred ash." (*Ibid.*, V. 25-26). And, elsewhere there is injunction by the use of the word '*sadā*': "Since the first brahmin has worn *tripuṇḍra* with sacred ash, a brahmin should, therefore, always wear *tripuṇḍra*. One should always wear *tripuṇḍra*, by using the sacred ash which has Vedic sanction." (*Ibid.*, V. 27-28). Moreover, there itself (it is said): "One should not abandon even by delusion the wearing of *tripuṇḍra* with the sacred ash, the besmearing of one's body with *bhasma* and also worship of *Rudraliṅga* all of which has been sanctioned by the *Vedas*." (*Ibid.*, X. 4). Also, in the *Skānda*, the neglect of *tripuṇḍra* is decried: "One should earnestly wear *tripuṇḍra*; it should not be neglected even mentally."

९. तथा रुद्राक्षधारणमपि अकरणे दोषकीर्तनादिभिर्नित्यम्। तथा हि स्कान्दे —

अरुद्राक्षधरो भूत्वा यत्किञ्चित्कर्म वैदिकम् ।
कुर्वन् विप्रस्तु मोहेन नरके पतति ध्रुवम् ॥

इत्यकरणे दोषः कीर्त्यते। बृहन्नारदीये —

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते महादेवप्रसादतः ।
रुद्राक्षधारणे श्रद्धा स्वभावादेव जायते ॥

इति श्रद्धायाः पुण्यफलत्वोक्तिः। स्कान्दे —

कण्ठे मूर्ध्न्युपवीते वा कर्णे करयुगेऽथवा ।
रुद्राक्षं धारयेन्नित्यं भक्त्या परमया युतः ॥

इति नित्यशब्दः। वायवीये —

नाभक्त्या धारयेदक्षान् सदा भक्त्यैव धारयेत् ।

इति सदाशब्दयोगेन विधानं द्रष्टव्यम्। अयं च समयिधर्मः तज्जन्मनि विशेषनिर्वाणदीक्षाद्यलाभे सालोक्यफलं दत्वा जन्मद्वयव्यवधानेनैकजन्मव्यवधानेन वा मुक्तिं जनयति। शिवधर्मोत्तरे—

अथ ये सततं भक्त्या भजन्ति शिवयोगिनः।
ते विन्दन्ति महाभोगानन्ते योगं च शाङ्करम्॥
भोगयोगार्थिभिस्तस्मात्सम्पूज्याः शिवयोगिनः।
प्रतिश्रयान्नपानेन शय्यावस्त्रासनादिभिः॥
इति यः कुरुते भक्तिं सततं शिवयोगिनाम्।
स द्वितीये तृतीये वा देहे योगमवाप्नुयात्॥

इत्यादिवचनैस्तथा प्रतिपादनात्। एते च समयिधर्मा यद्यपि सर्वेषामपि पुत्रकानां साधकानाञ्च साधारणाः, तथापि तेषामसाधारणधर्मान्तरसत्त्वादेते समयिधर्मा इत्युच्यन्ते। इत्थं समयिधर्मानुष्ठानाद्विशेषदीक्षाधिकारलाभे विशेषदीक्षां कृत्वा शिवपूजागमाध्ययनादिपुत्रकधर्मानुतिष्ठेत्।

इत्थं समयदीक्षायां विशिष्टायां विशेषतः।
वह्निहोमागमज्ञाने योग्यः सञ्जायते शिशुः॥

इति प्रतिपादितस्य समययुक्तविशेषदीक्षारूपस्य तदधिकारस्य सद्भावात्। तत्र शिवार्चनं मानसं प्रशस्तम्। तत्राशक्तस्तु पञ्चविधशुद्धिकरणपूर्वकं अभिषेकालङ्करणनिवेदनस्तोत्रपाठनमस्कारादिकं बहिर्यागशब्दाभिधेयं कुर्यात्। तथा वर्णाश्रमधर्मानप्यनुतिष्ठेत्। तेषां तत्त्वज्ञानसाधनत्वात्॥

9. Likewise, the wearing of *rudrākṣa* is also obligatory, for there are several scriptural texts which speak of sin accruing when it is not done. Thus it is said in the *Skānda*: "A brahmin, who does any Vedic ritual without wearing *rudrākṣa* because of delusion, goes, indeed, to hell." In this way, sin is spoken of as accuring when it (the wearing of *rudrākṣa*) is not done. In the *Bṛhannāradīya*, (it is said), earnestness (to wear *rudrākṣa*) arises as

a result of merit: "At the end of several births, a person of his own accord evinces interest in wearing *rudrākṣa* through the grace of Mahādeva." In the *Skānda*, (wearing of *rudrākṣa*) is said to be obligatory: "One should, with great devotion daily wear *rudrākṣa* on one's neck, head, sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*), ears and two hands." In the *Vāyavīya*, (it is said): "One should not wear *rudrākṣa* without devotion; always it should be worn only with devotion." In this way, the injunction that it should be worn always, should be noted. This *samayidharma*, after giving the fruit of *sālokya* to one who has not got the special *nirvāṇadīkṣā* in the present birth, yields *mokṣa* after the interval of two births or of one birth. For, it is set forth in the *Śivadharmottara* as follows: "Then, those who always adore the Śivayogins with devotion, obtain great *bhogas* and in the end attain union with Śaṅkara. Therefore, the Śivayogins should be adored by the seekers of *bhoga* and *yoga* through the offering of shelter, food, drink, bed, clothes, seat, etc. Thus one, who always serves Śivayogins, attains *Śivayoga* in two or three births." Even though these *samayidharmas* are generally the same for *putrakas* and *sādhakas*, nevertheless, because they have other specific *dharmas*, these are called *samayidharmas*. Thus, after following *samayidharmas*, obtaining eligibility for *viśeṣadīkṣā* one should practise *putrakadharmas*, such as worship of Śiva, study of *Āgamas*. For, it has been stated that there is eligibility for the soul to get *viśeṣadīkṣā* along with *samayadīkṣā* as, "Thus when a person has acquired the special merit of eligibility for *samayadīkṣā*, then he gains eligibility for performing fire-offerings and study of the *Āgamas*." Of these (*Śivapūjā* and the study of the *Āgamas*), the worship of Śiva mentally is the best. But a person, who is not able to do this, should do what is called external worship (*bahiryāga*), *viz.*, *abhiṣeka*, *alaṅkaraṇa*, *nivedana*,

stotrapāṭha (reciting devotional hymns), *namaskāra* (paying obeisance), etc., after undergoing the fivefold act of purification. Likewise, the duties of one's *varṇa* and *āśrama* should be performed since they are means to *tattvajñāna*.

१०. नन्वस्तु तेषां साक्षादेव मुक्तिसाधनत्वम्। गौतमधर्मस्कान्दादिषु तथा प्रतिपादनात्। तत्र गौतमधर्मे — "यस्यैते चत्वारिंशत्संस्कारा अष्टावात्मगुणाः स ब्रह्मणःसायुज्यं सलोकतामाप्नोति" इति कर्मणां साक्षान्मोक्षहेतुत्वं प्रतिपादितम्। तथा स्कान्देऽपि —

वर्णाश्रमसमाचारादेव मुक्तिर्न चान्यथा। इति ॥

अन्यत्रापि —

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः।

(भगवद्गीता अ. ३ श्लो. २०)

इति श्रूयते। न च तेषां फलान्तरे उपयुक्तत्वान्मोक्षफले न सम्बन्ध इति युक्तम्। तथा सति कर्मणां ज्ञानफलेऽपि सम्बन्धाभावप्रसङ्गात्। यद्युत्पत्तिवाक्यावगतस्वरूपाणां कर्मणामधिकारवाक्यद्वयेन परस्परानपेक्षया फलद्वयसम्बन्धः संयोगपृथक्त्वन्यायेन बोधयितुं शक्यत इत्युच्यते, तर्हि प्रकृतेऽपि मोक्षफलसम्बन्धोऽपि तथा वक्तुं शक्यत इति समानम् ॥

10. (It may be said:) let them (the duties of one's *varṇa* and *āśrama*) be the direct means to *mokṣa*, since it has been set forth in that way in the *Gautamadharma*, the *Skānda*, etc. In the *Gautamadharma*, it is stated that the rituals are the direct means to *mokṣa*: "One who possesses these forty *saṁskāras* and eight *ātmaguṇas*, attains the world of, and union with *Brahman*." Likewise, in the *Skānda* also, (it has been stated): "By following the duties of one's *varṇa* and *āśrama* alone, *mokṣa* (is obtained) and not otherwise." Elsewhere also, it is said, "By *Karma* alone, indeed, Janaka and others tried to attain perfection." (*Bhagavadgītā*,

III.20). It is not proper to say that since the *dharmas* (of *varṇa* and *āśrama*) are useful for (attaining) other fruits, they have no connection with the fruit of *mokṣa*. If it were so, there would arise the contingency of the *karmas* having no connection even with the fruit of *jñāna*. If it be said that even though the two *Adhikāravākyas* are independent of each other, the relation between the two fruits of the *karmas* whose nature is known through the *Utpattivākyas*, is known according to the principle of *saṁyogapṛthaktva* (two-in-one-ness), then in the present context also the relation to the fruit of *mokṣa* can be said in the same way.

११. ननु कर्मानुष्ठानस्य पुण्यजननद्वारा भोगहेतुत्वं नोपपद्यत इति चेत्, न; भोगकामनयानुष्ठितानां तेषां भोगहेतुत्वेऽपि मोक्षकामनयानुष्ठितानां मोक्षजनकत्वाविरोधात्। अन्यथा तवापि ज्ञानोत्पादाय तदनुष्ठाने तैर्भोगजननप्रसङ्गात्। न चानेकजन्मार्जितानां सञ्चितकर्मणां ज्ञानं विना निवर्तकाभावात् केवलकर्मभिर्न मोक्षः सम्भवतीति युक्तम्। योगादिसम्पादिताणिमाद्यैश्वर्यायत्तेन कायव्यूहपरिग्रहेण भोगद्वारैव तेषामपोह्यत्वात्। "वर्णाश्रमसमाचारादेव" — इत्यादिना कर्मणोऽपीतरव्यवच्छेदेन कारणत्वस्य प्रतिपादनाद्वचनद्वयाविरोधाय परस्परनैरपेक्ष्येण विकल्पेन साधनत्वस्य कल्पयितुमुचितत्वात्। तस्मात्साक्षात्कर्मणां मोक्षजनकत्वम्। न तु ज्ञानद्वारा इति, मैवम्। ज्ञानतिलके —

न दानैर्न तपोयज्ञैर्न होमैर्न यमैर्व्रतैः।
न स्नानतीर्थसम्पातैर्लभ्यते परमं पदम्॥

अनेकैः पापसङ्घातैरनेकैः पुण्यसञ्चयैः।
बध्नन्ति सर्वदात्मानं कोशागारक्रिमिर्यथा॥

इत्यादिना कर्मणां मोक्षहेतुत्वाभावस्य प्रत्युत बन्धहेतुत्वस्य च प्रतिपादनात्। किञ्च मलनिवृत्तिं विना न मोक्षः सम्भवति। शिवानन्दानुभवाच्छादकस्यानुवृत्तेः। न चाज्ञानरूपस्य मलस्य ज्ञानेन विना विनिवृत्तिर्युज्यते।

ज्ञानेन च तदज्ञानं निवर्तेत न कर्मभिः ।
ज्ञानं लब्ध्वाचिरादेव शिवसायुज्यमाप्नुयात् ॥

इति शिवधर्मोत्तरे मलस्य ज्ञानमात्रनिवर्त्यताप्रतिपादनात् । ज्ञानाभावे सञ्चित-कर्मणां प्रक्षयानुपपत्तेश्च । भोगेन प्रक्षये, पुनः पुनः कर्मार्जनस्यानिवारणात् । कर्मानुष्ठाने आनुषङ्गिकस्याधर्मस्यानिवृत्तेश्च । तस्मान्न केवलकर्मणा मोक्षः ॥

11. It may be argued as follows: If it be said that as the practice of *karma* leads to enjoyment by producing merit, it is untenable to say that *karma* is the cause of *mokṣa*, it is not so; though *karmas*, performed with the desire to get *bhoga*, are the cause of *bhoga*, there is no contradiction in *karmas* which are performed with the desire for *mokṣa*, producing *mokṣa*. Otherwise even for you, there arises the contingency of *bhoga* resulting from the performance of knowledge. It is proper (to say) that as the *sañcitakarmas* accrued in several births cannot be removed without knowledge, *mokṣa* cannot be attained by mere *karma* (action). For, those (*sañcitakarmas*) can be removed by (their) enjoyment itself, through the acquisition of a multitude of bodies which can be attained through the powers such as *aṇimā*, etc., earned by (the practice of) *yoga*, etc. By the text, "Only from the performance of the duties of *varṇa* and *āśramas*" etc., as *karmas* also are said to be the exclusive means (to *mokṣa*), for showing that there is no conflict between the two texts, it is proper to say that *karmas*, by themselves, without any mutual dependence, are the means. Therefore, *karmas* can directly produce *mokṣa*, but not through knowledge. (Reply:) It is not so. For, it is set forth in the *Jñānatilaka* that *karmas* are not the cause of *mokṣa*, but they are the cause of bondage, as follows: "The supreme abode cannot be attained through charities, nor by penance and sacrifices

nor by oblations (in fire), nor by sense-control, nor by austerities, nor by taking bath in holy rivers and pilgrimages. People ever bind themselves by several hosts of sins and by several heaps of merits just as an insect in the storehouse." Moreover, *mokṣa* is not possible without the removal of *mala*; for there is the continuance of the veil obstructing one's experience of *Śivānanda*. It is not tenable to say that *mala* which is in the form of nescience can be removed without knowledge. For, it is stated in the *Śivadharmottara* that *mala* can be removed, only by *jñāna*: "By knowledge that nescience will be removed and not by *karmas*. Immediately after obtaining knowledge one will attain union with Śiva." And also, the destruction of *sañcitakarmas* is untenable in the absence of knowledge. If it is held that the removal (of *sañcita-karmas*) is by *bhoga*, then the accruing of *karmas* again and again cannot be avoided; and thus, the demerits which incidentally accrue during the practice of *karmas* cannot be removed. Therefore *mokṣa* cannot be attained by mere *karma*.

१२. नन्वस्तु तर्हि ज्ञानकर्मणोः समप्राधान्येन समुच्चिततया मोक्षहेतुत्वम्। अत एव न विकल्पप्रयुक्तदोषाष्टकमपि। एवञ्च "न दानैः" इत्यादिनिषेधोऽपि ज्ञानं विना कृतकर्मविषयकतयोपपद्यते। समप्राधान्येन समुच्चये तु—

ज्ञानं प्रधानं न तु कर्महीनं
कर्म प्रधानं न तु बुद्धिहीनम्।
तस्मात्तयोरेव भवेत् प्रसिद्धिः
न ह्येकपक्षो विहगः प्रयाति॥

यथान्नं मधुसंयुक्तं मधु चान्नेन संयुतम्।
एवं तपश्च विद्या च संयुक्तं भेषजं महत्॥

इत्यादिकं वचनं मानम्। तस्माज्ज्ञानकर्मणी समप्रधान्येन मोक्षसाधनमिति। मैवम्।

न कर्म करणीयं हि बहिस्तस्य महात्मनः।
ज्ञानामृतेन तृप्तस्य भक्त्या च विवशात्मनः।

इति शिवधर्मोत्तरे,

न लिङ्गं नाश्रमाचारः परमात्मनि संस्थितौ।

(विद्यापादे श्लो. ७०)

इति सर्वज्ञानोत्तरे,

न ध्यानं न तपः पूजा न होमो नैव साधनम्।
अग्निकार्यादिकार्यं च नैव तस्य महेश्वरि॥

नियमोऽपि न तस्यास्ति क्षेत्रपीठादिसेवनम्।
नार्चनं पितृकार्यं च तीर्थयात्राव्रतानि च॥

इति देवीकालोत्तरे च सञ्जातज्ञानस्य कर्मनिषेधेन कर्मणां ज्ञानार्थत्वावगमात्। कर्मणां हि ज्ञानवत्साक्षान्मोक्षहेतुत्वे जातेऽपि ज्ञाने तानि कर्तव्यानि स्युः। ज्ञानद्वारा तु साधनत्वे द्वारस्य निष्पन्नतया तदर्थानि कर्माणि न कर्तव्यानीति तन्निषेध उपपद्यते। कर्मणां दृष्टज्ञानद्वारकत्वसम्भवेऽदृष्टद्वारकत्वकल्पनस्या-युक्तत्वाच्च। "ज्ञानं प्रधानं" इत्यादिवचनमप्युक्तनिषेधपर्यालोचनया, ज्ञानं प्रधानं, साक्षात्कारणम्। तत्त कर्मणा स्वजनकेन विहीनं चेत् स्वस्यैवानिष्पत्त्या कार्याजनकम्। तथा, कर्म प्रधानं, ज्ञानोत्पादकतया अवश्यापेक्षणीयम्। अत एव द्वारभूतया बुद्ध्या विनाकृतं न जनकम्। अत उभयोः सत्त्व एव मुक्तिर्भवतीति द्वारद्वारिभावसमुच्चयपरतया योजनीयम्।

12. It may be argued: Let it be (accepted) then that knowledge and *karma* being equally important, together constitute the means to *mokṣa*. Therefore the eight-fold defect due to *karma* being a separate means, will not arise. In this way, even the denial, (referred to) in the text: "Not by charities,....." etc., is tenable, since it

refers to the performance of *karma* without knowledge. There is evidence for the combination of *karma* and knowledge as equally important, in texts such as these: "Knowledge bereft of *karma* is not the principal (means); *karma* bereft of knowledge is not the principal (means); therefore the attainment (of *mokṣa)* takes place through the combination of the two alone; a bird cannot fly with only one wing." "Just as food mixed with honey and honey mixed with food constitute a good medicine, even so penance and knowledge combined together constitute a good medicine." Therefore, knowledge and *karma*, being equally important, together constitute the means to *mokṣa*. (Reply): It is not so. For, in the *Śivadharmottara*, (it is said): "For a great man who is satisfied with the ambrosia of knowledge and whose soul is free through devotion, there is, indeed, no need of the performance of any external *karma*." In the *Sarvajñānottara* (it is said): "For one, who is firmly rooted in the supreme soul, there is no distinguishing mark; nor is there any need of (the observance of) the duties of *āśrama*." (Vidyāpāda 70). In the*Devīkālottara* (it is said): "O Maheśvarī, for one (who follows the path of knowledge), there is no (need of) meditation, penance, worship, oblation (in fire), discipline, and rituals such as *agnikārya*. For him there is no (need of) austerities, dwelling in holy places and *pīṭhas*, etc., recitation (of *mantras*), rites towards forefathers, pilgrimages and vows." The above texts show that for one, who has gained knowledge, there is the removal of *karma*, since *karmas* are for the sake of knowledge. Even if *karmas* be the direct means to *mokṣa* like knowledge, they (*karmas*) must be performed for attaining knowledge. If *karmas* are means as they give rise to knowledge and when there is completion of their (*karmas'*) work as means, then there is no need to

perform *karmas* intended therefor. And, in this way, their denial is tenable. When it is possible to show that *karmas* are means to knowledge which is the perceptible fruit, it is not proper to suggest that *karmas* are the means to an imperceptible fruit. The text, "Knowledge is the principal means..." etc., must be construed as follows, taking into consideration the denial of *karmas* as stated above: Knowledge is the principal, *i.e.*, it is the direct means. But that (knowledge), when bereft of *karma*, its cause, cannot produce any result, since it remains incomplete. Likewise, *karma* is the principal, *i.e.*, it is very much required for the origination of knowledge. Therefore, *karma* is not fruitful when it is performed without knowledge. Thus since *mokṣa* takes place only when both (*karma* and knowledge) are present, their combination is to be understood in the form of means and end.

१३. कर्मणां ज्ञानजनकत्वे —

वेदानुवचनेनापि यज्ञेनाध्ययनेन च ।
दानेन तपसा देवास्तथैवानशनेन च ॥
वेत्तुमिच्छति यो विद्वान् स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः ।

इति स्कान्दवचनं मानम्। न च वेदानुवचनादेस्तृतीयान्तस्य, प्राधान्येन इच्छतीत्यनेनान्वयादिच्छासाधनत्वमेव; न ज्ञानसाधनत्वमिति युक्तम्। अश्वेन गन्तुमिच्छतीत्यत्र शब्दतोऽप्रधानेऽपि गमनेऽर्थतः प्राधान्यादश्वस्येव वेदानुवचनादेः "सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्" (ब्र. सू. ३-४-२६) इति न्यायेन वेदने सम्बन्धात्। शब्दतः प्राधान्याश्रयणेऽपि तादृशेच्छाद्वारा वेदनसम्बन्धाद्वा लौकिकव्युत्पत्त्याश्रयणेऽपि कर्मणां वेदनसाधनत्वलाभात्। वस्तुतस्तु मीमांसाशास्त्रीयव्युत्पत्त्याश्रयणे तु इच्छतीति पञ्चमलकारस्य वेदानुवचनादिसम्बन्धे विविदिषुं प्रति वेदानुवचनादि विहितमिति कर्मणां वेदनसाधनत्वमस्माद्वाक्यात्प्रतीयत एव। अथवा "यस्यैते चत्वारिंशत्संस्काराः"

इति वाक्यं कर्मणां ज्ञानसाधनत्वे मानम्। संस्कारा हि प्रोक्षणादिजनित-संस्कारवत्स्वतः फलकरणत्वाभावादुपकार्यं फलकरणमपेक्षन्ते। प्रकृते शिवसायुज्यरूपफलकरणं ज्ञानमेव। "ज्ञानादेव तु कैवल्यमित्याह परमा श्रुतिः" इत्यादिना तस्य फलकरणत्वेनोपस्थितत्वात्। उपस्थितपरित्यागेन अनुपस्थितकल्पने गौरवात्। तस्माच्चत्वारिंशत्संस्कारोपकृतेन ज्ञानेन शिव-सायुज्यं भवतीत्येवमर्थकतया संस्कारवाक्यं भवति कर्मणां ज्ञानसाधनत्वे मानम्। तथा यागादीन्यपि कर्माणि "ज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं तु क्रिया चर्या प्रकीर्तिता" इति वचनाज्ज्ञानजनकान्येव। एवं काशीमरणादिकमपि ज्ञानद्वारैव मोक्षसाधनम्। मलस्य ज्ञानमात्रनिवर्त्यत्वेन तेन विना मुक्तेरसम्भवात्। अत एव स्कान्दे —

श्रीमद्वाराणसी पुण्या पुरी नित्यं मम प्रिया।
यस्यामुत्क्रममाणस्य प्राणैर्जन्तोः कृपाबलात्॥
तारकं ब्रह्मविज्ञानं ददामि श्रेयसे हरे।

इति तस्य ज्ञानसाधनत्वं प्रतिपादितम्।

13. The following text of the *Skānda* is the evidence for the view that *karmas* lead to knowledge: "O gods! the wise man, who desires knowledge through the recitation of the *Vedas*, through sacrifice, through study, through charity, through penance and also through fasting, is the sage; and not other people." It is not proper to say that the recitation of the *Vedas*, etc., are the means to desire alone and not for knowledge, since the words, *vedānuvacana*, etc., which have the instrumental termination must be construed directly with the word *icchati* (desires). In the statement, "He desires to go by horse," even though the word *aśva* (horse) is not principally connected with the act of going, merely by its word-function, it is principally connected with 'going' through its meaning. Likewise, the recitation of the

Vedas, etc., are connected with *jñāna* in accordance with the principle, "And there is the necessity of all *karmas*, for the scriptures prescribe sacrifices, etc., even as the horse." (*Brahmasūtras* 3, 4, 26). Even though desire is intended as the principal on account of the word-function, there is connection with knowledge through that desire; or even if the ordinary interpretation of the word is resorted, there is advantage of showing that *karmas* are the means to knowledge. But, in fact, by resorting to the interpretation of *Mīmāṁsā-śāstra*, it is known from this text that *karmas* are the means to knowledge, because the word '*icchati*' is connected with the words '*vedānu-vacana*' etc., through the fifth *lakāra* (*leṭ*), and thus the recitation of the *Vedas*, etc., are enjoined on one who is desirous of knowing. Or else, there is the text, "For him there are forty *saṁskāras*" as the evidence for *karmas* being the means to knowledge. Indeed, the *saṁskāras* require the help of what is productive of result, since they do not produce any result of their own, in the same way as the purification produed by the act of sprinkling (of water), etc., is not productive of any result on its own. In the present context, knowledge alone yields the result of union with Śiva, since it is stated, by the texts, such as, "The supreme *śruti* says that *mokṣa* is attained through knowledge alone," that it (knowledge) is productive of result. Ignoring what is stated, to assume what is not stated is a case of prolixity. Therefore union with Śiva is attained through knowledge assisted by the forty *saṁs-kāras*. Thus, in this interpretation the statement about *saṁskāras* is the evidence which shows that *karmas* are the means to knowledge. Likewise, *karmas* such as sacri-fices, indeed, produce knowledge, as there is the text, "Rites and practices are spoken of for the purpose of the

origination of knowledge." Thus even death at Kāśī, etc., are the means to *mokṣa* through knowledge alone. Since *mala* is removable only through knowledge, *mokṣa* is not possible without knowledge. Therefore the nature of *karmas* as means to knowledge is set forth in the *Skānda* as follows: "O Hari! the glorious city, Vārāṇasī is sacred and is always dear to me; to the soul which leaves its life-breath in this place, through the force of grace, I give the saving knowledge of Brahman for its good."

१४. न च तत्र कथं सञ्चितकर्मणां निवृत्तिरिति युक्तम्। ज्ञानेन शिवकृतया दीक्षया वा तेषां निवृत्त्युपपत्तेः। तस्मात् कर्माणि ज्ञानद्वारैव मुक्तिसाधनानि। तेन वैदिकान्यागमिकानि च कर्माणि ज्ञानार्थिना कर्तव्यानि। न केवलं वेदागमयोर्विहितान्येव कर्माणि ज्ञानजनकानि; अपि तु यानि तत्र अविहितानि प्रतिषिद्धानि पातकानि तान्यपि शिवाराधनत्वेन कृतानि ज्ञानजनकानि। स्कान्दे —

यानि लोके निषिद्धानि कर्माण्यविहितानि च।
तानि शंभोः परा पूजेत्येतज्ज्ञानं महामखम्॥
यानि कर्माणि सर्वाणि निषिद्धानि श्रुतौ स्मृतौ।
तानि चाराधनं शंभोरिति ज्ञानं महामखम्॥
ईश्वरार्थधिया पापान्यपि कर्माणि सुव्रताः।
भवन्ति पूतान्यत्यन्तं सत्यमेव न संशयः।
आर्द्रं काष्ठं महानग्निः शुष्कं कृत्वा दहेद्यथा।
तथेश्वरधिया पापं विशुद्धं ज्ञानदं भवेत्॥
वैदिकं तान्त्रिकं हित्वा मार्गं स्वप्रज्ञया द्विजाः।
सोऽपि यज्ञ इति प्रोक्तो मया वेदार्थवित्तमाः॥
श्रद्धया सहितं सर्वं श्रेयसे भूयसे भवेत्॥

इत्यादिना तथा प्रतिपादनात्। अयं च प्रपन्नधर्मः।

14. It is not proper to ask how in that case, the removal of *sañcita-karmas* will take place, for their removal is possible either by knowledge or by the *dīkṣā* made by Śiva. Therefore, *karmas* are the means to *mokṣa* only through knowledge. Hence, the *Vaidika-* and *Āgamika-karmas* have to be performed by a seeker of knowledge. The *karmas,* which are enjoined in the *Vedas* and *Āgamas,* are not the only cause of knowledge, but even those (*karmas*) which are not enjoined there and also those which are prohibited as sinful ones, when performed as propitiation of Lord Śiva, are the causes of knowledge. For, it is said so in the *Skānda*: "The knowledge, that those *karmas* which are prohibited and also those which are not enjoined in the world form the great worship of Lord Śambhu, is a great sacrifice. The knowledge that all those *karmas* which are prohibited in *Sruti* and *Smṛti,* constitute the propitiation of Lord Śambhu, is a great sacrifice. O men of good austerities, those *karmas* which are held as sins, when performed as an adoration of the Lord, become completely holy; it is but true undoubtedly. As a big fire makes dry the wet fuel and burns it, even so sin done, for the sake of the Lord becomes pure and productive of knowledge. O the twice-born and the most versatile in Vedic lore, it has been said by me that an act which is performed acccording to one's own wisdom, ignoring Vedic and Tāntric ways, is also a sacrifice. All the acts (done) with faith will bring forth immense good." This (group of *Samayidharmas*) is called the *prapannadharma.*

१५. अप्रपन्नस्य तु वर्णाश्रमधर्मा एवानुष्ठेयाः। एवं पुत्रकधर्माननुतिष्ठतो यदा दैववशेन निर्वाणदीक्षाया असम्भवस्तदा सामीप्यफलमनुभूयान्ते जन्मान्तरे मुक्तिर्भवति। यदा तु तीव्रतीव्रतरशक्तिनिपातयोरन्यतरलाभेन

निर्वाणदीक्षां लभते तदा तया सञ्चितकर्मणां निवृत्त्या तत्त्वज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकदुरित-विगमेन तत्त्वज्ञानार्थं श्रवणादिकं कुर्यात्।

शुद्धशैवमिदं तन्त्रं न देयं न प्रकाशयेत्।
दीक्षितस्य च धीरस्य शिवभक्तिपरस्य च॥
श्रावणीयं न चान्यत्र कथनं हि प्रशस्यते।

इति श्रवणाधिकारत्वेन प्रतिपादिताया दीक्षाया निष्पादात्। यद्यप्यधीता-गमस्य पदपदार्थव्युत्पत्तिमात्रेणार्थज्ञानं भवति, तथापि तात्पर्यापरिज्ञाने आपाततः पूर्वापरविरोधप्रतिसन्धानेन सन्देहादिकलुषितमेव स्यादित्यकलुषित-प्रतिपत्तये तात्पर्यपरिज्ञानरूपं श्रवणमादरणीयम्। एतच्च —

यावत्कालं शिवज्ञानं दृढीभवति तस्य तु।
तावत्कालं च कर्तव्यं श्रवणादि विशेषतः॥

इत्यादिना विहितम्।

15. But, the duties of *varṇa* and *āśrama* alone have to be performed by an *aprapanna* (one who is not a *prapanna*). Thus if a person, who follows the *putrakadharmas*, does not obtain *nirvāṇa-dīkṣā* owing to the decree of fate, then he experiences the fruit of proximity and at the end of next birth, obtains *mokṣa*. When a person gains *nirvāṇadīkṣā* through the achievement of one of the two *Śaktinipātas, viz.*, the intense and more intense, there is the disappearance of sin which is the hindrance to *tattvajñāna*, as a consequence of the removal of the *sañcita-karmas* by that (*nirvāṇadīkṣā*); then he should resort to the study (of the *Āgamas*, etc.) for the sake of *tattvajñāna*. The fruit of (*nirvāṇa*) *dīkṣā* is said to be eligibility for the study (of the *Āgamas*), as (it is said): "This pure *Śaiva-tantra* should not be given (to the unworthy) and should not be publicised. It should be taught only to one, who

is initiated, well-versed in śāstraic lore, and is firmly devoted to Śiva; it is not proper to teach others." Even though a person who has studied the *Āgamas*, knows the meaning by the mere understanding of the words and word-meanings, nevertheless since he has not known the purport, his understanding becomes imperfect due to doubts, etc., arising from the apparent contradiction between the earlier and later teachings; consequently, for the sake of perfect understanding, the study (of the *Āgamas*) knowing its purport should be resorted to. This is enjoined by texts such as, "Until one becomes firmly established in *Śivajñāna*, one should specially practise the disciplines of *śravaṇa*, etc."

१६. यद्यपि तात्पर्यज्ञानं वाक्यार्थज्ञानजनकतया लोकत एव प्राप्तमिति न विधातव्यम्, तथापि निगमागमादिविचारेणैवायमर्थो निश्चेतव्यो न भाषाप्रबन्धादिविचारेणेतीतरव्यवच्छेदाय विधीयते। तथा चावघातादिविधिवदयं नियमविधिः। न च तत्र नियमादृष्टसाध्यं परमापूर्वमस्तीति नियमविधित्वं युक्तम्; इह तु तत्साध्यं नास्तीति न तद्युज्यत इति वाच्यम्। साक्षात्कारस्य तत्साध्यत्वोपपत्तेः। अत एव भगवता बादरायणेन "सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्" (ब्र. सू. ३-४-२६) इति सर्वादृष्टसाध्यत्वं ज्ञानस्याभिहितम्। एवं श्रवणेन जायमानं ज्ञानं च स्वस्य शिवेनाभेदावगाहि। न तु नियन्तृनियाम्यभावादिना भेदावगाहि।

अहमात्मा शिवो ह्यन्यः परमात्मेति यः स्मृतः।
एवं यो भावयेन्मोहान्न शिवत्वमवाप्नुयात् ॥
शिवोऽन्यस्त्वहमेवान्यः पृथग्भावं विवर्जयेत्।

(सर्व. वि. पा. श्लो. ३९-४०)

इति भेदज्ञाननिषेधपूर्वकं —

यः शिवः सोऽहमेवेति अद्वैतं भावयेत्सदा ॥

(सर्व. वि. पा. श्लो. ४०)

इत्यनेन सर्वज्ञानोत्तरवचनेनाभेदज्ञानस्यैव मुक्तिसाधनतया बोधनात्। इदं चाचार्यमूर्तिस्थाद्गुरोः निर्वाणदीक्षापुरस्सरं श्रवणं सकलानाम्। विज्ञानाकलप्रलयाकलयोऽस्तु निरधिकरणस्य शिवस्यानुग्रहमात्रेण दीक्षा तत्त्वज्ञानं च भवतीति वेदितव्यम्। एवं श्रवणे निर्वृत्ते युक्तिभिस्तदर्थस्यानुचिन्तनरूपं मननमयोग्यतानिरासेन श्रवणप्रतिष्ठार्थं कर्तव्यम्। अनन्तरं च श्रुतस्यार्थस्यानुध्यानरूपं निदिध्यासनं विपरीतभावनानिवृत्तये चित्तैकाग्र्याय च करणीयम्। अनादिजन्मानुवृत्ता विपरीतवासना हि न सकृच्छ्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तते; किं तु ध्यानाहितयैव वासनया। न विपरीतवासनायां सत्यां साक्षात्कारः सम्भवति। तथा चित्तैकाग्र्यं विना न सूक्ष्मवस्तुसाक्षात्कारः। केशादिसाक्षात्कारे तथा दर्शनात्। अतो विपरीतवासनानिवृत्तये चित्तैकाग्र्याय च निदिध्यासनं कर्तव्यम्। श्रवणादिकं च यदा साक्षात्काराय न पर्याप्तं तदा अर्चिरादिद्वारा फलभोगाननुभूय प्रलयसमये शिवानुग्रहे सति तत्र तदैव मुक्तिः। तदा शिवानुग्रहाभावे गुरुणा जन्मान्तरे मुक्तिः। यदा तु पर्याप्तं तदा गुरुकृपापरिपाकेन सूर्यकिरणसन्निधानेनेव स्वात्मज्ञानमभिव्यज्यते। अयमेव साक्षात्कारोदयः। फलसाधनमपि॥

16. Even though it may be argued that since the knowledge of the purport arises ordinarily from the knowledge of the sentence-sense, there is no need of injunction therefor, nevertheless this purport is to be ascertained only through enquiry into the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* and not through enquiry into grammer, etc.; thus there is the injunction for excluding (enquiry into) other works. Thus, this is restrictive injunction like the injunction relating to thrashing, etc. It is not proper to say that, while (in the case of thrashing, etc.) restristive injunction is tenable on the ground that a great *apūrva* arises as the imperceptible result of the restriction, in this case it is not tenable since no such result takes place; because it is intelligible to say that direct realisation is its result. So, that knowledge is the imperceptible result of all (actions) has been said by Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa in the aphorism:

"And there is the necessity of all *karmas*, for the *śruti* prescribes sacrifices, etc., (as means to knowledge) even as the horse." (*Brahmasūtras*, 3,4,26). The knowledge which arises from the study (of the *Āgamas*) in this way, comprehends the non-difference of oneself (soul) with Śiva. It does not comprehend difference through such relations as the controller and the controlled. Texts, such as these from the *Sarvajñānottara*: "A person, who considers himself due to delusion, 'I am a soul; Śiva who is known as the supreme soul is different (from me)', does not attain *Śivatva*. One should abandon the sense of separation as 'Śiva is someone different (from me); and I am different.'—", (Vidyāpāda, 39-40), after denying the knowledge of difference, impart that the knowledge of non-difference alone is the means to *mokṣa* through the text: "One should always think of non-difference in the form 'He who is Śiva is myself alone'.—" (Vidyāpāda, 40) This study is intended for *sakalas* after getting *nirvāṇa-dīkṣā* from a *guru* of perceptorial rank. It should be known that for *vijñānākalas* and *pralayākalas*, there take place *tattvajñāna* and *dīkṣā* by the grace of Śiva alone who is without locus. Thus when *śravaṇa* is completed, *manana* in the form of reflection on the meaning through reasonings should be done for the sake of stabilising what is known through study, by the removal of what is untenable. Thereafter, *nididhyāsana* which is contemplation on the meaning of what has been learnt should be practised for the removal of contradictory thoughts and also for the concentration of mind. Contradictory impression, that has come down through the beginningless births, indeed, does not get removed just by one study. But (it gets removed) only through the impression strengthened by contemplation. In the presence of contradictory impression, direct realisation does not take place. Likewise,

without the concentration of mind, realisation of what is subtle is not possible. For, it is seen, likewise, in the perception of a hair, etc. Therefore for the sake of the removal of contradictory impression and also for the sake of (achieving) the concentration of mind, contemplation should be practised. When the stndy, etc., do not result in direct realisation, a person experiences the fruit of enjoyments through the path of *arcirādi*, and then through the grace of Śiva, attains *mokṣa* at the time of dissolution there itself. In the absence of the grace of Śiva at that time, *mokṣa* will be attained in the next birth through (the grace of) *guru*. But, when (the study, etc.) are complete, self-knowledge emerges through the ripening of the grace of *guru* just as the latent fire of sun-stone manifests in the presence of the sun's rays. This is the rise of direct realisation (of truth). (It is) also the means to the end.

१७. नन्वाच्छादके मले सति कथमभिव्यक्तिः। न च मलनिवृत्त्यनन्तरमभिव्यक्तिरस्त्विति वक्तुं युक्तम्। अभिव्यक्तिसाध्यत्वेन मलनिवृत्तेस्त्वया स्वीकारात्। तस्मादभिव्यक्तिमलनिवृत्त्योः परस्पराश्रयपरिहाराय मलस्य दीक्षानिवर्त्यत्वमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। युक्तञ्चैतत्। मलस्य द्रव्यत्वेन काचादिदोषस्य चिकित्साव्यापारेणेव शिवव्यापारेणैव निवर्तनीयत्वात्। न चाज्ञानत्वेन मलस्य ज्ञानमात्रनिवर्त्यत्वं युक्तम्। अज्ञानशब्दस्य भ्रान्तिवाचकत्वे वा मलस्य भ्रान्तित्वाभावेन पक्षधर्मत्वाभावात्। एवं ज्ञानाभाववाचकत्वेऽप्यपक्षधर्मत्वमेव। भ्रान्तिहेतुद्रव्यवाचकत्वे तादृशक्रियानिवर्त्यत्वस्यैव दर्शनेन विरोधात्। आणववाचकत्वे तस्यैव पक्षतया सहचारग्रहस्थलाभावात्। तस्मात् साक्षात्कारः फलमेव; न साधनम्। न चैवं फलस्याविधेयतया साक्षात्कारस्य विधेयत्वमनुपपन्नं स्यादिति वाच्यम्। इष्टापत्तेः। श्रूयमाणो विधिस्तु यथा साक्षात्कारो निष्पद्यते तथा यतितव्यमित्येवमर्थकतया योजनीयः। तस्मात् दीक्षैव साधनम्। अत एव —

दीक्षैव मोचयत्यूर्ध्वं परं धाम नयत्यपि।

इत्यादिकं वचनमपि सङ्गच्छते। तस्मान्न साक्षात्कारः फलसाधनमिति।

17. It may be argued thus. When the obscuring *mala* is (prevalent) how can there be the emergence (of self-knowledge)? It is not proper to say that there will be the emergence (of self-knowledge) after the removal of *mala*; for, you hold that the removal of *mala* is accomplished through the emergence (of self-knowledge). Therefore, with a view to overcome the (defect of) mutual dependence between the emergence (of self-knowledge) and the removal of *mala*, the removability of *mala* through *dīkṣā* alone must be accepted. This is also proper. Just as the defects such as cataract (*kāca*) have to be removed through medical treatment, even so *mala*, being a substance has to be removed only by *Śaiva* practice. It is not proper to say that *mala* being nescience can be removed only by knowledge, the reason being that, since the term *ajñāna* means error and since *mala* is not error, there is absence of *hetu* in the *pakṣa*. Even if *mala* refers to absence of knowledge, there cannot be the presence of *hetu* in the *pakṣa*. In the same way if it means absence of knowledge, there is also absence of *hetu* in the *pakṣa*. If it means the substance that causes illusion, then as it is removable only by *karma*, it comes into conflict with experience. If it refers to *āṇava*, being itself the *pakṣa*, there is absence of illustration. Therefore direct realisation is only the end and not the means. And, it is not proper to say that since the fruit cannot be enjoined, it is untenable to hold that direct realisation is enjoined; for, there arises the contingence of what is intended. The injunction mentioned (here) should be so construed in the sense of endeavouring as to result in the direct realisation. Hence only *dīkṣā* is the means. That is why, texts such as: "*Dīkṣā* alone releases (a person) and even leads

upwards to the supreme abode," are tenable. Therefore direct realisation is not a means to the end.

१८. मैवम् —

ज्ञानेन हि तदज्ञानं निवर्त्येत न कर्मभिः ।

इत्यादिना अज्ञानस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यताविधानपूर्वकं कर्मनिवर्त्यतानिषेधात्। अप्रकाशरूपस्य मलस्य प्रकाशेनैव निवर्तनीयत्वाच्च। अप्रकाशरूपस्य तमसः आलोकादिना प्रकाशेन निवृत्तिरनुभूयत इति न सहचारग्रहस्थलस्याभावः। न च द्रव्यत्वेन कर्मनिवर्त्यत्वं ज्ञानानिवर्त्यत्वं वा अनुमातुं शक्यते। अज्ञानान्यत्वस्योपाधित्वे पक्षेतरत्वस्याप्युपाधित्वापत्तेरिति वाच्यम्। आगमबाधितत्वात्। न चाभिव्यक्तिमलनिवृत्त्योः परस्पराश्रयत्वम्। तमोनिवृत्तिप्रकाशयोरिव तदभावोपपत्तेः। तत्रापि हि सति तमसि न प्रकाशोदय इति तमोनिवृत्तिः प्रकाशोदये अपेक्षिता। प्रकाशोदयश्च तमो निवृत्ताविति प्रसक्तः परस्पराश्रयः। स च — सत्येव तमसि उदितेन प्रकाशेन निवर्तते तमः; तमःप्रकाशयोरपि क्षणमात्रमस्त्येव सहावस्थानमिति वा, एककालीनेनापि प्रकाशेन तमोनिवृत्तिर्जायते; जनकत्वं न पूर्वभावित्वम्; किं तु शक्तत्वमिति वा परिहार्यः। तद्वदेवात्रापि परिहारः सम्भवतीति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। "दीक्षैव मोचयति" इत्यपि वचनं दीक्षाया आवश्यकत्वमात्रपरम्। न तु ज्ञानव्यवच्छेदपरमिति न तद्विरोधोऽपि। तस्मात्साक्षात्कारेणैव मलनिवृत्तिः। अभिव्यक्तं स्वरूपज्ञानमेव साक्षात्कारः। न तु बुद्धिवृत्त्यादिरूपः। तस्य चेतने अप्रवृत्तेः। कारणाभावाच्च। न च शब्द एव कारणम्। तस्य परोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वस्वभावत्वेनापरोक्षज्ञानजनने सामर्थ्याभावात् न चापरोक्षत्वादौ करणस्वभावो न प्रयोजकः। अपि तु विषयस्वभाव इति वाच्यम्। पुरोवर्तिनि घटे "अयं घटः" इत्यादिवाक्येनापरोक्षज्ञानजननप्रसङ्गात्। न चेष्टापत्तिः। निमिलिताक्षं प्रति तस्य परोक्षज्ञानजनकतयैव सर्वसम्मतत्वात्। यस्यापि तत्रेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षोऽस्ति तमनिमीलिताक्षं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वेऽन्यस्यापि तदुत्पत्त्यापत्तेः। दशमस्त्वमसीत्यत्रापि शब्दात् परोक्षज्ञानानन्तरं ऐन्द्रियिकमेवापरोक्षज्ञानं जायते। न चैन्द्रियिके ज्ञाने शब्दापेक्षा किमर्थेति युक्तम्। दशत्वसंख्यापूरकतया स्वगतैकत्वस्यापेक्षाबुद्धावभानाद्दशमस्त्वमसीतिवाक्येन स्वगतमपि

एकत्वं संख्यापूरकमिति ज्ञापिते युक्तस्तत्साक्षात्कारः। अत एव स्वात्मगतैकत्वस्य तत्संख्यापूरकत्वाभिज्ञं प्रति न तद्वाक्यमुपयुज्यते। तस्माच्छब्दस्य न साक्षात्कारजनकत्वम्।

18. It is not so; texts such as: "That nescience, indeed, can be removed by knowledge and not by *karmas*," after enjoining the removability by knowledge, deny the removability by *karma*. And, for *mala* which is of the nature of darkness can be removed by light alone. There is no absence of illustration for it is experienced that darkness, which is absence of light, is removed by light such as lamp, etc. It is not proper to say that one can infer that being a substance, it can be removed by *karma* but not by knowledge; for, if being other than nescience is a limiting adjunct, then being other than *pakṣa* will also become a limiting adjunct. For, it is stultified by verbal testimony. Also, there is no (defect of) mutual dependence between the emergence (of knowledge) and the removal of *mala*; for the absence of this (defect) is seen as in the case of the relation between the removal of darkness and the (presence of) light. Even then the opponent may argue as follows: when there is darkness, there is no rise of light; so, the removal of darkness is required for the rise of light; for the removal of darkness, the rise of light is required — thus there arises mutual dependence. (The reply is:) The darkness, only when it is present can be removed by the light when it rises; and, both darkness and light, must co-exist just for a moment. Or, the removal of darkness is effected by light which exists at the same time (with darkness). Thus the above mentioned objection is answered. In the same way, in the present context also, the objection can be answered and so, there is no untenability. Even the text, "*Dīkṣā* alone releases," is only to stress the importance of *dīkṣā*;

it is not to exclude knowledge, and so, there is no contradiction. Therefore, the removal of *mala* is only through direct realisation. The manifest self-knowledge alone is direct realisation, and not what is in the form of cognition through the mental mode. For, it does not get into the consciousness (soul), as there is absence of cause. *Śabda* (verbal testimony) cannot be the cause. For, it (*śabda*), being capable of producing mediate knowledge, does not have the capacity to produce immediate knowledge. It is not proper to say that in the matter of getting immediate knowledge, the nature of the instrument is not the cause, but the nature of the object. Then, in respect of a pot which is in front, there is the possibility of getting immediate knowledge from the statement, "This is a pot." It does not fulfil what is desired (by the opponent). All agree that that statement can produce only mediate knowledge to one who has closed his eyes. Even in the case of one who has not closed his eyes, when there is contact with the sense-organ, that (statement) can produce only immediate knowledge. If the nature of the object is the cause (of immediate knowledge), it should take place even in the other case. Even in the case of the sentence, "You are the tenth," there arises immediate knowledge produced by the sense-organ, following the mediate knowledge caused by the sentence. It is not proper to ask, "What is the need of the sentence, in the case of knowledge produced by the sense organ?" It is proper to arrive at immediate knowledge when a person is reminded of his being one among the group of ten, filling up the (total) number, through the statement, "You are the tenth," because he does not come to know that he himself is one contributing to fill up the tenth. That is why, that statement is not useful to one who has understood that he

himself is one filling up the (total) number. Therefore the scripture cannot produce direct realisation.

१९. एवमभिव्यक्तस्वरूपज्ञानतया साक्षात्कारान्मुक्तो जीवन्मुक्त इत्युच्यते। अस्य च करणीयं कर्म किमपि नास्ति। तथापि ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः प्राङ् निरन्तरकर्मानुष्ठानवासनाबलात् प्रारब्धनाशाय लोकसंरक्षणाय च कर्मानुष्ठाने प्रवर्तते। न च कर्मभिर्जनितेन पुण्येन सम्बध्यते। न च कर्मणः पुण्यजननसमर्थस्य कथं तदजनकत्वमिति वाच्यम्। अग्निस्तम्भाभिज्ञं प्रति अग्नेरदाहकत्ववदत्र तत्त्वज्ञानिनं प्रति कर्मणोऽप्यजनकत्वस्योपपत्तेः। एवं प्रारब्धभोगार्थं निषिद्धानुष्ठानेऽपि अधर्मस्यानुत्पत्तिरुपपन्ना। कर्मणस्तज्जनकताबोधको निगमागमादिरपि प्रमाणम्; तस्य तत्त्वज्ञानरूपप्रतिबन्धकाभावसहकृतं कर्म तज्जनकमित्येवम्परत्वात्। विहितस्य निषिद्धस्य च सुहृद्दुर्हृदोः धर्माधर्मजनकत्वस्य सद्भावाच्च। कर्मकर्तृगतपुण्यापुण्यजनकत्वप्रतिपादकवचनस्य सामान्यविषयस्य विशेषविषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानिना कृतं कर्म तस्य सुहृदि दुर्हृदि वा पुण्यादिकं जनयतीत्येतदर्थप्रतिपादकेन वेदवचनेन सङ्कोचोपपत्तेः॥

19. Thus, after the emergence of self-knowledge, a person who attains release through direct realisation is called *jīvanmukta*. There is no action whatsover which has to be done by him. However, due to the force of the impression left over by the *karmas* which he has incessantly practised before the origination of knowledge, he is engaged in action for the destruction of *prārabdha* as well as for protecting the world. Indeed, he is not bound by the merit produced by *karmas*. It is not proper to ask how the *karmas* which is capable of producing merit does not produce it. Just as fire does not burn one, who has attained the power of quenching fire, even so here it is tenable that *karma* is non-productive in the case of one who has known the truth. In the same way, it is tenable to hold *adharma* (demerit) does not arise due to the performance of prohibited deeds (by him), for the enjoyment of *prārabdha*. Even the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*,

which teach that *karmas* are not productive (in his case), are authority. For, they teach that *karma* are productive of that only when they are helped by the absence of the impediment, *viz.*, the knowledge of truth. Also, it is said that merit and demerit produced by the performance of prescribed and prohibited *karmas* reach his (*jīvanmukta's*) friends and foes (respectively). Since the statement which says that *karma* produces merit and demerit in the agent is a general one, it can be reconciled, by restricting its scope, with the Vedic statement which teaches as a special case that the *karma*, performed by one who has known the truth produces merit, etc., in his friend or foe.

२०. नन्वस्य तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव सर्वाणि कर्माणि नश्यन्ति।

यथा वह्निर्महादीप्तः काष्ठमात्रं च निर्दहेत्।
तथा शुभाशुभं कर्म ज्ञानाग्निर्दहति क्षणात्॥
... ...
ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा॥

(भगवद्गीता अ. ४ श्लो. ३७)

इत्यादिवचनात्। एवं च कर्मणोऽभावाद्भोगोऽपि न सम्भवतीति न तदर्थस्य देहस्यावस्थानं युज्यते। अस्तु वा प्रारब्धकर्मणोऽवस्थानम्। तथापि निवृत्तमलस्यानावृतज्ञानतया कथं वैषयिकसुखदुःखादिभोगः। तस्य रागादिसाध्यत्वात्। निर्मलस्य च रागाद्यभावात्। तस्मात्तत्त्वज्ञानिनो देहावस्थानमयुक्तमिति जीवन्मुक्तिरनुपपन्नेति। मैवम्।

प्रारब्धं भोगतो नश्येच्छेषं ज्ञानेन दह्यते।

इत्यादिवचनानुसारेण "यथा वह्निः" इत्यादेः प्रारब्धेतरविषयकत्वं कल्पनीयमित्यतोऽस्त्येव प्रारब्धकर्मणोऽवस्थानम्। तेन तदधीनस्य भोगस्योत्पादनाय देहस्यावस्थानमपेक्षितमेव। न च निर्मलस्य कथं रागाद्यधीनो

भोग इत्यपि युक्तम्। रागाद्यभावेऽपि प्रारब्धविनाशाभिसन्धिना भोगोपपत्तेः। अथवा रागादिवासनया भोगः। अत एव प्रारब्धकर्मणोऽपि विनाशे तया वासनयैव भोग उपपद्यते॥

20. It may be objected: Only after the emergence of the knowledge of the truth (in a person), all his *karmas* get destroyed; for, texts such as these (say): "Just as fire with blazing flame completely burns wood alone, even so the fire of knowledge burns good and bad deeds within a moment." "...Thus, the fire of knowledge reduces all *karmas* to ashes." (*Bhagavadgītā* IV. 37). In this way, because of the absence of *karma*, enjoyment also is not possible; and hence the continuance of the body for the sake of it (enjoyment), is untenable. Let it be said that the continuance of the body is due to *prārabdhakarma*; even then, for a person, whose knowledge is free from concealment due to the removal of *mala*, how can there be enjoyment of pleasure and pain, etc., arising from objects? For, that (enjoyment) is caused by *rāga*, etc., and in the case of one who is free from *mala*, there is absence of *rāga*, etc. Since the continuance of the body is untenable for one who has known the truth, *jīvanmukti* is, therefore, not reasonable. (Reply): It is not so. In accordance with texts such as, "*Prārabdha* gets destroyed through enjoyment; the rest is burnt by knowledge," texts such, "Just as fire..." convey that objects other than *prārabdha* are removed (by knowledge); and so there is continuance of *prārabdhakarma*. In this way, for the sake of enjoyment caused by it, the continuance of the body, indeed, is required. It is not proper to say how there can be enjoyment caused by *rāga*, etc., for a person rid of *mala*. Even though there is absence of *rāga*, etc., there is the need for enjoyment for the purpose of the destruction of *prārabdha*. Or, there is enjoyment due to

the impression left over by *rāga*, etc. That is why, even after the destruction of *prārabdhakarma*, it is intelligible to speak of enjoyment due to that impression.

२१. केचित्तु —

नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपि ।

(वासिष्ठलैङ्गे अ. १० श्लो. ३३)

इत्यादिवचनात् सर्वमपि कर्म भोगनाश्यम्। "ज्ञानाग्निः" इत्यादिकमपि उक्तवचनाविरोधाय कायव्यूहपरिग्रहपूर्वकभोगोत्पादनद्वारकविनाशपरमेवेति वदन्ति। तन्न युक्तम्। सर्वस्यापि भोगनाश्यत्वे प्रारब्धाप्रारब्धयोर्विशेषाभावेन —

प्रारब्धं भोगतो नश्येच्छेषं ज्ञानेन दह्यते ।

इत्यादिवचनव्याकोपप्रसङ्गात्। "नाभुक्तं" इत्यादिवचनमपि अनेनैव वचनेन प्रारब्धविषयतया निवेदितमिति न तद्विरोधोऽपि। जीवन्मुक्तलक्षणं तु मायिकदेहादियुक्तत्वे सति निर्मलत्वम्। निर्मलत्वञ्च न मलध्वंसवत्त्वम्। मलस्यैकत्वेनैकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्गात्। किं तु मलसंयोगध्वंसवत्त्वम्। संयोगस्तु प्रतिपुरुषं भिद्यत इति एकस्य विनाशेऽप्यन्यस्याविनाशान्नोक्तदोषः। अन्ये तु — तत्तदावरणशक्तीनां विभेदेनोक्तदोषं परिहरन्ति।

21. But some people say: All *karmas* are removable only by enjoyment according to texts such as: "Even after crores and crores of *kalpas*, *karma* does not get destroyed without enjoyment." (*Vāsiṣṭalaiṅga* X, 33). With a view to avoid conflict with the text quoted above, texts such as, "The fire of knowledge." must be taken to mean that the removal of *karma* takes place through the production of enjoyment after the acquisition of innumerable bodies. It is untenable. If all (*karmas*) are destroyed through enjoyment, there will not be any distinction between *prārabdhakarma* and others, and so there

arises the contingency of violating the texts such as, "*Prārabdha* gets destroyed through enjoyment; the rest is burnt by knowledge." Even the text, "*nābhuktaṁ...*" etc., relates to *prārabdhakarma* in accordance with the text (*prārabdhaṁ bhogato...*), and so there is no contradiction with it. As for the definition of *jīvanmukta*, there is absence of *mala* in him, even while he is associated with the body, etc., caused by *māyā*. And absence of *mala* does not mean destruction of *mala*; for, since *mala* is one, when one is freed there will arise the contingency of the release of all. On the contrary, it means the destruction of association with *mala*. Inasmuch as association (with *mala*) is different from person to person, the defect mentioned above connot arise, for when one's association with *mala* is destroyed, others' association with it is not destroyed. Other people, however, overcome the above mentioned defect through differences in the concealing power (of *mala*) pertaining to different persons.

२२. अस्य च जीवन्मुक्तस्य हासक्रन्दनवल्गनादीनि चिह्नानि । यद्यप्येतान्युन्मत्तादिसाधारणानि, तथापि उन्मादादिहेतुकेभ्यस्तेभ्यो विलक्षणानि तत्त्वज्ञानकारुण्यादिजनितान्येतानि चिह्नानि । तथा हि — तत्र शिवशास्त्रोक्तमार्गे विद्यमाने पशुशास्त्रोक्तमार्गमाचरन्त्यज्ञानतो जनाः । अहो! प्रत्यक्षेऽपि विषये इत्थं मोहो जातः — इति ज्ञानं हासजनकम् । ल्पस्य वैषयिकसुखस्याभिलाषेण महद्दःखमनुभवत्ययं जनः, कथमेतन्निराकरणीयमिति कारुण्यं क्रन्दजनकम् । स्वात्मनः संसारसमुद्रादुत्तीर्णताज्ञानं वल्गनहेतुः । तदुक्तं तत्त्वसारे —

धृतिधैर्यसमायुक्तः सदानन्दसमावृतः ।

हसते नृत्यते चैव क्रन्दते वल्गतेऽपि च ॥

कार्तिकेय उवाच —

हसनादि त्वया प्रोक्तं योगीन्द्राणां च चेष्टितम् ।
तस्यार्थं नैव जानामि किमर्थं कुर्वते प्रभो ॥

ईश्वर उवाच —

सुव्यक्तं दूषयित्वा तु विमार्गेण जनो रतः ।
तं दृष्ट्वा हसते योगी अहो! व्यामोहितं जगत् ॥

ज्ञात्वा भवस्यासद्भावं क्रीडन्ते भवमध्यतः ।
क्रीडान्तोऽपि न लिप्यन्ते तेन नृत्यन्ति योगिनः ॥

रसलुब्धो यथा मत्स्यो लोहशक्तिं न पश्यति ।
सुखलुब्धस्तथा लोको यमलोकं न पश्यति ॥

तत्त्वहीनो महद्दुःखं सहतेऽतीव दारुणम् ।
तेनासौ क्रन्दते योगी दृष्ट्वा दुःखं जनस्य च ॥

अपारस्य समुद्रस्य पारं हि तरितं मया ।
इति मत्वा च गर्वित्वा वल्गन्ते तेन योगिनः ॥ इति ॥

इत्थमेवागमान्तरोक्तानि चिह्नान्तराणि ज्ञेयानि। एतैश्च चिह्नैः जीवन्मुक्तं विनिश्चित्य तस्मिन् परां प्रीतिं कुर्यात्। न कदाचिदपि द्वेषम्। यतो द्वेषे कृते तदीयनिषिद्धकर्मभिः स्वस्मिन् पापं जायेत। ईदृशे च जीवन्मुक्ते स्वरूपसाक्षात्कारेण निवृत्तावरणतया शिवानन्दः प्रकाशते। तथापि वैषयिकसुखदुःखादिकमपि विक्षेपवशाज्जायेत। अतः परममुक्तिरेव परमः पुरुषार्थः॥

22. This *jīvanmukta* has the following signs: laughing, crying, leaping with joy, etc. Even though these signs are common to mad-men and others, nevertheless these signs (of *jīvanmukta*) are different from those caused by

madness, etc., because these signs are the products of his (*jīvanmukta's*) realisation of the truth, compassion, etc. It is explained as follows: The realisation to the effect, "When there is the path laid down by *Śivaśāstras*, people, owing to nescience, resort to the path laid down by *paśuśāstras* (materialistic sciences). Alas, even though this is a matter of experience, thus, delusion has arisen," produces laughter in him. The compassion in him to the effect, "This person experiences great misery as a result of the desire for silly worldly happiness; how is this to be prevented?", makes him cry. The knowledge, that he has crossed the ocean of *saṁsāra*, makes him leap with joy. It is said in the *Tattvasāra*: "(The *jīvanmukta*) being in possession of knowledge and strength and always immersed in bliss, laughs, dances, cries and leaps with joy. Kārttikeya asks: O Lord, you have said that laughter, etc., are the behavioural features of great seers; I do not understand its purpose. Why do they behave (like this)? *Īśvara* replies: Seeing the people, who after condemning the good path, follow the wrong path, the seer laughs at them, (saying), "Alas! the world is deluded." The seers (*jīvanmuktas*), knowing the transitory nature of *saṁsāra*, sport remaining in the midst of it; though they play, they are not bound by it; therefore they dance. "Just as a fish, greedy of taste, does not look at the (destructive) power of the hook, even so a person, greedy of (transitory) pleasure, does not think of the abode of Yama. Not knowing the truth, he bears the extremely cruel and great misery,"— seeing such great misery of men, the seer (*jīvanmukta*) cries. "This ocean of *saṁsāra* which is difficult to cross, has, indeed, been crossed by me,"—thinking thus, the proud seers leap with joy." In this way only the other signs (of *jīvanmukta*) stated in other

Āgamas, are to be known. After recognising a *jīvanmukta* through these signs, one should show extreme devotion to him, and never aversion. If anyone shows aversion he will incur sin through the prohibited deeds of the *jīvanmukta*. In such a *jīvanmukta, Śivānanda* shines, through the removal of concealment following his realisation of his nature. However, worldly pleasure, pain, etc., will arise in him due to *vikṣepa* (projection). Therefore, the final *mokṣa* alone is the supreme *puruṣārtha*.

२३. तस्याश्च परममुक्तेः स्वरूपं वादिनः स्वस्वमत्यनुसारेणान्यथान्यथा वदन्ति । तथाहि — चार्वाकास्तावत् — देहस्यैव दुःखनिदानत्वात् तद्विनाशे दुःखानुत्पत्तेः सकलदुःखनिदानभूतदेहरूपात्मनाश एव मोक्ष इत्याहुः । तन्न । अपुरुषार्थत्वात् । यद्यपि मोक्षदशायां दुःखमूलस्य विनाशः सर्ववादिसम्मतः, तथापि स स्वयं न पुरुषार्थो भवितुमर्हति । न हि सर्पकण्टकादिनिवृत्तिरेव पुरुषार्थः । दुःखाभाव एव पुरुषार्थं इति चेत् स किं दुःखध्वंसः ? उत दुःखप्रागभावः ? नाद्यः । तदानीं दुःखस्यानुत्पत्तौ तद्ध्वंसाभावात् । उत्पत्तौ च तज्ज्ञानादेव नाश इति पुरुषप्रवृत्तिवैफल्यात् । न द्वितीयः । दुःखप्रागभावस्यानादेः साध्यत्वाभावेन पुरुषार्थत्वायोगात् । अस्तु तर्हि दुःखनिदाननाश एव पुरुषार्थ इति चेत्; न । पूर्वोक्तदोषात् । देहरूपस्यात्मनो भोक्तुः मुक्तिदशायामभावेनाभुज्यमानत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वाच्च । "नावेद्यः पुरुषार्थः" इति न्यायात् । पुरुषार्थो हि तत्प्रेप्सुना भुज्यमानः सन्नेव पुरुषार्थः । न च स्वात्मनाशः स्वेन भुज्यते । देहस्य दुःखनिदानत्ववत् सुखनिदानत्वस्यापि सद्भावेन तन्नाशस्योद्देश्यत्वायोगाच्च । शरीरात्मवादश्च पूर्वमेव निरस्तः । एतेन ज्ञानसन्ततिविच्छेदो मोक्ष इति माध्यमिकपक्षोऽपि निरस्तः । ज्ञाननाशस्यानुद्देश्यत्वाच्च । ज्ञानक्षणिकत्ववादश्च पूर्वमेव निरस्तः । विषयोपरागाभावेन निरुपप्लवा ज्ञानसन्ततिर्मोक्ष इति योगाचारमतमप्ययुक्तम् । ज्ञानहेतोः शरीरादेरभावात् । न च विषयावच्छिन्नज्ञान एव शरीरस्य हेतुता । लाघवेन ज्ञानमात्र एव तस्य हेतुत्वात् ॥

23. The disputants explain in different ways the nature of that final *mokṣa* according to their own convictions.

Thus, the Cārvākas hold (as follows): Since the body itself is the abode of suffering when it (body) is destroyed suffering cannot arise; and so, they say that *mokṣa* is nothing but the destruction of the self which is no other than the body, the abode of all suffering. This (view) cannot be accepted; for it is not *puruṣārtha*. Even though the destruction of the root-cause of suffering in the state of *mokṣa* is acceptable to all disputants, nevertheless it cannot by itself be *puruṣārtha*. Indeed, the mere removal of snake, thorn, etc., is not *puruṣārtha*. If it be said that the absence of suffering itself is *puruṣārtha*, is it the destruction of suffering? Or, is it the prior non-existence of suffering? It cannot be the former; for, since suffering does not take place in that state, there is no destruction of it. Even if it originates (at that time) it is destroyed through knowledge alone; and so any effort (for its destruction) on the part of the person is futile. It cannot be the latter; since the prior non-existence of suffering is beginningless, it is something to be accomplished (by the person) and so it is not fit to be *puruṣārtha*. Let it be, it may be argued, that the destruction of the cause of suffering itself is *puruṣārtha*. It is not so, due to the above-mentioned defect. Also since the body which is the self and enjoyer is non-existent in the state of *mokṣa*, there is nothing to be enjoyed, and so it is not *puruṣārtha*. There is the rule, "What is not known is not *puruṣārtha*." Indeed, *puruṣārtha* is that which, a person being desirous of it, enjoys it. One cannot experience one's own destruction. Since the body is also the cause of happiness, in the same way as it is the cause of suffering, it is not proper to say that its destruction is what is intended. Also the view that the body is the self has already been refuted. By this, even the view of the Mādhyamika, who holds that *mokṣa* is the destruction of the series of knowledge stands refuted;

for, the destruction of knowledge also is not what is intended. Even the view that knowledge is momentary has already been refuted. Also, the Yogācāra view which holds that the undisturbed series of knowledge without any colouring by objects is *mokṣa*, is untenable, since the body, etc., which are caused by knowledge are non-existent (according to it). It cannot be said that only the knowledge delimited by the object is the cause of the body, since, on the principle of parsimony, knowledge alone is its cause.

२४. साङ्ख्यास्तु — प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकख्यातौ प्रकृतिकार्यमहदाद्यनुपधानेनावस्थानरूपं कैवल्यं मोक्षमाचक्षते। तथा हि — पुरुषस्य भोगनिमित्तं प्रकृतिर्महदादिसृष्टौ प्रवर्तते। निर्लेपस्य च पुरुषस्य स्वतो भोगासम्भवाद्भोक्तृभूतबुद्ध्यविवेकादेव भोगो वाच्यः। बुद्ध्या च पुरुषस्य विवेकोदयेऽविवेककृतभोगासम्भवेन प्रकृतौ महदादिकार्यानिष्पत्तेस्तदुपधानविरहेणैवावस्थानरूपं कैवल्यं सम्भवतीति। तदयुक्तम्। चैतन्यप्रकाशविरहेण पाषाणताकल्पेऽस्मिन् कैवल्ये सदाशिवादितत्तद्भुवनभोगपरित्यागेन लिप्सायाः अनुदयात्। सांसारिकदुःखासंस्पृष्टं निरतिशयं सुखं यदि मुक्तौ स्यात्तदा तत्रेच्छा स्यात्। सकलभोगविरोधिकैवल्यमात्रे तु न कस्यापीच्छा उदेतुमर्हति। तस्मान्न कैवल्यं पुरुषार्थः॥

24. According to the Sāṅkhyas, *mokṣa* is the state of *kaivalya*, in which the self remains without the adjunct of *mahat*, etc., the products of *prakṛti*, after getting discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. It is explained as follows: *prakṛti* starts creating *mahat*, etc., for the sake of the enjoyment of the *puruṣa*. Since there is no enjoyment for the *puruṣa per se* when it remains unattached, there is enjoyment due to non-discrimination of *buddhi* alone, the enjoyer. When the *puruṣa* attains discrimination through *buddhi*, there is no enjoyment caused by non-discrimination; and so there is no more production of *mahat*, etc.,

by *prakṛti*. Thus, *kaivalya* takes place when the *puruṣa* remains in its condition free from the adjunct. This (Sāṅkhya view) is untenable. In this state of *kaivalya* which is similar to the state of a stone, due to the absence of the illumination of knowledge, there will be no desire on account of the abandonment of the worlds of enjoyment connected with *Sadāśiva*, etc. If there could be unsurpassable happiness untouched by worldly suffering in *mokṣa*, then there could be desire in that state. But if there is mere *kaivalya* which is opposed to all enjoyment, there is no possibility of desire arising in anyone. Therefore, *kaivalya* is not *puruṣārtha*.

२५. एतेनात्यन्तिको दुःखोच्छेदो मोक्ष इति नैयायिकमतमप्यपास्तम्। तन्मते मुक्तिदशायामात्मनो विशेषगुणशून्यत्वेन दुःखाभावस्याज्ञायमानत्वेन अपुरुषार्थत्वात्। ननु दुःखाभावस्य स्वरूपेण पुरुषार्थत्वम्, न तु ज्ञायमानतया। न हि "दुःखाभावं जानीयाम्" इत्युद्दिश्य प्रवृत्तिः। अपि तु "दुखं मे मा भूत्" "दुःखं मे इदानीं जायमानं नश्यतु" इत्येवम्। सुखादावपि स्वरूपेणैव पुरुषार्थत्वम्। ज्ञानं तु नान्तरीयकमेवेति चेत्, न, अज्ञायमानस्य दुःखाभावस्य मूर्छादिसाधारण्येनापुरुषार्थत्वात्। तदुक्तम् —

दुःखाभावोऽपि नावेद्यः पुरुषार्थतयेष्यते ।
नहि मूर्च्छाद्यवस्थार्थं प्रवृत्तो दृश्यते सुधीः ॥ इति ॥

एतेनात्यन्तिको दुःखसाधनध्वंसो मोक्ष इति नैयायिकैकदेशिमतं चापास्तम् ॥

25. By this the Naiyāyika view also which holds that *mokṣa* is complete destruction of suffering is refuted; since, according to this view, the self is bereft of all special qualities in the state of *mokṣa*, the absence of suffering cannot be known, and so it cannot be *puruṣārtha*. It may be objected: Absence of suffering by its very nature is *puruṣārtha* and not by virtue of being known.

Indeed, there is no pursuit with the intention, "Let me know absence of suffering." On the contrary, (there is pursuit with the intention), "Let there be no suffering for me" and "let the suffering which befalls me now perish." Pleasure, etc., also by their very nature are *puruṣārtha*. But knowledge is only invariably connected. (Reply:) It is not so. Since the absence of suffering which is not known is common to the state of swoon, etc., it is not *puruṣārtha*. It has been stated: "The absence of suffering which is not known, is not desired as *puruṣārtha*. Never, indeed, does a wise man pursue the state of swoon, etc." By this even the view held by some of the Naiyāyikas that *mokṣa* is the complete destruction of the means to suffering, stands refuted.

२६. भाट्टास्तु — नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिरित्याहुः। तदपि न। अभिव्यक्तिर्जन्या अजन्या वा? आद्येऽपि अभिव्यक्तिरावरणनिवृत्तिर्वा? ज्ञानं वा? आवरणनिवृत्तिरिति चेत् तस्यास्मन्मतत्त्वेन तवापसिद्धान्तात्। ज्ञानमिति चेत् "यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम्" इति न्यायेन तस्य विनाशित्वेन मुक्तेरनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अभिव्यक्तेरजन्यत्वे पुरुषासाध्यत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वायोगात्॥

26. The Bhāṭṭas, however, hold that *mokṣa* is the manifestation of eternal happiness. This (view), too, cannot be accepted. Is manifestation what is produced or what is not produced? With regard to the former, is manifestation the same as the removal of *āvaraṇa* or is it knowledge? If it be said that it is the removal of *āvaraṇa*, then this being our view is not valid according to you. If it be said that it is knowledge, then according to the principle, "What is produced is impermanent," it is destructible, and so there arises the contingency of *mokṣa* becoming impermanent. If manifestation is what is not produced, then being not accomplished by the person, it is not fit enough to be *puruṣārtha*.

२७. आर्हतास्तु — आत्मनः सततोर्ध्वगमनमेव मोक्षः। तस्योर्ध्वगमनं च बन्धविगमेन भवति। संसारदशायामधोगमनं च स्वतो लघोरपि कर्मबन्धनेनालघुभूतस्य तस्य लोहपञ्जरान्तःस्थितस्यालाबुकस्य जले क्षिप्तस्येव युक्तम्। ऊर्ध्वगमनमपि कर्मबन्धविगमेन लोहपञ्जरविच्छेदेनालाबुकस्येव युक्तमेवेत्याहुः। तदप्ययुक्तम्। आत्मनोऽणुमध्यमपरिमाणयोर्निरस्तत्वेन व्यापकस्य गमनासम्भवात्। ऊर्ध्वगमनस्य सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वाच्च॥

27. According to the Jainas, the continuous upward movement of the soul is *mokṣa*. Its upward movement takes place due to separation from bondage. Even though the soul by its very nature is light, its downward movement in the state of bondage, like that of a gourd kept in an iron cage and thrown into water, is proper, since it becomes heavy due to the bondage of *karmas*. They say that its upward movement, when it is separated from the bondage of *karma*, like that of a gourd which is freed from the iron cage, is proper. This, too, is untenable. Since the atomic and medium size of the soul is refuted, there cannot be movement for the soul which is all-pervasive. Also, since the upward movement is different from happiness and absence of suffering, it is not *puruṣārtha*.

२८. रुद्रविष्ण्विन्द्रादिपदप्राप्तिर्मुक्तिरित्यपि न युक्तम्, तस्य विनाशित्वात्। तन्मुक्तित्वप्रतिपादकपुराणादिवचनानामपि गौणमुक्तिपरत्वात्॥

28. Also, it is not proper (to say) that *mokṣa* is the attainment of the regions of Rudra, Viṣṇu, Indra and others, because that attainment is impermanent, and the statements of the *Purāṇas*, etc., which set forth the (attainment of these abodes) as *mokṣa*, refer only to secondary *mokṣa*.

२९. केचित्तु सत्त्वभुक्तिरेव मुक्तिरित्याहुः। तथा हि — पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिभोक्तृत्वमनादि। सादित्वे ततः पूर्वं पुरुषस्यापि सत्त्वे मानाभावेन तस्यापि सादित्वप्रसङ्गात्। न चानादेर्निवृत्तिः कल्पयितुं युक्ता। पुरुषस्यापि निवृत्त्यापत्तेः। ततो मुक्तिदशायामप्यस्यैव भोक्तृत्वम्। इयांस्तु भेदः। यत् संसारदशायां कर्मवशेन दुःखमोहान्तरितसुखरूपा प्रकृतिर्भोग्या; मुक्तौ कर्मणामभावान्निरतिशयानन्दात्मकसत्त्वरूपा प्रकृतिर्भोग्येति। एतदपि भोगजन्यत्वाजन्यत्वविकल्पेन भाट्टमतनिरासेनैव निरस्तम्॥

29. Some people regard the enjoyment of *sattva* alone to be *mokṣa*. It is explained as follows: The state of being the enjoyer of *prakṛti* by *puruṣa* is beginningless. If it (enjoyership) has a beginning, then there is no evidence to show that the person existed before it; and hence there arises the contingency of the person also having a beginning. It is not proper to speak of the removal of what is beginningless; in that case it will result in the extinction of even the person. Therefore, even in the state of *mokṣa* he alone is the enjoyer. But this much is the difference. That is, due to the influence of *karma*, *prakṛti* in the form of pleasure interspersed with great misery and delusion, is what is enjoyed in the state of *saṁsāra*. But, in *mokṣa*, *prakṛti* in the form of *sattva* which is of the nature of unsurpassable bliss, is what is enjoyed because of the absence of *karma*. This view also stands refuted by the refutation of the Bhāṭṭa view, through the consideration of the alternatives whether enjoyment is what is produced, or what is not produced.

३०. शिवसाम्यमपि न मोक्षः। तच्च साम्यं उत्पत्तिसङ्क्रान्तिसमावेशाभिव्यक्तिभिश्चतुर्धा सम्भवति। तत्र महाव्रतिनः उत्पत्त्या साम्यमुपगच्छन्ति। तथा हि — मुक्तौ तावच्छिवसाम्यमस्ति। तच्च सर्वज्ञत्वादिरूपम्। तच्च तदैवोत्पद्यते। अन्यथा पूर्वमपि तत्प्रसङ्गात्। तस्माच्छिवगुणसदृशगुणोत्पत्त्यैव शिवसाम्यमिति॥

30. *Śivasāmya* (similarity to Śiva) also is not *mokṣa*. This similarity occurs in four ways through origination, transfer, possession and emergence. Of these (four ways) the Mahāvratins hold that *Śivasāmya* occurs through origination. It is as follows: In *mokṣa*, there is *Śivasāmya* in the form of omniscience, etc; and that originates only then. Otherwise, there will be the contingence of its occurrence even earlier. Therefore, *Śivasāmya* occurs only through origination of qualities similar to those of Śiva.

३१. पाशुपताः सङ्क्रान्त्या साम्यमुपगच्छन्ति। तथा हि — कस्तूरिकाद्यामोदः पटादाविवेश्वरस्थं सार्वज्ञ्यादिकं मुक्तपुरुषे सङ्क्रामति। तस्माच्छिवगुणसङ्क्रान्त्या साम्यमिति॥

31. The Pāśupatas accept *Śivasāmya* (as *mokṣa*) through transfer (of the qualities of Śiva), That is, there occurs the transfer of qualities such as omniscience, present in Śiva, to the released soul just as the scent of *kastūrikā*, etc., gets transferred to cloth, etc. Therefore by the transfer of the qualities of Śiva, there is *Śivasāmya*.

३२. कापालिकाः समावेशेन साम्यमुपगच्छन्ति। तथा हि — यथा ग्रहाः पुरुषेष्वाविशन्ति तथेश्वरगुणा मुक्तेष्वाविशन्ति। तस्माच्छिवगुणसमावेशेन साम्यमिति॥

32. The Kāpālikas accept *Śivasāmya* (as *mokṣa*) through possession. It is as follows: Just as planets possess the persons, even so the qualities of God possess the released souls. Therefore, by the possession of Śiva's qualities there occurs *Śivasāmya*.

३३. दौवैकदेशिनः अभिव्यक्त्या साम्यमुपगच्छन्ति। तथा हि — शिवस्येव जीवानामपि सार्वज्ञ्यादिकं पूर्वमेवास्ति। किन्तु संसारदशायां मलरुद्धं

न प्रकाशते। मुक्तौ तु मलविगमेनाभिव्यज्यते। तस्मात् स्वीयगुणाभिव्यक्त्या शिवसाम्यमिति ॥

33. Some Śaivities accept *Śivasāmya* through emergence. It is explained as follows: As in the case of Śiva, omniscience, etc., are already inherent in the souls. However, these qualities do not shine in the state of *saṁsāra*, being impeded by *mala*. But, in *mokṣa*, owing to the removal of *mala* they emerge. Therefore, *Śivasāmya* arises through the emergence of one's inherent qualities.

३४. तत्र उत्पत्तिसाम्यपक्षस्तावदयुक्तः। मुक्तौ ज्ञानोत्पादकशरीराद्यभावान्न तावत्सार्वज्ञ्यस्योत्पत्तिः सम्भवति। तस्योत्पत्तिमत्त्वेऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् स्वर्गादिभ्यो मुक्तेरविशेषप्रसङ्गाच्च ॥

34. Of these, similarity through origination is untenable. Since in the state of *mokṣa* there is the absence of body, etc., necessary for the origination of knowledge, the origination of omniscience is not possible at that time. If it has origination, it will become impermanent, and hence *mokṣa* will not be different from heaven, etc.

३५. सङ्क्रान्तिसाम्यपक्षोऽप्ययुक्तः। तथा हि — किं स्वाश्रयपरित्यागेन आश्रयान्तरप्राप्तिः सङ्क्रमः? उत तदपरित्यागेन? नाद्यः। ईश्वरज्ञानस्य मुक्ते सङ्क्रान्त्यभ्युपगमे ईश्वरस्य ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात्। नापि द्वितीयः। ज्ञानस्य निरंशत्वेनांशेन सङ्क्रमस्यायोगात्। तथा विज्ञानसद्भावे मानाभावाच्च। शिवज्ञानं नान्यत्र सङ्क्रमते, गुणत्वादित्यनुमानेन सङ्क्रान्त्यभावसाधनाच्च। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्। गुणिपरित्यागेन गुणस्यान्यत्र गमने गुणितादात्म्यभङ्गप्रसङ्गेन गुणत्वस्यैवायुक्तत्वात्। तदुक्तम् —

त्यक्त्वा स्वगुणिनं यान्ति न च गुण्यन्तरं गुणाः।
गच्छतां च व्यवस्थेयं पदार्थानां विरुध्यते ॥ इति ॥

ननु —

निन्दनाद्द्विजसाधूनां पापानामथ सेवनात् ।
पापं सङ्क्रमते पुंसां स्वपुण्यमपयाति च ॥
क्षमावति त्वनाक्रोशात् पुण्यवद्भिः सह स्थितेः ।
पुण्यं सङ्क्रमते पुंसां पापं याति ततोऽन्यतः ॥

इति स्मृत्यादौ पुण्यपापादेः सङ्क्रमणं प्रतिपाद्यते । तथा आचार्यनिष्ठज्ञानस्य शिष्ये सङ्क्रमणं श्रूयते स्वायम्भुवादौ आचार्याभिषेके —

अद्य संक्रमितो योऽयमधिकारो मया त्वयि ।
स कर्तव्यस्त्वया तावद्यावत्सङ्क्रमितोऽन्यतः ॥ इति ॥

एवञ्च पूर्वोक्तगुणत्वहेतोर्व्यभिचार इति चेन्न । स्मृत्यादौ पुण्यपापयोः सङ्क्रान्तिप्रतिपादकवचनस्य तज्जातीयोत्पत्तिपरत्वात् । ज्ञानसङ्क्रान्तिप्रतिपादकवचनस्यापि गुरुनियोगेन गुरुवद्व्याख्यानादौ स्वातन्त्र्यप्रतिपादनपरत्वात् । तथा च तत्र न मुख्या सङ्क्रान्तिः । न च कस्तूरिकामोदादेः पटे सङ्क्रान्तिदर्शनाद्व्यभिचारः । तत्रापि कस्तूरिकावयवानामेव सङ्क्रान्तेः । तत्र च गुणत्वाभावेन हेतोरभावात् । न च वह्निगतस्यौष्ण्यस्य जले सङ्क्रान्तिः दृश्यते; अन्यथा जलसम्बन्धे करादौ दाहो न स्यादिति व्यभिचार इति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि जलस्थस्यानुद्भूतरूपवह्नेरेव दाहकत्वात् । तथा च न गुणस्य स्वाश्रयादन्यत्र सङ्क्रम इति सिद्धम् । तस्मात्सङ्क्रान्तिसाम्यपक्षः अयुक्त एव ॥

35. Even the view of similarity through transfer is untenable. It is explained as follows. Does transfer mean attainment of another abode after abandoning one's own abode, or without abandoning one's own abode? It cannot be the former. If the transfer of the knowledge of *Īśvara* to the released soul is accepted, there will arise the contingence of *Īśvara* becoming bereft of knowledge. Even the latter alternative is untenable. Since knowledge

is partless, transfer of a part of it is not proper. Also, there is no authority in support of knowledge remaining such (with parts). Again, the absence of transfer is supported by the inference: "The knowledge of Śiva does not get transferred to another, because it is a quality." If, by abandoning the substrate, a quality should move to another (substrate), the substrate will cease to be what it is, and hence it is impossible for a quality to remain what it is. It has been said: "By abandoning their substrate, the qualities cannot move to another substrate." It may be objected: The transfer of merit and demerit has been set forth in *Smṛti* texts, such as, "By censuring the good and the twice-born and by serving the bad, sin accrues to men, and their merit also leaves them off. By not censuring those who are patient and by keeping company with the meritorious, merit accrues to men and sin goes away from them to another place." In the same way, the transfer of the knowledge of the teacher to the disciple has been stated in the section on *Ācāryābhiṣeka*, in the *Svāyambhuva* and other works: "This eligibility which has now been transferred to you by me, has to be practised by you until it is transferred to another." Again the *guṇatva* which is the *hetu* (in the *anumāna*) stated above is deviant. (Reply:) It is not so. The *Smṛti* and other texts, which speak about the transfer of merit and demerit purport to convey the origination of what is similar to them. Even the statement about the transfer of knowledge conveys the independence (of the disciple) in the matter of exposition, similar to his *guru* as commanded by the latter. Therefore, here there is no transfer in the primary sense. Also, there is no deviation (of the *hetu*), even though the transfer of fragrance of *kastūrikā*, etc., to cloth is seen; in this case there is transfer of only the

parts of *kastūrikā*; thus because of the absence of *guṇatva*, there is absence of *hetu*. It is not proper to say there is experience of the transfer of heat, inherent in fire, to water, and if this be not the case, there will be deviation as the heat (will not be felt) in the hands, etc., when they (the hands, etc.) are in contact with water. Even there, the fire alone which exists in the water in an unmanifest form produces heat. Thus it is established that there is no transfer of quality from its substrate to another. Therefore, the view of similarity through transfer is undoubtedly untenable.

३६. नाप्यावेशसाम्यम्। तथा सति भूताविष्टस्येवास्वातन्त्र्यापत्त्या पुरुषार्थत्वायोगात्॥

36. Even the view of similarity through possession is untenable. If it were the case, the soul, as in the case of one who is possessed by an evil spirit, will not be independent; and thus, that state (of similarity through possession) is not fit enough to be *puruṣārtha*.

३७. अभिव्यक्तिसाम्यपक्षोऽप्ययुक्तः। ज्ञानक्रियाभिव्यक्तयात्मनस्तस्य सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वेन स्वतः पुरुषार्थत्वायोगात्। न च तत्कालीनो दुःखाभावः पुरुषार्थः। तस्य त्वया मोक्षत्वेनानङ्गीकारात्। ज्ञानक्रियाभिव्यक्तेरेव साम्यपदाभिधेयायास्तथात्वेनाभ्युपगमात्। विविधतत्तद्भुवनभोगहानेन तुल्यायव्ययतया तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वायोगाच्च। शिवाद्भिन्नस्य शिवसमस्य मुक्तस्य पारतन्त्र्यनिवृत्तौ शिवस्य सर्वेश्वरत्वविघातापत्तेश्च। मुक्तानां पारतन्त्र्यनिवृत्तौ जगत्कारणशक्तिमत्त्वेन स्वयमपि जगन्निर्माणप्रसङ्गाच्च। किं च मुक्तस्य शिवस्य च भेदकाभावाद्भेदो न युक्तः। शिवसाम्यस्य मुक्तित्वे एकदेशेन साम्यं वा सर्वात्मना साम्यं वा मुक्तिः? आद्ये बद्धानामपि यत्किञ्चित्साम्यसत्त्वेन बद्धमुक्ताविशेषप्रसङ्गः। द्वितीयेऽपि मुक्तस्य सावयवत्वाभावे निरवयवस्य सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणवतः स्वतन्त्रस्य च मुक्तस्य तादृशस्य शिवस्य च भेदकाभावेन मुक्तः शिव एव स्यात्। न शिवसमः। मुक्तस्य सावयव-

त्वाङ्गीकारे सावयवत्वं बैन्दवादिशरीरयोगित्वमेव वाच्यम्। अन्यादृशस्य तस्यासम्भवात्। तथा च मुक्तस्य बद्धस्य चाविशेषप्रसङ्गः। किं च सर्वथा साम्यस्याभेद एव पर्यवसानम्। तस्मान्न शिवसाम्यं मुक्तिः॥

37. Also, the view of similarity through emergence is not tenable. Since this act of emergence of knowledge is different from both happiness and absence of suffering, it cannot by its very nature be *puruṣārtha*. It cannot also be held that the absence of suffering present at that time is *puruṣārtha*. (That is to say), the act of emergence of knowledge alone which is referred to by the term '*sāmya*', is accepted (by you), as *mokṣa*. Also, since this *sāmya* is of equal gain and loss due to the abandonment of the enjoyment in each of the different worlds, it is not fit enough to be *puruṣārtha*. (If this *Śivasāmya* through emergence is accepted) then, when the released soul, though different from Śiva, becomes equal to Śiva, it is free from its dependent nature; and this will be detrimental to the supremacy of Śiva. When the released souls are not dependent (on Śiva), they, too, possessing the power of creating the world, on their own, create the world. Further, as there is nothing to distinguish a released soul from Śiva, difference between them is not possible. If (you contend that) similarity to Śiva is *mokṣa*, then, is *mokṣa* similarity in some respects or in all respects? If it be the former, since there exists some similarity (to Śiva) even in bound souls, it results in the non-distinction between the released and bound souls. Even if it be the latter, since there is nothing to distinguish between the released soul, which, due to the absence of parts, is partless, is in possession of omniscience and other qualities and also is independent, and Śiva, who is of the same nature, the released soul becomes Śiva Himself and not one similar to Him. If the released soul is

said to be in possession of parts, "to be in possession of parts" must mean that he is connected with the body, produced from *bindu*, etc., for it cannot be otherwise; thus, it results in the non-difference between the released and bound souls. Moreover, in all respects similarity amounts to identity. Therefore similarity to Śiva is not *mokṣa*.

३८. किं च शिवैकीभावेन शिवानन्दानुभव एव मोक्षः। तथैव स्वस्मिन् परमशिवाभेदज्ञानस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वेन श्रीमत्सर्वज्ञानोत्तराद्यागमेषु बोधितत्वात्। तथा हि सर्वज्ञानोत्तरे वचनानि —

योऽसौ सर्वगतो देवः सर्वात्मा सर्वतोमुखः ।
सर्वतत्त्वमयोऽचिन्त्यः सर्वस्योपरि संस्थितः ॥

सर्वतत्त्वव्यतीतश्च वाङ्मनोनामवर्जितः ।
सोऽहमेवमुपासीत निर्विकल्पेन चेतसा ॥

यदेवं निष्फलं ज्ञानं शाश्वतं ध्रुवमव्ययम् ।
निर्विकल्पमनिर्देश्यं हेतुदृष्टान्तवर्जितम् ॥

अलिङ्गमक्षरं शान्तं विषयातीतगोचरम् ।
अविभाव्यमसन्देहं तदहं नात्र संशयः ॥

अहमेव परो देवः सर्वमन्त्रमयः शिवः ।
सर्वमन्त्रव्यतीतश्च सृष्टिसंहारवर्जितः ॥

मया व्याप्तमिदं सर्वं दृश्यादृश्यं चराचरम् ।
अहमेव जगन्नाथो मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते ॥

अनेकाकारसम्भिन्नं विश्वं भुवनसञ्चयम् ।
शिवाद्यवनिपर्यन्तं तत्सर्वं मयि संस्थितम् ॥

यच्च किञ्चिज्जगत्यस्मिन् दृश्यते श्रूयतेऽपि वा ।
बहिरन्तर्विभागेन तत्सर्वं व्यापितं मया ॥

अहमात्मा शिवो ह्यन्यः परमात्मेति यःस्मृतः ।
एवं यो भावयेन्मोहान्न शिवत्वमवाप्नुयात् ॥

शिवोऽन्यस्त्वहमप्यन्यः पृथग्भावं विवर्जयेत् ।
यः शिवः सोऽहमेवेति अद्वैतं भावयेत्सदा ॥

अद्वैतभावनायुक्तः सर्वत्रात्मनि संस्थितः ।
सर्वगं सर्वदेहस्थं पश्यते नात्र संशयः ॥

एवमेकात्मभावेन संस्थितस्य तु योगिनः ।
सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रकल्प्येत विकल्परहितस्य च ॥

योऽसौ सर्वेषु शास्त्रेषु पठ्यते ह्यज ईश्वरः ॥

अकायो निर्गुणो ह्यात्मा सोऽहमस्मि न संशयः ।
अविज्ञातः पशुः सोऽसौ सृष्टिधर्मं समाश्रितः ॥

विज्ञातः शाश्वतः शुद्धः स शिवोऽत्र न संशयः ।
तस्मादात्मा सदा वेद्यः सुविचार्य विचक्षणैः ॥ इति ॥

एतेषां वचनानां गौणार्थतामवलम्ब्य महता प्रयासेन द्वैतपरतया रचितान्येकदेशिनां व्याख्यानान्तराणि न समञ्जसानीति सर्वज्ञानोत्तरव्याख्यानेऽस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

38. Moreover, through identity with Śiva, the experience of the bliss of Śiva alone is *mokṣa*. Thus it has been taught in the sacred *Sarvajñānottara* and other *Āgamas* that the knowledge of non-difference between the supreme Śiva and oneself is the cause of *mokṣa*. In support of this, there are the following texts in the *Sarvajñānottara*:

"I am He, who is the all-pervasive Lord, the soul of all, the knower of everything, the embodiment of all truth, unthinkable, transcendent above all, beyond all *tattvas*, beyond word, mind and names — thus one should meditate with a concentrated mind. I am that knowledge, which is not the fruit of anything, which is eternal, constant, imperishable, homogeneous, beyond denotation, uninferable and incomparable, without (differentiating) mark, indestructible, peaceful, beyond the objects, not knowable and beyond doubt; and there is no doubt about this. I am, indeed, the supreme Lord, Śiva, the embodiment of all *mantras*, beyond the comprehension by all *mantras*, and bereft of creation and destruction. All this, seen and unseen, moving and non-moving, is pervaded by me. I alone, am the Lord of the world; everything originates from me. The whole universe comprising objects in manifold forms, the group of worlds beginning with 'Śiva' and ending with earth — all these rest on me. Whatever things, external or internal, are seen and heard in this world — all these are pervaded by me. "I am the self; Śiva, who is regared as the supreme self, is different from me."— one, who thinks thus due to delusion cannot attain union with Śiva. One should abandon the thought of separation in the form: "Śiva is different (from me); I am also different (from Him)." One should always think of non-duality in the form: "I am, indeed, He who is Śiva." With the thought of non-duality, one sees oneself in all beings as entering into all and as dwelling in all bodies; there is no doubt about this. Thus a *yogin*, who remains with the thought of unity, bereft of distinctions, is said to be omniscient. I am the Self who is spoken of, in all scriptures, as unborn, ruler, bodiless and attributeless; there is no doubt about this. The *paśu*, who is

ignorant, is subject to the order of creation. He is identical with Śiva who is intelligent, eternal, and pure; this is beyond doubt. Therefore, the Self is what is it to be known through investigation by all the learned people." We have stated in the commentary on the *Sarvajñānottara* that other commentaries of some of the followers of this school, which, by resorting to secondary meaning, explain the above texts, with great difficulty, in the dualistic sense, are not valid.

३९. ननु सर्वज्ञेन नित्यमुक्तेन शिवेन किञ्चिज्ज्ञस्य बद्धस्य पशोरैक्यं कथं सम्भवति? विरुद्धधर्माणां भिन्नेष्वेव सम्भवात्। अन्यथा पशुशिवयोरभेदे पशुधर्मस्य बन्धस्य शिवे, शिवधर्मस्य नित्यमुक्तत्वस्य च पशौ प्रसङ्गः। न चैकस्मिन्नेव बदरीफले कालभेदेन श्यामरक्तरूपयोरिवैकत्रैव सर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मयोः सम्भव इति वाच्यम्। तथा सति शिवस्यैव पशुत्वदशायां बद्धत्वापत्त्या तस्य नित्यमुक्तत्वाभ्युपगमविरोधप्रसङ्गात्। अत एव शिवस्य बद्धमुक्तावस्थाप्रसङ्गेन घटे नष्टे घटाकाशस्य महाकाशैक्यमिव मायादिबन्धापगमे जीवस्य शिवैक्यमिति पक्षोऽपि निरस्तः। नदीनां समुद्रे विलयेन ऐक्यमिव मायादिबन्धविगमे पशूनां शिवे विलयेनैक्यमित्यपि न युक्तम्। लये एकीभावस्य एकीभावे लयस्य चासम्भवात्। लीनस्य मुक्तिरूपपुरुषार्थानुभवायोगाच्च। न च पशूनां लयोक्तिरत्र न स्वरूपलयः, किन्तु पशुत्वावस्थाविलयः; नदीनामपि समुद्रैक्ये नदीभावलय एव, न स्वरूपलय इति वाच्यम्। तथा सति यानि जलानि पूर्वं नदीभावेनावस्थितानि तान्येव प्राक्तनं नदीभावं विहाय समुद्रेणैकीभूतानीत्यनेन किं विवक्षितम्? किं प्राक्तनजलानि प्राक्तनसमुद्रेण मिलित्वा कञ्चिदवयविनमारभन्त इति विवक्षितम्? उत एकजातीयतया संश्लेषः? अथ पूर्वतनभेदलयेनाभेदोत्पत्तिः? आद्ये पक्षे तद्वदेव जीवचैतन्यस्य शिवेन सह मेलनेन कस्यचिदवयविन आरम्भकत्वं स्यात्; न च तथाभ्युपगम्यते। द्वितीयपक्षे शिवजीवयोः संश्लेषसिद्धावपि अभेदासिद्धिः। तृतीयपक्षे भेदस्य नित्यत्वेन नाशायोगः। अभेदस्य च जन्यत्वे विनाशावश्यम्भावेन मुक्तेरनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। किं च भेदध्वंसेनाभेदोत्पत्तिपक्षे मुक्तिदशायामेकस्यैव विद्यमानत्वं वाच्यम्। तथा सति मुक्तौ

विद्यमानः शिवो वा? जीवो वा? आद्ये शिवस्यैव सत्त्वेन मुक्तिफलभोक्त्रभावप्रसङ्गः। द्वितीये जीवस्यैव सत्त्वेन शिवाभावेन भोग्यशिवानन्दाभावप्रसङ्गः। तस्माज्जीवस्य न शिवस्वरूपैक्यं सम्भवति। किं तु ताम्रस्य रसगुडिकादिवेधेन कालिमविगमेन स्वर्णताप्राप्तौ स्वर्णैक्योक्तिरिव, विश्वामित्रमुनेस्तपोबलेन क्षत्रियत्वविगमेन ब्राह्मण्यप्राप्तौ ब्राह्मणैक्योक्तिरिव च, जीवस्य ज्ञानबलेन पशुत्वविगमेन स्वगतशिवधर्मभूतशिवत्वाभिव्यक्तौ शिवैक्योक्तिरित्येवाभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति चेत्; उच्यते॥

39. It may be argued (as follows): How is it possible for *paśu*, which is bound and parviscient, to be identical with Śiva, who is omniscient and ever-free? For, contradictory attributes can exist only in different entities. On the contrary, if there is non-difference between *paśu* and Śiva, then it will result in the presence of bondage, which is the attribute of *paśu*, in Śiva, and the presence of ever-free nature, which is the attribute of Śiva, in the *paśu*. It it not proper to say that, just as both black and red colour, owing to difference of time, can exist in one and the same berry fruit, even so the contradictory attributes such as omniscience and parviscience can exist in one and the same object. If this be the case, there will arise bondage for Śiva Himself in the state of being a *paśu*, and so it will be in conflict with the ever-free nature (of Śiva) which has been accepted. That is why, even the view which, on the basis of the distinction between the bound and released states of Śiva, speaks of the *jīva* becoming one with Śiva, after the removal of (*jīva's*) bondage such as *māyā*, in the same way as the pot-ether, at the destruction of the pot, becomes one with the all-pervasive ether, stands refuted. And it is not proper to say that there is oneness when the souls merge with Śiva, after the loosening of (their) bondage such as *māyā*, in the same way as there is oneness when the rivers join the

ocean. For, oneness is untenable when there is absorption, and absorption, when there is oneness. Also, for one, who gets dissolved, there cannot be the experience of *puruṣārtha* in the form of *mokṣa*. It is no argument to say: "The dissolution of souls mentioned here does not mean the loss of one's being, but only the loss of the state of being the soul; even in the case of the merger of the rivers with ocean, there is only the loss of the state of being rivers, but not the loss of their being." In this case, what is it that is intended to be conveyed when it is said that those waters, which existed earlier as river-waters, have themselves become one with ocean after abandoning their previous status of river-waters? Does it mean that the earlier waters, by mingling with the earlier ocean, give rise to some other entity? Or, does it mean that they become one in the sense of belonging to the same class? Or, does it mean that there arises non-difference due to the loss of their earlier difference? If it be the first alternative, there must come into existence, in like manner, another entity as a result of the conjunction of the *jīva's* consciousness, with Śiva, but this (coming into existence of a new entity) is not accepted. In the second alternative, even though there is oneness of Śiva and *jīva*, there is no non-difference between them. In the third alternative, as difference is eternal, its destruction is untenable. If there is origination of non-difference, then its destruction is inevitable; and *mokṣa* will become impermanent. Moreover, in the view that there is origination of non-difference due to the destruction of difference, it must be said that only one is present in the state of *mokṣa*. If so, does Śiva or the *jīva* exist in *mokṣa*? If the former, then Śiva alone being present, there will be no enjoyer of the fruit of *mokṣa*? If the latter, then the

jīva alone being present without Śiva, there will be no *Śivānanda* which is the object of enjoyment. Therefore there cannot be identity of the *jīva* with the essential nature of Śiva. But, if it be said that, just as copper is said to become one with gold, when it attains the nature of gold, the verdigris being removed through the action *rasaguḍikā*, etc., and, just as sage Viśvāmitra is said to become one with a *brahmaṇa* when he attains the status of a brahmin, the nature of *kṣatriya* being removed through the strength of *tapas*, even so the *jīva* becomes one with Śiva, when the inherent Śiva nature, which is a characteristic of Śiva, becomes manifest, the nature of *paśu* being removed through the strength of knowledge. The reply is (as follows).

४०. गुणगुणिनोरिव प्रकाशतदाश्रययोरिव च ईषद्भेद एवैक्यम्। अत एव बद्धमुक्तादिव्यवस्थोपपत्तिः। यथा हि — गुणगुणिनोरभेदसत्त्वेऽपि गुणस्य रूपस्यैव धर्मत्वं चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वं च, गुणिनो घटादेरेव धर्मित्वं त्वगिन्द्रियेणापि ग्राह्यत्वं चेति व्यवस्थोपपद्यते। तयोर्भेदस्यापि सत्त्वात्। तथैव शिवजीवयोरैक्यसत्त्वेऽपि जीवस्यैव किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वं बन्धादियोगश्च, शिवस्यैव सर्वज्ञत्वं नित्यमुक्तत्वादियोगश्चेति व्यवस्थोपपद्यते। शिवजीवयोर्भेदस्याप्यङ्गीकारात्। तच्चैक्यं न मुक्तिदशायामुत्पद्यते। तथात्वे विनाशित्वप्रसङ्गात्। तथा च संसारदशायामप्यैक्यमस्त्येव। किं तु आवरणवशात्तदा अनभिव्यक्तं आवरणापगमे मुक्तावभिव्यज्यते। यथा ह्यरणिप्रभृतिषु काष्ठेषु तादात्म्येनावस्थित एव काष्ठाकारतिरोहितो वह्निः पश्चान्मथनक्रियादग्धावारकगुरुकठिनद्रवपार्थिवाप्यावयवरूपकाष्ठाकारत्वेनाभिव्यज्यते तद्वत्॥

40. Even though there is a little difference, as in the case of a quality and its substrate also and light and its locus, there is oneness only in the sense of non-difference. In this way alone, the distinction between a bound and a released soul becomes intelligible. This may be explained as follows: Even though there is non-difference between

a quality and its substrate, the distinction, that colour which is a quality is fit enough to be a quality (of a substrate) as well as perceivable through the visual sense alone, whereas objects such as pot which possess qualities are fit enough to be a substrate as well as cognizable through the sense of touch also, is tenable, because there is also difference between them. In the same way, even though there is oneness between Śiva and *jīva*, the distinction that only the *jīva* is parviscient and is subject to bondage, etc., whereas Śiva alone is omniscient and is associated with the ever-free nature, etc., becomes intelligible, because even the difference between Śiva and *jīva* is accepted. This oneness is not what is produced in the state of *mokṣa*. If that were the case, it will become destructible. Thus, there is oneness even in the state of *saṁsāra*. However, that (oneness) which is unmanifest then due to concealment becomes manifest in *mokṣa* when the concealment goes away. Just as the fire which, though concealed by the form of the wood, remains in the *tādātmya* relation with the pieces of wood such as *araṇi* (fire-producing wood), becomes manifest subsequently through the parts of the wood when the obstructing factors, *viz.*, heaviness, hardness, fluidity and earthiness, are destroyed through the act of rubbing, even so (the oneness which remains unmanifest becomes manifest).

४१. न च तथा सति वस्त्रस्याप्यावरणभूततन्त्वाकारापगमे सति अभिव्यक्तेरेवोत्पत्तिरूपत्वेन अत्राप्यावरणापगमे अभिव्यक्तेरुत्पत्तिरूपत्वमेवेति मुक्तेरनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गदोषतादवस्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्। यत्र कारणरूपाश्रयगतावस्थाविशेषेणावृतं तदवस्थापनयनेनाभिव्यज्यते तत्रोत्पत्तिः; यत्र तु आश्रयगतद्रव्यान्तरेणावृतं तन्निवृत्त्याभिव्यज्यते तत्राभिव्यक्तिरित्युत्पत्त्यभिव्यक्त्योर्भेदाभ्युपगमात्। वस्त्रस्याश्रयभूततन्त्ववस्थारूपावरणापगमे अभिव्यक्तेरुत्पत्तिरूपत्वेऽपि प्रकृते आश्रयभूतात्मनि विद्यमानमलरूपद्रव्यान्तरेणावतत्वात्

शिवैक्यस्य तदावरणनिवृत्तौ तृणशैवालाद्यपगमे कूपे पूर्वमेव विद्यमानजलस्येवाभिव्यक्तेरुत्पत्तिरूपत्वाभावान्नानित्यत्वदोषप्रसङ्गः। एतेन शिवैक्यस्य पूर्वमेव सत्त्वे तादर्थ्येन पुरुषप्रवृत्तिवैयर्थ्यमित्येतदपास्तम्। तदाच्छादकमलनिवृत्तौ कृतिसाध्यत्वपर्यवसानात्। तथा च घटाकाशमहाकाशदृष्टान्तेन नदीसमुद्रदृष्टान्तेन च वेदागमेष्वैक्योक्तिरुक्तेषद्भेदगर्भाभेदरूपतादात्म्यमात्रसाधर्म्यविषया। न त्वात्यन्तिकाभेदांशपूर्वसिद्धभेदहान्यंशावपि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोस्तत्र विवक्षितौ। न हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोस्तत्र सर्वात्मना साम्यं विवक्षणीयम्। तयोरभेदापत्त्या दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभावस्यैवोच्छेदापत्तेः। तथा च न पूर्वोक्तदोषः॥

41. This being the case, it is no argument to say that just as the manifestation of the cloth itself, which takes place when the concealment in the form of threads gets removed, is of the nature of origination, even here the manifestation itself, which takes place when the concealment goes away, is of the nature of origination with the result that the defect of *mokṣa* becoming impermanent still persists. Where there is concealment by the particular state inherent in the cause, which is the locus, there there is origination when there is manifestation by the removal of that state; but where there is concealment by another substance which exists in the locus, there is manifestation when there is emergence by the removal of that (concealment)—thus the difference between origination and manifestation is accepted. Even though the manifestation which takes place by the removal of concealment in the form of the state of threads, which is the locus of cloth, is of the nature of origination, in the present case, since there is concealment by another substance in the form of *mala* which exists in the self which is its locus, there is manifestation of oneness with Śiva the concealment being removed, in the same way as there is manifestation of the already existent water in the well, when grass and

other plants are removed; inasmuch as this manifestation is not of the nature of origination there is no possibility of the defect of impermanence. By this is refuted (the objection) that, if union with Śiva is already existent, the pursuit therefor on the part of the individual becomes futile, because the removal of *mala* which conceals it, is what is to be accomplished through effort. Thus, by the example of pot-ether and all-pervasive ether, and also by the example of river and ocean, the oneness, which has been spoken of in the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*, is identical with *tādāmya* alone, which is non-difference coupled with a little difference. Here, the illustration and the illustrated do not, however, purport to convey the aspect of complete non-difference as well as the aspect of the destruction of difference which was existent earlier. Indeed, similarity in all respects between the illustration and the illustrated can never be what is intended; for, it will result in the obliteration of the distinction between the illustration and the illustrated, if the two were to become non-different. Thus, there is no defect stated earler.

४२. ननु तथापि शिवैक्यमात्रमपि न मोक्षः। तस्य सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वेन स्वतः पुरुषार्थत्वाभावात्। न चानन्दानुभवेन पुरुषार्थत्वम्। आनन्दसद्भावे मानाभावात्। आनन्दभोगसद्भावे भोगस्याध्यासरूपत्वेन संसारित्वापत्तेः। क्वचिदानन्दादिश्रवणस्य पूर्णत्वादिपरत्वादिति चेत्; न।

निस्तत्त्वे निष्कलीभूते विन्दत्यात्मनि यत्सुखम्।
निर्विकल्पमचिन्त्यं च हेतुदृष्टान्तवर्जितम्॥

तत्सुखं परमं प्रोक्तमात्यन्तिकमनौपमम्।
निरस्य विषयासङ्गं मनोवृत्तिं विवर्जयेत्॥

यदा यात्युन्मनीभावं तदा तत्परमं सुखम्॥

इति सर्वज्ञानोत्तरगतवचनेन सुखस्य प्रतिपादनात्। अत्र दुःखनिवृत्त्यात्मकं सुखमिति केषाञ्चिद्व्याख्यानं सुखशब्दमुख्यार्थपरित्यागे हेत्वभावादनुपपन्नम्॥

42. It may be argued: Even then, oneness with Śiva alone cannot be *moksa*, since it is not by itself *puruṣārtha* on account of its being different from happiness and absence of suffering. It does not become *puruṣārtha* through the experience of bliss, for there is no evidence for the existence of bliss. If it be said that there is enjoyment of bliss, there will arise the condition of *saṁsāra* since enjoyment is of the nature of wrong knowledge. If it be said that reference to bliss, etc., in some places purports to convey perfection, etc., it is not so; for it is happiness that is taught by the following texts contained in the *Sarvajñānottara*: "That undifferentiated, unthinkable, uninferable, and incomparable happiness, which one attains in the self which is bereft of *tattvas*, and parts, is said to be the supreme happiness, everlasting and incomparable. Giving up attachment to objects, one should completely get rid of the mental mode. When one transcends the mental state, then one attains the supreme happiness." Here, the interpretation of some, that happiness is of the nature of the absence of suffering, is untenable, as there is no reason for abandoning the primary sense of the word "*sukha*".

४३. न च सुखस्य जन्यत्वनियमात् सुखानुपपत्तिः। एवं सति ज्ञानस्याप्यभावप्रसङ्गात्। प्रमाणबलान्नित्यज्ञानाभ्युपगमे नित्यसुखस्याप्यविरोधात्। अत एव सुखभोक्तृत्वे संसारित्वं स्यादित्यपास्तम्। अनित्यसुखभोक्तृत्व एव संसारित्वोपगमात्। अन्यथा ज्ञानादिमत्त्वेन संसारित्वापत्तेः। तस्मान्न नित्यशिवानन्दभोगेन संसारित्वप्रसङ्गः॥

43. There is nothing unintelligible about happiness even though happiness is what is necessarily produced. In

that case, it will result in the absence of knowledge. If knowledge is accepted to be eternal on the strength of *pramāṇa*, there is no contradiction (in accepting) happiness also to be eternal. It is for this reason that (the objection that) there will arise *saṁsāra* if there is enjoyment of happiness, stands refuted; for the state of enjoyment of impermanent happiness alone will result in the condition of *saṁsāra*. Otherwise, by the possession of knowledge, etc., there will arise the condition of *saṁsāra*. Therefore there is no possibility of the condition of *saṁsāra*, through the enjoyment of the eternal bliss of Śiva.

४४. न चैवं शिवैक्यापन्नजीवस्यापि सुखस्वरूपत्वेन मोक्षस्वरूपसुखानुभव एवास्तु, किं शिवानन्दानुभवाभ्युपगमेनेति वाच्यम्। यथा रसवदपि रसनेन्द्रियं स्वेतरद्रव्यगतमेव रसं गृह्णाति। न तु स्वगतम्। यथा वा प्रकाशवदपि चक्षुरिन्द्रियं न स्वप्रकाशेन सूर्यादिप्रकाशं गृह्णाति। तथा सति सूर्यादिप्रकाशं विनैव घटादिरूपग्रहणापत्तेः। किं तु सूर्यादिप्रकाशेनैव चक्षुर्गृह्णाति। तथा च सूर्यादिप्रकाशानुभवे चक्षुःप्रकाश उपयुज्यते। तद्वदेव शिवानन्दानुभव एव जीवन्मुक्तस्य ज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपमुपयुज्यते। न तु स्वात्मगतसुखानुभव इति सम्प्रदायः॥

44. It is not proper to say: "Let there be the experience of happiness, which is *mokṣa*, to the soul who is of the nature of happiness, even though he has become one with Śiva; where is the need for accepting the experience of the bliss of Śiva?" Just as the sense of taste, though constituted of taste, apprehends the taste inherent in other objects alone, but not what exists in itself, (even so, the released soul experiences the happiness of Śiva alone). Or, *e.g.*, the visual sense, though constituted of light, does not comprehend the light of sun, etc., by its own light. If that were the case, there will be the possibility of apprehending the colour of jar, etc., even without the light of the sun, etc. But the visual sense

apprehends only through the light of the sun, etc. Thus, the light of the visual sense is useful to the experience of the light of the sun, etc. In the same way the nature of knowledge and bliss of the *jīvanmukta* is useful to the experience of the bliss of Śiva, but not the experience of happiness inherent in oneself. This is the traditional standpoint.

४५. एतेन मन्त्रौषधादिवीर्येण विषशक्तिप्रतिबन्धवज्ज्ञानावारकाज्ञानस्यापि ज्ञानेन शक्तिप्रतिबन्धमात्रं क्रियते। न तु ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिः क्रियत इति मतमपास्तम्। तथा सति शिवैक्यालाभात्। लाभे च शिवेऽप्यज्ञानप्रसङ्गात्। शिवागमेषु अज्ञाननित्यत्ववचनानामनादित्वेन बहुकालावस्थायित्वपरत्वात्॥

45. By this is refuted the view which holds that just as by the power of *mantra*, medicine, etc., the potency of poison is obstructed, even so by knowledge, there is only obstruction to the potency of nescience, which conceals knowledge; and that knowledge does not bring about the removal (of nescience). If that were the case, oneness with Śiva cannot be attained. Also, if there is attainment, it will result in the presence of nescience in Śiva. As for the texts in the *Śaiva Āgamas* which speak of nescience, they purport to convey that, being beginningless, it (nescience) stays for a long period.

४६. तस्मात्पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदये मलासंस्पर्शे आगामिकर्मास्पर्शे च सति सञ्चितकर्मणां च दीक्षया निवृत्तौ प्रारब्धस्य च भोगेन क्षये मलकर्मोभयाभावेन मायाद्वयस्यागामिशरीराद्युत्पादनशक्तिविलोपेन प्रारब्धकर्मभोगेन वर्तमानशरीरादिनाशे शिवानन्दानुभवविरोधिपाशापगमेन शिवेनैक्यं प्राप्यालौकिकनिरतिशयशिवानन्दानुभवात्मकपरममुक्तिं प्राप्नोतीति सिद्धम्॥

इति श्रीमदतिवर्णाश्रमाचार्यवर्यशैवपरिपालकशिवाग्रयोगीन्द्र-
ज्ञानशिवाचार्यविरचितायां शैवपरिभाषायां
मुक्तिनिरूपणं नाम पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः॥

46. Therefore, as stated earlier this is established. When there arises the realisation of truth, there is no more relation with *mala* as well as with *āgāmi-karma*; and *sañcita-karmas* having been removed through *dīkṣā* and *prārabdha* having been exhausted through enjoyment, the twofold māyā, in the absence of both *mala* and *karma*, is bereft of the potency for originating future body, etc.; and when the present body, etc., come to an end through the enjoyment of *prārabdha karma*, and when the bond (*pāśa*) which is opposed to the experience of *Śivānanda* goes away, the soul, becoming one with Śiva, attains the supreme *mokṣa*, in the form of the experience of the trans-empirical, unsurpassable *Śivānanda*.

Here ends the Fifth Chapter called Discussion of Mokṣa in the Śaivaparibhāṣā written by the preceptor, Śivāgrayogin, the Ativarṇāśramācārya, and protector of Śaiva.